Judgments - R (on the application of Godmanchester Town Council (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Respondent) and one other action R (on the application of Drain) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Respondent) and other action

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    25.  In R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Cowell [1993] JPL 851, 857 Staughton LJ, after noting that Denning LJ's requirements of overt and notorious acts were dicta, went on to say that although "that was not said in the section itself", it "seemed a sensible rule." If that might seem less than wholehearted assent, Staughton LJ's view had become firmer three years later when he presided in the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Environment v Beresford Trustees (31 July 1996, unreported) and concurred in the judgment of Hobhouse LJ. With characteristic precision, Hobhouse LJ said of the phrase "sufficient evidence that there was no intention during that period to dedicate it":

    "This is not a subjective test. The absence of intention must be objectively established by overt acts of the landowner."

    26.  He went on to cite the passage in the Fairey case as authority. This time, the application of the objective test was undoubtedly ratio decidendi. The issue was whether the proviso had been satisfied and the inspector who conducted the inquiry had found that there was not "sufficient evidence of overt acts by the owners to show the public at large that there was no intention to dedicate." This finding had been set aside by the judge but was restored by the Court of Appeal. The case was not reported, presumably because the law reporters thought that it laid down no new principle.

    27.  The first sign of dissent was in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Billson [1999] QB 374, 395, where Sullivan J said that the dicta of Denning LJ went too far. In his opinion, all that was required was that evidence of the owner's intention be "overt and contemporaneous". But he was not required to "publicise his intention to users of the way." A purely private act would do. Writing a letter to oneself and putting it in a locked drawer was described as a "far-fetched hypothetical example" but there is no suggestion that it would not in principle be sufficient. The judge was not referred to the Beresford case, no doubt because it had not been reported.

    28.  In R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Dorset County Council [2000] JPL 396, Dyson J took the new doctrine to its logical conclusion. After examining the authorities (again, without citation of the unreported Beresford case) he said:

    "On the face of it, the language of the proviso is straightforward. All that is required is that there be sufficient evidence of lack of intention to dedicate. Coming to the matter untutored by previous authority, one may be forgiven for thinking that what Parliament intended was that the tribunal of fact simply decide as a matter of fact whether there is or is not sufficient evidence of intention to dedicate…I accept that as a matter of fact the tribunal of fact will rarely, if ever, find that there is sufficient evidence of lack of intention to dedicate in the absence of overt and contemporaneous acts on the part of the owner. I do not, however, think that such a requirement can be spelled out of section 31(1) as a matter of construction."

    29.  I do not understand why, if Dyson J is right in saying that "intention" in section 31(1) refers to the landowner's actual state of mind, it would be rare for a tribunal of fact to find evidence of lack of intention unless there was proof of overt and contemporaneous acts. Who better to give evidence of the owner's state of mind than the owner himself? It is true that if he was asserting some improbable state of mind, one might look for corroboration. But there is nothing improbable in not having an intention to dedicate. It is the conclusion that the owner did intend to dedicate which is improbable: a "pure legal fiction", an "Alice in Wonderland requirement."

    30.  In these appeals, the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal followed the construction given to section 31(1) by Dyson J in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Dorset County Council [2000] JPL 396 and disapproved of Denning LJ's statement of the law in the Fairey case. This time, the unreported Beresford case was cited, but Auld LJ said ([2006] QB 727, 740) that it was "not a reasoned decision as to the meaning of the proviso so as to bind this court." Like Dyson J, Auld LJ thought (at p. 753) that in practice overt and contemporaneous acts evidencing lack of intention to dedicate would be required:

    "In most cases, no doubt, the fact-finder will look for overt, in the sense of objectively identifiable contemporaneous acts or declarations, if only to guard against any risk of abuse by landowners who might seek to rely on retrospective acts or declarations after the expiration of the relevant 20-year period."

    31.  Again, I cannot see why it should be an abuse for a landowner to say, after the expiry of the 20-year period, that although he did nothing to stop the public from using the way, this was due to tolerance, ignorance or inertia and without any intention to dedicate it as a highway. Such evidence would be an inherently plausible account of his state of mind. The only objection is that allowing the presumption to be defeated by such evidence would make nonsense of the Act.

    32.  My Lords, in my opinion the law as stated by Denning LJ in the Fairey case and by Hobhouse LJ in the Beresford case was correct and the Court of Appeal was wrong. I think that upon the true construction of section 31(1), "intention" means what the relevant audience, namely the users of the way, would reasonably have understood the landowner's intention to be. The test is, as Hobhouse LJ said, objective: not what the owner subjectively intended nor what particular users of the way subjectively assumed, but whether a reasonable user would have understood that the owner was intending, as Lord Blackburn put it in Mann v Brodie (1885) 10 App Cas 378, 386, to "disabuse [him]" of the notion that the way was a public highway. The Court of Appeal said that this would involve reading words into the Act; placing a gloss on the statute. But, outside the criminal law and parts of the law of torts, it is common to use the word intention in an objective sense, as in the intention of Parliament, the intention of the parties to a contract and, even in Latin, the animus possidendi which a squatter must have to acquire a title by limitation.

    33.  It should first be noted that section 31(1) does not require the tribunal of fact simply to be satisfied that there was no intention to dedicate. As I have said, there would seldom be any difficulty in satisfying such a requirement without any evidence at all. It requires "sufficient evidence" that there was no such intention. In other words, the evidence must be inconsistent with an intention to dedicate. That seems to me to contemplate evidence of objective acts, existing and perceptible outside the landowner's consciousness, rather than simply proof of a state of mind. And once one introduces that element of objectivity (which was the position favoured by Sullivan J in Billson's case) it is an easy step to say that, in the context, the objective acts must be perceptible by the relevant audience.

    34.  Such a construction is in my view supported by reading section 31 as a whole. The primary example of an act which would negative an intention to dedicate is the erection and maintenance of a notice inconsistent with dedication "in such manner as to be visible to persons using the way": section 31(3). If the notice is torn down or defaced, notice to "the appropriate council" will have the same effect: section 31(5). If any overt act would do, why should the notice have to be given to "the appropriate council"? A notice to an inappropriate council, or to the landowner's solicitor or friend, would be just as good. In the Court of Appeal, Auld LJ said that a notice to the appropriate council would be unlikely to come to the attention of the public using the way and this was an indication that, in general, the landowner's intention did not have to be communicated to users of the way. I disagree. A notice to the council under section 31(5) is plainly regarded as second best and is only allowed when the original notice has been torn down or defaced, just as substituted service is allowed only when there is good reason to dispense with personal service. It is true that users of the way are not very likely to call at the County Council offices to ask whether any notices under section 31(5) have been lodged, but a well-advised defender of rights of way, such as the Ramblers' Association, will know where to look and be able to draw such notices to the attention of users. The fact that in certain defined circumstances one can resort to a method less likely to come to the attention of users of the way is no basis for concluding that in general it does not matter whether the landowner's intention can come to their attention or not.

    35.  The same point may be made about the elaborate provision for maps, statements and statutory declarations in section 31(6). What would be the point of all this if Parliament was using the word "intention" in a subjective sense which could be proved by any relevant evidence? And why did Parliament, by Schedule 6, paragraph 4 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, insert a new section 31A (not yet in force in England) into the 1980 Act to establish a register of the maps and statements deposited under section 31(6) and require that it should be available for inspection free of charge? Surely to make such alternative methods of rebutting the presumption available to the public, so as to approximate as far as possible to the primary method of rebuttal.

    36.  Then there is the problem of the interruption of continuous user before the commencement of proceedings which, as we saw, the 1832 Act for private rights of way solved by providing a year's grace in which to bring the proceedings. The 1932 Act dispensed with a grace period by calculating the 20 years back from the date on which the right was called into question. The scheme contemplated by Parliament was that once users of the way were made aware that their right to use the way was challenged, they should not be able to gain an advantage from subsequent use of the way and the landowner should not be able to gain an advantage by subsequent prevention of use. What happened after the way was called into question was irrelevant to the operation of the Act. On the Court of Appeal's construction, however, the well-advised landowner, facing the possibility of a claim to a right of way based on many years' enjoyment, will make a private declaration that he has no intention to dedicate and will lodge it in a safe place. Only afterwards will he close the way or otherwise call the right into question. The effect will be to make it impossible for the claimants to prove the full 20 years user ending when the way was closed, because the owner will be able to satisfy the proviso in respect of the final period after he made his declaration.

    37.  My Lords, I think it is most unlikely that Parliament intended that the 1932 Act could be capable of being defeated by so simple a device, leaving the claimants to the arbitrary and illogical rules of common law, preserved by section 31(9). In the Fairey case Denning LJ, turning to the proviso after his discussion of bringing the right into question, said that it raised the same point. In general, that seems to me to be right. I do not say that all acts which count as negativing an intention to dedicate will also inevitably bring the right into question. For example, I would leave open the question of whether notices or declarations under section 31(5) or (6) will always have this effect. I should think that they probably would, because their purpose is to give notice to the public that no right of way is acknowledged. But we need not decide the point. I do not even say that acts which would indicate to reasonable users of the way that the owner did not intend to dedicate will inevitably bring the right into question, because one cannot foresee all cases. But the Act clearly contemplates that there will ordinarily be symmetry between the two concepts. Thus section 31(3) provides that an appropriate notice will be sufficient evidence to negative the intention to dedicate and section 31(2) provides that the right may be brought into question "by a notice such as is mentioned in subsection (3) below or otherwise". The notice will therefore both negative intention to dedicate and bring the right into question, while the words "or otherwise" contemplate other ways of bringing the right into question (like barring the way, permanently or once a year) which would also in my view be sufficient to negative an intention to dedicate.

    38.  I am not particularly troubled by the thought that this would leave little scope for the operation of the proviso. It is true that acts negativing an intention to dedicate would also, by calling the right into question, throw the inquiry back into an earlier period. If there was no rebutting evidence during that period, the right would be established (as in the Fairey case) and the proviso would not apply. But the 1932 Act began as a private member's bill in the House of Commons which underwent considerable amendment in the House of Lords, including the insertion of the provision for calculating time backwards. I would not expect such an Act to be particularly elegant in the way its parts meshed together, but the general purpose seems to me clear enough and was given effect by the construction adopted by Denning LJ in the Fairey case.

    39.  My Lords, that leaves two alternative submissions put forward by Mr Laurence QC for the appellants, with which I can deal very shortly. The first was that "during that period" in the proviso meant during the whole of that period. The intention not to dedicate had to be continuously manifested. There is authority against this construction (see, for example, Walton J in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Blake [1984] JPL 101, 104, saying that proof of lack of intention to dedicate for 17 of the 20 years would be "fatal to the applicant's case") and I do not think that it can possibly be right. The proviso negatives the effect of the enjoyment of the right for the period during which there was no intention to dedicate. If that leaves less than 20 years of unrebutted enjoyment, the claim fails.

    40.  The other submission was that notices under sections 31(3), (5) and (6) are an exhaustive statement of the way in which an intention to dedicate may be rebutted. But section 31(2) speaks of the right being called into question by a notice "or otherwise" and it is hard to imagine an act which called the right into question and did not also evidence an intention not to dedicate.

    41.  That brings me to the facts of the two appeals. Both arise out of applications to the surveying authority under section 53 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 to modify the definitive map and statement by adding a right of way not shown on the map. One application was by Godmanchester Town Council to add a public footpath around three sides of the perimeter of Monk's Pit, Godmanchester. This was a former gravel pit, rectangular in form, which had become a small lake. The map already showed a footpath along one of its sides and the application was to add a path which completed a circuit round the lake. The other was to add a footpath across land belonging to the Yattendon Estate at Aldworth in Berkshire. In both cases an inspector appointed under Schedule 15 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 found that there had been qualifying user for upwards of 20 years before the right had been called into question. The chief issue in each case was whether the proviso had been satisfied.

    42.  In the Godmanchester case, the Church Commissioners, as landowners, relied upon the erection of a sign and works done on the footpath as evidence of lack of intention to dedicate. The inspector rejected these as ambiguous or insufficient. But the owners also produced a letter to the local planning authority, written during the 20 year period, in which they complained of pedestrian trespass "around those parts of the pit which are not designated as a public footpath." Such a letter would not have come to the attention of users of the path or satisfied any of the alternative methods of negativing intention to dedicate in section 31. The inspector, following Dyson J in the Billson case and Sullivan J in the Dorset case, nevertheless held that the letter was sufficient and her decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. For the reasons I have given, I think that this was wrong and the decision must be quashed.

    43.  In the Yattendon case there were two inquiries. The first inspector found that the right of way was brought into question by the erection of signs in 1992. The estate owner relied upon three kinds of evidence as negativing an intention to dedicate before that date. They were, first, an earlier sign nailed to a beech tree, secondly, challenges by estate employees to people using the way and thirdly, a clause in an agreement granting an agricultural tenancy of the relevant land, by which the tenant covenanted to warn and keep off unauthorised persons from trespassing, to give notice to the owner of any continued acts or trespass and not to allow any footpaths to be created. The inspector accepted the first two categories as sufficient evidence of lack of intention to dedicate and said nothing about the effect of the tenancy agreement. He therefore refused to confirm the county council's order adding the footpath to the map.

    44.  The applicant then applied for judicial review to quash the inspector's decision on the ground that he did not address his mind to the question of whether the notices and challenges, which he had treated as evidence of lack of intention to dedicate, had also brought the right into question, requiring an investigation of an earlier 20 year period. The Secretary of State conceded that the decision could not stand and by consent it was quashed and a new inquiry ordered.

    45.  At the second inquiry, another inspector also found that the right of way was brought into question by the erection of signs in 1992. The earlier notice or notices had been insufficient for this purpose. The same was true of the challenges.

    46.  When she came to consider whether there was lack of intention to dedicate, she rejected the signs as insufficient and said nothing about the challenges. This may be because she took the view that if they were insufficient to bring the right into question, they would also be insufficient to be sufficient evidence of lack of an intention to dedicate. That would, in my opinion, be a consistent view to take. But, again following the Billson and Dorset cases, she said that the clause in the tenancy agreement was sufficient.

    47.  I rather doubt whether, even on the principle applied by the Court of Appeal, the clause could be regarded as sufficient. The fact that landlord and tenant have signed a common form agreement containing such a clause says very little about their actual states of mind. But I think that it was wrong in principle to take the tenancy agreement into account, because it would not have been available to users of the right of way. The Yattendon decision must therefore also be quashed.

    48.  The appellants ask that both cases be remitted to the Secretary of State with a direction to confirm the orders adding the footpaths. In each case, the only ground upon which the inspector held the presumption under section 31(1) to be rebutted was inadmissible. But I do not think that this would be fair. In the Yattendon case the first inspector held the presumption rebutted on other, admissible grounds and both landowners may have conducted their cases on the assumption that little other rebutting evidence was needed because, on the law stated by Dyson J and Sullivan J, their private declarations were sufficient. The Secretary of State, or an inspector appointed by him, is the statutory decision-making authority and I do not think that the House should substitute its own decision.

    49.  Nevertheless, the landowners may consider, in the light of the opinions of your Lordships and the evidence which they have adduced at the earlier inquiries, that it would serve no purpose to demand a further inquiry and I draw attention to the power of the inspector under section 250(5) of the Local Government Act 1972 (as applied by paragraph 10A of Schedule 15 to the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981) to award costs.

    50.  In the result, I would quash both decisions and remit the cases to the Secretary of State to decide in accordance with the opinions of the House. Since writing this opinion, I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the opinion to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead and I entirely agree with his observations on the public dialogue by which users and landowners may respectively assert and deny the existence of a right of way.


My Lords,

    51.  Commenting on the history and meaning of the Rights of Way Act 1932, Sir Lawrence Chubb, who was an environmental campaigner all his life and was knighted for his services to the English countryside, observed that in legal theory all highways, including public footpaths and bridleways, must have originated by one of two methods. They must either have been created under some statutory authority or have been dedicated by some owner. He conceded however that relatively few footpaths or bridleways have ever been deliberately or expressly granted by any definite act or deed on the part of a landowner: Journal of the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society (October 1932), vol 2, 244, 247. Such altruistic acts are not unknown. But, almost without exception, English landowners are jealous of their right to exclude the public from their private property. Given the numbers a public way may attract, and the tendency of some members of the public to drop litter wherever they go, who can blame them? For completeness, it should be added that a public way may be acquired by prescription. But in Mann v Brodie (1885) 10 App Cas 378, 386, Lord Blackburn said that in England it is in practice never necessary to rely on prescription since time immemorial. Deemed dedication is all that is needed to achieve this.

    52.  Deemed dedication may be relied upon at common law where there has been evidence of a user by the public for so long and in such a manner that the owner of the fee, whoever he is, must have been aware that the public were acting under the belief that the way has been dedicated, and the owner has taken no steps to disabuse them of that belief. The 1932 Act, which the Highways Act 1980 replaced, was enacted to clarify the law. No definite time was required at common law for a dedication to be inferred. In Mann v Brodie, 386, Lord Blackburn observed that a very short period of public user would often satisfy a jury. For the statutory presumption to apply, however, a full period of 20 years is required: section 31(1). Unlike the period which is needed for prescription, which can be measured between any dates however long ago for which evidence is available, this period must be calculated retrospectively from the date when the right of the public is brought into question: section 31(2).

    53.  The common law has not laid down fixed rules as to what the owner may do to disabuse the public of the belief that the way has been dedicated for use by the public. The statute clarifies the law in this respect too. The erection and maintenance of a notice which is inconsistent with the dedication of the way as a highway which is visible to persons using it will, in the absence of proof of a contrary intention, be sufficient evidence: section 31(3). If it is torn down or defaced, a notice to the appropriate council that the way is not dedicated as a highway will have the same effect: section 31(5). So too will the deposit with the council by the owner of a map and a statement indicating which ways, if any, he admits to have been dedicated as highways, so long as this is backed up every ten years by a declaration that no additional way has been dedicated in the meantime: section 31(6). The appropriate council is, in effect, the guardian of the public interest in these matters. In country areas, it is the council of the county in which the way or the land is situated: section 31(7).

    54.  Thus a balance is struck between the interests of the public and those of the landowner. The landowner knows that he can resist claims that a way across his land is a public way so long as he takes the steps that are mentioned in these subsections. But erecting a notice or lodging the relevant documents with the council may come too late if there is sufficient evidence of inaction on the landowner's part for a period of 20 years, calculated retrospectively from the date when he takes this step, to bring about the public right by presumed dedication. This is because the date as from which the calculation is to be made is the date when the right of the public is brought into question. If no-one seeks to assert that the way is a public way, cadit quaestio. But if there is a challenge, the right of the public to use the way will be taken to have been brought into question as soon as the landowner seeks in the ways the statute mentions to negative the intention to dedicate. The same will be true of other acts, or of some other course of conduct, by which the landowner seeks to exclude the public. The steps which the statute mentions are not to be taken as exhaustive of those that may be taken for this purpose: see the words "or otherwise" at the end of section 31(2). Whatever he does, time will have begun to run against the landowner from the beginning of the period of 20 years calculated backwards from the first such act or from the start of that course of conduct.

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