Protecting personal information
of members of the public from disclosure
9. In relation to the other main aspect of the
bill—which seeks to provide firmer guarantees against the
inappropriate disclosure of personal information contained in
MPs' letters to public authorities—we draw three points
to the attention of the House.
10. First, we note that during the bill's passage
through the House of Commons, several MPs referred to actual or
hypothetical situations in which personal information about constituents
contained in letters or emails from MPs to public authorities
had been—or might be liable to be—disclosed by the
public authority following requests under the 2000 Act. However,
opponents of the bill say that where this has happened or might
happen, disclosure would be contrary to the terms of the 2000
Act in its current form as there ought to be an assessment by
the public authority to ensure that disclosure does not contravene
relevant class and contents-based exemptions.[3]
11. Whilst we are not aware of any examples of
MPs' correspondence being wrongly disclosed in this way, we do
draw attention to a possible role for the Information Commissioner.
The 2000 Act established this office, setting out a duty "to
promote the observance by public authorities of the requirements
of this Act" (section 47) and a right to lay reports before
each House of Parliament (section 49). One way forward may be
for the Information Commissioner to conduct a thorough investigation
into the concerns raised by MPs about their constituency casework
correspondence and to lay a report before both Houses for further
consideration. We believe that the House may be in a better
position to assess the nature and extent of the problem, and any
proposed remedies, in the light of a report by the Information
Commissioner.
12. Second, clause 1(3) of the bill is in some
respects far too widely drawn. It includes communication on
any matter between Members of the House of Commons and public
authorities. This will create a class exemption which is far wider
than the mischief about which concerns are expressed. MPs write
to public authorities about many matters unconnected to complaints
by aggrieved constituents. The House will wish to consider whether
this is a proportionate restriction on the right to freedom of
information.
13. Third, clause 1(3) of the bill is also in
some respects too narrowly drawn. It makes no provision for the
better protection of communications by members of the House of
Lords. It is undoubtedly the case that MPs receive many more approaches
from individuals with problems, but it should not be overlooked
that many peers are also asked to assist individuals with grievances
or problems. Moreover, if in the future the composition of the
House of Lords is altered to include elected members, members
of the House of Lords may have "casework".
14. The disclosure of correspondence between
members of both Houses of Parliament and public authorities on
the subject of individuals is a serious matter and should be explicitly
prohibited. However, we do not believe that this mischief is addressed
in a sufficiently proportionate and specific manner in clause
1(3) of the bill.
1 
