APPENDIX 5: PAPER BY PROFESSOR PAUL
CRAIG: THE RULE OF LAW
This paper seeks to provide guidance concerning the
meaning of the 'rule of law', in the light of section 1 of the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which makes explicit reference
to that concept.
A 'health warning' is in order for anyone venturing
into this area: a cursory glance at the index of legal periodicals
revealed 16,810 citations to books and articles concerned with
the rule of law, and that is certainly an underestimation, since
many articles discuss the concept in ways that might not necessarily
be picked up by the search engine and the number only covers legal
There is considerable diversity of opinion as to
the meaning of the rule of law and the consequences that do and
should follow from breach of the concept. I will nonetheless attempt
to identify as objectively as possible different senses of the
rule of law.
2. Dicey's Conception of the Rule Law
Modern conceptions of the rule of law will be considered
below. It would however be odd not to advert to Dicey's conception,
given the prominence that it has had in the UK. It should nonetheless
be realised that his conception of the rule of law was ambiguous
in certain respects.
Dicey's first principle of the rule of law was that
'no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body
or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land.
In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system
of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of
wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint'.
The first sentence requires that laws under which
people are condemned should be passed in the correct legal manner
and that guilt should only be established through the ordinary
trial process. This is an important principle, although it should
be noted that nothing here speaks to the content of the laws which
an individual will have to face when taken before the courts.
The meaning of the second sentence is more problematic. The word
'arbitrary' could connote a clear law, which was properly enacted
by Parliament, but which might nonetheless be regarded as arbitrary
if it was thought to infringe certain fundamental rights, or if
it entailed excessive punishment. The word 'arbitrary' could alternatively
be used to describe a law passed in the correct legal manner,
but where it was very vague or unclear, with the result that individuals
had no real idea how to plan their lives in the light of the relevant
legal rule. This sense of arbitrariness is independent of whether
the content of the legislation was just or unjust.
Dicey's second principle of the rule of law concerns
equality: 'every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject
to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction
of the ordinary tribunals'.
This formulation is concerned primarily with equal
access to the courts, not with the nature of the rules which individuals
find when they get there.
It is true that Dicey was explicitly against officials being accorded
any special privileges, but beyond this Dicey's second principle
does not take one very far. He showed little concern with the
role of law in deciding whether different rules applicable to
different groups were defensible on the ground that that there
was some rational justification for the difference in treatment.
Dicey's third principle was that the unwritten constitution
in the UK could be said to be pervaded by the rule of law because
rights to personal liberty, or public meeting resulted from judicial
decisions, whereas under many foreign constitutions such rights
flowed from a written constitution.
This third limb of the rule of law is ambiguous.
It might be read to mean that a society must possess certain individual
rights if it is to conform to the rule of law. The alternative
reading was that if you wished to protect such rights then the
common law technique was better than that employed on the continent.
Dicey dealt in detail with the precarious protection of rights
on the continent, where constitutions enshrining rights would
often be abrogated at the stroke of the pen or the point of a
sword. He felt that in the UK, where individual rights were the
result of numerous judicial decisions indicating when the individual
was at liberty to speak freely etc, it would be considerably more
difficult for an authoritarian regime to sweep these rights aside.
3. Modern Conceptions of the Rule of Law
The Diceyan view of the rule of law was therefore
ambiguous in certain respects, and similar uncertainties surround
the historical meaning of the phrase 'government of laws, not
The modern literature on the rule of law is, as noted
above, extensive and diverse. A number of different meanings of
the rule of law can nonetheless be identified.
(a) The Rule of Law and Lawful Authority
A core idea of the rule of law to which all would
subscribe is that the government must be able to point to some
basis for its action that is regarded as valid by the relevant
legal system. Thus in the UK such action would commonly have its
foundation in statute, the prerogative or in common law power.
The relevant measure would then have to be made by the properly
authorised person or institution, in the properly authorised manner
If the government cannot provide a legal foundation
for its action then the UK courts would regard the action as unlawful,
since there would be no lawful authority for it.
This core meaning of the rule of law tells one nothing
as to the nature of the challenged governmental action. The government
might be seeking to achieve some benign objective, or it might
be attempting to do something that most would regard as undesirable.
This is irrelevant for the purposes of the present inquiry. The
measure would be equally contrary to the rule of law if the government
could not point to some basis for its action that would be regarded
as valid by that legal system.
(b) The Rule of Law and Guiding Conduct
The meaning of the rule of law considered in the
preceding section is important, but limited. Any law properly
passed by Parliament would meet the rule of law defined in this
manner. Thus the fact that laws should be passed in the correct
legal manner is a necessary facet of the rule of law, but it is
It is for this reason that most would agree that
the rule of law demands more than this. A further important aspect
of the rule of law is that the laws thus promulgated should be
capable of guiding ones conduct in order that one can plan ones
It is from this general precept that Raz deduced
a number of more specific attributes that laws should have in
order that they could be said to comply with the rule of law.
All are related to the idea of enabling individuals to be able
to plan their lives. The 'list' includes the following: that laws
should be prospective, not retrospective; that they should be
relatively stable; that particular laws should be guided by open,
general and clear rules; that there should be an independent judiciary;
that there should be access to the courts; and that the discretion
which law enforcement agencies possess should not be allowed to
undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules.
The rule of law in the sense articulated here could
be met by regimes whose laws were morally objectionable, provided
that they complied with the formal precepts of the rule of law.
It is equally the case that not all laws passed by a democratic
regime will necessarily comply with the rule of law.
The rule of law on this view is essentially a negative
value, as Raz himself admits. Given that the law can empower the
state to do all manner of things the rule of law minimises the
danger created by the law itself. It does so by ensuring that
whatever the content of the law, at least it should be open, clear,
stable, general and applied by an impartial judiciary.
It would however be mistaken not to recognise the
more positive side of the rule of law when viewed in this manner.
Even if the actual content of the law is morally reprehensible,
conformity to the rule of law will often be necessary to ensure
that individuals actually comply with the demands which the law
It is also important to recognise, as Raz emphasises,
that the rule of law in the above sense is only one virtue of
a legal system, and may have to be sacrificed to attain other
desired ends. We may feel that the rule of law virtues of having
clear, general laws should be sacrificed if the best or only way
to achieve a desired goal is to have more discretionary, open-textured
legal provisions. This may be so where it is not possible to lay
down in advance in the enabling legislation clear rules in sufficient
detail to cover all eventualities. Modifications to the rule of
law in this manner are not somehow forbidden or proscribed. Given
that it is only one virtue of a legal system it should not prevent
the attainment of other virtues valued by that system.
It is moreover important to be clear as to the consequences
of breach of the rule of law in the sense considered in this section.
The fact that a law is vague or unclear, and that it therefore
provides little by way of real guidance for those affected by
it, will not lead to a statute being invalidated in the UK. The
courts may well interpret such a statute narrowly, in favour of
the individual in such circumstances. They might also read it
down pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998, if the particular
statute would otherwise infringe rights derived from the European
Convention on Human Rights. If the courts felt unable to read
it down, they could issue a declaration of incompatibility under
the HRA, and the matter would be sent back to Parliament for reconsideration.
The courts therefore have considerable interpretive techniques
at their disposal to ensure that legislation that fails to meet
the requirements of the rule of law set out above is construed
narrowly in favour of the individual. This does not alter the
fact that UK courts have not traditionally exerted power to invalidate
an Act of Parliament on such grounds.
The matter is different if the provision that fails
to comply with the rule of law is something other than a statute.
There is nothing to prevent the courts from invalidating other
measures, whether they take the form of delegated legislation,
individual ministerial decisions, acts of local authorities or
decisions of agencies. If such a measure fails to comply with
the requirements of the rule of law it is always possible for
the courts to use one of the principles of judicial review to
annul the measure. Thus if a minister purports to make a measure
retrospective the courts will require express authorisation from
the enabling statute, or something closely akin thereto, before
they would be willing to accept that the minister's powers extended
this far. Similarly,
if the contested ministerial measure was very vague or unclear
the courts would have a number of options at their disposal. They
might decide that this was not consistent with the primary legislation;
that it should be annulled under section 6 of the HRA; that the
vagueness of the measure was indicative that the minister was
acting for improper purposes; or that the challenged measure was
an unreasonable exercise of the discretionary power vested in
Many would subscribe to the analysis presented above,
although they might well disagree either as to its application
in any particular instance, or as to whether the rule of law values
should be 'sacrificed' to attain some other desirable goal.
There have however been more radical challenges by
those who argue that the formal conception of the rule of law
was always a mask for substantive inequalities in power, and that
in the modern day this formal conception is in any event increasingly
A key issue is whether the rule of law should encompass
more than the formal conception presented in this section. The
contending arguments are complex, but the essence of the disagreement
can be presented as follows.
The rule of law as presented thus far is not concerned
with the actual content of the law, in the sense of whether the
law is just or unjust, provided that the formal precepts of the
rule of law are themselves met. To put the same point in another
way, it is necessary on this view to consider the content of the
law in order to decide whether it complies with the precepts of
the rule of law concerning clarity, generality, non-retrospectivity
etc, but provided that it does so comply then that is the end
of the inquiry.
The rationale for restricting the rule of law in
this manner is as follows.
We may all agree that laws should be just, that their content
should be morally sound and that rights should be protected within
society. The problem is that if the rule of law is taken to encompass
the necessity for 'good laws' in this sense then the concept ceases
to have an independent function. There is a wealth of literature
devoted to the discussion of the meaning of a just society, the
nature of the rights which should subsist therein, and the appropriate
boundaries of governmental action. Political theory has tackled
questions such as these from time immemorial. To bring these issues
within the rubric of the rule of law would therefore rob this
concept of an independent function. Laws would be condemned or
upheld as being in conformity with, or contrary to, the rule of
law when the condemnation or praise would simply be reflective
of attachment to a particular conception of rights, democracy
or the just society. The message is therefore that if you wish
to argue about the justness of society do so by all means. If
you wish to defend a particular type of individual right then
present your argument. Draw upon the wealth of literature which
addresses these matters directly. It is however on this view not
necessary or desirable to cloak the conclusion in the mantle of
the rule of law, since this will merely reflect the conclusion
which has already been arrived at through reliance on a particular
theory of rights or the just society.
(c) The Rule of Law, Justice and Accountable Government
The view presented above has however been challenged.
Those who support the opposing view accept that the rule of law
has the attributes mentioned in the previous section, but they
argue that the concept has more far-reaching implications. Certain
rights are said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law.
The concept is used as the foundation for these rights, which
are then used to evaluate the quality of the laws produced by
the legislature and courts.
It has also been argued that the rule of law provides
the foundation for the controls exercised by the courts over governmental
action through judicial review. In this sense the rule of law
is expressive of how the state ought to behave towards individuals
in society. The rule of law is said to demand that governmental
action conforms to precepts of good administration developed through
the courts, this being an essential facet of accountable government
in a democratic society. The constraints imposed on government
through judicial review are in part procedural and in part substantive.
The range of these principles varies, but normally includes ideas
such as: legality, procedural propriety, participation, fundamental
rights, openness, rationality, relevancy, propriety of purpose,
reasonableness, equality, legitimate expectations, legal certainty
and proportionality. There has been a vibrant academic debate
as to whether such principles must be legitimated by reference
to legislative intent. There is nonetheless general agreement
that it is the courts that have developed the principles of judicial
review over the past 350 years.
This general view has been advanced by a number of
writers and judges, although the precise detail of their analyses
Thus Dworkin has argued forcefully that subject to
questions of 'fit', the courts should decide legal questions according
to the best theory of justice, which is central to the resolution
of what rights people currently possess.
According to this theory, 'propositions of law are true if they
figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness and
procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation
of the community's legal practice'.
It is integral to the Dworkinian approach that, subject to questions
of fit, the court should choose between 'eligible interpretations
by asking which shows the community's structure of institutions
as a whole in a better light from the stand-point of political
this view an individual will have a right to the legal answer
which is forthcoming from the application of the above test.
Dworkin accepts the formal idea of the rule of law
set out above, labelling this the 'rule book' conception. This
requires that the government should never exercise power against
individuals except in accordance with rules which have been set
out in advance and made available to all.
Such values feature in any serious theory of justice.
However as Dworkin notes, this says little if anything about the
content of the laws which exist within a legal system. Those who
restrict the rule of law in this manner care about the content
of the law, but regard this as a matter of substantive justice,
which is 'an independent ideal, in no sense part of the ideal
of the rule of law'.
Dworkin argues that we should however also recognise
a rights-based conception of the rule of law. On this view citizens
have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and
political rights against the state. These moral and political
rights should be recognised in positive law, so that they can
be enforced by citizens through the courts. The rule of law on
this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception
of individual rights. In the words of Dworkin, this view of the
rule of law 'does not distinguish, as the rule book conception
does, between the rule of law and substantive justice; on the
contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the rules
in the book capture and enforce moral rights'.
It does not mean that this conception of the rule of law is consistent
with only one theory of justice or freedom. There is no such argument.
It does mean that it is not independent of the particular theory
of justice, or vision of freedom, which constitutes its content
at any point in time.
Similar themes have been advanced by Sir John
Laws, writing extra-judicially. In an important series of articles
he articulated the role of the courts in the protection of fundamental
rights. The detailed
nature of the argument is not of immediate concern to us here.
Suffice it to say for the present that Sir John Laws presented
an essentially rights-based conception of law and the role of
the judge in cases involving fundamental rights. He posited a
higher order law which was binding on the elected Parliament,
with the courts as the guardian of both fundamental individual
rights, and what may be termed structural constitutional rights.
The thesis is premised on a particular conception of liberalism
and individual autonomy, with a divide drawn between positive
and negative rights. The rule of law is held to encompass an attachment
to freedom, certainty and fairness. The first of these elements
is the substantive component of the rule of law, while the second
and the third bring in the more traditional attributes of the
formal rule of law.
The important recent lecture by Lord Bingham on the
rule of law is also relevant in this regard, more especially because
it was given against the background of the Constitutional Reform
Act 2005. Lord
Bingham articulates eight principles that comprise the rule of
law. Certain of these principles address the more formal dimensions
of the rule of law. These include the idea that the law must be
accessible, and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable;
that questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily
be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of
discretion; and that means should be provided for resolving without
prohibitive cost or inordinate delay bona fide civil disputes
which the parties themselves are unable to resolve.
It is however clear that Lord Bingham considers the
rule of law as extending beyond these basic precepts. He regards
it as including the central idea that the laws of the land should
apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences
justify differentiation, and that it demands that the law must
afford adequate protection for fundamental rights. Lord Bingham
expressly confronts the objection advanced by Raz to the inclusion
of fundamental rights within the rubric of the rule of law, but
disagrees with him in the following terms.
A state which savagely repressed or persecuted sections
of its people could not in my view be regarded as observing the
rule of law, even if the transport of the persecuted minority
to the concentration camp or the compulsory exposure of the female
children on the mountainside were the subject of detailed laws
duly enacted and scrupulously observed. So to hold would, I think,
be to strip the existing constitutional principle affirmed by
section 1 of the 2005 Act of much of its virtue and infringe the
fundamental compact which
underpins the rule of law.
It is equally clear that Lord Bingham views the principles
of judicial review as having their foundation in the rule of law.
Thus he states that 'ministers and public officers at all levels
must exercise the powers conferred on them reasonably, in good
faith, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred and
without exceeding the limits of such powers',
and 'adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair'.
Jowell has also articulated a view of the rule of
law, which has both a formal and a substantive dimension.
He accepts that one must be careful about equating the rule of
law with the substance of particular rules. He accepts also that
a significant part of the rule of law is concerned with procedure
or form as opposed to substance. Jowell does however believe that
the rule of law has a substantive dimension. He perceives the
rule of law as a principle of institutional morality and as a
constraint on the uninhibited exercise of government power. The
practical implementation of the rule of law takes place primarily
through judicial review. Its substantive dimension is manifest
in the judiciary's willingness to strike down administrative or
executive action if it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
Allan's interpretation of the rule of law also contains
an admixture of formal and substantive elements.
He argues that we should go beyond the formal conception of the
rule of law, but that we should stop short of regarding the rule
of law as the expression of any particular theory of substantive
justice. The rule of law on this view does not entail commitment
to any particular vision of the public good or any specific conception
of social justice, but does require that all legal obligations
be justified by appeal to some such vision. The rule of law should
embrace, in addition to its formal attributes, ideals of equality
and rationality, proportionality and fairness, and certain substantive
rights. These are said to constitute central components of any
recognisably liberal theory of justice, while leaving the scope
and content of the rights and duties which citizens should possess
largely as a matter for independent debate and analysis. Formal
equality is to be supplemented by a more substantive equality,
which requires that relevant distinctions must be capable of reasoned
justification in terms of some conception of the common good.
Allan's theory also embraces certain substantive rights, namely
freedoms of speech, conscience, association, and access to information.
It is recognised that there will be other rights within a liberal
polity, which should be faithfully applied, but these are not
regarded as a constituent part of the rule of law.
It should be recognised that any approach of the
kind under examination will require some choice as to what are
to count as fundamental rights, and the more particular meaning
ascribed to such rights. This choice will reflect assumptions
as to the importance of differing interests in society. This is
unavoidable. It is of course true that any democracy to be worthy
of the name will have some attachment to particular liberty and
equality interests. If, however, we delve beneath the surface
of phrases such as liberty and equality then significant differences
of view become apparent even amongst those who subscribe to one
version or another of liberal belief. This leaves entirely out
of account the issue as to how far social and economic interests
ought to be protected. It also fails to take account of other
visions of democracy, of a communitarian rather than liberal nature,
which might well interpret the civil/political rights and the
social/economic rights differently. It is therefore neither fortuitous,
nor surprising, that in other common law systems which possess
constitutionally enshrined rights, such as the United States and
Canada, there is considerable diversity of opinion even amongst
those who support a rights-based approach, as to whether this
should be taken to mean some version of liberalism, a pluralist
model, or a modified notion of republicanism.
This point is equally true of ideas such as legality,
rationality, participation, openness, proportionality, procedural
fairness and the like, which can be given interpreted differently
depending upon the more general scheme into which they are to
The consequences of breach of the rule of law in
the sense considered within this section should also be addressed.
It is important, as when discussing other versions of the concept,
to distinguish between the consequences of breach of the rule
of law in relation to primary statute and in relation to other
The short answer in relation to a primary statute
that violates the rule of law is as follows. The fact that a statute
does not conform to this conception of the rule of law does not
in itself lead to its invalidation. The UK courts have not traditionally
exercised the power of constitutional review to annul primary
statutes for failure to conform to fundamental rights, or other
precepts of the rule of law that constitute the principles of
judicial review. This proposition must nonetheless be qualified
in three ways.
First, there are statements by judges countenancing
the possibility that the courts might refuse to apply an Act of
Parliament in certain extreme circumstances. The examples tend
to be of (hypothetical) legislation that is morally repugnant,
or of legislation through which Parliament seeks to re-order the
constitutional structure by abolishing judicial review, by making
illegitimate use of the Parliament Acts or by extending very considerably
the life of a current Parliament. It should moreover be recognised
that the case law authority for the traditional proposition that
courts will not invalidate or refuse to apply statute is actually
rather thin. There are to be sure many judicial statements extolling
the sovereignty of Parliament, but they are principally just that,
judicial statements rather than formal decisions. Insofar as there
are formal decisions that could be said to be based on the traditional
proposition, the facts of such cases were generally relatively
innocuous. They were a very long way from the types of case where
courts might consider it to be justified to refuse to apply a
statute, which also means that such cases could be readily distinguished
should a court feel minded to do so.
Secondly, one who subscribes to the version of the
rule of law discussed in this section might well argue that courts
should generally exercise the ultimate power to invalidate statute
for failure to comply with constitutionally enshrined rights,
or with rights that are regarded as fundamental or foundational
even where they are not formally enshrined in a written constitution.
Dworkin is a prominent exponent of this view. The literature on
this topic is vast, with the debate for and against such judicial
power being replayed in successive academic generations.
Thirdly, courts or judges who subscribe to the conception
of the rule of law discussed in this section have in any event
powerful interpretive tools at their disposal through which to
read legislation so that it does not violate fundamental rights
or other facets of the rule of law. Thus even prior to the Human
Rights Act 1998, the courts made it clear through the principle
of legality that statutes would be read so as to conform to such
rights. If Parliament intended to infringe or limit fundamental
rights then this would have to be stated expressly in the legislation,
or be the only plausible reading of the statutory language. Legislation
was therefore read subject to a principle of legality, which meant
that fundamental rights could not be overridden by general or
ambiguous words. This was, said Lord Hoffmann, because there was
too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified
meaning might have passed unnoticed in the democratic process.
In the absence of express language or necessary implication to
the contrary, the courts would therefore presume that even the
most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights
of the individual. Parliament had, therefore, to squarely confront
what it was doing and accept the political cost. An interpretive
approach is clearly evident once again in the Human Rights Act
1998, section 3, which provides that 'so far as it is possible
to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must
be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the
Convention rights'. Section 3 does not, however, affect the validity,
continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary
legislation. Where a court is satisfied that primary legislation
is incompatible with a Convention right then it can, pursuant
to section 4 of the HRA, make a declaration of that incompatibility.
The consequence of breach of the rule of law in relation
to measures other than primary statute is more straightforward.
Insofar as the rule of law is regarded as the foundation of the
principles of judicial review then it follows that breach of the
rule of law, manifested through breach of one of the more particular
principles of judicial review, can lead to annulment of the measure.
This says nothing about whether the judicial decision will be
controversial or not. The great many judicial review decisions
generate no political controversy, but there will inevitably be
instances where Parliament, or more usually the relevant minister,
feels that the court's judgment was 'wrong' in some way. There
will more generally be wide-ranging academic debate about the
principles of judicial review and the way in which they are applied
in particular cases.
It is fitting to conclude this paper by reverting
to Lord Bingham's lecture, the catalyst for which was the statutory
mention of the rule of law in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005,
section 1. The importance of the interpretive tools used by courts
is apparent once again in the following extract.
[T]he statutory affirmation of the rule of law as
an existing constitutional principle and of the Lord Chancellor's
existing role in relation to it does have an important consequence:
that the judges, in their role as journeymen and judgment-makers,
are not free to dismiss the rule of law as meaningless verbiage,
the jurisprudential equivalent of motherhood and apple pie, even
if they were inclined to do so. They would be bound to construe
a statute so that it did not infringe an existing constitutional
principle, if it were reasonably possible to do so. And the Lord
Chancellor's conduct in relation to that principle would no doubt
be susceptible, in principle, to judicial review.
174 The Law of the Constitution (10th ed, 1959). Back
G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Clarendon, 1971), p
'The Rule of Law and its Virtue' (1977) 93 LQR 195. Back
If there were express authorisation in the primary statute then
it might be challenged under the HRA. Back
R. Unger, Law in Modern Society (Free Press, 1976), pp
176-181, 192-223. Back
Raz, n.3, 196. Back
R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Fontana, 1986). Back
Ibid. p 225. Back
Ibid. p 256. Back
R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985), pp 11-12. Back
Ibid. pp 12-13. Back
Ibid. p 11. Back
Ibid. pp 11-12. Back
'Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional
Rights'  PL 59; 'Law and Democracy'  P.L. 72; 'The
Constitution: Morals and Rights'  P.L. 622. Back
'Law and Democracy', n.14; 'Morals and Rights', n.14. Back
'Morals and Rights', n.14, pp 630-632. Back
Lord Bingham, 'The Rule of Law' The 6th Sir David Williams Lecture
Ibid. p 18. Back
Ibid. p 23. Back
Ibid. p 26. Back
'The Rule of Law Today', in Jowell and Oliver (eds.), The Changing
Constitution (Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2000), Chap.
TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice, A Liberal Theory of the
Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). Back
Lord Bingham, 'The Rule of Law', n.17, 4. Back