Select Committee on Constitution Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 412 - 419)

TUESDAY 1 MAY 2007

RT HON LORD FALCONER OF THOROTON QC

  Q412  Chairman: A warm welcome, Lord Chancellor. I should say that this is being filmed for television so it would be good of you—although strictly redundant—to identify yourself for the cameras.

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs.

  Q413  Chairman: Thank you very much, and I should also warn you that there are photographs being taken and I hope they do not distract you. We have just heard evidence from Lord Justice Thomas and Sir Igor and one thing that emerges very clearly is that just as on the occasion of the announcement of the announcement of the abolition of the Lord Chancellor and creation of the Supreme Court we have in the last few months been faced with a government demarche, which is ostensibly about the shuffling of departmental and Cabinet responsibility as a machinery of government issue, but nevertheless appears to have very profound constitutional implications, as the first one did and this one has. I want to ask you very directly: are you satisfied with the way in which these changes are (a) leaked, (b) announced, (c) iterated and (d) turned into a rational process of constitutional change?

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: As to leaks I will not comment. As to the process I am completely satisfied it is a sensible way of dealing with it. Can I briefly summarise what the position is? From February 2007 a Ministry of Justice became a serious possibility. During February and March there were discussions and exchanges of papers between the judiciary and myself. On 19 March, ten days before the formal announcement of the Ministry of Justice, a working party was set up between the Judges and senior officials to discuss the implications because the implications are very important in relation to this change. But what is agreed between the executive and the judiciary is that a Ministry of Justice is in principle constitutionally acceptable, subject to certain safeguards being put in place. The working party is a good, constructive and sensible way of working those details out because I do not think that anybody is suggesting that we change the fundaments of Lord Woolf's and my Concordat; nor is anybody suggesting we change the fundaments of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which changed the Lord Chancellor—and that was a big constitutional change—from being a Judge in government to being a minister in government but with a special relationship with the judiciary, and that special relationship with the judiciary continues and I do not believe—and nor do I believe other people in the working party believe—that that special relationship cannot be preserved subject to sorting out the operational arrangements; they are very important. I am completely satisfied of the method by which it was done; I think it was a sensible way of doing it. I heard the end of some of the questioning of Lord Justice Thomas; there is absolutely no question of having to conclude, if they are not concluded, the discussions by 9 May. I have absolute faith that the Judges, my officials, myself and the Lord Chief Justice are only concerned to reach a conclusion that leads to the best result for the good operation of the machinery of government, and that is absolutely clear from the working of the arrangements that are in place. Why we have done it in this way is because I think you need clarity about the arrangements going forward. If I thought that there was fundamental constitutional uncertainty about doing it in this way then I would have been against it. But that is not my view; I believe that the arrangements we have put in place deal with all the legitimate concerns and I am confident that with people of the quality of John Thomas, Igor Judge, Alex Allan and my senior officials we will reach agreement.

  Q414  Chairman: We are impressed by your faith and confidence, but let me put this to you. It seems that the government may not have come to terms with the very deep constitutional implications of its own Constitutional Reform Act, of which you were the co-parent, and I will put it this way: if there is a greater measure of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, and their sphere is more clearly delineated from that of the executive and the government, surely it stands to reason that changes which affect both parties should be mutually arrived rather than there being a unilateral demarche by the government, albeit—and I hear what you say about the working party that follows that up—should you not have started with the working party, with the judiciary who have their own sphere here to work through the implications of this, rather than having the usual simplistic machinery of government drive towards it?

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: This is an important change that has implications. You are completely wrong. I do not know whether it is your words or the Judges'—unilateral demarche—

  Q415  Chairman: No, it is my word.

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: That is a completely inaccurate account of it. The critical thing is—

  Q416  Chairman: I am sorry, was it discussed with the Judges before the announcement started coming out of Whitehall?

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I cannot comment on the leaks, I had nothing whatsoever to do with that. As soon as it became a serious prospect then I discussed it, as you know, with the Judges and that started in February. The important thing is to focus on the constitutional implications of the Constitutional Reform Act because you are absolutely right when you say that that has to be the foundation of everything. The Constitutional Reform Act involved a fundamental change in the role of the Lord Chancellor. What happened to the Lord Chancellor as a result of that Act of Parliament was that he ceased to be a Judge, he obtained certain statutory responsibilities, including protecting the independence of the judiciary; and also the courts and the Lord Chancellor were linked by primary legislation. The impact of the changes that we are now discussing involves bringing prisons, probation and sentencing to the Lord Chancellor. It does not relieve him of either his responsibilities to the court system or his duties to the Judges. What has to be worked out is how, in the light of his increased responsibilities, in operational terms, that will affect his relationship with the Judges. That is what the working party is doing and it is very important, I think, to focus on the fact that the Lord Chief Justice, speaking on behalf of the Judges, has said in principle that subject proper to safeguards that is okay, and it is, I think, right to focus on the process but wrong to think it is either the wrong process or one that will not produce a result.

  Q417  Chairman: You are not inclined to think that what seems to be a very considerable amount of questioning on behalf of the judiciary reflects dissatisfaction with the way in which this has been dealt? You are not inclined to take that seriously?

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I take everything genuinely—and I read in the newspapers dissatisfaction with some elements discussed by individual Judges—and I am as keen as I possibly can be and I hope my record reveals over the past four years that I have been personally as committed as I possibly can be to having a good constitutionally productive relationship with the Judges because I recognise my role under the constitution and my role under the various pieces of legislation. I do believe that this process is one that will produce results.

  Q418  Chairman: I was interested in the Judges' Council paper, which you will of course seen.

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I have.

  Q419  Chairman: The words that say, "The creation of a Ministry of Justice is not a simple machinery of government change but one which impacts on the separation of powers." Would you agree with that?

  Lord Falconer of Thoroton: The critical framework for the separation of powers now comes in the Constitutional Reform Act and the constitution. It has very important implications because what you have to deal with in the machinery of government changes where there are implications is a Lord Chancellor with all of the constitutional position laid out in the Constitutional Reform Act with these additional responsibilities. The sorts of things that then arise are, one is worried with maybe the prison or probation service seeking money—could that impact on the funding of the courts? Judicial reviews will come—actually judicial reviews come in to the Legal Services Commission at the moment and the way that the courts resolve those could well have an impact on funding for the courts, but we have been able to accommodate that. The fact we have been able to accommodate that does not mean it will not be different in practical terms going forward, and that is what we need to talk about.


 
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