Memorandum by Dr Kern Alexander, The Judge
Business School, University of Cambridge
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
GENERALLY
The purpose of this note is to discuss the development
of economic sanctions laws and regulations in recent years and
to highlight some of the main challenges confronting policymakers.
My comments will address some of the legal and regulatory issues
in the economic sanctions debate by focusing on the UN, EU, UK
and US sanctions regimes. I will mention some of the weaknesses
in these regimes and suggest ways for the UK government to develop
a more effective sanctions regime. I will also discuss some of
the problems with unilateral and extraterritorial US economic
sanctions and how this can potentially disrupt the development
of an effective international sanctions regime.
The use of economic sanctions to accomplish
foreign policy objectives has throughout history been an integral
component of the foreign policy of most nation-states. Nations
have relied on economic sanctions not only to influence foreign
policy objectives but also to respond to domestic political needs
and economic pressures. In antiquity and in medieval times, economic
sanctions were most often used as part of a nation's arsenal during
times of war.[1]
Indeed, Athens imposed economic sanctions in 432 BC when Pericles
issued the Megarian import embargo against the Greek city-states
which had refused to join the Athenian-led Delian League during
the Peloponnesian War.[2]
Until the 20th century, nation-states had relied principally on
economic sanctions as a subordinate part of a larger military
strategy to impose blockades and prevent the export of strategic
supplies to targeted countries.[3]
The use of economic sanctions as an independent
tool of foreign policy was not generally adopted by major states
until the 1920s following the enactment of the League of Nations
Charter.[4]
During this period, various member states of the League and the
United States adopted economic controls on various exports to
certain targeted countries, such as Japan, Italy and Yugoslavia.[5]
Later, during World War II, Great Britain, the United States and
other belligerent nations adopted comprehensive export controls
and financial asset controls against enemy states and their nationals.
The US maintained and extended most of its export and foreign
asset controls against communist countries and other states of
concern during the Cold War.[6]
In recent years, many studies have documented the extensive use
of economic sanctions by most developed states to promote foreign
policy and national security objectives.[7]
Beginning in the 1990s, many states led by the US began to expand
the focus of their economic sanctions programmes to include non-state
actors, such as international terrorists and drug traffickers.
The growth of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy
has been enormous and has attracted considerable commentary in
both academic and policy circles.
In assessing the effectiveness or utility of
a sanctions policy, it is necessary to define its objectives and
to have effective criteria for determining whether the objectives
have been met. Economic sanctions can have any combination of
the following objectives: behaviour modification
of the target, retribution or punishment, or as
a signal to the target or to other secondary states. Moreover,
the rationale of economic sanctions may involve promoting military
objectives on the one hand, and maintaining peace on the other.
Or it may involve the use sanctions as a means of containment
and/or dialogue. The basic purpose of economic sanctions,
however, throughout history has essentially remained the same,
namely, restricting foreign trade or withholding economic benefits
from targeted states to accomplish broader strategic or foreign
policy objectives. In recent years, targeted financial sanctions
have become the instrument of choice to put pressure on certain
states and to make it difficult for terrorists and drug traffickers
to move money across borders.
UNITED NATIONS
SANCTIONS
The United Nations Charter authorises the Security
Council to adopt and impose multilateral economic sanctions. Article
39 of the UN Charter provides that if the Security Council determines
a breach or threat to the peace, or act of aggression, it can
authorise the use of economic sanctions by its members on a multilateral
basis with coordination provided by the Security Council. The
language in Article 39 is broad and has been interpreted as providing
authority to the Security Council to determine what is a threat
to the peace.[8]
During the Cold War, the Security Council approved multilateral
sanctions in only two cases against Southern Rhodesia and South
Africa. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security
Council has adopted sanctions to a far greater extent by imposing
them against Iraq/Kuwait in the Kuwait War and later against Libya,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Montenegro, Afghanistan/Taliban,
and against international terrorists and terrorist organisations
such as Al Qaeda.
Following the US government's unilateral imposition
of extraterritorial sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait after the
Iraqi invasion, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661[9]
on 6 August 1990 which called on all states to freeze the assets
of Iraq and Kuwait "located within their territory."
Resolution 661 called upon all states to "take appropriate
measures to protect assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait
and its agencies".[10]
The resolution also called for the imposition of trade sanctions
against both Kuwait and Iraq, and provided an international legal
basis for the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. The adoption
of Resolution 661 was followed by the imposition of freeze orders
and trade sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait by most European countries,
the US, Japan, and Canada.
The international sanctions imposed against
Iraq and Kuwait during the Kuwait war were generally viewed as
successful because the countries adopting the sanctions had the
political resolve to ensure effective implementation and the objectives
of the sanctions policy was defined clearly for policymakers.
The UN sanctions against Iraq had three clearly defined objectives:
(1) to protect Kuwait assets from the invaders in order to "prevent
the misappropriation of the assets". This made it impossible
for the Iraqi government to have access to over $200 million of
blocked Kuwaiti assets abroad; (2) to keep leverage over the Kuwaiti
royal family against coming to an agreement with Saddam Hussein
that would be contrary to US policy: and (3) to apply the frozen
assets toward financing the war against Iraq.
However, following the Kuwait war, the Security Council
had difficulty in maintaining effective international sanctions
against Iraq to ensure that the terms of UN Security Council resolutions
were met. The Volcker Commission Report on the Iraq oil-for-food
programme demonstrated the weaknesses of the Security Council
sanctions programme against Iraq and efforts to distribute oil
proceeds to Iraqi civilians for humanitarian reasons. Moreover,
the Security Council sanctions committees that were established
to adopt and oversee implementation of international financial
sanctions against international terrorists and their supporters
have also been woefully inadequate in achieving their objective
of restricting and cutting off financial support for terrorists.
EU ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The European Community[11]
(EC) has express authority to impose economic sanctions unilaterally
against targeted states and entities.[12]
Before the Maastricht Treaty took effect in November of 1993,
however, there was no express authority in the Treaty of Rome
providing for a Community competence in economic sanctions. The
absence of such express authority, however, did not prevent the
Council of Ministers from issuing regulations implementing UN
embargo resolutions.[13]
The legal basis for such authority was Article 133 (ex-Article
113) of the Treaty of Rome which provides for "implementing
a common commercial policy"[14]
and gives the Community competence to preempt member state measures
in the same area.[15]
Hence, import and export restrictions and non-financial services
have been held to come within the ambit of Article 133.[16]
But the Commission did not interpret Article 133 as authorising
financial sanctions. EU member states were thus free to adopt
financial sanctions if they did not conflict with EC policy or
if they were pursuant to UN embargo resolutions.
In addition, the EC has relied on Article 80
(ex-Article 84), in conjunction with Article 133, to adopt transport
sanctions against Iraq, Libya, and Serbia-Montenegro[17]
pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions. The EC also utilises
Article 308 (ex-Article 235) as a residual basis for action—allowing
the Council to take "appropriate measures" if action
by the Community is necessary to attain one of the Community's
objectives and the EEC Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.[18]
In fact, the EC relied on the implied powers clause of Article
308 to implement paragraph 29 of Security Council Resolution 687
(1991), by which the Security Council calls upon all states to
prohibit the satisfaction of claims based on the non-performance
of contractual obligations whose execution has been affected by
the UN embargo against Iraq.[19]
Articles 223 and 297 (ex-Article 224) provide
further authority for sanctions to be imposed at different levels
of the Community. Article 223 provides a specific basis for EC
sanctions involving "trade in arms, munitions and war material."
In contrast, Article 297 (ex-Article 224) unequivocally grants
EU member states competence to adopt national laws unilaterally
without EC regulatory authority in order to implement Security
Council sanctions. It states:
Member States shall consult each other with a
view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning
of the common market being affected by measures which a Member
State may be called upon to take in order to carry out obligations
it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international
security.
Member States are required, however, to consult
with one another in deciding whether to implement Security Council
sanctions on an individual basis.
Unilateral Economic Sanctions Within The
European Community
Article 133 (ex-Article 113) was cited as authority
for adopting unilateral national sanctions against Argentina,
Iran, and the Soviet Union.[20]
Indeed, after the British government adopted comprehensive sanctions
against Argentina, including a freeze on Argentinian assets located
within British territory or under the control of British nationals,
the Council of Ministers voted unanimously in April 1982 to impose
a temporary import ban through a regulation based on Article 133
(ex-Article113).[21]
Although there were major loopholes in the ban which diminished
its effectiveness, the EC decision and the basis for it were correctly
viewed as an important precedent for future crises.
The EC has the power to limit the ability of
its members to impose unilateral economic sanctions against both
member and non-member countries. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome prohibits
export or import controls between the Member States, as well as
restrictions on private credit flows for foreign policy reasons.[22]
Some experts have argued that the language in Articles 9 and 10
not only confers powers on the European Community to control imports
but also restricts the discretion of Member States in imposing
economic sanctions against non-EU states.[23]
According to this argument, a Member State may only impose import
controls in certain circumstances where the EC has not enacted
directives or regulations preempting a specific area. For example,
the United Kingdom's ban on the import of diamonds from South
Africa in the 1980s was not preempted because there were no EC
regulations or directives which had been enacted against South
Africa thereby permitting EU member states to enact their own
sanctions. However, the effectiveness of the UK prohibition was
undermined by the fact that the United Kingdom could not prohibit
the importation of diamonds from South Africa by way of another
EC state.
The Treaty of Rome's prohibition on import controls
against another Community member state applies both to products
originating in that country and to products coming from third
countries that have cleared customs in a Member State.[24]
The possibilities of indirect trade thus make any unilateral import
control relatively ineffective, depending on the costs of transhipment
(which, in the case of diamonds, would be small). Similarly, though
there have been no EU cases decided on point, EU law probably
does not prohibit unilateral controls over exports to a third
country or over private credit transactions with third country
entities. Some questions, however, might be raised under Articles
133 (ex-Article 113) concerning a "common commercial policy"
and under Article 297 (ex-Article 224) requiring consultation
amongst Member states.[25]
In describing EC authority, it is important
to appreciate how the Community usually proceeds in determining
whether to impose economic sanctions. The initial discussions
amongst the Foreign Ministers usually focus on the steps to be
taken and also on choosing "between a true Community approach
or a perhaps coordinated but separate implementation" of
measures.[26]
When these measures are adopted, the Community documents are sometimes
vague about the specific legal authority imposing such measures.
One of the reasons for this is that the European Commission and
Council of Europe can choose among the legal vehicles through
which to implement sanctions measures. The decision to implement
a regulation or directive has a substantive impact on the way
a measure is implemented in the Member States.[27]
For example, in the case of South Africa, the foreign ministers
of EU Member States agreed to proceed on the basis of Article
133 (ex-Article 113) by adopting a ban on imports of gold coins,
iron, and steel as part of a sanctions policy to protest South
Africa's apartheid system.[28]
Later, the EC Council later decided to ban South African imports
of iron and steel pursuant to its authority under the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, rather than under Article
133 (ex-Article 113) of the EEC Treaty, because it is the ECSC
Treaty that governs competence over such products.[29]
The Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht
Treaty")
The Maastricht Treaty added two new articles
to the Treaty of Rome regarding Community powers in the area of
economic sanctions. These provisions are Articles 301 (ex-Article
228A) and 60 (ex-Article 73G). Article 301 states:
Where it is provided, in a common position or
in a joint action of the Treaty on European Union relating to
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, for an action by the Community
to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations
with one or another third countries, the Council shall take the
necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission.
Article 60 extends the authority granted in
Article 301 to include "measures on the movement of capital
and on payments." These Articles have strengthened the legal
basis supporting EC competence to impose economic and financial
sanctions. Although some states continue to contest the EC's authority
to impose financial sanctions under Article 60, the EC relied
on Article 60 to adopt Regulation 2471/94 to impose sanctions
freezing Bosnian-Serb assets in European financial institutions
in the 1990s, which was required under Security Council Resolution
942 (1993).
Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty does not prohibit
member states from continuing to enact their own national laws
that give effect to decisions taken pursuant to Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. Member States are also free to adopt their own
national sanctions laws against non-EU states insofar as such
sanctions do not conflict with express EC policy. In this regard,
EU law should not constrain UK policymakers in adopting effective
economic sanctions policies and regulations.
UK ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The British cabinet has very broad power to
impose economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes subject
to certain restrictions under EC law. The UK system is characterised
by so-called enabling legislation, that is, Acts of Parliament
authorising in advance the exercise of the necessary powers to
fulfil specific obligations. Several statutes authorise the Crown
to adopt Orders in Council that impose economic sanctions.
In the area of export controls, the Export Control
Act 2002 provides the most comprehensive coverage of UK export
controls. It consolidates and incorporates previous UK export
control legislation, including the Import, Export and Customs
Powers (Defence) Act of 1939.[30]
The Export Control Act was adopted in response to the recommendations
of the Scott Report of 1996. Parliament implemented the Act
through secondary legislation which became effective in May 2004. The
Act imports a licensing regime for the export of military and
dual-use goods and instruments, and requires licences for software
and technology products and services. The Act focuses mainly on
export controls and establishes a government objective to promote
global security by restricting exports to UN-targeted states and
international terrorists.
The Exchange Control Law of 1947 provides broad
power to the Secretary of the Treasury to restrict or prohibit
transactions in foreign exchange.[31]
The British government used the law against Southern Rhodesia,
Iraq, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[32]
The Emergency Laws Act also imposes payment controls by authorising
the Secretary of Treasury to restrict and freeze financial transactions
deemed to be a "detriment of the economic position of the
United Kingdom".[33]
Moreover, under the 1939 Trading With the Enemy Act, the Secretary
of State may label any country an "enemy", thereby rendering
trade illegal with that country.[34]
In addition, the United Nations Act 1946 authorises
the Government to exercise the necessary powers to implement Security
Council Resolutions.[35]
Section of 1(I) of the Act enables the Crown to adopt Orders in
Council in order to give effect to UN sanctions measures[36]
This provision has provided the legal authority for all British
statutory instruments that implement UN sanctions resolutions
that impose international sanctions against targeted states and
international terrorists. For instance, the UK Treasury has issued
statutory orders that authorise the Bank of England to impose
financial orders against individuals designated by the Security
Council as international terrorists. Similarly, the Cabinet has
the power to implement European Community legislation.
Although these laws provide broad statutory
authority for the Cabinet to impose far-reaching controls over
exports, imports and financial transactions, the British Cabinet
will often seek specific approval from Parliament when responding
to a particular crisis, as when the government successfully sought
Parliament's support for specific laws imposing sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and Iran in 1980. One of the reasons
that parliamentary support is necessary is that most British economic
sanctions laws are broad in nature and have textual ambiguities
which are not clarified in regulations. Therefore, in a particular
crisis, it is necessary for Parliament to enact country-specific
legislation imposing direct prohibitions on certain transactions
and commercial dealings with a targeted state.[37]
UNILATERALISM AND
US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The United States has the most comprehensive
system of economic and financial sanctions. Traditionally, US
economic and financial sanctions programmes have been important
instruments of foreign policy. In comparing the number of times
that sanctions were imposed by the leading states in the international
system, the US government has imposed economic sanctions on more
occasions than the combined number of times sanctions were imposed
by all other nations.[38]
Since 1991, the US government has resorted to economic sanctions
on over sixty occasions, specifically targeting countries which,
inter alia, support international terrorism, the manufacture
of weapons of mass destruction, the abuse of political and civil
rights, and confiscation of US-owned property.[39]
Generally, the US government has applied economic
sanctions against foreign governments, but since the 1990s sanctions
have been directed increasingly against international terrorist
organisations and other non-state entities such as drug traffickers.
Following 11 September 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order
13224 that significantly increased the scope of US financial sanctions
against international terrorists and terrorist organisations.
Today, US financial sanctions are targeted against an array of
alleged international terrorists and terrorist-supporting governments.
Moreover, US economic sanctions apply to states such as Iran and
North Korea mainly on the grounds these states are engaged in
nuclear weapons research that US alleges to violate the Nuclear
non-proliferation treaty and other multilateral conventions prohibiting
the use of weapons of mass destruction.
US economic sanctions have specifically targeted
countries which, inter alia, support international terrorism,
the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, the abuse of political
and civil rights, and confiscation of US-owned property.[40]
Under the USA Patriot Act, the US has adopted financial sanctions
to target foreign jurisdictions, foreign financial institutions,
and foreign transactions and accounts that are allegedly involved
in money laundering or supporting international terrorism or states
that support the development of weapons of mass destruction. Although
the US has attempted to coordinate these financial sanctions measures
through multilateral bodies (eg, the Financial action task Force
and Security Council Sanctions Committees), US financial sanctions
are often taken on a unilateral basis without approval or support
from other governments. Recent examples include the unilateral
economic sanctions against Iran, Cuba, Syria, and North Korea.[41]
Moreover, the US often maintains unilateral financial sanctions
against alleged terrorists in other countries, even when the relevant
UN Security Council Sanctions Committee has not approved their
application. This raises serious legal and regulatory problems
for European jurisdictions that do significant amounts of business
with the United States.
CONCLUSION
As globalisation facilitates the integration
of international economic activity, states are increasingly relying
on economic sanctions to accomplish an array of foreign policy
objectives. The use of economic sanctions raises a number of important
policy and legal issues regarding their application and enforcement.
Even where there is an international consensus that sanctions
should be imposed against certain pariah states, the experience
of the United Nations has shown that multilateral sanctions are
likely to fail if states lack the political will to enforce them
and have inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks to implement
them, while providing procedural safeguards. Policymakers and
legislators should ensure that economic sanctions laws have clearly
stated objectives and are implemented in a way that allows for
effective cross-border coordination between national authorities.
June 2006
1 Indeed, the Roman Government imposed a virtual trade
embargo on the Gauls between 232-225 BC which forbade anyone (including
non-Roman ciotizens in third countries) from buying or selling
gold or silver with the Gauls. W V Harris, War and Imperialism
in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (1975) 198, n 3. Back
2
Pericles, History of the Pelopennesian War (transl
by Rex Warner) (Penguin Books, 1973) pp 360-362. Back
3
W N Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, vol I (1952) 9 [hereinafter
Medlicott]. Back
4
See D W Bowett, The Law of International Institutions,
(4th ed) (1982) 18-25. Back
5
These sanctions policies proved to be ineffective in convincing
these countries to cease their aggression. See Renwick, Economic
Sanctions, p 18. Back
6
See M Domke, The Control of Alien Property (1947) 39-46. Back
7
G Hufbauer & J J Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered-Case
Histories (2d ed) (1998) 4-14, 163-283. Back
8
See McDougal and Reisman, "Rhodesia and the United Nations:
The Lawfulness of International Concern," (1968) 62 Am
J Intl' L. 1. Back
9
SC Res 661 (6 August 1990), 29 ILM 1325-1327 (1990). Back
10
29 ILM 1326. Back
11
The EC is technically three communities, established by separate
treaties: the European Economic Community (EEC), the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom). Present members of the EU include: Belgium,
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Since the treaty of Rome was signed in 1958, there has
been increasing integration of the three Communities. For example,
in 1965, a single Council and Commission were established. Treaty
Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities (Merger Treaty). In 1986, the Conference of the Representatives
of the Governments of the Member States adopted a Single European
Act, which included treaty modifications concerning foreign policy
coordination as well as community institutions, monetary cooperation,
research and technology, environmental protection, and social
policy. 25 ILM 503 (May 1986). It became effective in July
of 1987, after being approved by the twelve member states. Back
12
See Articles 301 (ex-Article 228A) and 60 (ex-Article 73G), Treaty
Establishing the European Community, as Amended by Subsequent
Treaties (25 March, 1957) ("Treaty of Rome"), reproduced
in B Rudden & D Wyatt, Basic Community Laws (6th
ed) (1996). Back
13
See SC Res. 661 (1990) (Iraq & Kuwait), implemented by
EC Regs 2340/90 (1990) OJ L213/1 & 3155/90 (1990) OJ
L304/1. See also, SC Res 748 (1992), implemented by EC
Reg 945/92 (1992) OJ L101/53 (Libyan embargo on aircraft
and component parts and services); SC Res(s) 757 (1992) &
820 (1993), implemented by EC Regs 1432/92 (1992) OJ
L151/4 & 990/93, (1993) OJ L102/14 (imposing comprehensive
commercial and financial sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Bosnian Serb territory). Back
14
Article 113(1) states that "the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements,
the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export
policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken
in case of dumping and subsidies". The full scope of the
EEC's broad powers under article 113 remains "undetermined
and controversial". because the term "common commercial
policy" is not defined in the Treaty of Rome. Back
15
See R Pavoni, "UN Sanctions in EU and National Law: The
Centro-Com Case", (1999) 48 ICLQ no 3, 582,
588. Back
16
The European Court of Justice gave Article 113 (now Art 133)
a broad interpretation in Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871,
para 45; see also, Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, paras
31, 39. Back
17
EC Reg 3155/90, (1990) OJ L304/1 (Iraq); EC Reg 945/92,
(1992) OJ L101/53 (Libya); EC Reg 1432/92, (1992) OJ
L151/4. Back
18
Article 308 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in
the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives
of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate
measures. Back
19
EC Reg 3541/92, (1992) OJ L361/1. Back
20
P Kuyper, "Community Sanctions against Argentina: Lawfulness
Under Community and International Law," in Essays in European
Integration in D O'Keeffe & H G Schermers, eds, Essays
in European law and Integration (1982) 141; 29 OJ Eur Comm
(No L 268) I (1986); 29 OJ Eur Comm (No L 305) 11, 45 (1986). Back
21
See 25 OJ Eur Comm (No L 102) I (1982). Back
22
Treaty of Rome, arts 9, 10 (free movement of goods-customs duties),
30-36 (elimination of quantitative restrictions), and 67-73 (movement
of capital). Back
23
B E Carter, International Economic Sanctions (1987) 224-5. Back
24
Treaty of Rome, art 9(2). Article 10(1) provides, "Products
coming from a third country shall be considered to be in free
circulation in a Member State if the import formalities have been
complied with and any customs duties or charges having equivalent
effect which are payable have been levied in that Member State.
. .". Back
25
See Treaty of Rome, arts 110-16 (common commercial policy) and
art 224 (consultation), discussed below. See also Title
III (cooperation in foreign policy) of the Single European Act.
See Stein, Hay & Waelbroeck, European Community Law and
Institutions in Perspective, 200-08 (Supplement). Back
26
Kuyper, p 144. See, for example, the coordinated but separate
measures taken by the Member States against Syria in 1986-87. Back
27
Article 189 provides for regulations, directives, decisions,
recommendations, and opinions. It reads: A regulation shall have
general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable to all Member States.
Further, it states:
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved,
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
to the national authoritis the choice of form and methods. . .
. A decision shall be binding in its entitety upon those to whom
it is addressed. Back
28
Council Reg (EEC) No 3302/86 27 October 1986 in OJ Eur Comm
(No L 305) II (1986). The regulation exempted "imported
documents issued and contracts concluded before the entry into
force of this Regulation." Back
29
Article 71 of the ECSC Treaty reserves to Member States the authority
to determine much of their own commerical policy for coal and
steel products. Article 113 of the EEC Treaty has not absorbed
this reservation. See also, Council Decision 86/459/ECSC is at
OJ Eur Comm (No L 268) I (1986). Back
30
The Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939, 2 &
3 Geo VI, c 69. See also, C Schmitthoff, The Export Trade:
A Manual of Law and Practice 305 (1950). Back
31
Exchange Control Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo VI, c 14. Back
32
Exchange controls remain in effect against both Iraq (pursuant
to UN Resolution 687) and Yugoslavia (Resolution 757). The government
lifted the Southern Rhodesian controls by issuing a general exemption
in December of 1979. The Exchange Control (General Exemption)
Order, SI No 1660 (1979). Back
33
See The Control of Gold and Treasury Bills (Southern Rhodesia)
(Revocation) Directions, SI No 1661 (1979). See also, Emergency
Laws (Re-Enactment and Repeals) Act 1964, c 60 [hereinafter Emergency
Laws]. Back
34
Trading with the Enemy Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo VI, c 89. The
law could be used to terminate all commercial transactions with
a particular country. Back
35
United Nations Act, § I, contained in Control of Gold and
Treasury Bills (Southern Rhodesia) Directions, SI No 1939 (1965). Back
36
United Nations Act 1946, s 1(I). Back
37
See discussion of Exchange Act 1947 and Strategic Goods (Control)
Order 1959 in 9 ICLQ (1962) 453-56. Back
38
G Hufbauer & J J Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,
History and Current Policy, (1998). Back
39
See US sanctions against Cuba for economic confiscation, support
of terrorism and failure to adopt political reforms; Libya's support
for international terrorism; Iran support for manufacture of weapons
of mass destruction, support of international terrorism; sanctions
(no sale of strategic parts and equipment to China and technology
and economic aid restrictions for India and Pakistan because of
their detonation of nuclear devices. Pakistani and Indian sanctions
imposed pursuant to the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994 (NPPA), 22 USC § 3201 (1994) (amending the Arms Export
Control Act by adding language that states, inter alia,
mandating a menu of sanctions against any "non-nuclear"
state that "detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 11,
1998". See 22 USC §§ 2751-2796d (1995). Back
40
G Hufbauer & J J Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,
History and Current Policy, (1998). Back
41
See US sanctions against Cuba for economic confiscation, support
of terrorism and failure to adopt political reforms; Libya's support
for international terrorism; Iran support for manufacture of weapons
of mass destruction, support of international terrorism; sanctions
(no sale of strategic parts and equipment to China and technology
and economic aid restrictions for India and Pakistan because of
their detonation of nuclear devices. Pakistani and Indian sanctions
imposed pursuant to the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994 (NPPA), 22 USC § 3201 (1994) (amending the Arms Export
Control Act by adding language that states, inter alia,
mandating a menu of sanctions against any "non-nuclear"
state that "detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 11,
1998". See 22 USC §§ 2751-2796d (1995). Back
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