Select Committee on Economic Affairs Minutes of Evidence

Memorandum by Dr Kern Alexander, The Judge Business School, University of Cambridge


  The purpose of this note is to discuss the development of economic sanctions laws and regulations in recent years and to highlight some of the main challenges confronting policymakers. My comments will address some of the legal and regulatory issues in the economic sanctions debate by focusing on the UN, EU, UK and US sanctions regimes. I will mention some of the weaknesses in these regimes and suggest ways for the UK government to develop a more effective sanctions regime. I will also discuss some of the problems with unilateral and extraterritorial US economic sanctions and how this can potentially disrupt the development of an effective international sanctions regime.

  The use of economic sanctions to accomplish foreign policy objectives has throughout history been an integral component of the foreign policy of most nation-states. Nations have relied on economic sanctions not only to influence foreign policy objectives but also to respond to domestic political needs and economic pressures. In antiquity and in medieval times, economic sanctions were most often used as part of a nation's arsenal during times of war.[1] Indeed, Athens imposed economic sanctions in 432 BC when Pericles issued the Megarian import embargo against the Greek city-states which had refused to join the Athenian-led Delian League during the Peloponnesian War.[2] Until the 20th century, nation-states had relied principally on economic sanctions as a subordinate part of a larger military strategy to impose blockades and prevent the export of strategic supplies to targeted countries.[3]

  The use of economic sanctions as an independent tool of foreign policy was not generally adopted by major states until the 1920s following the enactment of the League of Nations Charter.[4] During this period, various member states of the League and the United States adopted economic controls on various exports to certain targeted countries, such as Japan, Italy and Yugoslavia.[5] Later, during World War II, Great Britain, the United States and other belligerent nations adopted comprehensive export controls and financial asset controls against enemy states and their nationals. The US maintained and extended most of its export and foreign asset controls against communist countries and other states of concern during the Cold War.[6] In recent years, many studies have documented the extensive use of economic sanctions by most developed states to promote foreign policy and national security objectives.[7] Beginning in the 1990s, many states led by the US began to expand the focus of their economic sanctions programmes to include non-state actors, such as international terrorists and drug traffickers. The growth of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy has been enormous and has attracted considerable commentary in both academic and policy circles.

  In assessing the effectiveness or utility of a sanctions policy, it is necessary to define its objectives and to have effective criteria for determining whether the objectives have been met. Economic sanctions can have any combination of the following objectives: behaviour modification of the target, retribution or punishment, or as a signal to the target or to other secondary states. Moreover, the rationale of economic sanctions may involve promoting military objectives on the one hand, and maintaining peace on the other. Or it may involve the use sanctions as a means of containment and/or dialogue. The basic purpose of economic sanctions, however, throughout history has essentially remained the same, namely, restricting foreign trade or withholding economic benefits from targeted states to accomplish broader strategic or foreign policy objectives. In recent years, targeted financial sanctions have become the instrument of choice to put pressure on certain states and to make it difficult for terrorists and drug traffickers to move money across borders.


  The United Nations Charter authorises the Security Council to adopt and impose multilateral economic sanctions. Article 39 of the UN Charter provides that if the Security Council determines a breach or threat to the peace, or act of aggression, it can authorise the use of economic sanctions by its members on a multilateral basis with coordination provided by the Security Council. The language in Article 39 is broad and has been interpreted as providing authority to the Security Council to determine what is a threat to the peace.[8] During the Cold War, the Security Council approved multilateral sanctions in only two cases against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security Council has adopted sanctions to a far greater extent by imposing them against Iraq/Kuwait in the Kuwait War and later against Libya, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Montenegro, Afghanistan/Taliban, and against international terrorists and terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda.

  Following the US government's unilateral imposition of extraterritorial sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661[9] on 6 August 1990 which called on all states to freeze the assets of Iraq and Kuwait "located within their territory." Resolution 661 called upon all states to "take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait and its agencies".[10] The resolution also called for the imposition of trade sanctions against both Kuwait and Iraq, and provided an international legal basis for the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. The adoption of Resolution 661 was followed by the imposition of freeze orders and trade sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait by most European countries, the US, Japan, and Canada.

  The international sanctions imposed against Iraq and Kuwait during the Kuwait war were generally viewed as successful because the countries adopting the sanctions had the political resolve to ensure effective implementation and the objectives of the sanctions policy was defined clearly for policymakers. The UN sanctions against Iraq had three clearly defined objectives: (1) to protect Kuwait assets from the invaders in order to "prevent the misappropriation of the assets". This made it impossible for the Iraqi government to have access to over $200 million of blocked Kuwaiti assets abroad; (2) to keep leverage over the Kuwaiti royal family against coming to an agreement with Saddam Hussein that would be contrary to US policy: and (3) to apply the frozen assets toward financing the war against Iraq.


However, following the Kuwait war, the Security Council had difficulty in maintaining effective international sanctions against Iraq to ensure that the terms of UN Security Council resolutions were met. The Volcker Commission Report on the Iraq oil-for-food programme demonstrated the weaknesses of the Security Council sanctions programme against Iraq and efforts to distribute oil proceeds to Iraqi civilians for humanitarian reasons. Moreover, the Security Council sanctions committees that were established to adopt and oversee implementation of international financial sanctions against international terrorists and their supporters have also been woefully inadequate in achieving their objective of restricting and cutting off financial support for terrorists.


  The European Community[11] (EC) has express authority to impose economic sanctions unilaterally against targeted states and entities.[12] Before the Maastricht Treaty took effect in November of 1993, however, there was no express authority in the Treaty of Rome providing for a Community competence in economic sanctions. The absence of such express authority, however, did not prevent the Council of Ministers from issuing regulations implementing UN embargo resolutions.[13] The legal basis for such authority was Article 133 (ex-Article 113) of the Treaty of Rome which provides for "implementing a common commercial policy"[14] and gives the Community competence to preempt member state measures in the same area.[15] Hence, import and export restrictions and non-financial services have been held to come within the ambit of Article 133.[16] But the Commission did not interpret Article 133 as authorising financial sanctions. EU member states were thus free to adopt financial sanctions if they did not conflict with EC policy or if they were pursuant to UN embargo resolutions.

  In addition, the EC has relied on Article 80 (ex-Article 84), in conjunction with Article 133, to adopt transport sanctions against Iraq, Libya, and Serbia-Montenegro[17] pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions. The EC also utilises Article 308 (ex-Article 235) as a residual basis for action—allowing the Council to take "appropriate measures" if action by the Community is necessary to attain one of the Community's objectives and the EEC Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.[18] In fact, the EC relied on the implied powers clause of Article 308 to implement paragraph 29 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), by which the Security Council calls upon all states to prohibit the satisfaction of claims based on the non-performance of contractual obligations whose execution has been affected by the UN embargo against Iraq.[19]

  Articles 223 and 297 (ex-Article 224) provide further authority for sanctions to be imposed at different levels of the Community. Article 223 provides a specific basis for EC sanctions involving "trade in arms, munitions and war material." In contrast, Article 297 (ex-Article 224) unequivocally grants EU member states competence to adopt national laws unilaterally without EC regulatory authority in order to implement Security Council sanctions. It states:

    Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.

  Member States are required, however, to consult with one another in deciding whether to implement Security Council sanctions on an individual basis.

  Unilateral Economic Sanctions Within The European Community

  Article 133 (ex-Article 113) was cited as authority for adopting unilateral national sanctions against Argentina, Iran, and the Soviet Union.[20] Indeed, after the British government adopted comprehensive sanctions against Argentina, including a freeze on Argentinian assets located within British territory or under the control of British nationals, the Council of Ministers voted unanimously in April 1982 to impose a temporary import ban through a regulation based on Article 133 (ex-Article113).[21] Although there were major loopholes in the ban which diminished its effectiveness, the EC decision and the basis for it were correctly viewed as an important precedent for future crises.

  The EC has the power to limit the ability of its members to impose unilateral economic sanctions against both member and non-member countries. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome prohibits export or import controls between the Member States, as well as restrictions on private credit flows for foreign policy reasons.[22] Some experts have argued that the language in Articles 9 and 10 not only confers powers on the European Community to control imports but also restricts the discretion of Member States in imposing economic sanctions against non-EU states.[23] According to this argument, a Member State may only impose import controls in certain circumstances where the EC has not enacted directives or regulations preempting a specific area. For example, the United Kingdom's ban on the import of diamonds from South Africa in the 1980s was not preempted because there were no EC regulations or directives which had been enacted against South Africa thereby permitting EU member states to enact their own sanctions. However, the effectiveness of the UK prohibition was undermined by the fact that the United Kingdom could not prohibit the importation of diamonds from South Africa by way of another EC state.

  The Treaty of Rome's prohibition on import controls against another Community member state applies both to products originating in that country and to products coming from third countries that have cleared customs in a Member State.[24] The possibilities of indirect trade thus make any unilateral import control relatively ineffective, depending on the costs of transhipment (which, in the case of diamonds, would be small). Similarly, though there have been no EU cases decided on point, EU law probably does not prohibit unilateral controls over exports to a third country or over private credit transactions with third country entities. Some questions, however, might be raised under Articles 133 (ex-Article 113) concerning a "common commercial policy" and under Article 297 (ex-Article 224) requiring consultation amongst Member states.[25]

  In describing EC authority, it is important to appreciate how the Community usually proceeds in determining whether to impose economic sanctions. The initial discussions amongst the Foreign Ministers usually focus on the steps to be taken and also on choosing "between a true Community approach or a perhaps coordinated but separate implementation" of measures.[26] When these measures are adopted, the Community documents are sometimes vague about the specific legal authority imposing such measures. One of the reasons for this is that the European Commission and Council of Europe can choose among the legal vehicles through which to implement sanctions measures. The decision to implement a regulation or directive has a substantive impact on the way a measure is implemented in the Member States.[27] For example, in the case of South Africa, the foreign ministers of EU Member States agreed to proceed on the basis of Article 133 (ex-Article 113) by adopting a ban on imports of gold coins, iron, and steel as part of a sanctions policy to protest South Africa's apartheid system.[28] Later, the EC Council later decided to ban South African imports of iron and steel pursuant to its authority under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, rather than under Article 133 (ex-Article 113) of the EEC Treaty, because it is the ECSC Treaty that governs competence over such products.[29]

The Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty")

  The Maastricht Treaty added two new articles to the Treaty of Rome regarding Community powers in the area of economic sanctions. These provisions are Articles 301 (ex-Article 228A) and 60 (ex-Article 73G). Article 301 states:

    Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action of the Treaty on European Union relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or another third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

  Article 60 extends the authority granted in Article 301 to include "measures on the movement of capital and on payments." These Articles have strengthened the legal basis supporting EC competence to impose economic and financial sanctions. Although some states continue to contest the EC's authority to impose financial sanctions under Article 60, the EC relied on Article 60 to adopt Regulation 2471/94 to impose sanctions freezing Bosnian-Serb assets in European financial institutions in the 1990s, which was required under Security Council Resolution 942 (1993).

  Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty does not prohibit member states from continuing to enact their own national laws that give effect to decisions taken pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Member States are also free to adopt their own national sanctions laws against non-EU states insofar as such sanctions do not conflict with express EC policy. In this regard, EU law should not constrain UK policymakers in adopting effective economic sanctions policies and regulations.


  The British cabinet has very broad power to impose economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes subject to certain restrictions under EC law. The UK system is characterised by so-called enabling legislation, that is, Acts of Parliament authorising in advance the exercise of the necessary powers to fulfil specific obligations. Several statutes authorise the Crown to adopt Orders in Council that impose economic sanctions.

  In the area of export controls, the Export Control Act 2002 provides the most comprehensive coverage of UK export controls. It consolidates and incorporates previous UK export control legislation, including the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act of 1939.[30] The Export Control Act was adopted in response to the recommendations of the Scott Report of 1996.  Parliament implemented the Act through secondary legislation which became effective in May 2004.  The Act imports a licensing regime for the export of military and dual-use goods and instruments, and requires licences for software and technology products and services. The Act focuses mainly on export controls and establishes a government objective to promote global security by restricting exports to UN-targeted states and international terrorists.

  The Exchange Control Law of 1947 provides broad power to the Secretary of the Treasury to restrict or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange.[31] The British government used the law against Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[32] The Emergency Laws Act also imposes payment controls by authorising the Secretary of Treasury to restrict and freeze financial transactions deemed to be a "detriment of the economic position of the United Kingdom".[33] Moreover, under the 1939 Trading With the Enemy Act, the Secretary of State may label any country an "enemy", thereby rendering trade illegal with that country.[34]

  In addition, the United Nations Act 1946 authorises the Government to exercise the necessary powers to implement Security Council Resolutions.[35] Section of 1(I) of the Act enables the Crown to adopt Orders in Council in order to give effect to UN sanctions measures[36] This provision has provided the legal authority for all British statutory instruments that implement UN sanctions resolutions that impose international sanctions against targeted states and international terrorists. For instance, the UK Treasury has issued statutory orders that authorise the Bank of England to impose financial orders against individuals designated by the Security Council as international terrorists. Similarly, the Cabinet has the power to implement European Community legislation.

  Although these laws provide broad statutory authority for the Cabinet to impose far-reaching controls over exports, imports and financial transactions, the British Cabinet will often seek specific approval from Parliament when responding to a particular crisis, as when the government successfully sought Parliament's support for specific laws imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and Iran in 1980.  One of the reasons that parliamentary support is necessary is that most British economic sanctions laws are broad in nature and have textual ambiguities which are not clarified in regulations. Therefore, in a particular crisis, it is necessary for Parliament to enact country-specific legislation imposing direct prohibitions on certain transactions and commercial dealings with a targeted state.[37]


  The United States has the most comprehensive system of economic and financial sanctions. Traditionally, US economic and financial sanctions programmes have been important instruments of foreign policy. In comparing the number of times that sanctions were imposed by the leading states in the international system, the US government has imposed economic sanctions on more occasions than the combined number of times sanctions were imposed by all other nations.[38] Since 1991, the US government has resorted to economic sanctions on over sixty occasions, specifically targeting countries which, inter alia, support international terrorism, the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, the abuse of political and civil rights, and confiscation of US-owned property.[39]

  Generally, the US government has applied economic sanctions against foreign governments, but since the 1990s sanctions have been directed increasingly against international terrorist organisations and other non-state entities such as drug traffickers. Following 11 September 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 that significantly increased the scope of US financial sanctions against international terrorists and terrorist organisations. Today, US financial sanctions are targeted against an array of alleged international terrorists and terrorist-supporting governments. Moreover, US economic sanctions apply to states such as Iran and North Korea mainly on the grounds these states are engaged in nuclear weapons research that US alleges to violate the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty and other multilateral conventions prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction.

  US economic sanctions have specifically targeted countries which, inter alia, support international terrorism, the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, the abuse of political and civil rights, and confiscation of US-owned property.[40] Under the USA Patriot Act, the US has adopted financial sanctions to target foreign jurisdictions, foreign financial institutions, and foreign transactions and accounts that are allegedly involved in money laundering or supporting international terrorism or states that support the development of weapons of mass destruction. Although the US has attempted to coordinate these financial sanctions measures through multilateral bodies (eg, the Financial action task Force and Security Council Sanctions Committees), US financial sanctions are often taken on a unilateral basis without approval or support from other governments. Recent examples include the unilateral economic sanctions against Iran, Cuba, Syria, and North Korea.[41] Moreover, the US often maintains unilateral financial sanctions against alleged terrorists in other countries, even when the relevant UN Security Council Sanctions Committee has not approved their application. This raises serious legal and regulatory problems for European jurisdictions that do significant amounts of business with the United States.


  As globalisation facilitates the integration of international economic activity, states are increasingly relying on economic sanctions to accomplish an array of foreign policy objectives. The use of economic sanctions raises a number of important policy and legal issues regarding their application and enforcement. Even where there is an international consensus that sanctions should be imposed against certain pariah states, the experience of the United Nations has shown that multilateral sanctions are likely to fail if states lack the political will to enforce them and have inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks to implement them, while providing procedural safeguards. Policymakers and legislators should ensure that economic sanctions laws have clearly stated objectives and are implemented in a way that allows for effective cross-border coordination between national authorities.

June 2006

1   Indeed, the Roman Government imposed a virtual trade embargo on the Gauls between 232-225 BC which forbade anyone (including non-Roman ciotizens in third countries) from buying or selling gold or silver with the Gauls. W V Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (1975) 198, n 3. Back

2   Pericles, History of the Pelopennesian War (transl by Rex Warner) (Penguin Books, 1973) pp 360-362. Back

3   W N Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, vol I (1952) 9 [hereinafter Medlicott]. Back

4   See D W Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, (4th ed) (1982) 18-25. Back

5   These sanctions policies proved to be ineffective in convincing these countries to cease their aggression. See Renwick, Economic Sanctions, p 18. Back

6   See M Domke, The Control of Alien Property (1947) 39-46. Back

7   G Hufbauer & J J Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered-Case Histories (2d ed) (1998) 4-14, 163-283. Back

8   See McDougal and Reisman, "Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern," (1968) 62 Am J Intl' L. 1. Back

9   SC Res 661 (6 August 1990), 29 ILM 1325-1327 (1990). Back

10   29 ILM 1326. Back

11   The EC is technically three communities, established by separate treaties: the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Present members of the EU include: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Since the treaty of Rome was signed in 1958, there has been increasing integration of the three Communities. For example, in 1965, a single Council and Commission were established. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (Merger Treaty). In 1986, the Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States adopted a Single European Act, which included treaty modifications concerning foreign policy coordination as well as community institutions, monetary cooperation, research and technology, environmental protection, and social policy. 25 ILM 503 (May 1986). It became effective in July of 1987, after being approved by the twelve member states. Back

12   See Articles 301 (ex-Article 228A) and 60 (ex-Article 73G), Treaty Establishing the European Community, as Amended by Subsequent Treaties (25 March, 1957) ("Treaty of Rome"), reproduced in B Rudden & D Wyatt, Basic Community Laws (6th ed) (1996). Back

13   See SC Res. 661 (1990) (Iraq & Kuwait), implemented by EC Regs 2340/90 (1990) OJ L213/1 & 3155/90 (1990) OJ L304/1. See also, SC Res 748 (1992), implemented by EC Reg 945/92 (1992) OJ L101/53 (Libyan embargo on aircraft and component parts and services); SC Res(s) 757 (1992) & 820 (1993), implemented by EC Regs 1432/92 (1992) OJ L151/4 & 990/93, (1993) OJ L102/14 (imposing comprehensive commercial and financial sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Bosnian Serb territory). Back

14   Article 113(1) states that "the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping and subsidies". The full scope of the EEC's broad powers under article 113 remains "undetermined and controversial". because the term "common commercial policy" is not defined in the Treaty of Rome. Back

15   See R Pavoni, "UN Sanctions in EU and National Law: The Centro-Com Case", (1999) 48 ICLQ no 3, 582, 588. Back

16   The European Court of Justice gave Article 113 (now Art 133) a broad interpretation in Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871, para 45; see also, Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, paras 31, 39. Back

17   EC Reg 3155/90, (1990) OJ L304/1 (Iraq); EC Reg 945/92, (1992) OJ L101/53 (Libya); EC Reg 1432/92, (1992) OJ L151/4. Back

18   Article 308 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures. 

19   EC Reg 3541/92, (1992) OJ L361/1. Back

20   P Kuyper, "Community Sanctions against Argentina: Lawfulness Under Community and International Law," in Essays in European Integration in D O'Keeffe & H G Schermers, eds, Essays in European law and Integration (1982) 141; 29 OJ Eur Comm (No L 268) I (1986); 29 OJ Eur Comm (No L 305) 11, 45 (1986). Back

21   See 25 OJ Eur Comm (No L 102) I (1982). Back

22   Treaty of Rome, arts 9, 10 (free movement of goods-customs duties), 30-36 (elimination of quantitative restrictions), and 67-73 (movement of capital). Back

23   B E Carter, International Economic Sanctions (1987) 224-5. Back

24   Treaty of Rome, art 9(2). Article 10(1) provides, "Products coming from a third country shall be considered to be in free circulation in a Member State if the import formalities have been complied with and any customs duties or charges having equivalent effect which are payable have been levied in that Member State. . .". Back

25   See Treaty of Rome, arts 110-16 (common commercial policy) and art 224 (consultation), discussed below. See also Title III (cooperation in foreign policy) of the Single European Act. See Stein, Hay & Waelbroeck, European Community Law and Institutions in Perspective, 200-08 (Supplement). Back

26   Kuyper, p 144. See, for example, the coordinated but separate measures taken by the Member States against Syria in 1986-87. Back

27   Article 189 provides for regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. It reads: A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable to all Member States.
Further, it states:
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authoritis the choice of form and methods. . . . A decision shall be binding in its entitety upon those to whom it is addressed. 

28   Council Reg (EEC) No 3302/86 27 October 1986 in OJ Eur Comm (No L 305) II (1986). The regulation exempted "imported documents issued and contracts concluded before the entry into force of this Regulation." Back

29   Article 71 of the ECSC Treaty reserves to Member States the authority to determine much of their own commerical policy for coal and steel products. Article 113 of the EEC Treaty has not absorbed this reservation. See also, Council Decision 86/459/ECSC is at OJ Eur Comm (No L 268) I (1986). Back

30   The Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo VI, c 69. See also, C Schmitthoff, The Export Trade: A Manual of Law and Practice 305 (1950). Back

31   Exchange Control Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo VI, c 14. Back

32   Exchange controls remain in effect against both Iraq (pursuant to UN Resolution 687) and Yugoslavia (Resolution 757). The government lifted the Southern Rhodesian controls by issuing a general exemption in December of 1979. The Exchange Control (General Exemption) Order, SI No 1660 (1979). Back

33   See The Control of Gold and Treasury Bills (Southern Rhodesia) (Revocation) Directions, SI No 1661 (1979). See also, Emergency Laws (Re-Enactment and Repeals) Act 1964, c 60 [hereinafter Emergency Laws]. Back

34   Trading with the Enemy Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo VI, c 89. The law could be used to terminate all commercial transactions with a particular country. Back

35   United Nations Act, § I, contained in Control of Gold and Treasury Bills (Southern Rhodesia) Directions, SI No 1939 (1965). Back

36   United Nations Act 1946, s 1(I). Back

37   See discussion of Exchange Act 1947 and Strategic Goods (Control) Order 1959 in 9 ICLQ (1962) 453-56. Back

38   G Hufbauer & J J Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, History and Current Policy, (1998). Back

39   See US sanctions against Cuba for economic confiscation, support of terrorism and failure to adopt political reforms; Libya's support for international terrorism; Iran support for manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, support of international terrorism; sanctions (no sale of strategic parts and equipment to China and technology and economic aid restrictions for India and Pakistan because of their detonation of nuclear devices. Pakistani and Indian sanctions imposed pursuant to the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (NPPA), 22 USC § 3201 (1994) (amending the Arms Export Control Act by adding language that states, inter alia, mandating a menu of sanctions against any "non-nuclear" state that "detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 11, 1998". See 22 USC §§ 2751-2796d (1995). Back

40   G Hufbauer & J J Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, History and Current Policy, (1998). Back

41   See US sanctions against Cuba for economic confiscation, support of terrorism and failure to adopt political reforms; Libya's support for international terrorism; Iran support for manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, support of international terrorism; sanctions (no sale of strategic parts and equipment to China and technology and economic aid restrictions for India and Pakistan because of their detonation of nuclear devices. Pakistani and Indian sanctions imposed pursuant to the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (NPPA), 22 USC § 3201 (1994) (amending the Arms Export Control Act by adding language that states, inter alia, mandating a menu of sanctions against any "non-nuclear" state that "detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 11, 1998". See 22 USC §§ 2751-2796d (1995). Back

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