Examination of Witnesses (Questions 275
- 279)
TUESDAY 17 OCTOBER 2006
THE LORD
RENWICK OF
CLIFTON
Q275 Chairman:
We welcome somebody from the home team, if you like. We are delighted
that you are able to come along and help us with the inquiry.
In fact, some of us read I will not say every word you wrote all
those years ago but certainly we read parts of it, right at the
very beginning of this inquiry, and we are very grateful to you
for coming along. You are an old hand at this, but I am told I
have to say to everybody, please speak up clearly so we get a
proper record. We have got a number of questions which you know
about. Is there anything you want to say right at the beginning?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: No. Thank you very
much for the opportunity to participate in this; it is a fascinating
subject.
Q276 Chairman:
If I may start off, I just wondered what you saw as the most important
developments in sanctions policy and its implementation since
the publication of your book in 1981 on the subject. Has policy-making
in this area improved generally, have we learned the appropriate
lessons from the past, or is there perhaps a tendency to repeat
the old mistakes?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: I would like to talk
for a few moments about South Africa, which is the sort of experience
where I had a very direct line of sight. I think the main lesson
is a rather unpalatable one, that sanctions are most successful
when they are applied against a rational adversary, so they were
largely ineffective in changing the behaviour of the South African
regime under P W Botha. When F W de Klerk took over, he made a
sustained effort to reverse South Africa's isolation; ironically,
the demands for the continuance, and even intensification, of
sanctions continued even when he had set out on that course. One
or two quick observations on which sanctions "worked best"
against South Africa and which did not, at least, in my estimation.
One of the most effective sanctions was the arms embargo. As the
South Africans found themselves confronting Cuban and Russian
forces in Angola, with sophisticated military aircraft, missiles
and more capable tanks than theirs, their inability to access
state of the art western military equipment had a potentially
serious effect for them. With a very limited number of suppliers,
this kind of embargo is easier to enforce than most others, despite
some leakages. The other most effective measures were sanctions
imposed by the financial markets, following the decision by Chase
and other banks not to roll over South Africa's loans in 1995
and thereafter. This caused the Governor of the Reserve Bank and
some other influential figures to point out that South Africa
could not hope to create the employment opportunities needed to
meet the needs of a rapidly-growing population on the basis of
a continuing capital outflow. That message was received and understood
by de Klerk but not by his predecessors. Another relatively effective
sanction was the sports boycott; even though, I must confess,
I did not like it myself, being a sports lover, because it was
targeted directly at the white population and it did bring home
to them the extent of their isolation. I recall persuading Nelson
Mandela that, to help de Klerk win the white referendum in support
of the movement towards majority rule, he, Mandela, needed to
advocate lifting the sports boycott, which he did. The most undesirable
sanctions were those which targeted, for instance, South Africa's
agricultural exports, a measure ardently supported by their southern
hemisphere competitors and which succeeded in putting out of work
a considerable number of black farm workers. I noted with interest,
the other day, Mr Cameron's assertion that we were wrong not to
support sanctions against South Africa, as we did participate,
in fact, in a lot of sanctions. What is true is that at the Kuala
Lumpur Commonwealth Conference, as I recall and Lord Powell will
recall even better, Margaret Thatcher was alone in opposing further
sanctions against South Africa at a time when de Klerk had already
released most of the ANC leaders, was getting ready to release
Mandela and to terminate South Africa's nuclear programme. I am
trying to make the point that a serious sanctions policy has to
be able to be graduated, to be intensified or relaxed according
to the target country's behaviour. In the case of Rhodesia, for
instance, we found it quite difficult to get sanctions lifted
even when we had taken over responsibility for the running of
the country. I have to say that I think South Africa and de Klerk
were an exceptional case. We were very fortunate with him, because,
in relation to sanctions generally, there is plenty of other evidence
to show that a sufficiently ruthless regime can pass on the economic
effects of sanctions to the civilian population while largely
immunising itself from them and blaming foreign adversaries for
their misery. That certainly was the case in Iraq under Saddam
Hussein and it has been the case in Zimbabwe under Mugabe. The
relatively feeble sanctions against that regime, in Zimbabwe,
and their obvious lack of effect have been demoralising for the
opposition there and we are not sending a clear enough signal
to Mugabe's potential successors. Those sanctions, despite the
best efforts of colleagues behind me in the European Commission,
have been honoured more in the breach than in the observance;
a travel ban, for instance, was followed by the egregious example
of President Chirac inviting Mugabe to attend the Summit of African
Leaders in Paris, and so on. It is a case of what not to do. Except
in that case, I do feel that policy-making in this area has improved
in two important respects. Firstly, and most important, we no
longer make such ambitious claims for sanctions policies. We no
longer claim that, of themselves, they are likely to solve or
cure the problem. We are no longer likely to say, as Harold Wilson
did, that the Rhodesian problem will be solved in weeks rather
than months. Secondly, we are paying more attention to the target
country, and Lord Lamont is absolutely right to say that targeted
sanctions are difficult to enforce and quite often are relatively
ineffective. There is a case, nevertheless, for targeting sanctions
on nuclear programmes and arms embargoes and the regimes, to the
extent we can, rather than going in for catch-all sanction solutions.
There is a continuing problem; these measures often are and sometimes
have to be accompanied by aid programmes to the very same countries,
and those aid programmes typically have the unintended effect
of reinforcing the regime. That certainly was the catastrophic
effect of the `oil for food' programme in Iraq, which was administered
horrendously; also, it has been the effect of aid programmes in
Zimbabwe, where the disbursement of aid is controlled, to a large
extent, by the regime. I am not arguing that we should not do
it but we should understand that it has the practical effect of
assisting the regime.
Q277 Lord Lawson of Blaby:
There are so many questions arising from that. First, however,
may I bring you back to the specific question of your book and
ask whether there are any other ways in which you would modify
it, the conclusions you reached in your book? For example, your
book did not say very much, as I recall it, about targeted sanctions,
which were not very involved at that time. You did say, however,
for example, minor or petty sanctions are virtually certain to
produce a reverse political effect without exerting any real pressure.
Would you say that, very often, targeted sanctions can come into
that category?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: Yes, they can, in some
cases.
Q278 Lord Lawson of Blaby:
As I understand it, what you were advocating in what you have
just said to us was that sanctions which deny military material
are really much more what we should be thinking about rather than
economic sanctions. I will leave out sporting sanctions. You were
absolutely right about sporting sanctions in South Africa but
I do not think sporting sanctions against Iran are going to have
much effect. But tell me if I am wrong. Could you reply to that
perhaps, and also to the original question which I asked a moment
ago?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: Certainly. Being summoned
before this Committee, I reread at least the Conclusions of the
book. I would not actually change them but certainly, I think,
one should try to refine them. On targeted sanctions, you are
absolutely right that I think `slap on the wrist' sanctions do
more harm than good. If sanctions are to be imposed at all they
need to be made to hurt, in some measure, and that can be done
with asset freezes if they are really enforced, it can be done
with regime travel bans if they are really enforced, otherwise
they appear just derisory to both the recipients and to those
who are trying to oppose the people we are trying to penalise.
I think targeted sanctions, as I have said, for sure, arms embargoes
properly enforced, especially if the recipient country, the target
country, has relatively sophisticated military means. It is very
difficult to stop the supply of rifles or mines or hand-grenades,
but certainly you can stop the supply of very sophisticated strike
aircraft, and so forth, missiles, etc. Sanctions targeted on nuclear
materials and nuclear equipment, again, we have seen lots and
lots of leakages; nevertheless, it can be made more difficult
for countries to acquire more of that sort of material, which
is very much the issue with North Korea and Iran. At the end of
the day, I would start from my initial point, which was why are
sanctions imposed; typically, they are not imposed because we
think that they are such a blindingly good idea, they are imposed
because we cannot think of anything else to do. The alternatives
are to do nothing, other than rhetorical admonition, or to take
military action.
Q279 Lord Lawson of Blaby:
Is that absolutely right? I realise it cannot be avowed but there
is something in-between doing nothing and going to war, and that
is subversion, which will be well known to you, in many contexts.
I will not embarrass you by talking about the United Kingdom,
but it is well known, for example, that the United States, in
the past, with varying degrees of success, has employed that in
Latin America and there are many other examples that are known
to all of us, and obviously, in particular, to you. Indeed, there
would be some people who would think that this is perhaps the
most appropriate course of action in the case of Iran. As I say,
I think it is very difficult, and this is not something that could
be avowed, but it is an important part of the real world, is it
not?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: I am not against subversion,
in the sense that I have been declared an `enemy of the state'
in Zimbabwe and I regard that as a rather honourable category
to be in, but I do not think the Committee's discussion is mainly
about subversion. Could I make just one other point; sanctions
typically are addressed to different audiences. Audience number
one, very often, is your own domestic constituency. Audience number
two is the regime you are trying to hurt. Audience number three
sometimes may be members of that regime who are less intransigent
than others. Another audience is people in that country who may
be opponents of the regime. But, and this is very relevant to
Iran and North Korea, you are also trying to send a clear signal
to other countries about, the consequences of going down that
course, there will be consequences, there are not no consequences.
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