Select Committee on Economic Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280 - 284)

TUESDAY 17 OCTOBER 2006

THE LORD RENWICK OF CLIFTON

  Q280  Lord Powell of Bayswater: Lord Renwick is quite right, of course, in remembering that Margaret Thatcher was completely isolated and in the right in opposing sanctions in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, isolated not only from all the other Commonwealth Governments but from her own Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office, who were in favour of them. His remarks bring two questions to mind. One is, drawing on what he said about South Africa, would he agree that sanctions are more likely to be effective against sophisticated governments than `ordinary' governments; i.e., actually would it be easier to make sanctions work against Belgium than Burma? It seems to me that his argument for South Africa was that a government with sophisticated structures is more vulnerable than a simple government, for instance the Burmese Government, or something of that sort. Secondly, would he say that, for most governments, the only way that sanctions will be effective, if indeed they ever are, and I have doubts about that, is if they do impose a very substantial economic cost on the population as a whole? They may not work in those circumstances, but probably those are the only circumstances in which they do; targeted sanctions are just a diversion?

  Lord Renwick of Clifton: On targeted sanctions, and I have said that I think some targeted sanctions can be reasonably effective, witness the arms embargo, you are absolutely right, and Lord Powell is absolutely right, I think that a more sophisticated country with a sophisticated economy and relatively sophisticated military can be attacked harder, because, clearly, in the case of Zimbabwe, it is a subsistence economy now and, the penalties you can impose can simply lead a lot more people to starve, which is not a very attractive option. I think the basic premise is correct.

  Q281  Lord Kingsdown: To a certain extent, I think you have answered this, but nevertheless may I ask this, in case more detail can come out? Can you say that there are circumstances in which economic sanctions can be an effective instrument of coercion without imposing severe economic costs?

  Lord Renwick of Clifton: Frankly, I think it is doubtful. When we impose sanctions against a regime like North Korea or Iran, are we seriously expecting fundamentally to change the behaviour of an intransigent regime? If we are, I think we are whistling in the dark, actually. What we should be trying to address are elements within the system, or indeed outside it, which may decide that this is not the right way to go, and that certainly was the hope within Iran. I think the situation we are in now with Iran is that, if they continue the enrichment programme, it would send a very bad signal indeed to the more moderate elements within that regime if we did not respond. At the moment, the most intransigent leaders in Iran are convinced that they are winning, and there has not been a response from the international community. They believe that China and Russia will block such a response. I am not sure that is true, and if it is proven that China and Russia will not block a response, that would send a useful signal. In the case of North Korea, that has sent a useful signal, I think, because, although they modified the Resolution, the Chinese and Russians did support the Resolution. The Resolution vis-a"-vis North Korea does have some teeth in it; the implementation remains to be seen, but it does have some teeth in it and it is a targeted response.

  Q282  Lord Sheppard of Didgemere: Building on the same thing, is there sometimes confusion between the politicians, between the interested parties, maybe throughout the world, in various institutions, as regards whether sanctions are meant to be a tool of economic warfare aimed at complete regime collapse or whether they are just trying to get the person to adapt and modify their policy and practice?

  Lord Renwick of Clifton: When sanctions are imposed, quite often there is a degree of confusion as to what they are intended to do, but in the cases of Iran and North Korea there is not that confusion. What we are trying to get them to do is halt their military nuclear programmes, so there is not much ambiguity there. The problem which several members of the Committee have raised, effectively, is that when you impose sanctions against a regime it may feel its survival to be at stake, and its survival is more important to it than economic penalties so it tends to pass on the economic penalties. It may define its survival differently from us. To a North Korean leader, his military nuclear capability equals, in his head, apparently, his survival; some of the Iranian leaders may think the same way. It is very difficult, if a regime feels its survival to be threatened, to change its behaviour by any means short of military, or, at any rate, blockades, which is a military action.

  Lord Skidelsky: The next question is specific to North Korea, but I think you have dealt with that in a number of your replies. I will go back to it, but I would like to ask a slightly broader one, because, in a way, in the South African case, or southern Africa—

  Q283  Chairman: There is a division. Frankly, we are very near to the end and you know the questions that have been set. Is there anything you have not said that really you wanted to say, because I do not think we can draw everybody back for two or three sentences afterwards?

  Lord Renwick of Clifton: No.

  Chairman: You have said everything? Well, now we have got time for Lord Skidelsky's question, if it is not on the agenda.

  Q284  Lord Skidelsky: Very quickly. Is not one of the objects of an effective sanctions policy to encourage internal opposition to the regime? That is compatible with not making anyone suffer, except members of the regime?

  Lord Renwick of Clifton: I think one of the real deficiencies of the policy towards Zimbabwe, as I have said, is that it does not lead the internal opposition to feel that they are getting any real support from the outside, and that support can take various forms, including grants for non-governmental organisations and attempts to support them actively by all sorts of means. I do not think, necessarily, you have to put a large number of farm workers out of work in order to achieve that result, is the short answer.

  Chairman: I am sorry about the rush, but it seemed to me sensible not to drag everybody back in 15 minutes for a few more sentences. Can I say how grateful we are to you, because your time has been relatively short, compared with that of some of our other contributors, but I think you have managed to give us more useful information in the time that you have talked to us than on other occasions, and so we are extremely grateful to you for coming but also for the clarity of what you had to say to us. Thank you very much.






 
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