Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280
- 284)
TUESDAY 17 OCTOBER 2006
THE LORD
RENWICK OF
CLIFTON
Q280 Lord Powell of Bayswater:
Lord Renwick is quite right, of course, in remembering that Margaret
Thatcher was completely isolated and in the right in opposing
sanctions in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, isolated not only from all
the other Commonwealth Governments but from her own Foreign Secretary
and the Foreign Office, who were in favour of them. His remarks
bring two questions to mind. One is, drawing on what he said about
South Africa, would he agree that sanctions are more likely to
be effective against sophisticated governments than `ordinary'
governments; i.e., actually would it be easier to make sanctions
work against Belgium than Burma? It seems to me that his argument
for South Africa was that a government with sophisticated structures
is more vulnerable than a simple government, for instance the
Burmese Government, or something of that sort. Secondly, would
he say that, for most governments, the only way that sanctions
will be effective, if indeed they ever are, and I have doubts
about that, is if they do impose a very substantial economic cost
on the population as a whole? They may not work in those circumstances,
but probably those are the only circumstances in which they do;
targeted sanctions are just a diversion?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: On targeted sanctions,
and I have said that I think some targeted sanctions can be reasonably
effective, witness the arms embargo, you are absolutely right,
and Lord Powell is absolutely right, I think that a more sophisticated
country with a sophisticated economy and relatively sophisticated
military can be attacked harder, because, clearly, in the case
of Zimbabwe, it is a subsistence economy now and, the penalties
you can impose can simply lead a lot more people to starve, which
is not a very attractive option. I think the basic premise is
correct.
Q281 Lord Kingsdown:
To a certain extent, I think you have answered this, but nevertheless
may I ask this, in case more detail can come out? Can you say
that there are circumstances in which economic sanctions can be
an effective instrument of coercion without imposing severe economic
costs?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: Frankly, I think it
is doubtful. When we impose sanctions against a regime like North
Korea or Iran, are we seriously expecting fundamentally to change
the behaviour of an intransigent regime? If we are, I think we
are whistling in the dark, actually. What we should be trying
to address are elements within the system, or indeed outside it,
which may decide that this is not the right way to go, and that
certainly was the hope within Iran. I think the situation we are
in now with Iran is that, if they continue the enrichment programme,
it would send a very bad signal indeed to the more moderate elements
within that regime if we did not respond. At the moment, the most
intransigent leaders in Iran are convinced that they are winning,
and there has not been a response from the international community.
They believe that China and Russia will block such a response.
I am not sure that is true, and if it is proven that China and
Russia will not block a response, that would send a useful signal.
In the case of North Korea, that has sent a useful signal, I think,
because, although they modified the Resolution, the Chinese and
Russians did support the Resolution. The Resolution vis-a"-vis
North Korea does have some teeth in it; the implementation remains
to be seen, but it does have some teeth in it and it is a targeted
response.
Q282 Lord Sheppard of Didgemere:
Building on the same thing, is there sometimes confusion between
the politicians, between the interested parties, maybe throughout
the world, in various institutions, as regards whether sanctions
are meant to be a tool of economic warfare aimed at complete regime
collapse or whether they are just trying to get the person to
adapt and modify their policy and practice?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: When sanctions are
imposed, quite often there is a degree of confusion as to what
they are intended to do, but in the cases of Iran and North Korea
there is not that confusion. What we are trying to get them to
do is halt their military nuclear programmes, so there is not
much ambiguity there. The problem which several members of the
Committee have raised, effectively, is that when you impose sanctions
against a regime it may feel its survival to be at stake, and
its survival is more important to it than economic penalties so
it tends to pass on the economic penalties. It may define its
survival differently from us. To a North Korean leader, his military
nuclear capability equals, in his head, apparently, his survival;
some of the Iranian leaders may think the same way. It is very
difficult, if a regime feels its survival to be threatened, to
change its behaviour by any means short of military, or, at any
rate, blockades, which is a military action.
Lord Skidelsky: The next question is
specific to North Korea, but I think you have dealt with that
in a number of your replies. I will go back to it, but I would
like to ask a slightly broader one, because, in a way, in the
South African case, or southern Africa
Q283 Chairman:
There is a division. Frankly, we are very near to the end and
you know the questions that have been set. Is there anything you
have not said that really you wanted to say, because I do not
think we can draw everybody back for two or three sentences afterwards?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: No.
Chairman: You have said everything? Well,
now we have got time for Lord Skidelsky's question, if it is not
on the agenda.
Q284 Lord Skidelsky:
Very quickly. Is not one of the objects of an effective sanctions
policy to encourage internal opposition to the regime? That is
compatible with not making anyone suffer, except members of the
regime?
Lord Renwick of Clifton: I think one of the
real deficiencies of the policy towards Zimbabwe, as I have said,
is that it does not lead the internal opposition to feel that
they are getting any real support from the outside, and that support
can take various forms, including grants for non-governmental
organisations and attempts to support them actively by all sorts
of means. I do not think, necessarily, you have to put a large
number of farm workers out of work in order to achieve that result,
is the short answer.
Chairman: I am sorry about the rush,
but it seemed to me sensible not to drag everybody back in 15
minutes for a few more sentences. Can I say how grateful we are
to you, because your time has been relatively short, compared
with that of some of our other contributors, but I think you have
managed to give us more useful information in the time that you
have talked to us than on other occasions, and so we are extremely
grateful to you for coming but also for the clarity of what you
had to say to us. Thank you very much.
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