Memorandum by Mr Alex Vines, Royal Institute
of International Affairs
The Effectiveness of UN Financial Sanctions
In 2006 we enter a period where there has been
a swing back in favour of using sanctions as an alternative to
direct military engagement, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. There
is also a worrying inflationary trend to seek sanctions—such
as on Iran—without assessing what the impact would really
be or whether the UN system can deliver. This submission argues
for reflection and caution and the need to deconstruct what sanctions
achieve—especially financial sanctions.
Since the early 1990s there has been a dramatic
increase in sanctions imposed on countries by the United Nations
Security Council. Until then sanctions had only been imposed on
two countries: Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. During
the 1990s and up to 2004 the Council imposed sanctions on Iraq
in 1990; the former Yugoslavia in 1991, 1992 and 1998; Libya in
1992; Liberia in 1992 and 2001; Somalia in 1992; Haiti in 1993;
Angola's UNITA in 1993, 1997 and 1998; Rwanda in 1994; Sudan in
1996; Sierra Leone in 1997; Afghanistan in 1999; Ethiopia and
Eritrea in 2000; the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from July
2003; Co®te d'Ivoire from November 2004; Sudan from March
2005 and in October 2005 suspects in the 14 February 2005 terrorist
bombing in Beirut.
Instruments vested in the Council as part of
the peace and security mechanisms envisioned in Chapter VII of
the UN Charter provide the basis for the imposition of sanctions
by the Council. Such sanctions have been the cause of significant
debate and controversy, not least because of the humanitarian
crisis in Iraq during the 1990s, which was related to, if not
directly caused by, the imposition of UN sanctions.
What type of sanctions?
The most widespread type of UN sanction used
is the arms embargo, such as those imposed on Angola, Ethiopia/Eritrea,
Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia, DRC, Co®te
d'Ivoire and Sudan. There have also been commodity embargoes,
such as on diamond exports from Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia
and Co®te d'Ivoire, or on timber from Liberia. Travel bans
and assets freezes have been imposed on groups like Al-Qeda and
The Taliban, as well as individuals in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
DRC, Co®te d'Ivoire, Sudan and those involved in the Beirut
bombing. An arms embargo and financial sanctions were placed on
the Angolan rebel movement UNITA along with a ban on the sale
of petroleum products to them.
What is the impact?
Generally until the late 1990s UN sanctions
had little impact. This changed due to greater efforts in monitoring
compliance of them but despite the new enthusiasm, the record
remains variable.
Sanctions are more successful if assessed as
part of a wider diplomatic package. The UN diamond embargoes on
Liberia and Sierra Leone and the timber embargo on Liberia are
fairly successful. In contrast arms embargoes have failed across
Africa. Travel bans and assets freezes also have a variable record.
The UN system relies on support of member states
and increasingly on monitoring by a small number of independent
consultants in panels, groups or monitoring mechanisms. Their
role is to produce reports to the Security Council Committees
that then deliberate over what can be a violation and what to
do. Mostly Committees write letters and manage the lists of targeted
individuals and entities. The quality of the reports from the
consultants is improving, but the effectiveness of the Sanctions
Committees is variable. The choice of which country chairs these
committees is important—and can determine their effectiveness.
Greater scrutiny and feedback on what Expert Groups produce is
also needed.
The key to a successful embargo is political
will by the Security Council to implement and monitor the sanctions.
It is telling that the two countries where Western political will
for effective UN sanctions was at its greatest in the 1990s were
Iraq and Libya. Sanctions probably stymied Saddam Hussein's efforts
to procure weapons of mass destruction and in Libya they encouraged
Tripoli's rapprochement with the West. Sanctions on Liberia itself
were not successful, but they worked as secondary sanctions to
loosen Charles Taylor's grip on the Revolutionary United Front
rebels of Sierra Leone.
There have been few independent studies of the
effectiveness of sanctions in Africa and this is urgently needed.
Funded by the Canadian Government (with some additional support
from Denmark and the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office) Chatham
House has in 2006 conducted for the first independent appraisal
of the effectiveness of UN sanctions—with fieldwork recently
completed in Angola, Sierra Leone and Somalia.
What needs to be done?
Chatham House is in its final stages of completing
the study but the results show a number of things:
— Arms embargoes are ineffective but
tracking the funding can be more effective in stopping deliveries.
— Diamond embargoes also have had limited
impact—and it is important that better controls are introduced
in producing countries that issue Kimberley certificates. This
is likely to be a key agenda item at the Kimberley Plenary summit
in Botswana in November 2006.
— Travel bans and asset freezes can
be effective—especially if the lists produced by the UN
include quality indicators on who these individuals are and also
clear cut and accurate criteria on why they have been listed.
There also needs to be an emphasis on small numbers of individuals
as this assists tracking. In early 2006 in Co®te d'Ivoire
the imposition of targeted sanctions on three individuals had
a calming effect on others and there was a noticeable decline
in hate speech for some six months.
— The threat of sanctions can be a
more effective tool than imposition of the sanctions themselves.
— The effectiveness of sanctions deteriorates
over time as the targets find ways around them. Indeed sanctions
can encourage the deepening of corruption, money laundering and
criminal networks—and the longer they run, the more likely
this will be.
— There are cases, such as Somalia,
where the sanctions become an international fig leaf for symbolic
action and maybe should be scrapped as they undermine the credibility
of the UN system.
— There needs to be more systematic
independent appraisal of the work of UN expert Groups but also
greater transparency and accountability of Sanctions Committees.
— UN and regional peacekeeping operations
can play a constructive role in monitoring sanctions and there
is the need for better training and the development of standard
operating procedures. UN peacekeeping operations prefer to monitor
arms and commodity sanctions—the monitoring of individuals
and their financial assets often clashes with their peacekeeping
and mediation mandate. There are examples where peacekeeping operations
deliberately distance themselves from such sanctions.
September 2006
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