Success, failure and sanctions
105. The view that economic sanctions are almost
always ineffective was expressed by Mr Carver, who referred
to "the ineffectiveness of almost all sanctions adopted by
States, at least over the past 50 years" (p 130). He
attributed this to a failure to distinguish clearly between UN
sanctions for the protection and restoration of international
peace and security, and unilateral or coalition sanctions as acts
of war. He suggested: "Sanctions could become an effective
instrument to achieve the objectives set out in Chapter VII of
the UN Charter" if this distinction was adhered to and non-UN
sanctions abandoned. (p 130)
106. In contrast to Mr Carver's near-unequivocal
view that economic sanctions do not work, Professor Michael
Malloy of the University of the Pacific told us in written evidence:
"… in the most successful episodes,
sanctions are not applied sequentially, with other responses to
be triggered only after sanctions have failed to achieve the policy
objective. Rather, sanctions are best applied en suite,
along with all other appropriate available responses … Based
on available empirical data, the relatively most successful sanctions
programs appear to be those that apply a wide range of sanctions,
rigorously and in coordination with a range of other seriously
initiated foreign policy measures." (p 163)
Professor Malloy also stated:
"Economic sanctions themselves are purely
instrumental, but they are not themselves the embodiment of policy.
Sanctions will have whatever instrumental 'effect' the circumstances
of their use will allow, but it is overarching policy—foreign
and/or domestic—that should be judged in terms of its effectiveness,
not sanctions." (p 163)
107. In similar vein, Mr Vines concluded:
"Sanctions are more successful if assessed as part of a wider
diplomatic package". He added: "sanctions which are
part of a whole range of policies are more successful" (p 108
Q 93). Witnesses involved with the policy process expressed the
same view. Mr Kovanda argued that, in the cases of South
Africa, Libya and former Yugoslavia, "sanctions have achieved
their objective, together with other instruments of policy"
(Q 258). According to Mr Pattison, "sanctions are
most effective when they are not imposed in isolation" (Q 4).
This evidence vindicates Lord Renwick's view that:
"policy-making in this area has improved
… most important, we no longer make such ambitious claims
for sanctions policies. We no longer claim that, of themselves,
they are likely to solve or cure the problem." (Q 276)
108. Dr Colin Rowat of the University of
Birmingham and Mr Singleton drew our attention to the study
by Professor Gary Hufbauer, and others of 116 "major"
cases of economic sanctions between 1914 and 1990 (p 163,
Q 90). Professor Hufbauer concluded that success was achieved
on the main goals with economic sanctions contributing substantially
in 34% of cases, with a decline in the success rate to 24% from
the 1970s onwards. Dr Rowat noted that a follow-up study
of a further 50 cases of economic sanctions in the 1990s found
a similar success rate.
109. Overall, while there was disagreement over
the value of sanctions in particular cases, the near-consensus,
which we endorse, was that economic sanctions used in isolation
from other policy instruments are extremely unlikely to force
a target to make major policy changes, especially where relations
between the states involved are hostile more generally. An
emphasis on economic sanctions will usually be ineffective and
indeed counter-productive for inducing major policy changes by
a target state which is seeking security reassurance and economic
incentives or which sees its current policy as a vital interest:
this is illustrated by the failure to make substantial progress
with Iran. Even when economic sanctions are combined effectively
with other foreign policy instruments, on most occasions they
play a subordinate role to those other instruments. Economic sanctions
can be counter-productive in a variety of ways, including when
more vigorous coercion in the form of force is needed but is forestalled
by those making inflated claims for the value of sanctions as
an alternative. Sanctions may also be counter-productive
when what is required is a much greater emphasis on economic,
diplomatic and security incentives. When the Government's goal
is to symbolise disapproval, measures other than economic sanctions
should be used wherever possible. Furthermore, when the use of
economic sanctions for this purpose is proposed, serious consideration
should be given to the possibility that their overall effect will
be counter-productive, even in symbolic terms.
110. Nevertheless, economic sanctions can,
on occasion, contribute substantially to achieving objectives
when combined appropriately with other instruments of foreign
policy.[41] This
is particularly the case where the states involved already have
reasonably good diplomatic relations or wish to establish them,
as with Libya and its pursuit of WMD.[42]
It may also help if the objectives of the sanctions are proportionate
and clearly-defined. Of course, if, in any particular case, economic
sanctions are likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive,
this does not imply that the use of force—even if legal—is
likely to be any more successful if wider foreign policy considerations
are taken into account, as they should be.
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