Sanctions Policy: Principles
and Practice
142. Targeted financial sanctions have been less
effective than is sometimes suggested. They have been imposed
on people and entities selected on non-transparent or dubious
grounds; they have hit few targets and not hit them hard. (Para
84)
143. Even if it is regarded as necessary to retain
the option of comprehensive sanctions, it should be recognised
that this is not compatible with the claim that UK sanctions should
hit the regime rather than the people, and we are not persuaded
that humanitarian exemptions can adequately solve the problem.
(Para 85)
144. The UN has developed systematic technical
guidelines for evaluating the humanitarian implications of sanctions
before, during and after their imposition, and also for mitigating
their effects.[45] The
Government should ensure the application of the UN's humanitarian
assessment procedures to any sanctions with which it is involved,
especially those which damage the target country's economy in
a general way. It should also provide a public account of the
application of the UN guidelines. (Para 91)
145. We are sensitive to the demands of policy-making
and the reality that events can develop so rapidly that decisions
must at times be made reactively. Nevertheless, we would argue
that such reasons do not normally justify the rushed adoption
of sanctions. If sanctions are, nevertheless, imposed without
proper advance planning, they should certainly be followed by
proper monitoring and by the development of an exit strategy.
In our view, the Government has an incomplete commitment to the
principle that objectives should be clear and realistic and that
an exit strategy should be developed before sanctions are imposed.
It repeatedly adopts sanctions with little sense of whether the
objectives can be achieved or of how sanctions can contribute
to the achievement of those objectives. (Para 95)
146. Sanctions policy is more likely to be effective
if it incorporates an appropriate system of monitoring and control,
which would normally require the establishment of a permanent
expert staff. (Para 98)
147. We recommend that the Government should
be more active in promoting systematic monitoring and independent
expert review of sanctions policy. We also suggest that there
should be provision for regular Parliamentary review of sanctions
so that Parliament can consider whether sanctions are achieving
their intended goals or whether policy should be amended. (Para
99)
148. The direct costs to British business arising
from compliance with UK sanctions policy are minor. The opportunity
costs will be more substantial but more difficult to quantify.
The costs are acceptable to the extent that the sanctions policies
themselves are well founded, something that is open to question
in some of the cases we have considered. (Para 104)
149. Economic sanctions used in isolation from
other policy instruments are extremely unlikely to force a target
to make major policy changes, especially where relations between
the states involved are hostile more generally. Even when economic
sanctions are combined effectively with other foreign policy instruments,
on most occasions they play a subordinate role to those other
instruments. Economic sanctions can be counter-productive in a
variety of ways, including when more vigorous coercion in the
form of force is needed but is forestalled by those making inflated
claims for the value of sanctions as an alternative. Sanctions
may also be counter-productive when what is required is a much
greater emphasis on economic, diplomatic and security incentives.
When the Government's goal is to symbolise disapproval, measures
other than economic sanctions should be used wherever possible.
Furthermore, when the use of economic sanctions for this purpose
is proposed, serious consideration should be given to the possibility
that their overall effect will be counter-productive, even in
symbolic terms. (Para 109)
150. Nevertheless, economic sanctions can, on
occasion, contribute substantially to achieving objectives when
combined appropriately with other instruments of foreign policy.
(Para 110)
North Korea
151. North Korea has repeatedly stated its conditions
for renouncing nuclear weapons and scrapping longer-range ballistic
missile exports: diplomatic recognition, security guarantees,
lifting of sanctions and major economic incentives. However distasteful
the regime is, such a deal is preferable to the dangers of nuclear-armed
confrontation and the 13 February Agreement is to be welcomed.
We endorse the Government's support for the Agreement and the
phased lifting of sanctions as part of that Agreement. (Para 118)
Iran
152. The key strength of the EU's proposed Framework
Agreement on Iranian nuclear technology is its emphasis on incentives
rather than sanctions and its key weakness is the lack of US support
for it. (Para 120)
153. We urge the Government to make every effort,
bilaterally and through the EU, to persuade the US to commit fully
to involvement with the EU's proposed Framework Agreement. (Para
123)
Implications for policy towards
North Korea and Iran
154. Reliance on sanctions as the main means
of resolving the current disputes with North Korea and Iran appears
to be a recipe for failure. (Para 124)
155. The prospects for success would appear to
be maximised by a pragmatic emphasis on securing a sustained US
commitment to a broader international initiatives offering lifting
of sanctions, economic incentives, diplomatic recognition and
security guarantees. These incentives should be phased and coordinated
with verifiable, reciprocal steps by North Korea and Iran. (Para 126)
45 Manuel Bessler, Richard Garfield and Richard McHugh,
Sanctions Assessment Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact
of Sanctions and Field Guidelines for Assessing the Humanitarian
Impact of Sanctions. Back
