Memorandum by the Council for Arab-British
Understanding
INTRODUCTION
The Council warmly welcomes the inquiry into
the use of economic sanctions. We believe that this crucial debate
has sadly died down since the end of sanctions on Iraq in 2003.
During the Iraq sanctions there was a huge dynamic debate about
the efficacy of sanctions and the desirability of alternative
sanctions models, including so-called "smart sanctions"
and "targeted sanctions".
Although there has been only a limited public
or media debate since then, sanctions have continued to be used,
and their use has also been threatened. We are not in the position
to audit the entirety of the sanctions regimes programmes imposed
but would like to refer to several specific areas.
GENERAL ISSUES
WITH SANCTIONS
REGIMES
TIME
LIMITED SANCTIONS
Often various sanctions regimes have been used
to mask an unwillingness to tackle difficult political issues.
The sanctions, as was the case in Iraq, essentially maintained
the crisis in formaldehyde rather than leading to a resolution
of the dispute. The likely outcomes were either the sanctions
regime would erode thereby undermining international law or a
conflict was likely to break out. In the end both happened. Therefore,
there should be serious consideration given to sanction regimes
with limited time duration. Therefore, if the UN Security Council
wishes to extend the sanctions, it should require an entirely
new resolution.
Frequently on the issue of Iraq there was a
majority of UN Security Council members who wanted to see sanctions
on Iraq lifted. However, any permanent member could always veto
the lifting of sanctions, thereby making it extremely difficult
to get them removed. A similar situation occurred with Libya,
where the US also threatened to veto any resolution lifting sanctions.
This created a view in the targeted state that it was pointless
trying to get the sanctions lifted though the legal route, and
consequently encouraged sanctions -busting as the escape route.
International consensus
Another problem facing UN sanctions regimes
is that increasingly the international community is divided with
leading states opting to act on their own. Subsequently, it has
become much tougher to achieve the international consensus necessary
to make the sanctions effective.
The EU has often preferred constructive or critical
dialogue to sanctions unlike the US that has a tendency to isolate
and punish. This is most notable over Iran. Nevertheless sanctions
as a tool of diplomacy are important as an alternative to words
and war.
Who do sanctions affect?
Many sanctions regimes are designed to pressure
a civilian population to force their government to adopt certain
measures. Time and time again these have proved unsuccessful,
and typically are counterproductive. Indeed they frequently hurt
the very people the international community want to protect. This
is the case currently in Gaza where the sanctions effectively
imposed on the elected Palestinian authority have not decreased
their popularity nor have they compelled the new authority to
adhere to the demands of the Quartet. In fact, it appears to have
hardened the position of Hamas leaders. In the case of undemocratic
regimes like Iraq, there was simply no way in which ordinary Iraqis
could have put pressure on the Saddam Hussein regime even if they
had wanted to. What is clear is that the less the civilian population
is impacted by sanctions the more likely they are to succeed.
Not only that but any form of sanctions regime
that targets the whole civilian population is illegal and immoral.
Sanctions are can also serve as an extremely
useful scapegoat for a targeted regime especially if they are
in control of the media. All the ills of a particular state can
be blamed upon the embargo rather than their own policy failings.
Impact on third-party states
It is clear that UN sanctions regimes have a
huge impact on neighbouring states. In the case of Iraq some 21
states complained of losses as a result of the sanctions.
These states should be permitted to attend discussions
on such sanctions and consideration given to offset any losses
that they might suffer as a result. It has also been argued that
more targeted sanctions could limit the impact on third-party
states.
Unilateral sanctions have also had a huge impact
on third-party states. The United States in particular needs to
consider carefully how to offset this, if sanctions are to be
effective and not harm relations with other states.
If third-party states continue to lose heavily
as a result of sanctions regimes then they will have less motivation
in enforcing them.
Review of sanctions
There is an obligation for any UN-mandated sanctions
regime under Article 41 to ensure that they are "in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law".
CASE STUDIES:
SANCTIONS ON
STATES
SANCTIONS
ON IRAQ
This should be a main focus of any inquiry as
they were by far the most comprehensive sanctions regime but also
underwent numerous changes over a period of almost 13 years.
The sanctions did have a huge effect upon Iraq
because of their scale but also because Iraq was, and remains,
hugely dependent on hydrocarbon income. This meant that any sanctions
that did not target oil exports would be ineffective but also
if there was no oil income the Iraqi people would be the first
to suffer. It should be stressed that sanctions were one of, but
not the sole cause, of suffering of the Iraqi people and that
the former government of Iraq must bear a huge responsibility
as well.
However, it is clear that the sanctions regime
lost its coercive force and influence on the regime only two to
three years after they were imposed. In the first year alone the
Iraqi economy shrunk by 75 per cent. Instead the breaking of sanctions
and flouting of international law became something the regime
wished to encourage as an act of defiance.
In short, the Iraqi people were hit by sanctions
whilst the regime was able to protect its own interests. It was
also clear that it was not the regime that was largely blamed
but the parties involved in enforcing the sanctions. This was
one reason why American and British forces were not universally
welcomed as they had hoped when they invaded Iraq in 2003.
The regime was able to use the sanctions regime
for its own benefit. By September 1990 it had introduced a widespread
rationing system. As with other regimes, it withdrew ration cards
as a form of political pressure and suppression. It was an anomaly
of the whole sanctions regime that it depended upon a brutal dictatorial
regime to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
In future, sanctions programmes should take
into consideration all those items necessary for the proper running
and maintenance of core public utilities such as electricity,
water and sewage treatment. During the 1991 conflict these had
been severely damaged and Iraq found it difficult to bring them
back to pre-war levels. Consequently raw sewage was flowing into
Iraq's rivers in massive quantities.
In common with many sanctions regimes, the middle
classes tried to leave Iraq to find opportunities left elsewhere.
This brain drain is particularly damaging in many of these countries.
There was also significant criticism that UN
Security Council members, including Britain and the United States,
turned a blind eye to sanctions busting. The accusation was made
by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, but also by Calne Ross,
then a senior official in the Foreign Office: "We did not
turn a deliberate blind eye, but there was no serious attempt
to stop the smuggling. We never put serious pressure on Jordan
or Turkey or the Gulf states. There was a lot of talk, but not
much action."[95]
The oil-for-food programme
This needs a complete reassessment. There was
scope at every stage of the process for the politicisation of
what was supposedly a humanitarian process.
There was no proper impact assessment of the
sanctions on the Iraqi people. Moreover as the sanctions and the
programme persisted, it was insufficient to deal with the developmental
need of the Iraqi people as well. This was particularly the case
as the programme was run in six months stages with only limited
means to undertake long term planning.
The oil-for-food programme also had a huge impact
on the domestic economy as there was no cash component. For example,
there was no motivation for Iraqi farmers to produce foodstuffs
when they had to compete with imported foodstuffs paid for out
of the programme. Without a cash component water pumps and other
machinery would arrive but there were no funds to pay for the
operators. The cash component was recognized in UNSCR 1284 but
was never implemented in the centre and the south.
Sanctions-supporting governments pointed out
that Northern Iraq, which was not under the control of the then
Government of Iraq, was in a far healthier situation. However,
the north received 22 per more capita in funds, had a cash component,
and also had a significant number of international aid agencies
operating there, whereas there were hardly any in the rest of
the country.
The whole sanctions regime also allowed the
Iraqi government to play havoc with the oil markets. It was able
to increase or decrease its production free from any quotas that
it was party to under OPEC. On several occasions Iraq halted oil
production which sent shockwaves through the energy markets.
Sanctions on Libya
The UN sanctions could be argued to have had
some impact on the government of Libya. There was clearly a desire
to get the sanctions lifted, and hence after a long time, the
Libyans agreed to a third-party trial at the Hague. Much later,
this was also accepted by the British and American governments.
However, there was also clear evidence of a
large segment of the Libyan elite who did not see lifting sanctions
as essential. There was also a huge degree of smuggling across
the borders and therefore people who had vested interested in
maintaining the sanctions regime. African governments in particular
began to defy the travel ban yet again undermining international
law.
The sanctioning of Palestinian authority areas
There has been an embargo by the international
community on the Palestinian Authority since the elections of
Hamas in January 2006. This has not been authorised by the United
Nations Security Council but by the Quartet—United Nations,
the EU, United States and Russia. This comes on top of the existing
Israeli closures and checkpoints regime that has decimated the
Palestinian economy as a form of collective punishment.
This has had a massive impact not on the elected
government of Hamas that the Quartet objected to, but the Palestinian
people already suffering from an occupation that has lasted almost
40 years.
The embargo has hit every section of the Palestinian
economy. The Palestinian Authority's monthly income dropped from
$150 million to $20 million or less, according to the United Nations.
This one of the principle causes of a huge rise in the numbers
of Palestinians living in poverty which according to the UN is
in excess of 70 per cent.
In Gaza, its impact was worsened by the Israeli
shelling and especially the destruction of the power station in
June. Currently, most of Gaza's 1.4 million inhabitants only have
a few hours of electricity a day. There is also a lack of fuel
to operate the water wells and the lack of clean water has become
a serious health problem. In addition, there are shortages of
key drugs in most major Palestinian hospitals.
Basic foodstuffs are in short supply according
to the World Food Programme. The sugar price in Gaza has risen
by one third since January. The United Nations reported for example
in June that 43.1 per cent of pregnant women had anaemia. The
World Food Programme is increasing the number of people it feeds
in Gaza to 220,000.
As part of the blockade the Israeli forces have
prevented fishing in Gaza since 25 June 2006. Yet again there
appears to be no reasonable security reason for doing this. Israeli
patrol boats have for years effectively controlled the Gaza seashore.
Access is also an issue on the West Bank. Increasing
aid agencies have been finding it harder to enter through Israeli
checkpoints. The United Nations even reported that in June and
July, 22 water tankers were denied entry into the West Bank.
It has also undermined credibility in US-UK
ambitions to spread democracy throughout the region. It has also
as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard,
has stated, reduced the credibility of the United Nations as well.
Sanctions on Syria
The US imposed additional trade sanctions on
Syria in May 2004 through the Syrian Accountability Act. This
included a freeze on overseas Syrian assets and a ban all exports
except those of a humanitarian nature. Air parts are allowed for
safety reasons. However, at present Syrian Arab Airlines has to
apply to Boeing or Airbus (a large portion of Airbus parts come
from the US) for parts, in what is a long approvals process. When
planes are abroad they usually have to be re-supplied from spare
parts in Syria as they cannot be supplied for example at Heathrow.
This means that supplies have to be flown specially to Heathrow
from Damascus, wasting time and energy.
Syria remains the only country that the US considers
a state sponsor of terrorism, with whom it still has diplomatic
relations. However, the existing sanctions have restricted the
US's ability to engage the Syrian government over key issues such
as Lebanon and Iraq. It is left to the EU to do this.
SPECIFIC TYPES
OF SANCTIONS
Extra-territorial sanctions
We feel that the Helms Burton Act and Iran-Libya
sanctions Act were a dangerous precedent. Whilst the United States
should have the sovereign right to decide who it trades with,
to be able to sanction foreign companies is a clear violation
of other states' sovereignty.
Sanctions on parts for civilian aircraft
We believe that there is a strong case for outlawing
this type of sanction. It is not targeted against any regime or
individual and there may come a time when a civilian airliner's
safety is put at serious risk.
Under the sanctions regime imposed against Libya
in UN Security Council Resolution 883, spare parts for civilian
airliners were included. We cannot detect that this ever put the
regime under any pressure to comply whatsoever.
Arms trade sanctions
We believe that these are one type of smart
sanction that is worthwhile using. They have been increasingly
imposed on both states and non-state actors. The United Nations
Security Council set a precedent by setting up a sanctions regime
against UNITA in 1993, the first non-state actor to be so targeted.
We believe that there is a strong case for a
complete arms trade ban with Israel, thereby ensuring that Britain
is not involved in the arming of any side in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Licensed arms sales to Israel over the past year has
reached a value of £23 million, almost double the figure
for 2004. The behaviour of the Israeli military in both Lebanon
and Gaza are both more than justifiable reasons for imposing such
a comprehensive ban which should be EU wide. In particular there
should be a serious review of the use and sale of cluster bombs
and similar munitions. It is estimated that Israel fired 1.2 million
bomblets in the last three days of the war alone carpeting the
civilian areas of southern Lebanon. Finally, the British government
should be compelled to explain their collaboration in the supply
of US weaponry to Israel that could have been used in Lebanon.
There are however difficulties with arms sanctions.
The main arms exporting states are permanent members of the UN
Security Council, and therefore are not keen to stem what is a
lucrative trade. For this reason there is a tendency to impose
arms embargoes on poorer countries, where the market is not attractive,
rather than richer ones.
There needs to be greater work carried out to
monitor the efficacy of such embargoes. Any successful arms embargo
needs to have a monitoring mechanism incorporated into it. It
was noticeable that this weakened the arms embargo imposed on
the South African apartheid regime, which found endless loopholes
to ensure it maintained its military forces.
Many UN member states lack the ability to enforce
and monitor such sanctions. This has been seen in Africa but also
in the Middle East. Stemming the flow of weapons has been extremely
difficult also for those countries with long land and sea borders.
For example, Yemen had to seek assistance form the United States
to establish a proper coast guard.
Sanctions on Al Qa'ida and associates
After having imposed sanctions on the former
Taliban regime in 2001, the UN Security Council extended this
embargo, which included arms and travel bans as well as an assets
freeze, to those associated with al Qa'ida.
There is a sanctions list of names and organisations
that are embargoed. However, the process of altering and updating
that list has proved very cumbersome. There have been dead people
who have appeared on this list even. There have also been cases
where names have been misspelled.
We are concerned that there is no proper and
effective means for a person who has been named on this list to
appeal or seek review.
The blockade of Lebanon by Israeli forces
During the conflict between Israel and Lebanon
in July/August 2006, Israeli forces blockaded Lebanese ports,
having also attacked Beirut airport. The blockade was finally
lifted on 7 September some 24 days after the ceasefire came into
being. The impact on the Lebanese economy was huge, and the sea
blockade continued well after the fighting had ended. The land
blockade had been lifted on 14 August. So far it has been difficult
to establish the precise costs to the Lebanese economy of the
blockade but the conflict is predicted to cost as much as $4 billion.[96]
This was a clear violation of international
law. The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on the laws
of war are explicit that economic sieges against civilian populations
are banned.
The Israeli wall: requirement for actions against
those companies participating in construction of the wall
The Advisory Opinion from the International
Court of Justice on the Israeli wall in 2004 made it clear that
the wall and its regime was illegal and should be dismantled.
Nothing has been done in the two years since. According to the
opinion and the subsequent UN General Assembly Resolution, states
are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation
resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render
aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such
construction. Moreover there should be a register of damages that
arise from the construction of the wall that threatens to annex
around 10 per cent of the West Bank. We have yet to see any evidence
that the British government has made any attempt to ensure compliance
with this resolution or attempted to dissuade any British companies
from working on the wall.
CAABU believes that there is a clear case for
the government to impose punitive measures against any companies
or individuals who participate in the construction of this illegal
wall which has strangled Palestinian life, imprisoning over one
million people, dividing families from families, people from their
land, schools and medical facilities.
SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. There should be a continued and careful
review of all sanctions regimes including those imposed by the
UN, regional groupings and individual states.
2. All sanctions regimes should be time
limited.
3. There should be very clear criteria as
to how and under what circumstances sanctions would be lifted.
4. The lifting of UN sanctions should not
require a new Security Council Resolution that could be vetoed
by a substantial majority of Security Council Members.
5. From the start, there should be inbuilt
monitoring of the impact of any sanctions regime to assess its
impact especially on the civilian population.
6. Sanctions regimes should be better targeted
at the regimes or parties in question. Above all such sanctions
regimes must ensure that civilian populations are not unduly harmed.
7. All sanctions regimes should give careful
consideration to the impact on third-party states.
8. There should be greater emphasis on arms
trade embargoes particularly in conflict areas. This should include
Israel as a consequence of its disproportionate assaults on the
Lebanese and Gaza civilian populations. The embargo on the Palestinian
civilian population should be lifted immediately.
September 2006
95 Quoted by Phillip Sherwell, in the Daily Telegraph,
17 April 2005. Back
96
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