Memorandum by Mr Mikael Eriksson, European
University Institute
Targeted sanctions are currently in a dynamic
phase where much learning is taking place. Not only has there
been a shift nowadays from comprehensive sanctions to targeted
sanctions, but also to more mature stages of sanctions
use. Several international processes such as the Stockholm process,
the Interlaken process and the Bonn-Berlin process have been the
latest efforts in shaping this foreign policy instrument.
The shift to targeted sanctions came as direct
response to the high humanitarian costs following the comprehensive
UN sanctions on Iraq. Targeted sanctions is based on a simple
logic, that is: to target, by using political and economic means,
those individuals who are in the vanguard of local armed conflicts,
terrorism and political violence, while at the same time avoiding
hurting civilians who do not carry any political responsibility
on behalf of the government. By targeting specific individuals
it is though, multifaceted conflicts may be dissolved and prevented.
The aim of the measures furthermore, has been to influence internal
political dynamics within a regime so that a reduction of power
of decision-making elites can take place. Over the last few years,
targeted sanctions have also been applied to bring perpetrators
and former war criminals to international justice, as has been
the case for the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia,
and Sierra Leone. Some high profile targets which have been listed
are inter alia: Slobodan Milosevic (Former Yugoslavia),
Saddam Hussein (Iraq), and Charles Taylor (Liberia). Besides being
oriented on leaders, targeted sanctions has also been applied
on particular conflict resources such as rough diamonds, conflict
timber and arms.
But targeted sanctions have not been the obvious
instrument to deal with threats to peace and security. Several
governments have also turned to more violent options such as target
assassination. The logic of targeted assassinations suggests that
a government could approve the killing of a political leader of
another government or non-state organisations in as a "preventive
measure". The killing aims are eliminating a leader that
poses a strategic threat, and who is believed to be able to cause
harm to a great number of people. This strategy has been used
in the combat against international terrorism. Today there exist
many examples where this option has been carried out: by Israel
of the former Hamas' leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin, or by Russia of
the former leader of the Chechen movement, Alsan Maschadow, etc.
The legitimacy of this strategy is questioned and it has been
heavily criticised by the human rights community.
Going back to the importance of targeted sanctions,
one can note that in the post Cold-war etc, states in the international
state system are currently being challenged by three immediate
security threats: civil-wars, terrorism and organised crime. Behind
many of these threats stand rough charismatic leaders and decision-makers.
Now, by sanctioning the leadership of these entities, as vanguards,
the international community could have a decisive impact on the
development of peace and security. By focusing on individual targets,
ie by restricting their private, economic and political manoeuvre
room, entire conflict complexes could be dissolved. In fact, the
centrality of key personalities could be illustrated by looking
into three areas of the contemporary security environment. According
to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project there were about 30 armed
conflicts ongoing in the world in 2005. Of these a majority were
of intra-state character. Many times these local armed conflicts
have been led and operated by a number of key leaders such as
Jonas Savimbi (Angola), John Garang (Sudan), Joseph Koney (Uganda),
and numerous others.
The shift from comprehensive sanctions to targeted
sanctions is here to stay. Confronting and battling "new"
types of threats, calls for neater strategies that are better
fit to deal with issues like money laundering, smuggling, trafficking,
human right abuses, terrorism, etc rather than employing strategies
of collateral damage such as the comprehensive sanctions imposed
on Cuba under Castro targeted sanctions fits better to targeting
those particular entities that are guilty or considered guilty.
The application of targeted sanctions should therefore, I believe,
be weighted against its alterantive, for instance as an option
to war.
SANCTIONS PARAMETERS
The central question to which this testimony
tries to answer is what makes targeted sanctions work. Instead
of focusing on success or failure of sanctions which is
commonly made, I would like to emphasise the importance of sanctions
parameters that may benefit our understanding of targeted
sanctions and sanctions impact. Depending on which of the different
parameters that are combined, different understandings and experiences
of sanctions can be made.
The following parameters will be discussed here:
8. Symbolic vs direct sanctions.
9. Context of implementation.
10. Side Effects of Targeted Sanctions.
To begin with, all sanctions regimes are unique.
This implies that all sanctions regimes (ie covering countries,
companies or individuals) also have its particular internal dynamic,
established for different means and diverse set of purposes. As
such it is unreasonable to carve out a grand sanctions model for
all sanctions situations. In fact one of the more classical research
pieces made on sanctions (studying about 116 sanctions cases around
the world since 1914 until today) received much criticism for
mixing different sanctions types with each other and then carving
out some general conclusions based on this pattern, Hence the
first recommendation is to consider each sanctions regime in its
own milieu.
Moreover, departing from the view that sanctions
reviews could be understood in terms of "best" and "worst"
cases do not help us much in shaping better sanctions tools. Times
change and so do objectives, learning and implementation (both
instrumentally but also "cognitively" among policymakers
and implementers). It does not help, in my view at least, to conclude
that there has been an "effective" sanctions regime
applied on Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia, when trying to foster
a better sanctions regime on Mugabe, as the conditions are so
different. For instance, in the later case Europe was in a completely
different political and economic shape of enforcing its principles
and for instance the idea of targeted sanctions was not around
at that time. Besides, what does a good and a bad case really
mean? Just because one has succeeded in bringing down a government
which the international community had a great deal of problem
with, does not mean that the sanctions have been effective. I
believe a good case is a case that is consideration of the parameters
stated below. Instead of discussing good or bad cases, hence I
would like to thrash out some parameters that need to be kept
in mind and not overlooked when considering sanctions. They may
look rather simple—which they also are—but they are
many times ignored by politicians involved in shaping a sanctions
regime.
1. Type of imposer
When considering sanctions one needs to be clear
with the type of effect one wants to achieve: should the effect
be local or international; symbolic or instrumentally effective.
Based on the attempt and the goal of the policy, the sender (ie
the decision maker) needs to plan or decide between unilateral
sanctions, regional sanctions or multilateral sanctions as each
type is likely to affect the outcome of the stated goal in a different
way. For instance, while the UN is generally implementing sanctions
due to threat to international peace and security, EU is generally
implementing sanctions which relate to human rights issues and
democratic failures (eg elections). In fact depending at what
level sanctions is enforced, different tolls and hence difference
dynamics will be established. However, the type of actor is not
always distinct. There are instances in which unilateral, regional
and multilateral measures are in place at the same time (in addition,
one type of imposer such as the EU may also decided to support
sanctions efforts introduced by another regional factor such as
the OSCE, or African Union). Despite different configurations,
this does not necessarily suggest that a better "effect"
of sanctions will be made.
2. Conflict history
Sanctions are usually established to deal with
complex political emergencies. Depending on how far these emergencies
have developed in time and how intricate these have become, sanctions
are likely to play different roles despite the original attempt
to enforce the same type of measures. This needs to be kept in
mind. Furthermore, stakeholders (ie targets) may be immune to
international measures, as they may have learnt that international
efforts to modify their behaviour have failed.
3. Type of conflict
Type of conflict many times determines the nature
of the sanctions game, and hence the impact. A conflict that is
interstate may play on differeent conditions than a conflict that
is of intrastate nature. When implementing targeted sanctions
then, this needs to be given consideration, Furthermore, from
time to time, the imposer (UK; EU or the UN) may be party to the
conflict to which sanctions are to be implemented, while at other
time be distinct aside of it. This is likely to affect a targets
perception of the sanctions (in terms of credibility of the sender).
Hence, a sender needs to be clear with what its own interest to
the conflict is and what direct impact it may have on sanctions
efficacy.
Also, depending on the raison d'être for
the conflict, the international community today considers a strategy
to either target one, both, or all parties to the conflict. Sometimes
sanction is also placed on two parties just to avoid taking a
political stance on one or the other side. To sum up, the type
of conflict in which the sanctions are introduced may thus get
very different effects as the conditions and dynamics may look
different depending on the type of conflict and the interest of
the stakeholders.
4. Type of target
Looking at the last 15 years of targeted sanctions
experiences, many creative measures have been taken, all for the
better purpose of trying to effect rough entities in a direct
way. Perhaps most interesting are attempts to play around with
different types of targets (included in so-called sanctions lists).
In terms of individual sanctions, the international community
may consider hawks (spoilers) and doves in a sanctions strategy
(ie implement travel bans or frozen assets on individuals that
are hawks and leave out sanctions on those that are "do-gooders",
depite being members of the same government. In other cases though,
sanctions may be introduced to put pressure on both parties to
a conflict. Most of the time however, sanctions are implemented
to put pressure only on one factor at a time, for instance a particular
spoiler to a peace agreement, an obstructive government, or a
particular individual with capacity to fuel a conflict, etc. Sometimes
family members to a key entity are targeted with sanctions, while
sometimes low key bureaucrats are placed on a sanctions list.
Depending on the last decade's problems and advantages of targeting
specific types learning will take place. Hence states need to
pay attention to lessons learned when consolidating future sanctions
regimes. In fact several questions about strategic targeting need
to be dealt with. For instance: is targeting family members which
are basically only at "guilt by association" good targets?
(for instance the children of Charles Taylor of Liberia); or is
it a good strategy to target an organisation but not the individual
leaders of the organisation? (eg Hamas); or is it any point in
listing low level bureaucrats of a government, that does not have
any direct or indirect responsibility to the conflict? (eg Zimbabwe),
etc. In any case, knowing your target and the dynamics on ground
is utterly important. Therefore regional representatives (embassies,
EU delegations, or UN offices) play a crucial role. Not only do
they know the political and economic reality on the ground, but
they are also up-dated and well informed, thus making the targeting
more accurate.
5. Conflict Phase
A sanction is likely to play a different role
depending on what phase of an emergency it is entering. A conflict
may have been ongoing for decades or simply for a few weeks. For
instance, sanctions may be applied as an instrument for conflict
prevention (as was the case with introducing targeted sanctions
on the al-Qaeda); conflict management (as was the case
with conflicts in Liberia, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone); conflict
hampering (as when an arms embargo was introduced on the fighting
in Eritrea and Ethiopia); or conflict signalling (as when
sanctions were introduced on Burma/Myanmar). Most of the time
however, these instruments are not so clear cut. For instance
sanctions were placed on al-Qaeda members for the purpose of preventing
potential terrorists to act, but at the same time to strangle
the flow of money to entities already engaged in terrorism (ie
is prevention, management and signalling). Hence, senders need
to know how targeted sanctions fit into the broader conflict development.
6. Sanctions objectives
Sanctions may be imposed by a sender during
the time of an emergency in either a speedy shape or as well calculated
and rational strategy. What should be noted though is that the
objective for which a sanction is introduced may easily change
during weeks and months of emergency. This requires that the objective
of the sanctions are flexible enough or fit to be "re-invented"
on short notice so as to fit reality on ground. Many time, sanctions
objectives are to static rather than being dynamic (ie political
and economic developments on ground develop but the original position
reflects a previous situation or a context).
Another factor that needs to be considered is
if the targeted sanctions are based on a self interest or a common
good (sometimes falling into the same category). Engaging in a
political emergency is not always a good strategy as it may well
be politically self-destructive on behalf of the sender; the target
may cry out that the sender is impartial and self-interested.
The target may in fact try to complicate the senders involvement
in the conflict as far as it can (for instance, France's self
interest in Invory Coast may have complicated its role and armed
its role of being impartial, leading to a specific counter targeting
by armed groups against France).
Furthermore, when assessing sanctions—and
targeted sanctions in particular—one important parameter
is to consider which strategy that is accompanying it. Sanctions,
as have been pointed out in earlier witness statements, could
deal with behavioural modification, retribution, punishment, signalling,
self-indulgence. It may also come in the form of a threat, as
a gradual political and economic build-up, to temporarily stop
but not hider, or as a negotiation tool. Depending on the type
of underlying strategy in combination to some of the other parameters
mentioned above, different political playoffs will take place.
Some strategies are good in some settings, while not in other.
The more they are tried at different levels, the likelier it is
that sanctions mechanism will work. An interesting although very
sophisticated development of targeted sanctions practise (practised
by the EU during the War in the Balkans) is the use of a positive
and negative sanctions strategy. Instead of only considering sanctions
as a tool for punishment, this strategy rewards good behaviour.
By engaging the target in a dialogue and winning other those targets
that are more dovish, this type of targeting may have a considerable
greater impact than through pure isolation. Being clear with what
type of objectives one wants to achieve is therefore necessary.
However, unless the other parameters are taken into account, also
this strategy may fail.
7. Type of sanctions
One important parameters of sanctions impact
is decided by the actual type of restrictive measure that is being
implemented. In a majority of cases there are arms-embargoes in
place. During the last decade many innovative measures have been
tried both by the UN and the EU, to which frozen assets and travel
bans have been effective, not to forget targeted sanctions on
conflict resources. It is likely that the international community
will abolish or add new types of measures, until it has reached
enough tools for an effective sanctions formula. Unfortunately
each type of restrictive measure brings with it a whole new set
of factors which deals with implementation, diplomatic procedures,
monitoring mechanisms, and cooperation between different institutions.
It is very different to implement an assets freeze than to implement
timber sanctions. Although it may sound simple, it involves a
number of important considerations. We are at a stage now, where
both the EU and the UN is implementing restrictive measures as
a routine, which may be good if they are effectively enforced.
A routine methodology implies speedy enforcement and unity, However,
if not seriously and flexibly done, it may well play out as a
disastrous strategy as it wont's signify anything either for the
sender or the target.
8. Symbolic vs direct sanctions
The purpose of economic sanctions is to affect
the behaviour of a target in a particular way. Today the international
community seems divided over—unconsciously though—whether
or not this effect should be purely effective or purely symbolic.
In some sanctions regimes much resources (in terms of political
attention, technical enforcement etc) make it look like that certain
entities should be directly effected. For instance, assets are
frozen, individuals are forbidden to travel etc. In other cases
however, entities are placed on sanctions lists without being
targeted directly (although the same measures are in place). These
measures it seems, are only symbolic as they "name and shame"
those that are being targeted. The question is whether one type
is better than the other. This is most likely determined by many
of the other parameters such as the type of conflict, or the type
of imposer. For instance, although the leadership in Burma/Myanmar
has travel bans placed on them, they may not want to travel to
Europe in the first place. Therefore one could say that sanctions
in a sense are pointless or ineffective (although being blacklisted
publicly may not be the ideal wish for an official representative).
In a sens targeted sanctions is fruitful in both ways, although
more or less efficient (perhaps). Important to stress though is
that targeted sanctions on individuals, for instance through financial
sanctions, over time has a large psychological impact. This type
of impact should not be disregarded.
9. Context of implementation
In order to discuss the efficiency of sanctions
one needs to consider the context of implementation, Generally
one could state that a multilateral sanction is better to enforce
than regional sanctions. If targets are excluded from operating
within Europe's borders or its legal territories, it may easily
transfer its assets to Asian markets. Furthermore, it is easier
to target individuals that are being integrated in formal economies
(as was Serbia) than are those that live in economies far away
from western economies (such as Burma/Myanmar) are in transition
phase (such as Liberia). The reason is simply that there are far
more mechanisms and financial controls that can trace or stop
certain financial acitivies. For instance the Swedish finance
inspection have the capacity to inform more or less all financial
operators to impose sanctions on designated individuals and companies.
Despite this effective monitoring and implementing mechanism there
may well be problems every now and then.
10. Side Effects of Targeted Sanctions
The shift from comprehensive sanctions to targeted
sanctions was mainly due to the large humanitarian impact during
the former. The question is if the new form of targeted sanctions
has similar negative impacts? Until now few experiences of negative
impact has been collected. There may be different reasons for
this. First of all it seems that there are not many cases which
have created a negative humanitarian impact. Secondly, a direct
structural hardship as the Iraqi population experienced during
Saddam Hussein's regime are more likely to receive more international
attention that indirect hardships such as infringements of legal
safeguards on behalf of specific targets. Thirdly, although there
may be negative humanitarian consequences, these hardships may
well be accepted as those that are enjoying them are targets for
a particular reason, and therefore deserves it. Finally, targeted
sanctions have not yet been enforced for such a long time that
international evaluation has not been made yet.
However, most of the side effects known nowadays
are infringements on human rights. This is also a typical concern
raised by targeted individuals themselves. For instance, claims
are made by targets that the deprivation of personal assets or
the right to travel hinder them for instance to reach crucial
medical facilities, to meet with children, to represent their
countries, etc. A concern raised by different targets is also
that they are not judged or "listed" by courts, but
only arbitrarily for political means on behalf of the sender.
Besides the question of evidence of guilt of those being targeted
is the entire question of designation and de-listing. In many
cases, individual targets do not have a place to turn to, to which
they can appeal their listing (for instance to get rid of their
financial ban, or to get access to their frozen assets). However,
these legalistic problems are currently being addresses at an
international level (mainly with the Security Council) and improvements
have been made, although much still needs to be done.
In terms of targeted sanctions applied on specific
economic sectors, targeted sanctions have sometimes forced people
out of work despite the employees themselves not having been politically
connected to any company policies. For instance a textile sector
sanction on Burma has been applied by the U.S. which is said to
have forced women out of their work in textile factories into
street prostitution. While the aim has been to target a leadership
with interest in specific companies (many times state-companies)
the effect has been the employees, which was probably not the
original intention.
September 2006
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