Memorandum by the United Nations Office
for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
1. Sanction regimes pose an increasingly
difficult dilemma for the United Nations' dual mandate of preserving
peace and protecting human needs. As the UN Secretary-General
noted: "Humanitarian and human rights policy goals cannot
easily be reconciled with those of sanction regimes".[211]
Economic sanctions are "too often a blunt instrument"
and may impose hardships on civilians that are disproportionate
to likely political gains.[212]
2. Becoming aware of this quandary a general
consciousness evolved also within the United Nations Security
Council that "further collective actions in the Security
Council within the context of any further sanction regime should
be directed to minimize unintended adverse side effects of sanctions
on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries."[213]
3. This led to the realization that comprehensive
economic sanctions or broad trade embargoes are coercive measures
of the past and that in today's sanction policies strategies for
mitigating adverse humanitarian impacts on vulnerable populations
have imperatively to be incorporated from the very beginning.
4. The UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat
have responded positively to this challenge for more humane sanction
regimes and have increasingly used more targeted sanctions (eg
financial, arms, travel, diplomatic and/or sanctions on specific
commodities like oil, diamonds, timber, etc). Also the request
of the Security Council for monitoring and reporting mechanisms
to assess possible unintended side effects of sanction regimes
is a clear proof of the Council's increased awareness of the potential
harm sanctions can inflict on the humanitarian, social and economic
situation of a targeted country. (eg Security Council resolution
1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan, resolution 1343 (2001)
and 1478 (2003) on Liberia and the most recent resolution 1698
(2006) on the Democratic Republic of the Congo). This development
has helped to address some of the concerns about the UN's culpability
for sanction-related suffering.
5. Today it is an accepted standard that
sanction authorities like the UN Security Council or regional
organizations bear the fundamental responsibility for mitigating
unintended consequences of sanctions they impose and for ensuring
that the coercive measures enacted to uphold international norms
do not cause suffering disproportionate to the ends served.
6. Political gain and civilian pain of sanction
regimes cannot be separated anymore from one another or analyzed
in isolation. The art of sanction statecraft lies in applying
sanction measures that are sufficiently forceful to persuade targeted
leaders to move toward political compliance, while avoiding unintended
humanitarian and/or socio-economic side effects that undermine
the viability of the policy and of the instrument itself.
7. Within the UN Secretariat, the Policy
Branch of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure that UN
sanctions do not negatively impact on the living conditions of
civilian populations in targeted states. At the core of these
efforts was the development of a sanction assessment methodology,
with the goal to make sanctions more effective by assessing possible
humanitarian implications in advance of-, during- and following
sanctions. Recognizing the increased concern and seeing an opportunity
to move away from the previous ad hoc approach of assessing the
impact of sanctions on living conditions, OCHA initiated a project
in September 2002 to develop a standardized methodology for assessing
whether and how sanction regimes can cause unintentional harm.
So far OCHA has undertaken assessments of the humanitarian implications
of UN sanctions on Afghanistan, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia.
For the beginning of 2007, there is another sanction assessment
planned: Based on Security Council resolution 1698 (2006), OCHA
will have to evaluate possible sanction measures on the illegal
exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
8. The assessment methodology that OCHA
developed aims to address two important challenges that present
themselves when assessing the impact of sanctions on humanitarian
conditions:
(i) accurate evaluation of the current status
of humanitarian conditions, and
(ii) separation of the effects of sanctions
on health and well-being from those due to other causes. Identifying
possible humanitarian consequences of sanctions early on can reduce
confusion about humanitarian conditions and their causes, and
can help mitigate any unintended consequences of the coercive
measures.
9. The project funded by the Governments
of Canada and Switzerland—was undertaken in collaboration
with humanitarian agencies within the UN system and beyond. OCHA's
project team also engaged in consultations with UN Member States
as the methodology was being formulated and refined.
10. The project has culminated with the
publication of two documents, which I co-authored together with
Dr. Richard Garfield and Gerard McHugh: a Sanctions Assessment
Handbook and a complementary set of Field Guidelines. Jan Egeland,
the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
Relief Coordinator, strongly urged "those engaged in considering
and designing sanction regimes to employ this methodology to minimize
their unintended humanitarian consequences." OCHA envisions
that this important new approach will make a significant contribution
to the protection of civilians in sanctioned countries, and will
enhance the capacity of UN agencies and Member States alike to
anticipate and prevent deteriorations in humanitarian conditions
that may result from sanctions.
24 September 2006
211 Kofi Annan, Annual Report of the Secretary-General
on the Work of the Orgarnisation (1998), A/53/1, United Nations,
New York, 27 August 1998, 64. Back
212
Kofi Annan, The Cause of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable
Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Secretary-General's
Report to the United Nations Security Council (New York: United
Nations, 16 April 1998), 25. Back
213
United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 13 April 1995,
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1995/300,
Annex 1. Back
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