Select Committee on European Union Written Evidence


Memorandum by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland

  Many thanks for your letter of 8 December 2006 and the invitation to present evidence to the European Union Committee on Missing Trader Intra Community Fraud (MTIC).

  MTIC fraud occurs because imported goods across EU borders takes place without VAT being imposed in the country of origin. Such an arrangement was supposed to be a temporary arrangement while members harmonised their VAT systems and rates.

  It is abhorrent that criminals have been able to abuse the system in such a way that they fraudulently obtain money and place at risk the integrity of the system, undermining the confidence which ordinary taxpayers have in the system. In principle such activity is intolerable and we at the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland are anxious to do all that we can to eliminate the fraud.

  During 2006, we issued a copy of the letter attached at Appendix 1 to all our members. This was intended to raise awareness of the fraud helping those who might otherwise become embroiled to identify the risks. We also published in our CA Magazine an article (Appendix 2) highlighting the risks and identifying the warning features.

  Newspaper coverage throughout 2006 has been a cause of concern. By the summer of 2006, according to the Guardian, the Office of National Statistics estimated that £10 million was being lost to criminal activity in one quarter of the year. A fraud at such a level would be of a concern to every citizen because it would force the Government to raise tax. It is in the public interest that such fraud must be stopped. The existence of such levels of fraud within the UK alone must have a detrimental impact on the internal market. It indicates that the current structure of the internal market is seriously flawed. There is concern that the major economies of Britain, Germany, France and Italy are most at risk and anecdotal evidence suggests that the UK fiscal authorities have been relatively successful in challenging the fraud. The policy of more careful examination of repayment claims has identified fraudulent activity which has then seen the successful rejection of the repayments. The anecdotal evidence suggests that the fraudsters have transferred their activity to other fiscal jurisdictions as well as diversifying their activity into other goods.

  More generally, fraud at such a level on any fiscal system undermines the acceptability and integrity of the fiscal system. Honest taxpayers will be concerned if they think that fraudsters are abusing the system and fraudulently extracting money.

  Evidence of greater cross border co-operation to challenge MTIC fraud is to be welcomed. In August, the successful operation mounted by HMRC and its European counterparts, officials from Zollkriminalant, Germany's Customs department, were deployed in the Swiss/German border and at Frankfurt Airport to monitor the movements of goods into the European Union. The serial numbers of over 30,000 mobile phones were scanned and compared with others in HMRC's nemesis database and uncovered evidence of MTIC fraud. The extension of legislation empowering HMRC to mark goods identified as being at risk enables the fiscal authorities to track those commodities that have in the past been used to make fraudulent claims across EU borders. This can only be one element of the anti MTIC strategy but it is a good example of the kind of international co-operation which will tackle MTIC fraud quickly and effectively for specific goods. The risk is that the fraudsters will then use a different type of commodity rather than, as in this case, mobile phones.

  Improved intelligence should help to identify data which suggests that international trade may be a risk factor being abused by potential fraudsters. If, for example, there is no substantial manufacturing activity of specific high value goods and yet goods are being exported, there must be a risk that in the absence of an obvious commercial reason for such an export trade, the economic motivator is the fraud involving VAT. As a general principle, the Commission's suggestion to increase cross border liaison by tax and law enforcement authorities and governments should lead to improved risk management and a better challenge. Only time will tell whether these mechanisms are adequate but they would, in the short term, appear to be effective in helping the UK combat MTIC fraud.

  In MTIC fraud, the goods are merely a means to give structure to the transaction. Effectively, it is the VAT or purported VAT that is the economic driver and that is what is being traded. As there is no true economic purpose to the transactions, they are arguably outside the scope of VAT and it is arguable that input tax is not recoverable. This was the underlying principle to the 2003 legislation denying the recovery of input tax to traders involved in the chain. Arguably, they should be held as joint and severally liable if they negligently became involved in a carousel chain with the purchaser appearing to be the buffer.

  One way which HMRC attempts to stop the carousel fraud is at the stage of considering an application to register for VAT. This acts as a deterrent to the potential fraudsters but it can cause considerable additional cost and inconvenience to honest traders wishing to register. The significant delays in processing registration applicants are generally unwelcome and the UK compares poorly with other jurisdictions in this regard. Customs are able to exercise a further level of control by requiring some traders to obtain Customs approval on a daily basis before finalising a transaction. Such traders must send to HMRC details of sales, purchases, customers and suppliers so that HMRC can monitor transactions and using risk assessment try to stop VAT fraud.

  The 2003 legislation attempted to make persons in a supply chain jointly and severally liable for VAT that has not been paid by a missing trader where they knew, or had reasonable grounds to suspect, that VAT would go unpaid. The measure applies to goods of a specified description and the risk is that fraudsters will merely use goods that are outside the specified descriptions which currently includes telephones, computers and certain high value related components.

  In contacting ICAS members and publishing articles on how to identify and combat fraud, ICAS has been trying to prevent the fraud occurring. It is in everyone's interests that commercial organisations should take reasonable steps to enquire into the legitimacy of customers, the economic viability of transactions and the preservation of redress if the vendor is not able to transfer proper legal title.

  At the time of writing, the UK Government and HMRC has been frustrated in seeking to impose a reverse charge mechanism on certain goods. There is a concern that such an approach would not be effective as it might transfer the problem to another EU country or alternatively it might change the nature of the goods used to give the transactions some structure. In inviting evidence, the Committee asked whether these mechanisms are adequate. It is difficult to answer that question because of the lack of empirical evidence but we are confident that the visible prosecution of fraudsters and the improvement in identifying goods being transferred and risk assessment all act as significant deterrents to the fraudsters. The fraudsters are however manipulating the temporary VAT regime which is being shown to be defective. The solution must be that member states have a responsibility to fight individually against this fraud and to do all that they can to prevent it. It is also right that the Commission should bring forward proposals and a potential solution would be to reconsider the VAT scheme and move from the temporary arrangements towards an origin scheme as was the original intention.

  The final question posed by the Committee is to attempt to quantify the benefits and costs of moving from the current destination system to an origin system. We are unable to comment on this. A significant variable in attempting to answer this question must be the lack of harmony in the VAT tax rates between different member states. This raises issues of sovereignty. We believe that simplification and restructuring of the VAT system has much to commend it but we refrain from commenting on VAT tax rates as this would appear to be a political decision.

12 January 2007


 
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