The EU/US Passenger Name Record (PNR)
Agreement
CHAPTER 1: Introduction
1. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
in New York and Washington DC have led to major changes in the
way security matters are handled throughout the Western world,
and not least of course in the United States. The need to monitor
and control internal flights, and international flights into,
out of and over the United States has required the collection
and analysis of vastly greater quantities of data relating to
passengers on those aircraft. The principal beneficiary is the
United States, but other beneficiaries are the passengers and
crew on those aircraft, and a significant proportion of these
are of course nationals and residents of the United Kingdom and
of other Member States of the European Union.
2. The United States Government and other governments
have long been using passenger lists to screen travellers and
persons already on watch lists, or in whom they have some other
interest, before they depart on a journey. Since 9/11 the focus
has shifted to thwarting potential terrorists who are so far unidentified
by using more of the detailed information collected by airlines
and travel agencies when an individual books a flight. These Passenger
Name Records (PNR) contain information, such as travel itineraries
and payment details, that can be analysed in conjunction with
current intelligence to identify high-risk travellers before they
board their planes.
3. If this information is collected accurately,
analysed correctly, and its use limited to counter-terrorism,
few would challenge the need for this or its desirability. The
problems arise when more information is collected than is needed
for this purpose, standards of accuracy slip, and the information
is shared with those not responsible for counter-terrorism and
is used for other purposes.
4. The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission, published
in 2004, identified a reluctance by different security authorities
to share information with one another as one of the main causes
of the failure to prevent the terrorist attacks, and made a number
of recommendations to counter this. But the 9/11 Commission also
recommended:
"As the President determines the guidelines
for information sharing among government agencies and by those
agencies with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy
of individuals about whom information is shared."
5. It is this perennial conflict between the
security of the public and the privacy of the individuals who
make up the public which is at the heart of our inquiry. A balance
has to be struck, and the guiding consideration must be the principle
of proportionality: the collection and retention of data for security
purposes must be no more invasive of individual privacy than is
necessary to achieve the objective for which they are collected.
That objective must be narrowly and clearly defined.
6. We sought the views of a number of persons
and bodies on these issues. We took oral evidence from Ministers,
we heard the views of persons speaking on behalf of interested
organisations, and we visited Brussels to take evidence. We also
had a useful meeting with officials of the United States Embassy.
To all of these we are most grateful.
7. The timing of this inquiry is important. Negotiations
are in progress for the conclusion of a new Agreement between
the EU and the United States on Passenger Name Records (PNR),
and we hope that this report may influence the content of the
Agreement.
8. We recommend this report to the House for
debate.
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