APPENDIX 3: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY
OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
May 14, 2007
Dear Member of the European Parliament,
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today before
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to
further our important dialogue on matters critical to the security
of the European Union and the United States.
We face a shared challenge in preventing acts of
terrorism against our countries and our citizens. At the same
time, we share a fundamental and unwavering commitment to protect
the civil liberties and privacy that are the hallmarks of all
free and democratic nations.
Recent terrorist attacks in Algeria and Morocco,
as well as earlier attacks in Madrid and London, the foiled plot
this past August against transatlantic aircraft bound for the
United States, and the recent convictions of five British terrorists,
underscore the serious, nature of the threat we face and the importance
of developing common tools and approaches to counter this global
menace.
One of these tools is Passenger Name Record (PNR)
data, which is a limited set of information provided by air passengers
travelling between Europe and the United States. PNR data, used
in combination with passenger manifest data, allows U.S. officers
to check passenger names and other basic information against lists
of known or suspected terrorists and criminals so that we can
enhance screening of dangerous people and prevent them from boarding
commercial aircraft.
Combined with other intelligence, we use PNR data
to check for links that might reveal unknown terrorist connections,
such as a traveler who has provided contact information overlapping
with a known terrorist. It is our ability to identify these hidden
links that has made PNR so valuable to our counterterrorism efforts
and the reason it is imperative we reach a new understanding regarding
how this information will continue to be shared and protected.
Below are several examples of how analyzing PNR data
has prevented dangerous individuals from entering the United States.
In June 2003, using PNR data and other analytics,
one of our inspectors at Chicago's O'Hare airport pulled aside
an individual for secondary inspection and questioning. When the
secondary officers weren't satisfied with his answers they took
his fingerprints and denied him entry to the United States. The
next time we saw those fingerprints—or at least parts of
them—they were on the steering wheel of a suicide vehicle
that blew up and killed 132 people in Iraq.
In January 2003, Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
officers in Miami used PNR to disrupt an internal conspiracy within
an airline that was smuggling cocaine between Venezuela and Miami.
A corrupt ticket counter agent would identify low risk travelers
(typically families) and add an additional bag to their reservation
after they departed the ticket counter. This bag would be filled
with cocaine. Corrupt airline employees in Miami plotted to remove
the added bags from circulation prior to inspection by CBP in
Miami.
On March 11, 2005, CPB arrested two individuals for
smuggling drugs from London to Chicago. Their PNR information
revealed the use of common credit cards. This credit card's reservation
history denied a third traveler who had used the same card and
listed a second credit card. Analysis of this new credit card
number identified three additional travelers. Three of the four
travelers were arrested during subsequent travel for drug smuggling.
In January 2006, CBP officers used PNR data to identify
a passenger posing a high risk for document fraud. The passenger,
posing as a citizen of Singapore, was scheduled to depart Korea
for the United States. The subject's travel itinerary was targeted
by a query using data from recent cases of document fraud in Sri
Lanka. CBP officers contacted airline representatives in Korea
and requested assistance in verifying the traveler's documents.
With airline assistance, CBP determined the subject's travel document
was a counterfeit Singapore passport. The subject was in possession
of his Sri Lankan passport. The subject was also a positive match
to the Transportation Security Administration's No Fly List and
suspected of being an armed and dangerous terrorist. The subject
was denied boarding for the flight. He was subsequently stopped
on another date using the same method of PNR targeting. In the
second incident, he attempted to travel to the U.S. using a counterfeit
UK passport.
In February 2006, CBP officers used PNR data to identify
a passenger with a high-risk for narcotics possession arriving
from the Dominican Republic. The subject, a returning U.S. legal
permanent resident, purchased his ticket using cash and made certain
changes to his reservation. Upon arrival, the subject was selected
for an enforcement exam. During an examination of the subject's
personal effects, CBP officers discovered two packages containing
heroin. The subject was placed under arrest and turned over to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for prosecution.
At Boston Logan Airport in April 2006, CBP officers
used PNR data to identify two passengers whose travel patterns
exhibited high-risk indicators. During the secondary interview
process, one subject stated that he was traveling to the United
States on business for a group that is suspected of having financial
ties to Al Qaeda. The examination of the subject's baggage revealed
images of armed men, one of which was labelled "Mujahadin."
Both passengers were refused admission.
In May 2006, PNR analysis identified a high-risk
traveler arriving at Atlanta Hartsfield airport from Europe. CBP
officers determined that the individual's visa was issued one
week prior to September 11, 2001, yet he had never travelled to
the United States. The subject's passport listed him as a "flight
instructor" and his reasons for traveling to the United States
included the plan to "see a man in New York for two days."
The individual was ultimately linked to numerous individuals who
U.S. law enforcement regards as security risks and immigration
violators. The passenger was denied admission.
In May 2006, CBP officers used PNR data to target
a high-risk passenger arriving from Amsterdam. Officers linked
the subject to a split PNR; the second traveler was a Palestinian
who previously claimed political asylum. The high-risk passenger
was also identified through a known telephone number used by terrorist
suspects contained within his PNR. Upon arrival the subject applied
for admission as a Jordanian citizen and was referred to secondary
inspection for further examination. The subject revealed that
his purpose of travel was to visit a relative for thirty days.
During the secondary inspection, the subject revealed that he
had been arrested and convicted on terrorist related charges in
a third country. The subject also admitted to being a former member
of an organization that espoused political views and supported
violent acts that include suicide bombings. The Joint Terrorism
Task Force and Immigration and Customs. Enforcement were contacted
and responded to interview the subject. Upon completion of the
interview the subject claimed credible fear of returning to Jordan.
He later recanted and was expeditiously removed from the United
States. .
If such a system had been fully developed before
9/11, we might have been spared that tragedy. Consider this: two
hijackers, Nawaq Alhamzi, appeared on a watch list and would have
been "flagged" when they purchased their tickets. Through
analysis of their PNR data, we could have learned that three other
hijackers—including Mohammed Atta—used the same address
as Alhamzi and Al-Midhar; five other hijackers used the same telephone
number as Atta; and still one other used the same frequent flyer
number. The analysis of PNR and other basic data that we use today
would have flagged all nineteen hijackers as connected to Alhamzi
and Al-Midhar. If we surrender this tool, we will abandon the
real-time defenses that can save our citizens' lives.
These concrete examples illustrate the necessity
of analyzing and sharing PNR data. But it is also important to
note the strong privacy protections in place to safeguard this
information. PNR data is protected under the U.S. Privacy Act
and the Freedom of Information Act, among other laws, as well
as the robust oversight provided through the U.S. Congress, American
courts, and internal controls such as the Department of Homeland
Security's Privacy Office, Inspector General, and Government Accountability
Office. In addition, our policies ensure that records pertaining
to foreign nationals are properly protected. PNR data is also
used in strict accordance with U.S law. Our officers make determinations
based on relevant criteria developed from investigative and intelligence
work. PNR data does not alone tell us who is and who isn't a terrorist.
It simply helps our officers make a more complete and informed
assessment at the border to decide who warrants further scrutiny
prior to entry. And PNR data is not used to create a "risk
score" that remains with an individual or automatically adds
a person to a terrorist watch list.
One of the central lessons of the 9/11 attacks, and
subsequent attacks in Europe and elsewhere, is that we must break
down barriers to information sharing. That same lesson must extend
to our use of PNR data. We must not take this valuable counter-terrorism
tool away from border law enforcement professionals by limiting
or restricting the kind of information sharing and analysis that
has already proven effective.
I appreciate the time you have given me today to
address the Committee, and I look forward to working with you
as we seek new ways to strengthen international cooperation in
our fight against terrorism while protecting the fundamental rights
and liberties we all cherish.
Sincerely,
Michael Chertoff
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