Select Committee on European Union Written Evidence


Memorandum by The Law Society of Scotland and The Law Society

  1.  This response has been prepared jointly by the Law Society of England and Wales and the Law Society of Scotland. The Law Society of England and Wales is the representative body of over 100,000 solicitors in England and Wales. The Society negotiates on behalf on the profession and lobbies regulators, government and others. The Law Society of Scotland is the governing body for Scottish solicitors. It promotes the interests of the solicitors' profession and those of the public in relation to the profession.

  2.  Both Societies regularly comment on domestic UK legislation, as well as EU legislative initiatives through their joint Brussels office. This position paper has been prepared with input from the Employment Law Committees of both Societies. These Committees are composed of practitioners with an expertise in the field of employment law. This response is based on the views given in our response to the Commission's Green Paper, which is limited to issues of employment law, rather than broader issues of economic and social policy. As such, we have not answered all the questions posed.

INTRODUCTION

  3.  We endorse the Commission's introductory comments that the original purpose of labour law was to offset the inherent economic and social inequality within the employment relationship. That is an inequality which exists between the worker and the employer. However, what the Green Paper goes on to conclude is that the original purpose is no longer appropriate and that the traditional model has the effect of disadvantaging newcomers and jobseekers. In our opinion, the Green Paper erroneously seeks to re-focus the economic and social inequality of employment as one between workers with secure employment status and those without. We believe that it is important to restate the original purpose of labour law by reference to an inherent tension in the employment relationship which legislation should seek to mediate.

  4.  Also of concern is the peripheral role in the debate given to collective labour law. The stated purpose of the Green Paper is to focus on individual labour law. The debate should be re-balanced to attach appropriate importance to issues of collective labour law. EU decision makers have already recognised firstly the importance of social dialogue in modernising Europe's economy and labour markets and secondly that for many, individual employment operates through a framework of collective bargaining.[108]

Question 1

  5.  In our response to the Commission we noted that it was not clear in the Green Paper exactly what "flexibility" was actually sought or envisaged. We would not, for instance, endorse flexibility which aimed to increase the use of zero-hour contracts; such contracts do not, in general, provide an adequate level of security.

Question 3

  6.  We noted that there is an inherent contradiction within the term "flexicurity". It is difficult to envisage how measures can be adopted which will on the one hand preserve security and existing rights, and, on the other, provide for increased flexibility for employers. This contradiction is not addressed in the Green Paper.

  7.  As for changing existing arrangements for employment security, the priorities for a meaningful labour law reform agenda should include giving appropriate emphasis to collective as well as individual rights. If transition from one employment status to another is to be considered, then the role of collective labour law should not be overlooked. There are numerous instances, for example in relation to working time, where increased flexibility has been achieved through the use of workforce and collective agreements. These models should be fully considered in any labour law reform agenda.

  8.  It is also difficult to envisage meaningful advances in the employment model by considering labour law (collective or individual) in isolation. Priority must be given to related social security and economic factors which necessarily impact upon the employment relationship and the relative security of workers.

Questions 4 and 5

  9.  As to the challenges in the labour market, greater clarity is certainly needed in the UK to determine the legal distinction not only between employment and self-employment, but also between employment and the wider "worker" category protected by directive-derived worker rights. The current uncertainty about which employment/worker rights apply, the appropriate tax treatment, and ownership of related risks and responsibilities (particularly in relation to personal injury and other health and safety issues) militates against flexible transition between these key, different, working relationships. Particular difficulties include:

    (a)  Different findings of status depending on the forum. For example, HMRC (Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs) findings on the tax status of an individual will not necessarily be binding on an Employment Tribunal, and vice versa.

    (b)  Since each case turns on its own facts, preliminary hearings by Employment Tribunals on employment status (as a pre-condition of enforcing statutory employment rights) will not be binding on other Tribunals, which leads to something of a Tribunal lottery for the parties involved.

    (c)  For the same reason, currently there are many examples of where "hard cases make bad law", where advantage is taken of the legal uncertainty to widen the parameters of protection (eg for health and safety protection as in Lane v. Shire Roofing Co (Oxford) Ltd [1995] IRLR 493, where the Court of Appeal pointed out there are "good policy reasons in the safety at work field to ensure that the law properly categorises between employees and independent contractors", but then interpreted the law broadly to give the injured worker health and safety protections).

    (d)  The plethora of, inevitably costly, higher court cases continues to develop the tests to be applied when determining employment status and means that this becomes increasingly complex and uncertain. In a recent example (the 2006 decision in Ministry of Defence HQ Defence Dental Service v. Kettle, [2007] UKEAT 0308-06-3101 (31 January 2007)) the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) added an additional requirement when considering the weight to be attached to contractual documentation, namely to decide whether the parties intended the documents to be an exclusive record of their agreement, and, if not, to look at other relevant material, including oral exchanges and conduct, to determine employment status.

    (e)  HMRC's stricter test to accept the self-employed status of a former employee working for their former employer (eg the 2005 HMRC Commissioner's decision in Demibourne Ltd v. HMRC [2005] UKSPC SPC00486, emphasising the need for a clear distinction between the old and new relationships, but again very much turning on individual facts). Again, the consequent uncertainty about the tax position going forward acts against easy transition from employed to self-employed status, even on moving to a consultancy position on retirement (as in the Demibourne case).

    (f)  The added difficulty of distinguishing self-employment from the third, "worker", category, as indicated by recent case law (Bacica v. Muir (2005, IRLR 35), regarding whether a supposedly self-employed painter was a "worker" under the Working Time Regulations), and the different tests to be applied.

  10.  Plainly such uncertainty not only militates against smooth transition from employed to self-employed status in the UK, but facilitates scope for non-bona fide transitions. In particular, it encourages those seeking to avoid employment, and tax, and health and safety obligations, to press those in less strong negotiating positions to move to less secure, ostensibly self-employed, status. This leaves these same individuals with the onus of subsequently proving employment protection before being able to claim attendant employment rights.

  11.  We would suggest, therefore, that this is a key area for legal reform within the UK (the same basic rules applying both in Scotland and the rest of the UK). Although the legal definitions and associated problems will differ in other Member States, plainly moves towards harmonisation, as well as clarity, at the Community level will inevitably assist cross-border transitions, and so in turn provide greater flexibility in the EU labour market.

  12.  There is also often uncertainty as to the employment status of temporary agency workers and an abundance of case law on the question. If, is currently possible that an agency worker whose contract is with the agency and who is supplied to a client business may be an employee of both or either business or not be an employee at all. This obviously has important implications for the employment rights, such as protection against unfair dismissal, which is dependent on the worker having the status of employee.

  13.  While case law suggests that the worker might often be an employee of the client business, this is not automatic. Indeed in recent cases, the Employment Appeal Tribunal has itself called on government to clarify the position of such workers (James v. Greenwich Council, [2006] UKEAT 0006_06_1812 (18 December 2006)), noting that "many agency workers are highly vulnerable and need to be protected from the abuse of economic power by the end users".

  14.  We also comment in relation to such workers, that there are a number of factors that affect transitions from temporary to permanent positions. For instance "temp-to-perm" fees often have the effect of hindering a possible transition from a temporary agency position to a permanent position in the agency's client company. Likewise other terms and conditions of the agency worker's engagement might make it more attractive from the client business's perspective (or indeed the worker's) for him or her to remain in a temporary post. It should be recognised, however, that other factors must also be borne in mind when considering the merits of agency work and the rules pertaining to it.

  15.  If additional protections were afforded to agency workers, care should be taken so that such measures do not affect adversely the employment market. There are high rates of agency employment in the UK and it is often argued that "Day 1" protection could have adverse consequences for the amount of available employment.

Questions 6

  16.  The principle of a "floor of rights" is undoubtedly attractive to workers, particularly vulnerable workers who may enjoy few, if any, of the rights associated with the traditional model of full-time employment. For instance, those on zero-hour contracts are not considered to be employees under English law, and may not be workers either (Carmichael v. National Power [1999] UKHL 47). Although there will undoubtedly be cost implications for those who employ them, there may be some benefit associated with a simplification of the current system arising from granting certain basic rights to all workers. It may also remove the unfair competitive advantage enjoyed by those who seek to exploit workers by disguised employment. There are however serious obstacles to the notion of a floor of rights for all workers.

    (a)  Given the variety of labour market conditions and employment protection rights throughout the expanded EU, it will be very difficult to provide for measures affecting all workers that will operate successfully in all Member States.

    (b)  Identifying those who will benefit from the protection of a floor of rights is a very complex and perhaps impossible task. It is often very difficult to distinguish between genuine self-employment and disguised self-employment. The variety of tests developed by courts and tribunals in the UK gives some indication of the difficulties that exist in this area of law. Disguised self-employment is often used as a mechanism by unscrupulous employers to prevent the worker from enjoying the protection to which he or she would otherwise be entitled. However, self-employment, whether genuine or otherwise, may also be attractive to the individual for tax or other reasons. The extension of a substantial number of rights enjoyed by workers to the genuinely self-employed would undoubtedly impose unacceptable costs upon those appointing them and give rise to loss of employment. It would therefore be unacceptable to business.

  17.  One of the most compelling arguments in favour of regulation of the employment relationship is that the parties enter into that relationship on an unequal footing. That notion of inequality is perhaps best illustrated in the context of vulnerable workers. Workers may be vulnerable on account of inexperience of the labour market, language difficulties, or inability to obtain or pursue traditional models of employment. Homeworkers, agency workers, migrant workers, those on zero-hour contracts and young workers are all categories of workers who are at particular risk of exploitation. As noted above, moves towards harmonisation and greater clarity of terms, such as that of "worker", at the Community level will inevitably assist cross-border transitions, and so in turn provide greater flexibility in the EU labour market. However EU-wide measures could be adopted to protect vulnerable workers as they will exist throughout the EU and will often be subject to the same pressures and difficulties. While not endorsing specifically any of the following, a variety of measures could provide increased protection for these vulnerable groups and might merit further consideration.

    (a)  The introduction of a legal presumption of either employee or worker status in the case of vulnerable groups of workers or workers employed in industries or sectors where exploitation or disguised employment is commonplace. The onus of proof would lie on the employer to demonstrate that some other relationship existed (for instance, worker instead of employee status or self-employed rather than worker). The decision as to the categories of workers or sectors in which the legal presumption should operate could be left to individual Member States to determine, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.

    (b)  The creation of stronger disincentives for employers to deny basic rights for workers. These could include penalties for employers who seek to impose self-employed status on staff in order to avoid the additional costs and protection that follow from employment or worker status. These could follow the models for penalties already in place, where employers fail to consult on collective redundancies or TUPE transfers. Alternatively, awards made by tribunals could be subject to uplifts in the manner provided for by the Statutory Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures.

    (c)  The imposition of additional obligations upon end-users of agency workers in order to remove the insecurity and poorer rates of pay experienced by agency workers. This could include a statutorily imposed equality clause on all agency workers, in the same manner already provided by the Equal Pay Act 1970, or an obligation upon end-users to notify all agency workers of suitable vacancies, as provided by the Temporary and Agency Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Bill.

April 2007




108   See for example the Communication from the Commission, "The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change" (COM (2002) 341 final). Back


 
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