Examination of Witnesses (Questions 64
- 79)
THURSDAY 3 MAY 2007
MR KLAUS
WELLE AND
MR ANTHONY
TEASDALE
Q64 Chairman:
Mr Welle, it is a real privilege for the members of this Committee
to have this chance to meet with you. We are on the record. I
would like to begin by saying that my Committee does try to have
the best possible relations with our Members of the European Parliament
and, of course, through the COSAC meetings, which I and my colleagues
attend, we do have good discussions particularly with the Members
of the European Parliament who come to the meetings, such as our
old friends, Jo Leinen, Andrew Duff and a few others—we
always appreciate seeing them. When we decided that this Committee
ought to take a look at the Annual Policy Strategy we naturally
wanted to talk to the Commission about this and Margot Wallström
was here just before you came in and had an hour with us. It seemed
to us that it was essential that we should have a chance to talk
to you about the role of the European Parliament, particularly
in the construction of and the ability to comment on, influence,
the final version of the Policy Strategy. We are extremely glad
that you have agreed to come and talk to us, partly about the
mechanics of it but also if you could let us know a little bit
from your position where you see the European Parliament having
any particular difficulties with what is in the Strategy and how
you propose to get some changes made if you need changes. It is
partly the mechanics and partly the substance. Would you like
to begin by giving an opening statement just to set the scene?
Mr Welle: Thank you very much. I am delighted
to have received this invitation. I remember that some years ago,
the House of Lords was the first chamber which came to the conclusion,
after intensive study, that we did not need a "third chamber"
in EU decision making. Ever since, I have followed the debate
about the reform of the House of Lords, but I must say that I
have the impression that in many ways your House is a very enlightened
chamber as far as Europe is concerned.
Q65 Chairman:
Thank you.
Mr Welle: My relationship with this subject
began with the job I held between 1999 and the end of 2003 as
Secretary-General of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament.
At a certain moment the Secretaries-General of the various political
groups in the Parliament discovered that there was a working group
operating in the Council in which the Commission was taking part,
but from which the Parliament was absent. This was the "Mandelkern
group" preparing what became the Mandelkern report on Better
Regulation. We got the political group leaders to take this issue
up in the Parliament's Conference of the Presidents with the late
foreign minister of Sweden, Anna Lindh. They suggested there should
be a high-level inter-institutional working group on Better Law-Making
in which the Parliament would be fully involved in determining
what is "better" in that process. This Group met at
both a political level and an administrative level. I took part
in the negotiations at the administrative level. Especially in
that early phase, when what was meant by "better" needed
to be decided, we felt that the initial framework presented to
the Parliament covered only a very limited number of issues with
other important questions left out. In these negotiations the
concept of "Better Law-Making" as finally set out in
the Inter-Institutional Agreement, was broadened. To give you
a few examples: in the Parliament, we believe it should be part
of Better Law-Making that there should be transparency when law-making
takes place. This is a question which the Council normally is
not very keen on, but we managed to get a reference in the Agreement
to transparency. We also said if we want to deal with Better Law-Making
and Better Regulation we should have a look at the legislative
process from the very beginning to the very end and, therefore,
we cannot afford to exclude for example the phase that has to
do with transposition and implementation into national law: we
have to look at all parts of this process. We also insisted that
the issue of comitology could not be excluded from a Better Law-Making
agenda. I believe the success early on in the negotiation was—and
this was thanks to the Parliament's involvement—to ensure
that the concept of Better Law-Making was significantly broadened.
I was appointed as of 1 January 2004 as Director-General for Internal
Policies, in the European Parliament, thus responsible on the
administrative side for 17 out of the 20 committees in the Parliament,
as well as for legislative co-ordination, conciliation and relations
with national parliaments. During that time I discovered that
the IIA on Better Law-Making as such was providing only a basic
framework—and that this framework was in desperate need
of being filled out with proper procedures in order to produce
tangible results, based on improved co-operation between the three
institutions. In respect of what we are focussing on today—the
Annual Policy Strategy—this has been and still is "work
in progress". I know that you are interested in discussing
where progress has been achieved in recent years and where we
see potential areas for the further development of this consultation
mechanism. I should be delighted to talk about this, but I should,
of course stress that I come from an institution which is a parliament,
one that is logically represented by parliamentarians. I can only
give you the informed view of a functionnaire of a parliamentary
institution because at the end of the day it is the Members of
European Parliament who define the line of this institution, but
obviously we are happy to provide advice if requested.
Q66 Chairman:
Thank you very much indeed, that sets the scene for us very nicely.
If we may, we would like to hear a little bit about the structured
dialogue that you have. How is this organised?
Mr Welle: We have in fact had a kind of procedure
in general for many years already. In the past it was regarded
as pretty useless or dysfunctional, which was why Members were
not very keen to contribute to it. A number of changes were introduced
to make it more effective, especially by the Framework Agreement
(between Commission and the Parliament) of 2004. We contributed
actively to the development of such changes to make the dialogue
more operational. How is it working now? Let's take the current
cycle for the year 2008. Early this year, in February we saw the
submission by the Commission of its Annual Policy Strategy for
2008 and a debate thereon in the Parliament in March. We then
have a second phase, where Commissioners are invited to their
respective policy committees in the Parliament and are expected
to have an exchange of views on priorities for 2008. That process
is happening now. As the Parliament, we then invite Commission
Vice-President Wallström to the Conference of Committee Chairs
to confront her with the results of these exchanges before they
are formalised. A synoptic document is then produced by the Conference
of Committee Chairs putting all the different elements and suggestions
from the various committees together into one single text. This
is a new element in the process which was not there before—following
from the Framework Agreement of 2004. We now have a single document
from the Parliament which is authorised by the Conference of Committee
Chairs unanimously—because that is the way it works—which
is then in turn sent to the Conference of Presidents (of political
groups) in September and after that, with their endorsement, is
sent over to the European Commission. This means that the Parliament
is now delivering a co-ordinated input before the Commission takes
its final decision its Annual Legislative and Work Programme for
2008. After this, Vice-President Wallström will come back
to the Conference of Committee Chairs to discuss this paper. The
Parliament conducts this procedure in the hope that elements of
its suggestions will be taken on board and explanations given
as to why some suggestions are taken up and others are not. The
Commission submits its Annual Legislative and Work Programme in
November. At the end of the year, normally in December, there
is a formal resolution of the Parliament, negotiated between the
political groups on the Commission's Annual Legislative and Work
Programme. A new element which was introduced this last year—following
a request by the Parliament—is that after the Parliament's
resolution, the Commission now sends a letter with a detailed
response to all the requests made in the Parliament's resolution
and gives arguments about why they have or have not been taken
on board, before the new Annual Policy Strategy is presented in
February. This year, Vice-President Wallström did this both
by attending the Conference of Presidents, and by submitting a
written text. As I say this is a new element which was introduced
this year to have more precise information about what is happening
to Parliament's input, and how far it is being taken into account,
and to ask the Commission for reasons in cases where, using their
right of initiative, they do not want to follow our requests.
To sum up, in recent years developments in this area have been
the Framework Agreement, the written statement by the Conference
of Committee Chairs, its adoption by the Conference of Presidents,
the regular consultation mechanism with Vice-President Wallström,
then the letter to the EU Commission where all the arguments are
put forward giving the Parliament a chance to have the first position
established before the Annual Legislative and Work Programme is
published and not just commenting afterwards. From this year,
we now have a detailed response before a new Annual Policy Strategy
is published. Also, at the end of last year for the first time—at
the request of the Conference of Committee Chairs and then the
Parliament as a whole a detailed list of simplification measures
intended has been annexed to the Annual Legislative and Work Programme.
So this list becomes accessible and not only something one reads
about in the Financial Times.
Chairman: Good. It looks as though the
European Parliament does have an input into the Annual Policy
Strategy itself in addition to a later input into the Annual Legislative
and Work Programme, so you have two chances, as it were, at which
to get the Parliament's views taken on board before the Legislative
and Work Programme is implemented. I would like to see whether
any of my colleagues want to come in at this point.
Q67 Lord Tomlinson:
I am fascinated by what you said about this input through the
Conference of Committee Chairs. Is there not a danger that this
Conference becomes a sort of bran tub at which everybody has got
to have a little bit of satisfaction and, therefore, that confuses
the view that the European Parliament might have in relation to
what I would think of as a strategy? For example, I would like
to see the European Parliament sometimes come forward and say,
"Our strategy is that the Commission should, for example,
complete the Single Market. Forget about everything else, one
strategic goal". With this input through the Committee Chairs
is it not a little bit of, "Well, transport has got to have
a little bit, the internal market has got to have a little bit,
justice and home affairs..." and it dilutes any strategic
review of objectives?
Mr Welle: I think the Conference of Committee
Chairs has tried to confront this problem by the fact that its
statements are normally divided into two parts. There is a first
part which stresses issues of major importance and there is a
second part where we have more detailed listings of proposals
we would like to see put forward. Therefore, I think there is
a very clear message to the Commission about which issues are
of prime importance and which initiatives are being suggested
by the different committees. Of course, the different actors in
the Parliament have all to be properly involved in the procedure.
Basically, we always need a double legitimacy. On the one hand,
we need the legitimacy of the experts, and these are the Members
in committee, and, on the other hand, we need the legitimacy of
the main political actors, who are the political groups. In fact,
we need to organise the process in a way where we simultaneously
get the expert view from the committees (which are closer to the
dossiers) and the overall view of the political groups, who are
the only ones that can provide us with what you have correctly
described as the big strategy, the main directions in which we
should go. When we look at the procedure, we start off in plenary
with the APS, a good moment for the political groups, then we
go to committees, again a chance for the political groups but
this time at the level of co-ordinators to make their views heard
and get it into the committee's contribution, and then we have
the committee as such, which through its chairman, endorses a
view and puts this forward in writing to the Conference of Committee
Chairs. These views are assembled and a general line given in
the introductory parts of their text, but the document is then
handed over to the Presidents of political groups for endorsement
and sent off to the European Commission. The Annual Legislative
and Work Programme, once published by the Commission comes into
plenary in December, which is once again a moment for the political
groups. However, I think we are fully aware of what you are saying.
If not managed properly, there could be a danger of losing ourselves
in the detail, but there are certain instruments in place which
ensure the general message, if the political will is there, is
not lost.
Q68 Lord Tomlinson:
Can I just ask a brief follow-up on that? With the state of the
Financial Perspective, which the European Parliament, as I understand
it, believes is very, very tight, what kind of flexibility within
the Financial Perspective exists for you to give the necessary
financial backing in the budgetary procedure to what you consider
to be a newly emerging priority?
Mr Welle: I think most of the issues that are
normally dealt with in this process are not necessarily ones with
huge financial implications; they are normally legislative matters.
Nevertheless, I think this touches on an important point, which
is how are the budgetary procedure and policy strategy process
linked? This is a very legitimate question, because the whole
concept of the Annual Policy Strategy is based on the assumption
that the legislative agenda and the working agenda should enjoy
the necessary financial means, so obviously both things need to
come together. In my own view, they are not in fact yet sufficiently
interlinked. In the last set of negotiations with the Commission
on the Framework Agreement (in 2004), the Commission very deliberately
chose not to combine the two procedures—the APS/ALWP and
the budgetary procedure—because they saw if they were brought
closely together it could become a very powerful instrument. We
are not yet there. The Parliament is discussing how best to organise
its budgetary debate in the autumn and whether that should be
more closely linked with legislative planning, and whether the
commitment of the European Commission to field its full team of
Commissioners when it presents the Annual Legislative and Work
Programme in the autumn could not be used to develop something
in a new format, where the wider public might be able to see financial
means and legislative measures brought together in a major orientation
debate once a year.
Q69 Lord Tomlinson:
That is very helpful.
Mr Welle: We are not yet there and we do not
have the agreement of the European Commission to go for such a
format.
Q70 Chairman:
Whether you succeed in that or not, and it sounds to me a very
logical development, it still remains, as we were discussing earlier
with the Vice-President, a zero-sum game in that you have your
financial perspective imposing a ceiling. Therefore, the drawing
up of a Strategy and eventually an Annual Legislative and Work
Programme is a reordering of priorities so that where you need
to apply more finance for one thing you are going to have less
for something else, or you may have to drop something. I am wondering
whether the course that you are going down where you get to that
point accentuates that problem and makes it more public. What
would be the impact of the fact that you are having to play a
zero-sum game?
Mr Welle: Up to now we have been working under
the old Financial Framework so the experience we have had was
not an experience where we were working with tight financial ceilings,
not that I am aware of. In the debates we have had in the Parliament,
up until now this has not occurred as a problem. I am not excluding
that it might occur under the Financial Perspectives in the 2007
or a later procedure, but this has not been our major problem.
The major problem we have been facing up to now is that the Commission
installed this mechanism but at the same time was not ready to
integrate all of its planning activities into it. For example
we had ad hoc propositions on the withdrawal of legislation from
the Commission which the European Parliament found out about from
an article in the Financial Times as I alluded to earlier.
We have had ad hoc lists of simplification procedures which have
not been submitted to this procedure of consultation but were
taken note of through the newspapers. The Parliament's argument
is that, once such a procedure is established, it should be the
relevant procedure for all legislative work. It also means that
we need to have the information in due time, which does not mean
that the Parliament is expecting that everything is available
in December for the coming year, but rather that there should
be a proper consultation mechanism and at the stage of the Annual
Policy Strategy the simplification programme for the next year
should be available. If there is an intention to go for withdrawal,
this information should be available. From our point of view,
this is very crucial because we have seen that many of the Commission
initiatives on Better Regulation, notably on simplification, have
been running into dead-ends because the Commission has not taken
into account the views of the co-legislators, namely the Council
and the Parliament. Therefore, the Parliament has been continuing
to argue that there should be proper consultation on these propositions
before they are finally made. The Parliament believes that the
simplification agenda and a potential withdrawal agenda, if there
is such an agenda, has to be submitted early with the Annual Policy
Strategy in February, so that it becomes available for consultation
with the responsible parliamentary committees, which will then
be in a position to give feedback to the Commission on whether
or not they are ready to co-operate on that specific legislation,
or whether certain changes are needed, whether this is really
simplification or they believe it is not simplification but a
"complicating measure". This could also be the logical
place to conduct a debate between the Commission and the Parliament
about speedier procedures on simplification. Up until now, the
Commission has been hoping to be able to establish a single procedure
for simplification, probably with the Legal Affairs Committee
of the Parliament. Given that simplification is not in fact a
legal concept but a political one this will not happen, because
the sectoral committees in the Parliament will not accept that
everything which is labelled "simplification" will just
go through the Legal Affairs Committee. Therefore, if the simplification
agenda of the Commission is to have more success than in the past,
the Commission desperately needs to consult the Parliament and
its respective committees earlier in the year. That is where the
Annual Policy Strategy could develop a lot of additional importance.
Chairman: That is much food for thought.
Q71 Lord Marlesford:
The point I would like to pursue comes both from what Lord Tomlinson
and my Lord Chairman said. I was very struck by you emphasising
that representations you make to the Commission at both stages
appear to be based on unanimity. I can see that you can probably
get agreement on most of the proposals put forward by the Commission
but where I would have thought it would be difficult to get agreement
possibly is on priorities. If everything you say has to be by
agreement, does that mean that there are areas where you do not
comment particularly on priorities because you cannot get agreement?
If so, would it not be better on occasion to make representations
which reflect the difference of view in the Parliament and you
say, "On the one hand and on the other, but on balance the
majority felt..."?
Mr Welle: There is still an objective problem
with the position we have in the Parliament and this is that we
have two procedures to come to a final conclusion. We have the
expert procedure, coming through the committees—yes submitted
to the Conference of Presidents and then sent off to the Commission
in September—but equally we have a resolution in plenary
in December which is motivated by the political groups and is
doing exactly what you have described, setting political priorities.
Additional work is still needed in the house to reflect how we
can better link these two exercises—how the preparatory
work that is being done by parliamentary committees becomes fruitful
and can be accepted by the political groups, and what is the mechanism
to link these two. On the Lisbon Strategy, in fact, such a mechanism
has been established: and we have a cross-committee group called
the "Lisbon Group of 33" which produces a draft resolution
each year which is then taken over by the political groups, not
as the end result but as the basis for their own deliberations.
This has allowed the Parliament in the recent years to come forward
with a relatively well-informed, compact and consolidated broad
consensus view on Lisbon issues. There we have managed to combine
the experts' view and the political statement from the political
groups. In the Annual Policy Strategy, however, we still have
two procedures which remain to a certain extent distinct which
might impact one on the other but which are probably not yet sufficiently
connected.
Q72 Chairman:
Thank you. I would like to put this question to you, and I do
not know whether you are going to have difficulty in answering.
This is the first year that the Commission has invited the national
parliaments to comment on the Annual Policy Strategy. What I would
like to know is whether the European Parliament sees this as an
advantage, are you indifferent to it or do you think that we are
meddling where we should not be meddling?
Mr Welle: I think I can make an educated guess
about the view at least of the President of this institution.
He is convinced, and I think his opinon is broadly shared in the
house, that the European Parliament and national parliaments are
partners, not rivals. We are partners for transparency and to
keep democratic control of the process. Both institutions sometimes
probably have the view that there are issues which fall into the
middle—which are no longer controlled by national parliaments
but not yet controlled by the European Parliament. This President
refuses to think of the relationship between the European Parliament
and national parliaments as one of competition and sees it rather
as a relationship of partnership. In such a spirit of partnership,
it can only be welcomed if national parliaments have a view early
on of what is going to happen in the European Union. Personally,
I feel it is high time that national parliaments should no longer
focus just on the institutional aspects but get involved in the
policy aspects—and actively involve their policy experts
across the committees on those issues, instead of being surprised
once things happen. This enables them to play their major role,
which is control of their own national administrations. The basis
for this is knowledge early on and early participation in the
process. I do not wish to go off the record!
Chairman: I am very happy!
Q73 Lord Tomlinson:
Can I have a follow-up to that question which might force you
off the record? I have listened with great interest to what you
said there but is not the Lamassoure report on own resources,
which has now been adopted by the Budget Committee, a direct threat
to the powers of national parliaments which at the present time
have the competence, the sole competence, to endorse the own resources
decisions that are necessary for financing the European Union
budget? Will President Pöttering be telling Mr Lamassoure
and the Budget Committee to butt out?
Mr Welle: No. I think that it was a widespread
impression in the Parliament after the last round of negotiations
that the mechanism chosen had disqualified itself because the
way negotiations were conducted in the Council until the very
end was not very convincing. It is on the table that we need to
go for a new mechanism to finance the European Union, not to enlarge
its budget but to find a more transparent way of doing so.
Q74 Lord Tomlinson:
With a national parliament responsibility, own resources.
Mr Welle: I do not think the Parliament is assuming
that the fact that national parliaments are participating in these
debates will always mean that we will have the same views—of
course not—but it is important that national parliaments
and the European Parliament are debating these issues and debating
them early on. That is why, under the co-chairmanship of the European
Parliament and the national parliament of the Presidency-in-Office,
we are conducting a whole series of meetings between European
parliamentarians and national parliamentarians on the future of
Europe, where one of the issues that has been put at the centre
of the debate is the financing of the European Union and its own
resources. In fact, the Parliament does believe that this is an
issue where there might indeed be a divergence of views, but where
debate is necessary and where it is very helpful if national parliaments
participate in this debate.
Chairman: Well, we participated in the
sense that we recently produced a report on reforming of own resources,
which we hope will be a useful contribution. I was slightly alarmed
by the fact that while we attended two of these joint meetings
of the European Parliament, the national parliaments and the Commission
and discussed future financing, suddenly the national parliaments
appeared to disappear off the radar screen and we heard nothing
more after that. We are concerned to make sure, and I am not saying
that this is your responsibility, that when we get to the 2008-09
review we are not just a party to it but will have been a party
to the preparation of the policy that is going to be discussed.
I am in no sense accusing the European Parliament of trying to
sideline us, it is not that, it is just that somehow we got dropped
overboard on this and we are anxious to climb up the side of the
ship and get back on again. I take it that basically you would
like to see us play a proper role in this. I just wanted to have
my little moan for a moment. I chaired one of the working groups
in that and found it very useful but we were a little alarmed
to see that after that there was deafening silence in our direction.
Let us move on, if we may. Lord Bowness.
Lord Bowness: I think we have covered
a lot. I will be guided by you as to where you want to go.
Q75 Chairman:
One issue we do want to raise with you that is important is the
role of the Council in all of this. It seems to me that at the
end of the process the Council can just turn round and say, "Jolly
good effort, dear colleagues, but no". How much communication
is there between the Parliament and the governments on this to
try and avoid a blocking of the Strategy?
Mr Welle: I am very happy that you have raised
the issue of the Council. With the indications I had, I was expecting
questions on the role of the Commission and whether the Commission
is doing things properly and so on, but not questions about the
Council. In my view, in fact, it is not the Commission but very
often the Council which is the weak link in this whole exercise,
even though the Council started the exercise. Let's go through
some of the issues which can be subsumed under the heading of
Better Law-Making. On comitology where the Council long avoided
addressing the issue, we are very pleased that we have managed,
very much supported by the Commission under the Austrian Presidency,
to negotiate a new comitology regime in all areas where the Parliament
decides on primary legislation by co-decision. This means that
if the Parliament leaves some space free, but a subsequent comitology
decision proves to be unacceptable for reasons of subsidiarity,
proportionality or whatever, it now has the right to come back
into this. That is an area where we have made concrete progress.
On transparency, the Council itself, under pressure from the Nordic
countries, has made a lot of progress recently by opening up its
debates, but I remember that in 2002-03 it was regarded as more
or less a no-go area in the negotiations. On impact assessments,
it can be discussed whether the Commission is far enough advanced
on the issue but at least it has now separated the conduct of
impact assessments from the unit itself which has been drafting
the legislative proposal and given the question to an independent
internal body. I know there is debate in the Parliament as to
whether this process should be devolved to an external body. Perhaps
it would be useful to look also at how far the other two institutions
have progressed. In the Parliament we have established a budget
line of €700,000 with which we undertake assessments on substantive
amendments employing external expertise, so it is not home-made
by the Parliament's services. The advice is acquired through framework
contracts taken out before the policy issue is known—which
is very important, as you do should not choose the provider of
advice when you know the issue, but rather you identify the provider
before the issue is defined. We have the instruments ready. It
is true that there is a certain reluctance in the Parliament to
use them, but the triggering mechanism is with the Members, it
is the Members who decide whether they would wish to submit a
substantial amendment to an impact assessment. In the Council,
as far as I know, they are still far from that. They had a test
case on batteries, where I think the Dutch Government volunteered
to make the impact assessment because they had the biggest economic
interest in the case. If you apply this mechanism, then it means
you ask Austria to do the impact assessment on transfer across
the Alps, and you would have needed to ask Germany to do it on
REACH and maybe Britain on some aspects of the Common Agricultural
Policy. The value of such an approach is very evident. I have
doubts whether the Council, which likes to stress the importance
of impact assessments, has in fact yet developed a proper mechanism
to conduct such assessments on substantial amendments itself.
On simplification, I have already said it is very important for
the Parliament to have information earlier, but we are moving
in that direction. The Commission made the simplification list
available for the first time at the end of 2006 at the stage of
the Annual Legislative and Work Programme. We would like to have
it earlier but we are in a process to try to integrate simplification
into the APS procedure. There remains a major issue concerning
the reduction of volume of EU legislation and this very much depends
on whether "re-casting" could become the standard instrument
for the Commission to undertake simplification or, alternatively,
if that instrument is not chosen, to use codification. There is
still some ground to be explored there. On legislative planning,
it has to be said that the Council up until now simply refuses
to be part of a joint programming exercise. We have described
here how far we have made progress with the Commission but, of
course, the Council has a double-function: on the one hand it
has executive functions but it is also the second part of the
legislature. In this latter role the Council needs more actively
to involve itself in the programming efforts of the other institutions
and so contribute to transparency. On transposition there is a
lot still to be done. There has been a suggestion in the Parliament
that in future some of its "own-initiative" reports
should be devoted to follow-up appraisal of transposition. Even
though this is the responsibility of the Commission, parliamentarians
could play a bigger role here so that there is a feedback mechanism
on how the legislation that has been passed affects the citizens
once it hits the ground. It would be a feedback mechanism for
future legislation. The last point, which has recently been brought
into the debate by the German Presidency, relates to "discontinuity"(between
the five-year terms of the Commission). The European Parliament
has always done a screening exercise after the European elections.
If in the future the Commission would be willing to give a proper
answer to that scrutiny exercise after each set of European elections,
we will have made some measurable progress. I have been running
through some of these issues just to communicate that I think
this whole area is very much work in progress. We have to improve
things on one issue after another. There has been very visible
progress in many areas already, but other areas still need to
be tackled. We will only be successful if all three institutions
are actively contributing to make this work.
Q76 Lord Bowness:
My Lord Chairman, you have actually got to the point I was winding
myself up to here which was about the involvement of the Council.
Just listening to that explanation, which was very interesting,
and the fact that the Council are not really involved in any of
the kinds of things you are talking about, this may be a very
naive question but within the Council is there, as it were, an
equivalent of this Policy Statement and does anybody see it? If
so, who sees it and when?
Mr Welle: I think the experience up to now has
been that individual Council presidencies were ready to accept
responsibility in this area and to move an issue forward—the
Finnish Presidency very strongly on transparency, the Austrian
Presidency on the issue of comitology, the Dutch Presidency at
least tried its best on impact assessments. This is dependent
on the willingness of an individual presidency to carry an issue
forward. I do not think that in the Council secretariat there
is a concerted effort that is comparable to the efforts that are
conducted, for example, within the Commission.
Q77 Lord Bowness:
So the only equivalents we have are the presidency proposals,
are they, for each presidency?
Mr Welle: Sorry?
Q78 Lord Bowness:
The only thing that might equate to Council priorities is the
presidency proposals published before each presidency, is that
right?
Mr Welle: The Commission consulted the Council
on the APS and they did respond. My comment would be that, given
that this is a major change in how we try to do European law-making
legislation, I do not see on the Council side that there is a
concerted strategy to improve things across the board, or at least
it has not been as evident as we have seen from the Commission.
There are clearly areas, like legislative planning, where up to
now the Council has not been ready to accept programming between
the three institutions.
Q79 Chairman:
Can I just be clear on this point. The Commission asked the Council
to comment on the APS and they did comment?
Mr Welle: Yes.
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