APPENDIX 1: GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE
REPORT, "THE FURTHER ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU: THREAT OR
OPPORTUNITY?"
Setting the scene
The history of the EU, as well as the legal
texts on which the EU is based, show that the process of enlargement
has been an integral part of its development over the last 50
years. (para 3)
1. Enlargement has been at the core of the success
and development of the EU. Enlargement has enabled the peaceful
re-unification of Europe across the Cold War divide. In the words
of the Prime Minister in Warsaw in 2003: "In the era of
globalisation, nations like ours need to come together as allies
and fashion the new Europe for our and others' national interest.
To make it outward, not inward; to make it economically effective,
not economically feeble; to use Europe to make our voice heard
louder and stronger in the world." and helped us to respond
better to the challenges of globalisation.
2. We agree that development of the EU has gone
hand in hand with enlargement. Since the first enlargement in
1973, of which the UK was a part, each successive enlargement
has added to our prosperity, our range of rights and opportunities
and our ability to compete in a tougher global market. Enlargement
has cemented the values of democracy and the rule of law across
Europe.
3. The December 2006 European Council concluded
that: "Enlargement has been a success story for the European
Union and Europe as a whole. It has helped to overcome the division
of Europe and contributed to peace and stability throughout the
continent. It has inspired reforms and has consolidated common
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as the market
economy. The wider internal market and economic co-operation have
increased prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged
Union to respond better to the challenges of globalisation. Enlargement
has also enhanced the EU's weight in the world and made it a stronger
international partner."
Current attitudes towards enlargement
There is a sharp contrast between public perceptions
(and some political rhetoric) about the impact of the last enlargement
and the assessment of it by most experts. (para 7)
Perhaps the single biggest obstacle to future
enlargements is inadequate public support in Western Europe, combined
with a hostile or ambiguous stance taken by many political leaders
in the Member States. Little attempt has been made to explain
the benefits that enlargement has brought. (para 26)
Much public opposition to future enlargements
stems from misunderstandings about the impact of past enlargements,
in particular the accession of the Central and Eastern European
countries in 2004. As subsequent chapters explain, this impact
has been positive. The governments of the existing Member States,
supported by the European Commission, must make significant efforts
to explain the impact of enlargement to Europe's citizens, including
issues such as migration, the link between enlargement and globalisation
and the need to find a way of living harmoniously with different
religious communities. (para 50)
Attitudes towards enlargement remain fluid,
are influenced by non-enlargement related developments (such as
economic growth) and are partly related to lack of information
about enlargement. A concerted effort on the part of EU politicians
and other opinion formers could help to increase public support
for enlargement. (para 59)
4. We agree that there is often a sharp contrast
between public perceptions and expert analysis of the benefits
of enlargement and more needs to be done across the EU to correct
misunderstanding and explain the benefits. We agree on the importance
of public support and that public attitudes remain relatively
fluid and influenced by concerns over factors unrelated to future
enlargement (such as low levels of economic growth). We also agree
on the need for proactive efforts to explain the benefits of EU
membership and enlargement (such as tackling crime, promoting
energy and climate security). The December European Council agreed
that better communication and greater transparency are important
to ensure public support. The November 2006 European Commission
Enlargement Strategy Paper proposes expanding its support for
civil society dialogue; listening to the concerns of the public
to enable it to communicate more effectively on enlargement and
making public key documents such as final EU common positions
and producing user-friendly information to explain the accession
process.
5. This Government has always been a strong advocate
for enlargement. We will continue to make the case in speeches
and articles to both domestic and international audiences. Parliamentarians,
business leaders, journalists and other opinion formers—have
made significant contributions and we hope will continue to do
so.
6. Some of the most powerful advocates of enlargement
are not politicians or business leaders but people who have direct
experience of the benefits of enlargement: farmers who rely on
workers from new Member States, small businesses that have found
dynamic partners or new customers, and British tourists who enjoy
weekend trips to the Baltic or buy holiday homes on the Black
Sea.
7. In addition to proactive communication, we
would also underscore the importance of a rigorous application
of the criteria for membership to candidate and prospective candidate
countries. This will ensure that all new member states are fully
prepared for accession and build public confidence in the effectiveness
of the process.
The impact of the last enlargement
It is safe to assume that the impact of the
2004 enlargement on the new members was roughly 20 times larger
than on the old ones. (para 67)
8. We agree that the impact of enlargement is
significantly greater on the candidate countries than the existing
members because of the relative sizes of their economies. But
the cumulative benefits of a larger, more competitive single market
continue to accrue.
Although the available studies have relied
on very different assumptions and methodologies, they have come
to broadly similar conclusions: First, the impact of eastward
enlargement on the EU-15 has been limited. Second, the impact—though
small—is positive. Third, as pointed out above, much of
the impact has taken place already since economic integration
between Eastern and Western Europe has proceeded gradually since
the early 1990s. Most studies conclude that the cumulative economic
gain for the old EU is below 1 per cent over a period of five
to ten years. (para 76)
9. We agree that the impact of A10 accession
was positive for the EU 15. UK merchandise trade with the new
member states increased by 392% between 1992 and 2005, nearly
ten times as fast as with the rest of the world, and is steadily
rising. There were around 14,000 UK firms exporting to Central
and Eastern Europe in 2001. Firms like Tesco, Unilever, Vodafone
and BP are successful investors in both new member and candidate
states.
10. The Commission's paper on the economic impact
of enlargement highlighted that the three countries that opened
their labour markets to the A8 countries (UK, Ireland and Sweden)
were also among the top performers in employment rate growth amongst
the EU 15 in the two years following accession. From the UK point
of view, although it is not currently possible to measure reliably
the impact of A8 migration on economic growth, a 2002 Treasury
estimate attributed 10-15% of economic trend growth to migration.
In its February 2006 Inflation Monitoring Report, the Bank of
England confirmed that overseas workers—including those
from the A8—played a significant role in boosting the available
pool of labour and helping ease shortages, therefore helping to
keep inflation down. The Department of Work and Pension's two
reports (May 2005 and February 2006) on the impact of enlargement
on the UK labour market found that the broad outcome had been
to increase output and jobs. More generally, the expansion of
the single market to more than 500 million citizens will bring
long-term benefits in an increasingly competitive, globalised
economy—widening the consumer base and increasing competition.
11. The benefits of enlargement are also evident
in other key areas where increased co-operation makes for a more
effective response to cross-border problems such as international
crime and trafficking in people and drugs. It also helps to promote
security and stability, human rights and the protection of the
environment. In the cases of Bulgaria and Romania these environmental
benefits are quite dramatic. In 1990, in Romania "degradation
[in the Danube Delta region] was reaching serious proportions
through engineering works and inappropriate land uses… Pollution
carried downstream in the Danube… threatened fish life…[and]
drastically reduced the numbers of migratory fish (sturgeons,
hausen, ship sturgeon, and Russian sturgeon)" (Source: UNEP).
Now there are over 800 natural protected areas in Romania, which
represent over 5% of the national territory. These include three
biosphere reserves, two Ramsar sites (protected wetlands), and
18 landscape reserves. In Bulgaria, air quality around the Maritza's
three power units, once identified as Europe's number one environmental
'hotspot" for sulphur pollution, have dramatically improved
through EU investment and action by the Bulgarian government.
A new plant on the site will be using state of the art pollution
control technology and will meet the relevant EU and Bulgarian
emission standards for particulates. Similarly, at the Kozloduy
nuclear plant dangerous Units 1-2 were taken offline early in
negotiations and 3-4 were also closed upon accession. These are
all examples of the benefits of enlargement.
The increase in the number of Member States
and the concomitant wider spread of interests and positions has
made aspects of EU decision-making more laborious. But suggestions
that enlargement could lead to gridlock in the EU institutions
are not borne out by evidence. (para 105)
12. We agree with the Committee that EU institutions
and decision-making systems have adapted remarkably well to the
challenge of decision making at 25. The EU institutions are not
currently facing gridlock due to recent enlargement. However,
there are some institutional questions that must be addressed.
In particular, existing treaties require us to look again at Commission
size now that Bulgaria and Romania have joined the EU. We have
already said that we are ready to consider whether steps can be
taken on the basis of the existing treaties to make the EU more
effective. We will be discussing these issues over the coming
months under the German Presidency.
We recommend that in future the EU does not
endorse target dates for EU entry until the accession negotiations
with the candidate in question are almost complete and the EU
is fully satisfied that the candidate can assume the obligations
of membership. (para 118)
13. We agree. This approach was recommended by
the Commission in its November 2006 Enlargement Strategy Paper
and endorsed by the December European Council. Neither Croatia
nor Turkey has yet been offered target entry dates as part of
their negotiation process. But we believe it is positive that
both countries have set themselves internal targets to help energise
their reform efforts and pursue their own individual pace of progress.
It is essential that future enlargements do
not import existing disputes about borders, the treatment of minorities
and recognition into the Union. At the same time, however, the
EU must be careful not to allow third countries to effectively
gain a veto over the accession of a candidate by preventing the
settlement of an existing dispute. (para 123)
14. The Government believes that the EU should
ensure that any candidate country fully meets the requirements
for membership. In practice this means meeting the so-called Copenhagen
criteria.
15. In this context full account needs to be
taken of any existing disputes about borders, the treatment of
minorities and recognition related issues. We also agree that
the EU should be careful not to allow third countries to gain
a veto over the accession of candidate countries by introducing
new requirements over which the candidate country does not have
full control.
The EU must use conditionality in a consistent
and credible manner. Rather than aiming for a "big bang"
enlargement of the Western Balkans, the EU should stick to a system
under which each country progresses towards membership as fast
as its pre-accession preparations allow. (para 130)
16. The December 2006 Council conclusions reaffirmed
that the EU should keep its commitments towards all the countries
that are in the accession process, moving forward on the basis
of strict conditionality at all stages of the negotiations, and
judging each country on its own merits. We fully endorse this
approach.
Absorption capacity and the borders of Europe
The Copenhagen accession criteria have enabled
the EU to encourage and monitor economic and political change
in the candidate countries. The EU should not modify the list
of the criteria or set them in stone by including them in a future
treaty. (para 136)
17. We agree. The UK firmly supports a rigorous
but fair accession process based on the Copenhagen criteria. However,
as the Committee notes, this should not prevent us tailoring our
approach in the light of experience. For example, in December
2006 the EU agreed various improvements suggested by the Commission
to enhance the management and quality of the accession process,
including its proposal to tackle difficult issues like administrative
and judicial reforms and corruption early on in the process. The
accession process has successfully evolved to meet different challenges
over the last fifty years. We cannot anticipate all the challenges
that we will face in the future.
Since the EU Treaty gives any European country
the right to apply for Union membership, any attempt to draw a
final boundary around its territory which excluded European countries
would not be consistent with the Treaty. Moreover, politically
it would be undesirable for the EU to attempt to define its final
boundaries since this would weaken the EU's ability to encourage
positive change in potential candidates. Ambiguity is preferable
to a definite 'no'. (para 143)
18. We agree. The December 2006 European Council
confirmed that the EU would keep its commitments regarding the
ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia and that
the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. But we must
also keep the EU's door open to countries like Ukraine and Belarus,
however distant a prospect candidate status might be. Bringing
irreversible democratic and economic reform to these countries
will benefit all Europeans. The EU treaties provide that "any
European state" may apply to become a member of the Union.
The treaty does not define how this is to be interpreted geographically.
We note that, 1992 Commission report entitled 'Europe and the
Challenge of Enlargement' stated that: "the shared experience
of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot
be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by
each succeeding generation. The Commission believes that it is
neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers
of the European Union, whose contours will be shaped over many
years to come".
The debate about absorption capacity is harmful
since the term is inherently vague and is interpreted by many
in the candidate countries as an excuse for closing the Union's
doors. However it now seems unlikely that the debate will go away.
We therefore believe that it would be best if the term was deconstructed
into its individual components and considered in that light. The
debate would then shift onto solid ground and focus on real issues
such as budgetary capacity and institutional adjustments. "Absorption
capacity" would become a to-do list for the existing Member
States rather than a barrier to the candidate countries or an
excuse for delaying or preventing their accession. (para 153)
19. We consider it to be firmly in the interests
of existing Member States and candidate countries that the EU
should be properly prepared for future enlargements and that these
preparations should proceed in parallel with the accession negotiations.
The Copenhagen Council of 1993 acknowledged the importance of
the EU's absorption capacity and the impact of enlargement on
the EU's institutions, budget and common policies has been considered
in advance of all previous enlargements. The question of absorption
capacity (now renamed integration capacity) was discussed at the
European Council in December 2006 on the basis of the Commission's
"Special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new
members." There is no stated intention to revisit this
issue in the immediate future. We do not believe that any assessment
of integration capacity should create a new barrier for candidates.
Their progress through the accession process should continue to
be based on their success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and
accepting and implementing the body of EU legislation and policies
known as the acquis.
The political context for future enlargements
A larger EU will need institutional change
and more efficient decision-making procedures. It will also require
a rebalancing of the respective representation of large and small
countries. An overstretched and ineffective EU cannot play a stabilising
role in its neighbourhood and the wider world. We recommend that
EU governments acknowledge that the Constitutional Treaty will
not be adopted in its current form. Sensible and functionally
oriented improvements to the working practices of the Union could
be dealt with in a new intergovernmental conference; including
a careful review of the rationale for all institutions where currently
there is one representative per Member State. (para 167)
20. Mr Hoon made a Written Ministerial Statement
to Parliament on 5 December regarding the Government's approach
to consultations on the future of Europe under the German Presidency.
We can make no presumption about the outcome of this process or
whether/when there will be a new intergovernmental conference.
Nor is it for the UK alone to say what will happen to the Constitutional
Treaty: that will be a matter for agreement among the 27. But
we believe the EU needs now to focus on policies that are directly
relevant to citizens' lives, such as energy security, climate
change and counter terrorism. Any reform of EU institutions must
have a clear logic and help deliver practical benefits.
We believe it would be a mistake for the EU
to impose an artificial "pause" on enlargement while
these institutional debates are proceeding. Such a pause would
be destabilising for applicants and could become a trap from which
it would be difficult to emerge (if a pause was officially declared
it would also need to be ended by a unanimous decision, which
may prove problematic). Instead, the Union should proceed in a
measured way, handling all applications on their merits, neither
accelerating nor retarding the process. In fact, this would mean
at most one more accession in this decade, namely Croatia. (para
168)
21. We agree with the Committee that ongoing
discussions on the future of Europe do not mean that we should
bring enlargement to a halt, and we would not support a "pause".
The December European Council agreed that the enlargement strategy
based on consolidation conditionality and communication, combined
with the EU's capacity to integrate new members forms the basis
for a renewed consensus on enlargement". It also confirmed
that the EU would "keep its commitments regarding the
ongoing accession negotiations". The programme of the
German Presidency reflects that commitment to make progress with
the accession negotiations. We will work closely in support of
the Presidency and Commission to move Croatia and Turkey's accessions
forward.
A Union of 27 or more Member States will require
more flexible ways of policy-making. While the idea of a "core
Europe" is unlikely to gain traction, the increasing use
of "variable geometry" or "enhanced co-operation"
appears both inevitable and indeed desirable. While moving in
this direction, the EU needs to take care not to endanger existing
achievements, such as the single market, and to ensure democratic
accountability of new initiatives. (para 176)
22. Article 43 of the Amsterdam Treaty provides
for "enhanced co-operation". These provisions allow
Member States who wish to co-operate more closely in certain areas
to be able to do so. However Article 43 also sets out rigorous
criteria for the activation of Enhanced Co-operation to ensure
policy consistency among all Member States and to safeguard the
EU Single Market. To date, the Enhanced Co-operation provisions
of Article 43 have not been activated. However, moves towards
de facto enhanced co-operation are a reality as the Committee
points out. We fully concur on the importance of the integrity
of the Single Market, and the need for democratic accountability.
The budget review of 2008-09 must take into
account the possible impact of future enlargement. A serious restructuring
of the EU's spending priorities will be required for successful
future accessions, in particular those of Turkey and the countries
of the Western Balkans. (para 181)
23. Our aim is to achieve a modern, outward-looking
European Union, enabling member states to respond to the challenges
of globalisation and deliver opportunity, fairness and prosperity
for all our citizens. These priorities should be reflected in
the Budget of the EU. The December European Council invited the
Commission to provide impact assessments on key policy areas in
the course of the accession negotiations.
24. The 2008/09 Budget Review is the opportunity
to create a budget that meets the challenges of the 21st Century
and takes into account the prospect of future EU enlargement.
We will aim for an ambitious and fundamental review, guided by
a principled approach that calls for advancement of the national
and EU public interest, proportionality and sound financial management.
Candidates and potential candidates
If the countries of the Western Balkans are
to be able to address their many challenges in terms of economic
reform, statehood and the integration of minorities they need
to be offered a credible EU perspective. Without such the Western
Balkans could turn into an area of political and economic instability
surrounded by EU Member States, where nationalism, economic deprivation
and organised crime could flourish. The Union could be faced with
the stark choice between integrating the Western Balkans into
the EU or having to take responsibility for running them as protectorates
if they turn into failed states. The Union must therefore adhere
to its Thessaloniki commitment to the eventual accession of these
countries and should avoid any linkage between the entry of Turkey
and the entry of the countries of the Western Balkans. (para 195)
25. We agree with the Committee that a credible
EU perspective for the Western Balkans should be maintained. The
UK Government remains committed to EU enlargement for the Western
Balkans and firmly believes that the only viable solution to the
region's difficult past is a European one. We are therefore pleased
that the December 2006 European Council re-affirmed that the future
of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union. The December
Council also reiterated that each country's progress towards the
EU depends on its individual efforts to comply with the Copenhagen
criteria and the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association
process. We support this too.
The accession of the Western Balkans confronts
the EU with new challenges compared with the previous eastward
enlargement. The countries that joined the EU in 2004 were relatively
homogenous, stable nation states that were motivated by the desire
to 'rejoin Europe'. In the Western Balkans, the EU is dealing
with more fragile, fractious countries. To help these countries
along the path to greater stability and prosperity the EU needs
a more proactive approach: simply setting conditions and waiting
for governments to fulfil them in their own time will no longer
be enough. The EU must also devote real resources to the accession
process, both in terms of expertise and money. Since the accession
of these countries will take time, the EU needs to find ways of
maintaining momentum for positive change. It should gradually
integrate the candidates into various EU policy areas, and should
include them in a customs union. (para 196)
26. We agree that enlargement to the Western
Balkans presents the EU with new challenges. But some of the most
difficult issues are already a central part of the accession process,
including the challenges of administrative and judicial reforms
and tackling corruption and organised crime. We should maintain
step by step the process of supporting these countries to implement
the changes required for EU membership. We agree we should provide
both financial and technical support to assist the countries of
the Western Balkans meet the conditions of the "acquis"
and Copenhagen criteria. The EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession
(IPA) provides the financial support to help the countries achieve
this. Between 2007-2013 55% of the Instrument for Pre-Accession
(total budget €11.57 billion) will be allocated to the Western
Balkans. As part of this, the EU's Twinning programme funds secondments
of public sector experts from EU Member States. This enables us
to help them to reform their administrations in line with European
standards. We agree that finding ways of maintaining momentum
for positive change is important. We therefore very much welcome
the recent signing of the enlarged and amended Central Europe
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which now includes all the Western
Balkan countries. The agreement is a substantial step forward
both economically and politically and a move closer towards a
future European wide free market.
Croatia is making good progress with its accession
preparations, and the EU should not discourage the country by
making its accession date dependent on an agreement on institutional
reform among the existing member-states. If the EU has not agreed
institutional changes by the time Croatia is ready, the minimum
changes required for Croatian membership would need to be included
in Croatia's accession treaty. It is important that Croatia should
be able to join the Union if and when it has completed its accession
talks, not only for Croatia but also for the credibility of the
EU accession progress. Delays in Croatian accession would send
a negative signal to the Western Balkans. (para 204)
27. The Government welcomes the report's comments
regarding Croatia. The country has made solid progress since accession
negotiations began on 3 October 2005. Negotiations have been provisionally
closed on two chapters (Ch25—Science and Research and Ch26—Education
and Culture), and opened on a further three (Ch17—Economic
and Monetary Policy; Ch20—Enterprise and Industrial Policy;
and Ch29—Customs Union). We are confident that further chapters
will be opened during the course of the German Presidency. The
UK continues to support Croatia's preparations proactively. We
are providing £600,000 of bilateral assistance this year
targeted at specific EU related issues in addition to our contribution
through EU-funded projects.
28. We agree that Croatia should join the Union
as soon as it meets the necessary standards and that any unnecessary
delay to its accession would send a negative signal to the Western
Balkans. If necessary institutional adjustments to enable Croatian
accession could be made in Croatia's accession treaty.
The EU must do more to acknowledge the progress
that Turkey has already made. The EU member-states should strive
to maintain a more consistent and coherent line, reassuring Turkey
that they remain committed to admitting it as a full member, if
and when the accession negotiations have been completed. (para
226)
29. The Government agrees with the Committee
that Turkey has made a great deal of progress in recent years,
including abolishing the death penalty, significantly reducing
torture, ensuring constitutional rights for women and improving
the cultural rights of minority groups. However, there is more
to be done, and the Commission's 2006 report stated that "the
pace of reform has slowed". We continue to urge the Turkish
Government to address areas of continuing concern such as freedom
of expression.
30. The December 2006 European Council reaffirmed
that it would honour existing commitments to Turkey and other
countries that are in the enlargement process. Furthermore, the
agreement at the December 2006 General Affairs and External Relations
Council allows negotiations with Turkey to move ahead and the
EU to continue to pursue the strategic objective of Turkish accession.
Given the strategic importance of Turkish accession
for the long-term development of the wider Europe, the EU should
not allow the question of Cyprus to derail the accession talks.
A compromise needs to be found under which Turkey implements its
commitments under the Ankara protocol while the EU lives up to
its promise to free up trade with Northern Cyprus. Until such
a compromise is in place, the EU may decide to suspend the negotiations
on a limited number of chapters directly related to the customs
union. If the negotiations were halted altogether, it would require
a tremendous effort on both sides to re-start them. (para 227)
31. The Government agrees that the question of
Cyprus should not be allowed to derail Turkey's accession negotiations.
Indeed, it is our view that steady progress in Turkey's negotiations
will increase trust and interaction between the parties and improve
the prospects for a resumption of settlement negotiations under
UN auspices.
32. Turkey must of course fulfil its obligations
to all Member States, including fully implementing the Additional
Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. At the December 2006 General
Affairs and External Relations Council, EU Member States agreed
not to open 8 chapters and not to close any chapters until Turkey
has done so. At the same time, the Council agreed that all other
work should continue, and that chapters for which technical preparations
have been completed should be opened.
33. We are also pleased that support for resuming
work without delay on a Direct Trade Regulation to end the isolation
of the Turkish Cypriots will be reiterated by the January 2006
General Affairs and External Relations Council and that work on
this will be taken forward by the German Presidency. We will continue
to support efforts to achieve agreement as soon as possible.
Whatever the hesitation and hostility hanging
over Turkey's accession negotiations, we believe that it is in
both Turkey's and the EU's best interests that the accession negotiations
be pursued in good faith and with a will to bring them to a successful
conclusion. (para 228)
34. The Government agrees. We are pleased that
EU Member States reaffirmed at both the June and December 2006
European Councils that they would honour existing commitments
to Turkey and other candidates.
Possible alternative to enlargement and the cost
of non-enlargement
The EU needs to have an attractive and effective
policy to work with those countries that do not have the immediate,
or even medium-term, prospect of membership. The European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) is a promising start but the EU needs to improve
it through better incentives, tougher conditionality and more
differentiation among the participating countries. An effective
ENP may also have to distinguish between the EU's European neighbours
and the neighbours of Europe, between those that ultimately harbour
hopes for membership and those that do not. In the case of the
former, an ENP that is construed as alternative to membership
is unlikely to be acceptable. For the eastern neighbours, the
ENP could be turned into a waiting room for membership. At the
very least, the ENP should be "membership" neutral.
(para 245)
35. We agree with the conclusions of the report
that the EU needs an effective policy to work with countries that
do not at this stage have a prospect of EU membership. The European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) offers a framework through which the
EU can engage with its eastern and southern neighbours on social,
political and economic reform. Supporting the development of prosperous,
stable and democratic neighbours is strongly in the EU's interests.
Failure to support neighbouring countries in their reforms has
a number of potential negative consequences for the EU, for example
in terms of illegal immigration, poor environmental standards,
and lack of energy security. We agree that there is scope for
the ENP to be improved to offer better incentives to partner countries,
and to this end will continue to work with partners to explore
where the EU can strengthen its offer.
36. The ENP is 'membership neutral' and does
not prejudice the future of the eastern neighbours' relationship
with the EU. We strongly agree that ENP should not be an alternative
to membership for Eastern neighbours. This would be unacceptable
to the Eastern neighbours. The prospect of EU membership is a
powerful lever for reform. Closing off this option would doubtless
have serious implications for the reform process in the east,
engendering some of the negative consequences for the EU described
in the preceding paragraph.
Neither Turkey nor the countries of the Western
Balkans are likely to accept a "privileged partnership"
however it is defined as a substitute for full membership of the
EU. Repeated calls for a privileged partnership from EU governments
could have a demotivating effect on the candidate countries. (para
255)
37. We agree that any reference to privileged
partnerships risks undermining the momentum for reform in Turkey
and the Western Balkans. Member States have agreed to stand by
existing commitments to countries that are in the accession process,
most recently at the December 2006 European Council. The clear
objective of negotiations is full membership, although as in any
negotiations the outcome cannot be guaranteed in advance. We will
continue to work towards that objective.
If the EU were to halt or considerably slow
down the enlargement process, it could face heavy costs in terms
of political instability and economic stagnation in its neighbourhood.
The most immediate and severe impact would be in the Western Balkans.
Although a return to war and bloodshed looks unlikely there would
likely be an upsurge in nationalism and current positive trends
in governance and economic reform would be halted. (para 268)
The Member States should therefore keep to
their commitment to offer full membership to both Turkey and the
countries of the Western Balkans if and when they are ready to
assume the obligations of membership. (para 269)
38. We agree on the likely detrimental impact
on the political stability and reforms in the Western Balkans
of a halt or considerable slowing down of the enlargement process.
We would also underscore the potential detrimental impact on the
reform process in Turkey. We fully endorse the Committee's conclusion
on the importance of honouring our clear commitments to Turkey,
Croatia and the other Western Balkans countries.
Enlargement and South East Europe Group
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
January 2007
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