THE EU AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1. After many years of crisis, fighting, political
stalemate, apathy on the part of the international community,
and despair that the apparently intractable problems of the Israeli/Arab
conflict can ever be resolved, there were in the Spring of 2007
a number of hopeful signs that progress could be made. The case
for a renewed effort to make progress is urgent, even if current
circumstances are unpromising. This inquiry focuses on what the
European Union's role has been so far, and whether this is the
moment for the European Union (EU), whose involvement in the Middle
Peace Process has been largely unsung, to put all its weight behind
re-launching efforts to bring the parties together and make progress
at the negotiating table and on the ground.
2. During our inquiry events moved constantly.
In February 2007, Saudi Arabia took an unprecedented lead in sponsoring
an agreement between the Palestinians to form a coalition government,
and in renewing the commitment of the Arab League to the 2002
Arab Peace Initiative. (See Box 6, Chapter 3). This "Mecca
Agreement" led in mid-March 2007 to the formation of a new
Palestinian National Unity Government (NUG) (see Box 4, Chapter
2). On the diplomatic front, the United States Secretary of State,
Dr Condoleezza Rice increased the number of her visits to
the Middle East in an attempt to unblock the negotiating deadlock.
The EU's High Representative, Javier Solana, was also tasked by
the EU's Council with missions to the Middle East, including direct
talks with the Syrian and Saudi governments. The events of June
2007 occurred after the substantial completion of this report.
These are discussed in Chapter 6.
3. The changed dynamics among the Arab League
group sponsoring the Arab Peace Initiative were stimulated by
growing concerns over the fragility of Iraq, the spread of sectarian
Sunni-Shi'ia violence beyond Iraq's borders, and the growing regional
influence of Iran: in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, as well as in Palestinian
affairs (see Chapter 3).
4. The EU, and the international community, need
to decide whether, if a single Palestinian entity is restored,
to return to the bilateral, negotiations-based Road Map with its
incremental path (see Box 3 Chapter 2), which has so far failed
to produce results; or whether, in addition, to start work on
the final status issues (see Box 9 Chapter 4), a path which has
become known as the "political horizon", a formulation
used by Dr Condoleezza Rice. In an atmosphere in which countries
in the region have increased their active interest in the conflict,
can a wider regional settlement be achieved through the kind of
formula represented by the Arab Peace Initiative? Should the EU
support a process between Israel/Palestine which does not also
address issues such as Syria and the Golan Heights, and Lebanon
(Chapter 3) or should it continue to pursue a comprehensive approach
to a peace settlement? How can progress be made in the EU's relations
with the Palestinian Authority government? (Chapter 4)
5. The credibility of the Middle East Peace
Process needs to be restored by a renewed, concerted and sustained
effort by the whole international community. We believe therefore
that the EU, which has many interests at stake in this region,
should participate actively and forcefully in such an effort.
6. The shifts in Middle Eastern power relations
have had both direct and indirect impacts on the dynamics of peace-making
between Israelis and Palestinians, leading some to doubt whether
either party could engage in or sustain a renewed peace process.
There are serious risks in continuing a policy of neglect of the
central issue of Palestine and this underlines the need to make
progress towards the achievement of the two state solution. It
is not, for example, certain that the current support for the
two state solution will continue indefinitely in the absence of
any progress.
7. In this report we have sought to assess the
value that could be added by European Union policies and actions
over and above what individual national governments can achieve.
How effective has EU action been and how can the EU's collective
influence be better directed towards establishing an international
and regional consensus on the way forward? We listened to witnesses
from both sides of the conflict and to key players in the EU,
as well as academic and other experts in the field and we present
our findings. In Chapter 2 we outline the recent historical perspective.
In Chapter 3 we discuss the EU's relations with key players—Israel,
the Palestinian Authority and the US. The final part discusses
the EU's relations with a number of states in the region, notably
Syria, Lebanon and Iran. Chapter 4 discusses the EU's objectives
and approach to the MEPP and we consider the institutional arrangements,
including the operation of the EU, the EU's High Representative
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the EU Special
Representative for the Middle East peace process, together with
roles played by and interactions between the EU and its member
states. We also examine the EU's role in the Quartet (see Box
8, Chapter 4). In Chapter 5 we examine the EU's economic and state-building
support for the Palestinian people and territories, including
the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM), the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions, as well as the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Chapter 6 was
prepared after our report had been substantially completed to
discuss the events of June 2007 and their consequences. Our conclusions
appear in bold print in the text, and are presented together in
Chapter 7.
8. We make this Report to the House for debate.
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