The European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) missions
144. Towards the end of 2005, the EU adopted
Joint Actions setting up two ESDP missions in the Palestinian
territories: the European Coordinating Office for Palestinian
Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), and EUBAM Rafah, a border assistance
mission (see Box). Arguably, their symbolic and political significance
has outstripped their operational impact. The boycott of the Palestinian
Authority resulted in the suspension of EUPOL, and the EUBAM border
assistance mission has been severely curtailed due to the closure
of the Rafah crossing point for 80% of the time since June 2006[30]
(p 140). However, the acceptance by the parties of a limited
security role for the EU is a significant political breakthrough
(Q 9), showing the growing trust placed in the Europeans
in this very sensitive area, especially by the Israelis.
BOX 13
EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah[31]
145. These two missions should be seen in the
context of the overall EU strategy for political engagement in
and practical assistance to the parties to the MEPP. Their overall
goals are to contribute to confidence-building and the implementation
of agreements between the parties, especially the Agreement on
Movement and Access of November 2005 in the case of EUBAM; and
to build the capacity of the Palestinian administration to manage
its own security challenges.
146. However, one question that arose was what
the missions could achieve under conditions of occupation and
in the absence of a coherent overarching framework for building
up a viable and democratic Palestinian state. Dr Richard
Youngs and Prof. Robert Springborg were particularly critical
of the missions. Dr Youngs expressed the strong view that such
small-scale missions would have no impact unless they were linked
to a high-level political engagement (Q 117), as otherwise
they would simply amount to token gestures. This position was
echoed by Dr Ahmed Khalidi who emphasised the importance
of the EU speaking out on issues of substance, remarking that:
"I do not think that our main problem is that of not having
enough policemen" (Q 55).
147. A related point made by several witnesses
was that attempting to build a democratic and viable Palestinian
state is a difficult or even impossible task under conditions
of occupation, and therefore the EU's operational missions can
in any case only achieve as much as the political and security
conditions allow. The Palestinian General-Delegate to the UK Professor Manuel
Hassassian stated that the occupation was the key factor hindering
progress, arguing that: "The occupation has played a detrimental
role. We cannot undermine the fact that the Israelis have not
been very helpful, cooperative or happy to see the involvement
of the Europeans in building capacity for the Palestinians. The
intention of the Israelis is still not to have an independent
Palestinian state" (Q 107).
148. However, Dr Richard Youngs recognised
that there is a two-way relationship between the occupation and
the reform of Palestinian institutions: "[…] one cannot
not have a fully functioning, democratic Palestinian state until
occupation is ended, so that is still the big issue, and that
focusing and pressing on issues of corruption, for example, should
not be a kind of pretext for taking the critical spotlight off
occupation, but, on the other hand, I think the EU did realise
that neglecting issues of underlying reform was itself militating
against the prospects for longer-term peace […]" (Q 124)
Seen from this angle, the yardstick of success for the ESDP missions
is whether they can improve the conditions for peace despite being
caught up in the fluctuating dynamics of the conflict.
149. In contrast to the sceptical views outlined
above, several witnesses were very positive about the ESDP missions,
especially Palestinian General-Delegate Professor Manuel Hassassian
and Ambassador Madi of Egypt. Professor Manuel Hassassian
said: "In all fairness, all those missions that have been
dedicated to work in helping the Palestinian people in their infrastructural
development, in their capacity building, in the development of
their human resources, have been very efficient" (Q 107).
This was echoed by Dr Kim Howells, who took the view that
the missions have "proved to be effective instruments"
(Q 320).
150. Ambassador Madi was unequivocal about the
success of EUBAM: "We look at it as one of the most important
roles played by the Europeans so far. Why? For many years we were
asking for a European presence in the Palestinian-occupied territories,
presence in the form of monitoring the situation. I have to go
back every time to how we look at the European role as an honest
broker, because, this is why we are in favour of a European presence
on the ground […] We hope that this role can be expanded
further and the Europeans can play more of a role inside the Palestinian
territories, whether in the monitoring or any assignment which
would be accorded to the Europeans in the future" (Q 166).
This positive evaluation was echoed by UNRWA, which underlined
the critical contribution of EUPOL and EUBAM in facilitating movement
in and out of Gaza, essential for economic and social recovery
(p 161).
151. EUPOL COPPS, which started out as a UK programme,
failed to get off the ground in early 2006 because of the boycott
of the Palestinian government. Dr Richard Youngs said it
had showed great potential and felt that it had been disappointing
to see it rendered inoperative: "It is often asserted that
the EU has had more of a focus on genuine underlying reform of
the security sector and does talk about the need to strengthen
civilian control over security forces over the need to help create
a single security service, and that contrasts with the US approach
where we know that the US has approved quite large funding directly
for the presidential guard" (Q 128).
152. Despite the EU's attempts to link security
assistance to the strengthening of the rule of law, Dr Richard
Youngs highlighted some weaknesses in the EU's approach, noting
that most of the aid had gone to the provision of hardware, such
as anti-riot equipment, rather than being directed at more fundamental
reform issues (Q 128). He criticised the EUPOL mission for
its tendency to increase factionalism, as there was a perception
in the Palestinian territories that the EU was "helping to
try and quash Hamas more than giving Hamas a legitimate stake
in the provision of security" (Q 128).
153. We believe that work to set up EUPOL
COPPS should resume when conditions allow, but it should be re-oriented
and strengthened. The EU must address the weaknesses of EUPOL
COPPS. In particular, the mission must focus on capacity-building
and reform rather than equipment, and should strengthen rather
than weaken the rule-of-law. Coordination with other operational
actors and donors also appears to be an area of concern.
154. The partial success of the EU's operational
missions, as well as the high-profile contribution of EU Member
States to the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) raises the question
of whether the EU could play an operational role in the framework
of a future peace settlement, in a monitoring or peacekeeping
role. Several witnesses were positive about this idea (Q 166).
Yossi Mekelberg was particularly enthusiastic about the prospect
for such a role, given recent experience in Lebanon: "in
Lebanon, the deployment of a multilateral force is a change […]
The multilateral [force], of now almost 12,000 in Lebanon, […]
changed the perception actually that [a] multilateral, including
a European force, can serve as peace-keepers … there, and
it can set a precedent, an important precedent, as far as agreement
with the Palestinians is concerned" (Q 58).
155. We believe that discussions with the
parties to the conflict and the members of the Quartet should
commence with a view to identifying whether the EU may be in a
position to support a peace settlement through the deployment
of a peacekeeping mission. In the light of these discussions,
the Council of the EU could consider undertaking scenario development
and planning work for a possible EU operational mission to the
Palestinian territories.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
and European Neighbourhood Policy
156. The Euro-Mediterranean (Euro-Med) Partnership
was launched in 1995, in part as an adjunct and support mechanism
for the Oslo peace process then taking place between Israel and
the Palestinians (Youngs, Q 116). The Euro-Med's political focus
stopped short of entering into the details of the continuing conflict,
but sought to support peace-building efforts by seeking to build
regional integration, including through the promotion of a Mediterranean
Free Trade Zone by the year 2010. Unfortunately, this skirting
around of the core issues has led, in the words of Mr. Quarrey
of the FCO, to "a rather sterile debate around issues to
do with Israel-Palestine" and an ineffective way of making
the Euro-Med Partnership contribute to the MEPP (Q 33). In
the views of Professor Manuel Hassassian and Ambassador Madi,
the Euro-Med Partnership also failed because the EU lacked more
of an assertive political role in the peace process (QQ 106,
163).
157. The regional aspirations of the Euro-Med
Partnership also suffered from the stalling of the Oslo Peace
Process, and the subsequent suspension of direct peace negotiations.
At the tenth anniversary of its launch in Barcelona in 2005, only
one Arab head of state attended the official summit (Youngs, Q 132).
Yet, as Ambassador Eran notes, the Euro-Med Partnership remains
the only regional forum in which Israelis and Arabs have continued
to meet, even at the height of bilateral tensions (Q 313).
Sir John Sawers also observed that the tenth anniversary summit
also changed the direction of the Barcelona Process towards increasing
the proportion of EU funding spent on good governance, education
and private sector reform, from 25% of the budget to 50% projected
for 2007 to 2010 (Q 32).
158. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
has emerged as a different type of instrument, based on deepening
the EU's bilateral relations with neighbouring states with few
or no prospects of joining the EU in the near future, and partly
as a means of using the bilateral approach to overcome the blockages
inherent in region-wide policies exemplified by the Euro-Med Partnership
(Youngs, Q 146). The 'ENP Action Plans' bilaterally negotiated
by the EU with each partner also carry the advantage of bringing
the political and economic instruments of the EU closer together
under the Commission, which is thus able to create approaches
better tailored to the individual circumstances of each partner
(Dr Eran, Q 313).
159. In respect of the MEPP, David Quarrey of
the FCO said the ENP has greater potential than the Euro-Med Partnership
to engage the desire of both Israel and the Palestinians to normalise
their relations with the outside world (Q 33). If the tools
of the ENP are used creatively, this broader goal of normalisation
could be used both as a lever and as an incentive to both sides
to re-engage in peace. To date, however, the Action Plan negotiated
with the Palestinian Authority has not been implemented, due to
the EU's suspension of relations with the PA government (Mingarelli,
QQ 207, 208). However, Dr Youngs—speaking before the
formation of the NUG—said that if a unity government was
formed and the EU was able to engage with it, the ENP could provide
the EU with the possibility of offering new inducements to both
Fatah and Hamas to move in the direction of peace (Youngs, Q 146).
160. The lower level of the Commission's direct
financial assistance to Israel lessens the opportunities for it
to use development assistance as a lever over the direction of
Israeli policy. However, the significant increase in bilateral
cooperation taking place under the EU's Action Plan with Israel
has opened the way for more opportunities for the Commission to
exercise its political as well as economic influence (Youngs,
Q 146) (See Chapter 3). Dr Jana Hybášková
referred to several relevant examples in this respect (Q 231).
161. We believe that while the Euro-Med Partnership
has been useful in the past, it is now the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) that can make a contribution to developing relations
with the parties to the MEPP. The advantage of the ENP is that
it allows the EU to develop bilateral relations which are suited
to each individual partner country. Progress made by each country
is not dependent on progress made by other countries. Under the
ENP, the EU offers various financial and other incentives to support
the implementation of each country's Action Plan.
25 See also footnote 8 at para.36. Back
26
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament "EU-Palestinian cooperation beyond disengagement-towards
a two-state solution" ref. COM(2005) 458 final, Brussels
5 October 2005. These proposals were the subject of an exchange
of correspondence between the EU Committee and the Minister for
Europe at the FCO (see letter from Douglas Alexander MP, Minister
for Europe, dated 29 November 2005-Please see appendix 6 for this
correspondence). Back
27
Source: EU Fact Sheet on the TIM. Back
28
The UK had been evaluated by the OECD to be among the best donors
at not labelling aid as the UK's and for being co-ordinated with
others and in the Palestinian area more than 90% of UK aid was
spent in co-ordinated ways (Q 359). Back
29
The European Union is closely involved in the main international
donor coordination structures for aid to the Palestinians, and
plays a leading role in several of them. At the strategic level,
the EU is a co-chair of the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC). This
forum is a 12-member committee that was set up in 1993 as a result
of multilateral talks, and serves as the principal policy-level
coordination mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinian
people. The EU also co-chairs the Governance Strategy Group (p 139). Back
30
Coinciding with the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and the launching
of Israeli incursions into Gaza. Back
31
The information in this box is taken from EU fact sheets posted
on the Council website. Back
