CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
166. The credibility of the Middle East Peace
Process needs to be restored by a renewed, concerted and sustained
effort by the whole international community. We believe therefore
that the EU, which has many interests at stake in this region,
should participate actively and forcefully in such an effort.
(Para 5)
167. The EU's consistent support since 1980 for
a negotiated two-state solution as the basis for a final and comprehensive
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has subsequently
gained the adherence of the majority of the international community
and, above all, since 2002, of the US. This is one of the major
successes of EU diplomacy in the MEPP, particularly in influencing
the evolution of US policy. The seriousness of the current situation
is a major test for the EU which again needs to put its full weight
behind the search for a comprehensive solution. For 20 years extremists
have been allowed to dictate the agenda. Any resumed peace process
now needs to be proofed against their acts. (Para 11)
168. We are not convinced that the Road Map,
as originally conceived in 2003, is the only vehicle for progress,
and consider that the interim steps it describes should no longer
be pursued to the exclusion of the consideration of final status
issues such as the territorial limits of the two states, the fate
of refugees and the status of Jerusalem. We are reinforced in
this view by the recent statement by High Representative Javier
Solana that the time has come for the EU and the Quartet to focus
more directly on resolving the issues which are at the heart of
the conflict. (Para 20)
169. We believe that the EU needs to explore
more imaginative ways of re-engaging the Israelis in the search
for peace. EU policy contains a clearly stated position calling
on the Israeli government to take "further steps, including
the freezing of settlement activities and dismantling of settlement
outposts and Israeli abstention from measures which are not in
accordance with international law, including extra-judicial killings
and collective punishment." (Para 26)
170. We believe the EU needs to use all the instruments
at its disposal. The European Neighbourhood Policy, in particular,
offers a promising route through which the EU can work for a deepening
bilateral relationship with Israel within the context of steps
towards resolving Israel's conflict with the Palestinians. The
EU needs to make clear to the Israeli government that there could
be opportunities for developing the relationship within the Neighbourhood
Action Plan. Conversely, a lack of engagement by Israel in the
MEPP would in the long run hinder the process of economic harmonisation
and bilateral technical and security cooperation. (Para 33)
171. We are gravely concerned about the security,
human rights and socio-economic situation in the occupied Palestinian
territories. It is becoming evident that the Quartet approach
contributed nothing to ameliorate the crisis. (Para 40)
172. The EU should engage more urgently and consistently
with the Israeli government to persuade them to transfer the remainder
of the withheld Palestinian tax and customs revenues to the Palestinian
authorities in a way that benefits all Palestinians[33].
(Para 41)
173. We believe that the European Union's support
for a Palestinian coalition government, including Hamas, could
not have been unconditional. To require that a Hamas-led government
not only renounce attacks on Israel but use its governmental authority
to prevent such attacks by others was entirely justified. (Para
45)
174. However, the EU should not allow the peace
process to be held hostage by any faction, individual, or state.
The history of the Middle East is scarred by peace initiatives
that have been derailed by extremists on both sides. Although
each situation is different, recent experience in other situations,
such as Northern Ireland, can serve as a source of inspiration
and valuable lessons on how to bring into the peace process individuals
and movements who previously espoused violence and how to avoid
the process succumbing to acts of violence. (Para 46)
175. We believe that the EU's objective should
be to attempt to maintain a peace process that is as inclusive
as possible, while firmly rejecting attempts by outsiders and
extremists to derail it. Dialogue with the key parties is an essential
aspect of the peace process, and channels of communication should
as far as possible be kept open. (Para 47)
176. The requirement that the Palestinian government
accept and respect positions established collectively by the Arab
side, most recently at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh, is entirely
justified. But conditions about the formal recognition by Hamas
of the state of Israel amalgamate elements of any final status
negotiations with the preliminaries to such negotiations. We believe
that the interpretation of the conditions set by the Quartet was
undesirably rigid and we would urge the government and the EU
to reconsider the precise formulation of any conditions and to
apply them in future with a reasonable amount of flexibility.
(Para 51)
177. We are concerned that military support for
one faction over another heightened tensions in the occupied Palestinian
territories. (Para 55)
178. We also believe that the EU should engage
in a frank dialogue with the United States on this issue, with
a view to ensuring that all aid provided by members of the Quartet
improves the cohesion of the Palestinian administration and avoids
increasing tensions. (Para 56)
179. We also believe that it is a necessary condition
for any peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours
that there should be a Palestinian Authority capable of fulfilling
any responsibilities it has accepted under such a settlement.
It should also be able to provide stability and good governance
within the Palestinian party to a two-state solution. Accordingly,
the European Union needs to keep that ultimate objective firmly
in mind at every stage of its dealings with the Palestinians and
Israelis and the wider international community; and to concentrate
its efforts on moving towards that objective. The provision of
emergency humanitarian aid by the EU must not conceal the need
to move as soon as possible to a situation where the EU's resources
go directly to properly constituted Palestinian governmental institutions.
(Para 57)
180. The present situation on the ground is far
removed from the stated objective of creating a viable Palestinian
state. But the "Mecca agreement" between Hamas and Fatah
brokered by the Saudi government offered, the possibility of a
first step along that road. The European Union needs, by its statements
and its actions, to encourage further progress along these lines.
(Para 58)
181. We believe that a key role for the EU in
the EU/US relationship is to press upon the US the importance
to the future of the region of its sustaining an active, balanced
and consistent interest and engagement in the MEPP, and supporting
the Palestinians as well as Israel in achieving the two state
solution. In pursuit of this objective, the EU and Member State
governments should give their full support to their parliamentarians,
in making full use of the existing relationship and in increasing
links to explain and discuss the European position with their
counterparts in the US Congress. (Para 63)
182. We acknowledge the importance of the diplomatic
energy and commitment to reviving the MEPP demonstrated in recent
months by Saudi Arabia and other Arab League states, and the facilitating
role played by Saudi Arabia in the formation of the Palestinian
National Unity Government as having been one of the most helpful
developments in recent months. While it is premature, and perhaps
unwise, to focus too closely on the machinery and form that the
new, and unprecedented, engagement of the Arab states in the MEPP
will take, the EU and other members of the Quartet should take
seriously and encourage the renewal of Arab regional leadership.
Recent initiatives, such as the designation by the Arab League
of Egypt and Jordan as the League's interlocutors with Israel
and the Palestinians in the MEPP, should be fully supported by
the EU. (Para 70)
183. We recognise the importance of the EU continuing
its engagement with Syria, not least to test President Assad's
seriousness of purpose. Syria has clear and legitimate national
and strategic interests at stake in the MEPP. Both the Israelis
and Palestinians have an interest in ensuring that Syria does
not undermine the prospects for peace, either by supplying weapons
to support Hezbollah attacks from Lebanon into Israel, or by providing
a safe haven and financial support for a Hamas leadership in exile.
(Para 76)
184. We believe negotiations for a comprehensive
settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute must involve Lebanon, whose
political stability and viability is a necessary element for progress
towards such a settlement. We urge the EU to continue to give
full support to the government of Lebanon, including by continuing
to support the establishment of an international tribunal to try
those suspected of involvement in the assassination of former
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other Lebanese public figures.
(Para 83)
185. The stability of Lebanon requires the continuing
absence of hostilities along the country's border with Israel.
We urge the EU therefore to give full support to UNIFIL II in
its strengthened form and mandate, including the prevention of
attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon, and to make clear to
Israel that any military action from their side will be met by
the condemnation of the international community. Given that the
only remaining territorial dispute in the area concerns the Shebaa
Farms, and in order to neutralise it as a source of conflict,
we suggest that the EU seeks to convince Syria and Lebanon to
refer the issue to the International Court of Justice, and to
convince Israel to declare that it will respect any judgement
by the Court and evacuate the area in dispute forthwith. (Para
84)
186. We believe that it is important that the
EU continues to engage with Iran diplomatically, but it should
not allow the content of these negotiations to "leak into"
or create a direct linkage to the MEPP. Iran should not be allowed
to have a veto over the MEPP. (Para 91)
187. We believe that leading EU Member States
have an important role to play in any renewed peace effort and
that this needs to be coordinated within and designed to support
an overall EU position. The Government should direct the UK's
involvement with these objectives in mind. (Para 99)
188. The EU has a very wide range of instruments
at its disposal, in addition to those available to the Member
States, and plays an important role in coordinating aid to the
Palestinian territories. We believe that the EU Member States
should carefully consider the value of engaging in competing or
parallel initiatives and démarches, and that they
should closely coordinate their efforts in the framework of a
coherent EU policy. (Para 100)
189. We see the Quartet of the US, the EU, Russia
and UN as continuing to be the essential diplomatic tool for coordinating
the involvement of the wider international community in any such
peace effort. The EU has already played an influential, but largely
unacknowledged, role within the Quartet, introducing innovative
proposals for the way forward. We believe that the EU's role within
the Quartet needs to be more active and assertive than it has
been in the past, providing leadership with imaginative ideas,
including on final status issues and through engaging in a frank
and intensive dialogue with other partners, in particular the
US. This should however be done in private and with the aim of
building consensus as the best means to preserve the Quartet's
influence with both the parties to the conflict, with whom the
EU and the Quartet should seek to pursue an even-handed approach.
It is essential to ensure that fewer opportunities exist than
in the past for the parties to the conflict to exploit divisions
between international actors within the Quartet, and most especially
those between the EU and US. We urge the Government to seek to
ensure that the EU's representatives in the Quartet, notably the
High Representative, get the backing they need to play a more
active and assertive role. (Para 110)
190. We welcome the greater role attributed to
the High Representative's office in providing a focus for
collective EU efforts, but consider that a more structured approach
is required to coordinate and synchronise the diplomatic efforts
of the High Representative with the economic and other instruments
deployed by the Commission. The pro-active role of Dr Solana
has gone a long way towards improving the situation. (Para 116)
191. We consider that the High Representative,
Javier Solana, assisted by the EU Special Representative, Marc
Otte, has worked very actively and effectively towards achieving
the objectives of the EU in relation to the MEPP. The question
now arises as to whether the EU has the capacity in place to participate
in intensive negotiations on a comprehensive peace settlement.
We would encourage the Council to make the necessary preparations
so that the EU can quickly mobilise a full negotiating team to
assist the peace process. (Para 117)
192. We believe that the EU's extensive budgetary
assistance and humanitarian aid has been vital to the establishment
and maintenance of Palestinian institutions and to sustaining
the Palestinian people and this should be publicised both in the
region and outside. The EU should continue to make every effort
to monitor the distribution of its aid in difficult circumstances.
(Para 128)
193. The EU should link its financial and technical
assistance more directly to its political goals and make that
assistance conditional on progress in institutional reform in
the Palestinian territories and in the peace process. The EU role
is important to strengthening the Palestinians' capacity both
to assume their responsibility for achieving peace and to enhance
governance standards and accountability in the everyday lives
of Palestinian citizens which is critical to public support for
the objectives of peace. (Para 129)
194. We firmly support the Temporary International
Mechanism (TIM) but believe that it has been no more than a stop-gap
measure, whose usefulness must not conceal or delay the need to
move as soon as possible to a situation where the European Union's
resources go to properly constituted Palestinian governmental
institutions. The TIM cannot be a substitute for more normal economic
conditions, in particular free movement and access, and the full
transfer of withheld Palestinian revenues by the Israeli government.
(Para 134)
195. The TIM should accordingly not divert the
attention of the EU from the root causes of the insecurity and
poverty in the Palestinian territories. The Commission is to be
commended on the way in which it quickly set up the Temporary
International Mechanism in response to the boycott of the Palestinian
government and on its leading role in co-ordinating humanitarian
aid, including from the Member States. We would encourage the
Commission to continue to work towards the effective coordination
of humanitarian aid with other donors, including Arab states and
the United States. (Para 135)
196. We support the European Commission's plans
to establish a successor mechanism to the TIM, even though the
events of June 2007 re-opened the question of how EU funding mechanisms
would evolve. In the meantime it will be important that aid should
be available to Palestinians in all the occupied territories.
Strict guarantees should be provided that funds will not be diverted
to purposes other than those for which they are intended and,
over the longer term, particular attention should be paid to reducing
the aid dependency of Palestinians. (Para 141)
197. We believe that work to set up EUPOL COPPS
should resume when conditions allow, but it should be re-oriented
and strengthened. The EU must address the weaknesses of EUPOL
COPPS. In particular, the mission must focus on capacity-building
and reform rather than equipment, and should strengthen rather
than weaken the rule-of-law. Coordination with other operational
actors and donors also appears to be an area of concern. (Para
153)
198. We believe that discussions with the parties
to the conflict and the members of the Quartet should commence
with a view to identifying whether the EU may be in a position
to support a peace settlement through the deployment of a peacekeeping
mission. In the light of these discussions, the Council of the
EU could consider undertaking scenario development and planning
work for a possible EU operational mission to the Palestinian
territories. (Para 155)
199. We believe that while the Euro-Med Partnership
has been useful in the past, it is now the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) that can make a contribution to developing relations
with the parties to the MEPP. The advantage of the ENP is that
it allows the EU to develop bilateral relations which are suited
to each individual partner country. Progress made by each country
is not dependent on progress made by other countries. Under the
ENP, the EU offers various financial and other incentives to support
the implementation of each country's Action Plan. (Para 161)
200. There is a danger that the situation will
deteriorate rapidly and that the crisis will spread beyond the
Palestinian territories. In addition, events such as those of
June 2007 may be used, as they have often been used in the past,
as an excuse for inaction and neglect. We do not believe the international
community can afford yet again to repeat these errors and should
recognise an even greater urgency in seeking a solution. (Para
164)
201. These recent events, in our view, reinforce
the overall conclusion of our report, that the EU now needs to
play a more active and imaginative role in the search for peace
in the Middle East than it has done in recent years; they underline
the importance of the main policy recommendations we have made.
Indeed our view is strengthened that the EU needs to increase
and sustain its effort to work more closely with all the main
players towards an inclusive peace process and settlement. (Para
165)
33 The situation changed following the events of June
2007 (see footnote 5 at para. 28). Back
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