Memorandum by Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Independent Foreign Policy Adviser on
Middle Eastern Affairs
The Sub-Committee asked me to address the following
question:
WHAT SHOULD
EU POLICY WITH
REGARD TO
THE MIDDLE
EAST PEACE
PROCESS FOCUS
ON?
Supporting the National Unity Government
The EU, in close coordination with other Quartet
Members (the US, UN and Russia) should support the newly-formed
Palestinian National Unity Government (NUG) in order to avoid
the collapse of the PA and a return to violence. The EU should
focus on strengthening Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions,
resuming economic aid directly to the Ministry of Finance, and
supporting the reform of the multiple factionalised security forces.
The political process should be supported by the Quartet, of which
the EU is a key member. Positive conditionality should be linked
to economic aid and new benchmarks should be created to enhance
the peace process.
The EU should judge the NUG by its performance:
its actual commitment to non-violence should be judged by its
adherence to a Hudna or ceasefire and its willingness and ability
to control and crack down on opposition groups like Palestinian
Islamic Jihad which advocate violence against Israel and oppose
any peace process. The actual halt of attacks on Israel should
be non-negotiable, as should the end to any public display of
illegal arms.
Recognition of Israel should also be judged
by the NUG's willingness and commitment to negotiate with Israel
on the basis of the 1967 borders. Hamas' agreement to empower
President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate on its behalf should be welcome.
Recognition of previous agreements is tricky
since neither Israel nor the PA have carried out many of their
obligations under Oslo, the Road Map and other interim agreements.
The NUG's commitment to respect previous agreements
stipulated in the Mecca Declaration is welcome. It could be viewed
as a cautious first step even if it falls short of the Quartet's
desire to seek a declaration of full recognition. Small steps
in a difficult process must be viewed as progress and should be
encouraged.
Current EU efforts should also focus on getting
the NUG to release the IDF's Corporal Gilad Shalit who was kidnapped
from Israeli sovereign territory in June 2006 and BBC correspondent
Alan Johnston who was kidnapped in Gaza in mid-March 2007 . Attention
should also be given to ensuring that the NUG succeeds in preventing
the firing of Qassam rockets from Gaza into Israel. It is also
important for the EU to devise a strategy to monitor and limit
the smuggling of arms through tunnels from Egypt into Gaza. The
EU should work closely with other Quartet members and consult
regularly with the Arab Quartet, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE. The latter have an increasingly important
role to play in the MEPP.
It is important to deal with the NUG as a whole
and not to boycott, undermine or marginalise individual members
of the government Attempts to isolate certain members may hamper
efforts to reach a cease-fire and promote a political settlement.
Reaching out to Hamas moderates
The EU must come to terms with the fact that
Hamas is part of the fabric of Palestinian society. The question
the EU should be grappling with is how to support Hamas in a way
that will strengthen Hamas moderates and marginalise the extremists.
It must recognise that the movement is not homogeneous and that
boycotting it will strengthen the extremist tendencies since moderates
thus far have little to show for their more conciliatory approach.
The EU and Israel
The EU, in close coordination with other Quartet
members should put pressure on Israel to dismantle the 102 illegal
outposts in the West Bank and stop the expansion of settlements.
The EU should also engage in discussions with
Israel about the possible lifting of the numerous restrictions
on movement of Palestinian people and goods since the Palestinian
economy cannot function without freedom of movement. Israel should
also be encouraged to release the custom revenues it holds for
the PA and release Palestinian prisoners. All these would serve
as vital confidence-building measures and should be set benchmarks
as part of a peace process and not isolated ad hoc actions.
KEY GOALS:
POLITICAL PROCESS,
SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC REFORM
The political process, security and economy
must all be top priorities for the EU. They must all be addressed
in tandem. One of the key mistakes the Quartet made in the past
is that the US alone dealt with all political and security issues
in the MEPP whereas the EU and UN were assigned to deal with economic
aid. The latter found themselves pouring vast sums of money into
a bottomless pit due to continuing insecurity and the lack of
a meaningful political process. The only way to avoid this in
future is for the EU and UN to have a role in the political and
security spheres too.
The political process
There is a short window of opportunity now for
a serious push to resume talks on the so-called final status issues:
borders, settlements, Jerusalem and refugees.
In March 2007 Palestinian warring factions Hamas
and Fatah reached a truce and formed a National Unity Government
with a number of independent candidates, representing the vast
majority of Palestinian people. Later that month, the Arab League
revived its 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, extending a hand to Israel.
Syria, in the past year, has consistently and persistently called
for a resumption of talks with Israel. The US, after years of
a hands-off policy, has finally engaged. The Israeli government
is weak, having suffered a terrible blow in the July 2006 Lebanon
war, and is anxiously awaiting the publication of the Winograd
Commission of Enquiry into the conduct of the various responsible
state institutions. Senior politicians, including the Prime Minister
and Minister of Defence may be forced to resign after the publication
of the report. In addition, a series of serious corruption and
sexual assault scandals have broken out in recent months further
weakening the government. Nevertheless, there is huge support
in the Israeli public for a settlement of the conflict both with
the Palestinian and Syrians. Despite the weak Israeli government,
the time is ripe for a serious push for peace. There is overwhelming
support in the Israeli public for a peace deal and a window of
opportunity to re-build trust is now open and it must be seized.
The Arab Peace Initiative is most welcome. It
is no a peace plan. It is a declaration of overture by the entire
Arab world towards Israel on the basis of key principles. It rightly
leaves the actual negotiations to the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Other important framework documents include the Clinton parameters
of July 2000, the Taba document of January 2001, and the more
recent Geneva Initiative. All these can form a basis for serious
peace negotiations. The Road Map is unlikely ever to be implemented
since neither side is likely to carry out its commitments under
Phase 1 of the plan. The Palestinians are called upon to dismantle
all terrorist infrastructure and the Israelis to withdraw from
much of the West Bank. The dismantling of terror infrastructure
is only likely to come at the end of a peace process, not at its
beginning.
The Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
(DDR) of armed personnel belonging to the various Palestinian
factions will be key to achieving a lasting peace settlement.
It should only be expected that DDR will succeed as part of a
political process when sufficient guarantees have been given to
the various armed groups that their security will be assured.
Hamas is unlikely to ever give up its arms before a deal is done.
It is simply not how the movement works, and based on experiences
from other countries including Northern Ireland, this should not
come as a surprise.
Similarly, Israel is unlikely to withdraw from
parts of the West Bank without an agreement since it will be concerned
about Palestinian groups arming themselves very close to the border
with Israel. Israel has not had much success with its unilateral
withdrawals.
Security
One of the main problems in the PA is the multitude
of security forces and the factional allegiances they hold. Most
of the members of the Presidential Guard and the Preventative
Security are allied to Fatah. That is why Hamas created its own
security force, known as the Executive Force. It is only after
the Executive Force overran the Preventive Security headquarters
in Gaza in February this year, that Fatah and Hamas reached a
truce. Hamas feels it needs its own force to counter the Fatah
forces.
Creating a unified and competent security apparatus
in Palestine will be one of the most difficult challenges facing
the NUG, but also the most important one. The scale of the challenge
should not be under-estimated by international actors who are
placing pressure on the NUG to restore security in Palestine.
As with DDR, it is not realistic to expect significant progress
in integrating the diverse security forces into a national force
unless this task is approached hand-in-hand with the political
and economic components.
The EU should be ready to engage with other
international partners in support of a comprehensive Security
Sector Reform (SSR) programme, with each partner working in their
area of comparative advantage. This task is too delicate to be
left to one country to lead. It is also imperative that there
be a coherent framework for international assistance in the security
domain. This will be necessary to ensure that donors do not work
at cross-purposes. An appropriate balance must be struck between
improving the governance of the security forces and bolstering
their capabilities.
If the motto is to be "One Authority, One
Gun", then there should be members of both factions in the
Preventative Security and Presidential Guard. Only then will Hamas
consider dismantling its own force.
Economy
Following the victory of Hamas in the January
2006 elections, the EU devised a Temporary International Mechanism,
known as TIM, to bypass dealing directly with the Hamas government.
The TIM is intended to ensure that money gets to Palestinians
in need and that salaries to PA employees are paid, at least in
part. It basically provides a social welfare net.
The EU must now work towards the goal of creating
a Palestinian economy which will replace the TIM. Palestine must
not become a welfare-state.
It is time to engage directly with the Ministry
of Finance, headed by Salam Fayyad. He is a man well known to
the EU, a former finance minister in the previous Fatah government
to whom much credit was given by donors for the reforms he carried
out at the time. There should, of course, be some conditionality
attached to aid: Hamas and the NGU as a whole must adhere to a
Hudna or cease-fire, stop the Qassam rocket launchers and release
Shalit and BBC correspondent Alan Johnston.
More efforts should be made to ensure the freedom
of movement of goods. Israeli restrictions are often intrinsically
linked to security and some creative thinking is necessary in
order to ensure that goods get in and out of the PA, especially
Gaza, also in time of strife. Plans should be made to open the
Gaza sea port and airport with a serious international and EU
presence to monitor the goods.
A prosperous Palestine is in the interest of
not only Palestinians but also Israel and all neighbouring countries.
Only prosperity will bring stability, and only security and progress
in the political process will allow for vital and urgent economic
reforms to take place.
The EU and Arab states
The EU should engage with the Arab League and
the Arab Quartet in discussions on how to best implement the Arab
Initiative. The EU should also encourage the Arab League to reach
out to the Israeli public, to engage in confidence building measures
which will help persuade Israelis that peace really has a chance.
More work needs to be done by the Arab states and the EU in the
area of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion. In the lastest
Tel Aviv University March Poll, it was revealed that half the
Israeli population was not aware of the Arab summit in Riyadh
in March and have never heard of the Arab Peace Initiative.
MOVING FROM
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
In sum, it is time for the EU to move from thinking
along the lines of conflict management to actually getting into
the nitty gritty of conflict resolution. The EU can play an active
role in the process along-side other Quartet members. It is time
for the Quartet to come up with a detailed and comprehensive peace
plan, as the required parameters are known to both sides. Further
time should not be wasted.
The EU should also engage more broadly, by reaching
out to public opinion both in Israel and the PA, helping to explain
the Arab Initiative, stressing that it is a beginning rather than
an end in itself, and helping to bridge the gaps in knowledge
and perception across the Palestinian and Israeli divide.
Appointing a full-time Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian
talks
Without the appointment of a full time peace
negotiator, the MEPP is doomed to fail. The EU should appoint
a high level envoy to carry out full-time shuttle diplomacy between
Israel and the PA as soon as possible. Since the US has lost much
credibility in the region, the EU is now in a position to take
over the lead in negotiations. The EU is a much more credible
body and it should take a more active role in the political and
security spheres, not only the economic one. It is time to discuss
the thorniest final status issues and overcome the taboos. The
EU envoy should be endorsed by the Quartet.
Syrian-Israeli talks
The EU should also facilitate the immediate
resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. The contours of such
an agreement are known to both sides and the time is certainly
ripe. A Syrian-Israeli agreement will in all likelihood include
a Lebanese-Israeli agreement and would greatly facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian
comprehensive agreement as well as the normalization of Arab-Israeli
relations in the region.
18 April 2007
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