Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20
- 36)
THURSDAY 1 FEBRUARY 2007
MR JOHN SAWERS AND MR DAVID QUARREY
Q20 Lord Boyce:
Possibly working in the Quartet or not, do you think there is
any scope for the EU to launch any small-scale confidence-building
measures which could help to improve the situation?
Mr Sawers: Yes, I think there are a number of
areas where we can help. We are supporting the office of the Palestinian
President, for example, in helping build up the structures around
President Abbas so he can be more effective as President. We are
helping with his security. We are working with the Americans on
their security plan, and I am delighted to see the US administration
have put in a bid to Congress for some $86 million worth of support
for the Palestinian Security Forces, which is a significant advance
in the American approach in terms of providing practical support
alongside that from the European Union. There may be other ideas,
and I do not know if David has some ideas.
Mr Quarrey: I think there are things like the
ESDP missions themselves, and I think particularly of Rafah. As
John said earlier, it has not always been easy there but I think
it has helped having some co-operation between the Israelis and
the Palestinians there which will be useful in the long term because
it helps to build confidence. I think if we can get things moving
on the EU COPPS with the civil police again that will help build
capacity as well. There is also a great deal of UK and EU activity
which is working with civil society, which is aimed at education,
which works on things like some tertiary education links, which
also help around the margins perhaps but also help build confidence
as well. I think there is a continuing important role for the
EU to support that.
Q21 Chairman:
Do you think there is sufficient co-operation between the work
which is being done by the Commission in the Middle East and Palestine
and the role of the EU Special Representative who is representing
the Council?
Mr Quarrey: Yes, I think they have worked well
together, for example, the EU position that has held since the
election of Hamas last year, which has a tough political position
based around the Quartet three principles, but then on the humanitarian
side an approach through the Temporary International Mechanism,
which is aimed at alleviating humanitarian consequences from our
inability to deal with the PA Government, I think reflects a balanced
approach and I think that reflects as well the Council Secretariat
side and the Commission working together on this. As we look forward,
hopefully, to progress on the political track, I think the Commission
are very clear that they want to play an important role in that
by supporting the development of viable Palestinian institutions.
It has been the Government's view, and certainly the Prime Minister's
view, that that is an essential part of future progress.
Q22 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
There have been rumours about secret talks going on between the
Israelis and the Syrians. Is there any truth in that? What do
you think might come out of that and could the EU play any role
in making that any better?
Mr Sawers: I do not know anything about secret
talks between Israelis and Syrians apart from what I read in the
newspapers and I do not know whether those individuals are representing
their respective governments or not. There has been an attempt
by a number of countries, including our own, to persuade the Syrians
to change their approach on a whole range of Middle Eastern issues,
including their approach on Palestine, to end the house room they
give to Palestinian terrorist groups like the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad and Hamas's military wing, and to support the policies of
the international community. At some point there will need to
be a negotiation between Israel and Syria on their own border
and to establish a peace treaty between the two of them, but I
think we should expect there to be efforts outside government
to explore whether this is possible. As to what you are referring
to, Lord Hamilton, I do not know whether that is the case or not
and to what extent that is authorised but it is important for
there to be some channels of communication with the Syrians in
order to keep on reminding them what the international community
expects of them and what is available to them if only they were
to change their behaviour.
Q23 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Perhaps I could just go back to something that came up in a recent
question about the Council Secretariat and the Commission, but
this is a wider question. Do you think that we are moving into
a more hopeful period in which there is greater activity, at least
for the preparation of a settlement in the Middle East if not
for the immediate achievement of it, and that the three key players,
the UN, the EU and the United States, have got negotiating teams
that are properly structured to handle this sort of much more
intensive involvement with Israel and the various Arab states
and so on, because, looking at it from the outside, I think I
am a bit inclined to answer no, they have not, to all three of
them. The Americans seem to have nothing except periodic visits
by Secretary Rice which are liable, of course, to be diverted
if she is required to play a high profile role in some other part
of the world, Iraq or whatever it is. The EU is doing pretty well
with a kind of push-me-pull-you set-up, but is it really punching
its full weight, is it really structured properly, and the UN
has been virtually absent for some time in this Middle East but
apparently the new Secretary-General wishes to play a more prominent
role. I wonder what you think about whether the structures are
adequate to the political aspirations that are being put on them.
Mr Sawers: I do not entirely share your analysis,
Lord Hannay, of the US commitment. I think there is very deep
engagement at levels below Secretary Rice. The Assistant Secretary
for the Middle East, the Deputy National Security Adviser pay
regular visits and are constantly in touch with the parties. They
and their teams are working full time on this issue, so it does
go beyond, as you say, the occasional visits of Condoleezza Rice
herself. I do not think there is yet in any of those three players,
the US, the European Union and the United Nations, a plan for
a new negotiating team; they have not got that far yet. Secretary
Rice is planning to go back to the region again later this month.
We should see what progress she can make then. If she is able
to take this further and establish some negotiating process between
the two sides then the sorts of negotiating teams that you are
talking about I think will be necessary. On the European Union
side, of course, there has been a proposal, of which we have been
supportive, to merge the responsibilities of the Commission and
the Council Secretariat in foreign policy so that there is a single
figure, whatever the person is going to be called, who has the
authority of the Council of Ministers and the financial resources
and expertise of the Commission. That is an idea which is still
out there and I think that would improve the European Union's
cohesion and effectiveness on this sort of issue. For the European
Union to speak with a single voice rather than two voices would
be an advantage. On the United Nations side, I think it is the
intention of the new Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy
to the Middle East and refresh that role, and I think that would
be an important contribution as well, but I do not think we have
got to the stage yet of negotiating teams for a new negotiation,
although if the efforts bear fruit we may get there in the months
to come.
Q24 Lord Crickhowell:
Following up on Lord Hannay's point, in an earlier report by this
Committee we said, "We welcome the Commission proposal that
there should be a high-level strategic planning meeting at the
beginning of each Presidency between the Presidency, Commission
and High Representative enabling issues of coherence and the overall
direction of EU external action for the duration of the six month
Presidency to be discussed, in order that the EU institutions
and the Member States understand each other's priorities".
The Minister in response said that that had happened under the
Finnish Presidency. Has it happened at the start of the German
Presidency as we enter the next phase?
Mr Sawers: What has happened is that there have
been intensive contacts between the German Government and the
Commission and the Council Secretariat in advance of their taking
up their Presidency, and there was a visit, as is usual at the
beginning of the Presidency, by the Commission President and Dr
Solana to Berlin to do precisely as you say, to co-ordinate at
the highest level the priorities for the coming six months. I
cannot say for sure, Lord Crickhowell, whether the Germans have
followed precisely the practice of the previous Finnish Presidency,
but I can assure you that there have been very close contacts
and I think co-ordination is really rather good.
Q25 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
You have mentioned some of the operational instruments available
to the EU: Rafah, COPPS and so on. Turning specifically to the
financial side, in your judgment how effective have they been?
What has been their impact in giving the European Union weight
within the Quartet?
Mr Sawers: It is difficult to say how much political
influence you purchase with humanitarian assistance. I would not
like to say there is a clear link between the two of them, but
I think the European Union's generosity, the collective generosity
of Europe, as I say, €680 million in 2006 alone, stands as
a demonstration of our political commitment and of the level of
popular support for European involvement in this, which has an
influence with other parties and which means the European Union
is able to do things vis-a"-vis supporting the Palestinian
Authority and the Palestinian leaders that other actors are not
able to do, so it does buy us some influence on that side of the
equation.
Q26 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Have the lessons been learned from other financial transfers?
We learned, for example, from the IMF in 2003 that $900 million
passed into the private coffers of the Palestinian leadership.
OLAF, the anti-fraud section of the EU, was particularly ineffective
in relation to dealing with that. We need more transparency; welcome
the creative side of the Temporary International Mechanism, but
have the lessons been learned in relation to the total misuse
of EU taxpayers' money over the earlier period?
Mr Quarrey: I think the lessons have been learned.
As I mentioned the last time I was before the Committee, it is
worth recording as well that the EU had suspended direct budgetary
assistance to the Palestinian Authority before the election which
brought Hamas to power precisely because of our concerns about
how the then Fatah-run Palestinian Authority was using some of
those funds and our concerns about maladministration and so on.
We have been in this extraordinary position since then with the
Hamas-led PA government and the Temporary International Mechanism
replacing budgetary support during that time. There are very detailed
controls within the Temporary International Mechanism which have
been designed principally to ensure that the funds provided are
not misused politically, if I may put it that way, in this current
situation. I think we hope nationally and EU partners will hope
that we can learn some of the lessons from the TIM and apply that
to future funding when the situation is normalised between the
EU and the PA. Quite how that will apply in practice, I could
not honestly tell you at this stage, but I think there is a very
strong feeling within the EU that funds in the past have either
been abused and wasted or have occasionally have been used, for
example, to fund projects which have later been destroyed by the
Israelis. So I think there is quite a concern to ensure that the
large sums of money that we will need to bring to deploy to support
the required process are used properly and I suspect that some
of the lessons we have learned from the TIM may contribute to
that learning process for the next phase.
Lord Hamilton of Epsom: My question has been
largely answered, my Lord Chairman, and I think it better to go
on to the next one.
Q27 Chairman:
There is this question of the contribution of the EU bilateral
relations, not only with Israel but also with the Palestinian
and with other neighbouring states and international organisations,
such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. How
far has that been useful, as well as a direct input through the
Quartet?
Mr Sawers: My Lord Chairman, I think it is part
of the fabric of the European Union's engagement in the region.
The Arab League is a completely different organisation from the
European Union but it is an organisation that brings together
Arab countries as a whole and which has an important role in establishing
the formal policies and positions in the Arab world which are
held in very high regard, such as the conclusions of the Beirut
Summit of 2002, where contacts between the European Union and
the Arab world and the Arab League itself were influential. With
the Gulf Cooperation Council there is the start of a political
relationship. Given the common concerns that we have in Europe
(with Iran and its growing and often malign influence in the region)
we have a very large overlapping agenda with the Gulf Cooperation
Council. They are also keen to see progress in the Palestinian
question. It has been quite interesting: one development of the
last year has been the way in which the United States has begun
to engage and listen carefully to the views of the Gulf Cooperation
Council and countries like Jordan and Egypt, collectively, as
a sub-group within the Arab world, and I think they have had an
influence on US thinking and US policy which has been very much
compatible with European Union influence. Working more closely
with these groupings, with these countries, helps advance a common
approach to the problems with which we are dealing.
Q28 Lord Lea of Crondall:
When we were discussing the scope of what we will be doing, there
was a view emerging, to some degree, that we could not help but
look a little bit outside the peace process per se for
exactly the reasons you have been describing. In what sense would
you say that all the rhetoric from Tehran, for example, and somehow
the casus belli of many other issues being to do with Israel,
for implicating the Palestinians, or however one wants to decide
it, is germane to this. If a crisis is emerging about Israel/Iran—nuclear
weapons on one side, nuclear weapons are needed on the other side
because there are nuclear weapons on this side, et cetera, et
cetera—how far does all of that bear on what we are talking
about?
Mr Sawers: I think very significantly. When
you visit Israel or, indeed, the Arab world, one of the greatest
concerns—possibly in Israel the greatest concern—is
not the Palestinians, Syria or the Arab world generally, it is
Iran. The activities of Iran in supporting extremist groups in
Arab countries—in the Lebanon, in Iraq, as we have seen—has
raised the level of concern and certainly has raised the impact
of the nuclear file and the implications for the Arab world and
the Middle East as a whole should Iran succeed in acquiring nuclear
weapons technology or, worse still, nuclear weapons themselves.
The rhetoric of President Ahmandinejad is one thing: we cannot
ignore it; is it very damaging; and it certainly would be wrong
to assume that it is does not carry some meaning. I think it has
raised again the concern that Israel's very existence could be
brought into question by enemies in the region—a prospect
which really has not been there for much of the last 35 years
but was very much there in the early years of Israel's existence.
We are deeply concerned about Iranian intentions, about Iranian
behaviour in the region and about Iranian aspirations to develop
its nuclear programme in ways which we are not convinced are entirely
peaceful. We can only interpret Iranian activity on the nuclear
file as being to acquire nuclear weapons technology and possibly
nuclear weapons themselves and this would be deeply destabilising
in the region. Whether the common concerns between Israelis and
Arabs and Europeans and Americans will lead to faster progress
on the Palestinian question is a matter of speculation, but I
think is an added factor destabilising the region and an added
concern for all the countries in the region, and, as we saw last
summer in the conflict in the Lebanon, an Iranian armed group
in the Arab world can set back the prospects for peace and for
stability very severely. We are seeing this to a large extent
in Iraq as well. I am not saying the problems in Iraq are entirely
created by Iran, but Iran could take a very different approach
which could establish much better prospects for establishing stability
in Iraq than we have at the moment. I share Lord Lea's concern
that there are new factors here which have a real bearing on stability
and peace in the region which we have to address and we have to
factor into our own policies.
Q29 Lord Lea of Crondall:
You mentioned the EU having a strong role (in Britain, France
and Germany) vis-a"-vis Iran—although that has had
its ups and downs—but, clearly, on our own inquiry here,
when you say it can only complicate what is already a very complicated
situation is to sort of spatch-cock in—which is probably
the wrong expression, but I will use it—something to do
with Israel and Iran, even though it is the elephant not yet recognised
as being in the room.
Mr Sawers: Lord Lea, we have to deal with life
as it is. What we face now is an Iran which is posing an increasing
threat to the security of the region and which is causing particular
security concerns for the State of Israel because of its support
for terrorist groups and because of its aspirations, as we see
them, to develop nuclear weapons. Any Israeli prime minister and
Israeli leader is bound to be deeply concerned by such activity.
It is bound to be a factor. Obviously it would be much better
if we had an Iranian leadership which was committed to a two-State
solution, which was committed to countering terrorist groups and
was not causing instability in the region, but that is not what
we have got, and we have to deal with the Iran which presents
itself.
Q30 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
In the past the Lebanon has tended to be treated as a special
case and not really part of the Middle East Peace Process: something
which could not be dealt with in advance of the Middle East Peace
Process but which would sort of slot in all right when it was
done. The events last summer cast some doubt about whether that
was very wise and the standoff that exists in the Lebanon seems
to add to that doubt, but I am still not clear in my mind—and
perhaps you could cast some light on it—how the Lebanese
dimension is to be handled in a period when we are trying to make
overall progress. The second question about Iran really follows
on from your replies to Lord Lea. Having identified Iran as a
major spoiler in all this, having identified it over the years
as a country which has played quite a role and which is playing
a bigger role in all this, how is that issue to be handled in
practical terms if you are not talking to the country in question?
The whole issue of talking to Iran has got itself snarled up over
the nuclear matter. It does seem to me a trifle difficult to hope
to get Iran into a more cooperative spirit if we are not even
actually talking to them very much.
Mr Sawers: With your permission, perhaps I could
ask David Quarrey to answer the question on the Lebanon. On Iran,
we have of course been talking to the Iranians throughout this
period of difficulty and tension, even after the election of President
Ahmadinejad 18 months ago. The combination of engagement and pressure
on the Iranians is beginning to have an effect in Iran. We saw
in the elections in mid-December that the hard-line faction did
really rather badly and I think that is because of disenchantment
with the policies of President Ahmadinejad's government.
Q31 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Mainly economic, though.
Mr Sawers: They are mainly economic, but the
economic policies have largely failed. There is a good degree
of economic incompetence on the part of the Iranian government
that has contributed to them, but there is also great concern
in the international community that companies and banks should
not be associated with Iran and certainly should not do anything
which might advance financing for terrorism or financing for proliferation.
There is no money available for new investment in Iran at the
moment, so their oil production is declining. It is even difficult
for banks to be involved in normal business with Iran, so ordinary
Iranian businessmen are having difficulty getting letters of credit
and so on, and this is adding to the economic pressure on Iran.
I do not think the popular support of the government's nuclear
policy, in particular their stated policy of acquiring civil nuclear
power, has diminished at all. What is getting across to the Iranians
is that, if they want to have a more normal relationship with
the rest of the world, including an economic and commercial relationship
with the rest of the world, they have to address our concerns
on issues like their nuclear aspirations. My Lord Chairman, Lord
Hannay is alluding, I am sure, to the US policy of not talking
to Iran. We have seen some progress there as well. The European
policy has had some ups and downs. We made some good progress
at one stage; we were then set back by the election of the new
Iranian leadership. Our response has been to engage the Americans,
the Russians and the Chinese more fully with our own approach
and that has led to a change in the American policy. They are
not yet talking to one another but Secretary Rice has said on
behalf of the US Administration that if Iran meets the requirements
of the Security Council and suspends its enrichment programme
and most sensitive nuclear technology activities then the United
States will engage with its partners in Europe and Russia and
China in negotiating with Iran. As we have seen with the six-party
talks with North Korea, to engage the United States in a multilateral
process also provides opportunities for some bilateral contacts
at the margins of those multilateral processes, so there has been
a change in the US approach. The US and Iran have worked together
on other issues, like Afghanistan. I was at a conference the other
day in Berlin where the United States and Iranian representatives
were taking part in the same meeting and contributing to the same
objectives on Afghanistan. There are issues where the two countries
need to have more contact, such as over Iraq, but I think this
will happen step by step. If Iran meets its obligations under
the Security Council Resolution then we will have direct contact
between Iran and Washington on the most sensitive of issues, and
I think that will be something to be welcomed, but the next step
is for the Iranians to take.
Mr Quarrey: On Lebanon, I would like first to
note that, in the context of the Committee's inquiries, it was
the strength of the EU's bilateral relations with Israel and the
Lebanon last summer which allowed the EU to play the key role
in bolstering UNIFIL, which was then the essential pre-condition
to achieving the ceasefire. The EU's policy of building a more
balanced relationship with Israel paid dividends in that context
in helping achieve the ceasefire. In terms of how Lebanon is handled
in the next phase of the context of the wider peace process, our
best focus remains Security Council Resolution 1701, which, while
it does not address in terms the issues that would need to be
covered for peace between Israel and the Lebanon, I think the
issues raised there, including Shebaa farms, the demilitarisation
of Southern Lebanon, the control of legitimate armed forces of
Lebanon across the whole country, are in fact the issues on which
we need to make progress in order to create the conditions for
peace between Israel and Lebanon. I think our focus is likely
to remain on trying to implement 1701 so that the conditions are
therefore improved for when we can achieve a wider peace process.
Q32 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Since its inception in 1995, the Barcelona Process/Euromed has
been relatively disappointing. Now we have a revision of the European
Neighbourhood Policy, possibly to be concentrated on during the
Portuguese Presidency in the second half of this year, how relevant
is the revised European Neighbourhood Policy to the Middle East
Peace Process?
Mr Sawers: There is an important connection.
At the tenth anniversary event under our presidency just over
a year ago, a new direction in the Barcelona Process was established
which is geared more towards support for modernisation and reform
in the Arab world. Under the Commission's plans for spending the
very generous sums of money available for the Mediterranean region,
the proportion going to issues like good governance, education,
private sector reform have gone up from 25% of the budget in the
previous framework to over 50% in the new framework for the period
2007 to 2010. I think it is in these areas like education and
good governance that we can establish better conditions in the
Arab world for the sort of free debate; for more open societies;
for more successful economies that lead to a more sophisticated
policy towards the Middle East than we have seen in the past.
It is an indirect link, but I think the level of commitment, and
the commitment to modernise countries in the Mediterranean region;
to help them pursue their own modernisation plans, is that much
greater under the new scheme than it was under the old one.
Q33 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
As you have conceded, that is the regional context. What specifically
does the process offer for Israel/Palestine?
Mr Quarrey: Realistically, not a great deal
at this stage. One of the things that has frustrated the Barcelona
Process has been the fact that almost all, certainly high-level
meetings end up in a rather sterile debate around issues to do
with Israel Palestine—partly because the Israelis are there
with their near neighbours, which they are not often. So far we
have not found a very effective way of making then Barcelona Process
contribute to the Middle East Peace Process. As John says, the
contribution so far is indirect, but I think there is a powerful
incentive in play. Perhaps one of the strongest forces for peace
between Israel and the Palestinians is the desire of each party
for normalisation of their relations with the outside world. The
EU by having an increasingly effective European Neighbourhood
Policy is able to hold up the prospect of that normalisation,
so it is useful as an incentive there, but the realistic answer
to your direct question is that so far Barcelona has not made
a very significant direct contribution.
Q34 Lord Lea of Crondall:
On one question—because you have had notice of it and commented
on it indirectly—perhaps you would write to the Chairman
if the statistics are complex, but I think it would be quite interesting
to compare, if it is possible—and it must be possible in
some way—the European Union sums of money going one way
or another and the American. Some people say that the Americans
provide the policy and we provide the money and it will be quite
interesting to know how true that is.
Mr Sawers: I am very happy to write to you,
my Lord Chairman, to give you some details of the level of financial
support that has been given. Lord Lea is correct in alluding to
the point that the European Union gives much more generously to
the Palestinian leadership and the Palestinian Authority than
do the United States. The United States do have a substantial
programme of support for the UN Relief and Works Agency, which
is the main vehicle for humanitarian assistance. As I have mentioned
earlier, they are bidding now for some more money to support Palestinian
security operations, which is very welcome. The US assistance
has traditionally, as we all know, gone to Israel, and they give
very significant subventions to Israel in support of Israeli security—which
are welcome in themselves and which contribute to Israel's own
security and prosperity, which is an important factor here. In
terms of total sums committed to the region, I think both the
United States and the European Union give very generously indeed,
but they give in different ways and to different parties, which
has a bearing on the influence and role that each side can play
politically. The American willingness to be active on the Palestinian
side is gradually growing, and that is to be welcomed. As I have
described, I think the European Union approach to Israel has become
much more broadly based and much more sophisticated over the last
five or 10 years than was the case beforehand. If I may say so,
it is a bit of a caricature to think that the European Union pays
the money but somebody else decides the policy. The fact is that
we all have different roles in determining the policy and both
the United States and Europe give very generously but in different
ways.
Chairman: That leads on very well to a question
from Lord Hannay.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I feel we have covered
the ground.
Chairman: In that case, I wonder whether we
could come to a question on the Member States and the European
Union, again from Lord Lea.
Q35 Lord Lea of Crondall:
We have been very impressed by the quality and range of the evidence
we have had, but, it is often said that London and Paris are instinctively
starting from different places. Could you say anything about that?
The coherence of the EU must at some point along the line be greater
if we have solidity of the general strategy—which is self-evident,
but could you comment on it—by the Member States.
Mr Sawers: I agree with that in principle, Lord
Lea. Of course it is inevitable that there are going to be differences
between the Member States and this Government and I personally
would not want that situation to change. It is important that
different Member States of the European Union can act in different
ways and respond to their own particular political links with
the region in support of a broad European Union policy to which
all Member States are signed up. I think the existence of a common
European Union policy towards the region is very important in
harnessing the collective European effort. Yes, there are nuances.
I have mentioned before that the German approach is quite close
to the British approach. There are other countries, particularly
in the Mediterranean who feel greater pressures and greater connections
with the Arab world and the countries in North Africa than they
do with Israel and the countries of the Gulf. But each country
is able to use its links in different ways. Sometimes these differences
have to be worked through; sometimes it means that the level of
clarity in the European Union position is slightly less than it
might otherwise have been. But I think the multiplicity of links
and activities that European Union countries can bring among themselves—the
role the French can play, the Germans, ourselves, the Central
European countries, the Mediterranean countries, the Scandinavian
countries—all bring something slightly different to the
party. To harness that within a single policy I think is the right
way to go. You mentioned French policy. French policy is quite
influenced and driven by the character of the President in France
and the President in France is going to change in the months ahead.
I suspect French policy will evolve as well. We will see. But
we have a common European approach and different national assets
which we can use to deploy.
Lord Lea of Crondall: Thank you very much.
Q36 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Do you not think that is perhaps slightly complacent, given the
extremely cogent arguments you advance for saying why the handling
of Iran has been enormously improved by having a group of Member
States who worked as a single team, effectively, with Solana.
After all, in the past there were quite serious differences between
Member States in policy towards Iran and that was thoroughly unhelpful:
various Member States at various stages in the Iran saga of its
relations with the outside world have actually gone at cross-purposes
and so on. That is certainly true in the case of the Middle East
Peace Process and certain activities by various Member States.
Surely there does need to be a bit more—I am not saying
a replication of the EU 3 to deal with the Middle East, which
would be intensely irritating to countries who are not in the
EU 3, but surely some approach that is a bit less: "Let a
thousand flowers bloom"—or, rather, let 27 flowers
bloom—"and it is all fine" is going to be needed.
Mr Sawers: I do agree with that. As the European
Union gets larger, the possibility of working and negotiating
policies at 27 or more gets more and more difficult. We will find
different groups of countries coming together with a common interest
in different areas to take the lead role; subject, of course,
to general support for the broad policy framework which they are
pursuing. We have that on Iran, as you say, and there are informal
mechanisms which we and the French and Germans and Italian and
Spaniards use on this issue, the Middle East, and they are informal,
they are at working level, but it is a way of clearing out some
of the differences so that we can create a common approach. It
is fair to say that, whereas 10-15 years ago the different efforts
of European countries could often cancel one another out, I do
not think that is the case any more. What happens is that we reinforce
one another in the work that we do. The discipline of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy actually helps that and there are
informal mechanisms behind the scenes which help ensure that the
differences of detail are hammered out behind closed doors.
Chairman: Mr Sawers and Mr Quarrey, may I, on
behalf of the Committee, say how very much we have appreciated
the time you have spent with us this morning. As I said at the
beginning, you are our first witnesses and you have certainly
provided us with a very good basis for the remaining part of our
study and also a rather clear position both of European Union
policy and the role played in it by the UK. Thank you again very
much indeed.
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