Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40
- 59)
THURSDAY 8 FEBRUARY 2007
MR YOSSI MEKELBERG AND DR AHMAD KHALIDI
Q40 Chairman:
Thank you very much, Mr Khalidi. Are you happy that we move straight
on now to the questions?
Mr Mekelberg: Actually, the questions reflect
what I want to say.
Q41 Chairman:
What I would draw your attention to in these questions is that
we are concerned about the European Union and the Middle East,
as we are of course a Committee which is considering the Common
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. I would be
grateful if you would like, both of you, to indicate how you characterise
the current situation regarding the Middle East peace process.
Mr Mekelberg?
Mr Mekelberg: One of the problems with the second
and third points which Ahmad made is this issue of the peace process.
We had nearly 14 years of process without peace and the problem
of setting pre-conditions all the time without converting it into
a peace agreement. How can we move much quicker in a more determined
way into signing peace, assuming that we are all talking about
a two-state solution? If this is still on the cards and we agree
that there is a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based
on a two-state solution, and we have not moved to something which
is damage limitation and conflict management, or alternatively
to a one-state solution, which I am definitely not a supporter
of, so if you believe that a two-state solution is the one that
can guarantee security, can guarantee the prosperity of most people,
and then we have to take into account the wider Middle East, then
we need to find a process. One of the questions refers to the
Road Map and if it is still viable, so to make a process where
there is no emphasis, what we saw since 1993 is an emphasis on
the process and not enough on the end game, where it leads to.
The Road Map, for the first time there were some asking what was
the end game, where was it all going to lead. One of the problems
now is the regional commitment on any level. If you look at all
the main potential participants in such a peace process, none
of them is committed, none of them is capable. For a viable peace
process we need viable, legitimate governments that can function
and can make decisions. We need it in Israel, we need it in Palestine,
we need the European Union, and you know the European Union is
a committee and it is probably difficult, is it Eastern European?
Are we talking about the Union as a Union or are we talking about
27 countries? Can we achieve the Common Foreign and Security Policy
on this topic or not, and the United States; wherever we look
we cannot see strong enough governments, or capable enough governments
that can deal with the peace process. Let me say, Washington is
important; following the mid-term elections in the United States
it is very difficult to see an administration there that is committed
day in, day out, week in, week out, for negotiations, mediation
and to take the necessary first step to reach a two-state solution.
In Europe it is a problem to reach a Common Foreign and Security
Policy. Britain under Tony Blair has played a very significant
role in the peace process; some would say positive, some others
might tell you not. I think Tony Blair played a significant role
in that. He is about to leave office. We do not know how the next
administration here in London is going to deal with the peace
process. Then come the Israelis and the Palestinians and we have
two Governments which lack legitimacy in order to sign any peace
agreement, a permanent, final status agreement. On the Israeli
side, especially following the fiasco of Lebanon, the Israelis
are waiting for the Winograd Report, the commission by High Court
Judge Winograd, and whether this Government can survive at all
is at the mercy of this committee, and anyway the political system
is not very stable right now. There are other issues; you have
probably read. The President is about to face trial, other ministers,
so it is not a kind of Government that I can see can take bold
decisions in the direction of peace. On the Palestinian side,
and I am sure Ahmad is in a better position to deal with the Palestinian
side, there is a dual, if not triple, administration now between
the PLO itself, which is the legitimate source of negotiations
with the Israelis, and then the Palestinian Authority which is
divided at least between the Fatah and the Hamas and beyond. This
does not seem—and what we have seen recently where we have
seen clashes occurring and let us hope that it does not deteriorate
into a civil war—to be a situation which is conducive to
a proper peace process. It is also the commitment you see. We
have too many "Kodak" moments in all these forces. The
Secretary of State comes and visits, they all simply leave, and
Abu Mazen, go to Davos and have a meeting, so another photo opportunity.
There are too many photo opportunities without the link with the
real issues, which is, at least to start with, the humanitarian
issue among the Palestinians, ensuring security, and beyond it
is the general situation, so the general situation right now in
the Middle East, which I think is also not conducive to the peace
process.
Dr Khalidi: My comment will look at actually
two or three of the questions together, if you do not mind, rather
than one by one, because they are all linked. I have to disagree
very slightly with Yossi here. There is a sense at the moment
amongst the international community, including the United States,
and certain elements on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides,
that there may be reasons or an opportunity now to try to get
the peace process back on track. The argument stems largely from
the view that dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict at this juncture
will help to realign forces in the area towards other threats,
other perceived threats, ranging from Iran to radical Islam. One
of the elements of the Iraq report, the Baker-Hamilton Report,
which was not adopted in its entirety but one of the elements
which may just have sunk in to some parts of the administration
in Washington, including the State Department, is that, yes, indeed,
some attempt to address the Arab-Israeli conflict will help. The
question is what kind of address or management and what direction
and what the outcome is likely to be. The consensus at the moment,
as far as I understand it, in Washington and within the Foreign
Ministry in Israel, is that perhaps there is a way in which you
can merge phases one and two of the Road Map and then try to link
this to a very general outline, agreed principles, on what the
final status would look like. You would move in a clear direction
and address Palestinian concerns, which have always been, "How
can we enter a process when we don't know what the end result
will be?" Here, rather than do a full, comprehensive, final
status agreement, you set yourself a more limited goal of limited
principles, a framework of principles, with a timetable, so you
act in two or three phases, incorporate elements from the Road
Map but you elucidate the final status without necessarily having
a full final status agreement and you enter into negotiations
on that later on. The rationale behind this is not only based
on perhaps a sense from some of the Arab countries, the United
States and Israel that there is another threat looming on the
horizon, but also, and precisely because most of the leaders in
the area are weak, this may be, in fact, an incentive to them
to try to achieve something. Part of the argument says that Ehud
Olmert, for instance, needs political movement for the Palestinians
in order to restore his own credibility and justify his own move
away from what he promised his people, which was he was going
to do it unilaterally. Now he says that he is willing to do it
through negotiations, and precisely because he is weak there is
a need; and the same applies to the Palestinian side, although
the Palestinian side has its own problems, which we can talk about
later. The important thing for me here is that although this is
an approach which may have some traction, my argument would be
that the only way you can get substantial movement on the peace
process now is to marry between two things. First, a robust external
role, not one of pure crisis management but a really strong, robust,
supporting role from the United States and the EU; and, second,
a link-up to the regional dimension, whereby you bring in regional
parties, and specifically, in this case, Syria. I would say that
one of the keys to moving on the Palestinian track would be to
incorporate Syria into a broader negotiating process, because
this will have a positive impact on the Palestinian track, it
will increase the pressures on Hamas, it will broaden the prospects
for peace and it will correspond to what the Arabs have been calling
for, for some time, under the guise of the Beirut 2002 peace initiative.
Q42 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
Could we ask Mr Mekelberg whether he agrees with the point about
Syria? I thought that was a very important point which has just
been raised and I would be interested to hear whether you agree
with that point?
Mr Mekelberg: I agree in principle. I think
it will not work. I think, if we can look for a comprehensive
peace process, which includes Syria and will take Syria outside
the conflict equation, it is desirable, and if we hear correctly,
they were just recently negotiating and almost what stood between
peace was the park around the Sea of Galilee, so it is a lot of
fruit trees and grass and then there is peace. If they agree according
to the recent initiative, it is all agreed short of a few things.
However, we have to go back to the Barak Government.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Perhaps we
could come on to that. I do not want to crash into Lord Crickhowell's
time. I am so sorry. Thank you; that is very helpful.
Q43 Lord Crickhowell:
Dr Khalidi started by saying "Don't go for it, if there is
no commitment." A simple message. Mr Mekelberg started by
saying there cannot be any commitment because of the weakness
of the various parties and the lack of legitimacy. I was a little
surprised, but I understand the argument, that the United States
and others may wish to go for something because of the importance
of the binding solution on other problems in the Middle East,
Iran, and so on, may be an opportunity. I could not see, having
heard the first two statements, they gave no commitment, there
cannot be a commitment, how there could be an opportunity, and
then Mr Khalidi said "Ah, but there could be possibly, if
there is a robust external role and a link with the regional parties."
Do not we still face the problem of the lack of legitimacy and
the extraordinary weakness of the governments of so many of the
crucial parties? Given the description which was given to us very
clearly by Mr Mekelberg about those problems, can we get and is
it wise to go for a first stage, with the rather remote prospect
of it leading eventually to something else, given the weaknesses
that we heard described so vividly in the opening statements?
Mr Mekelberg: I think we have been facing even
something else, because actually so far we are talking about governments
and we ignore the people, because if you read surveys we see that
both Palestinians and Israelis do want peace and they actually
want peace on the basis of a two-state solution. It is how we
bridge this gap between two things. Both communities or people
want peace based on basically what was agreed in Camp David, Taba,
even Geneva. However, they do not believe that the other side
want it as much as they do. It is to do two things: firstly, and
this is I think where the European Union can do a lot, to try
to help through education, through all sorts of social projects,
it makes you see that the other side wants it as well, the majority
of them, because so far we have been hijacked by the extremists
and on this peace process we have been hijacked by the extremists.
The other thing is how to translate this into votes when there
are elections. At least 70% of people on both sides see that they
can also vote for parties they support, because if one of the
anomalies of it you go and say it, you know in service, "I
want peace, I want to back a two-state solution," and you
support parties that do not support this, because of the lack
of trust, because they do not think that anyone sees their point.
Before it is possible let us support parties that are strong,
to show the other side how powerful we are, and then if ever we
will be able to we will go to negotiations. We have to bridge
these two gaps which I think are crucial. Whether, as Ahmad says,
actually because they are weak, I suspect the three Governments
are more likely to go to war than to go for peace, and I think
history has shown that time and again. I hope that I will be proved
wrong, but it is not, I do not think we saw in the past the tendency
is to go; hence, what can again bridge this gap is international
commitment which helps both sides to see sense. By commitment,
I do not mean just pressure, there should be also incentive. We
use a lot of terms of pressure and leaning on other governments;
it is also an incentive to see what you can gain out of unity,
out of a peace process. I think that is the way to proceed. Do
you agree?
Dr Khalidi: I concur with Yossi. I do not see
any contradiction between saying "If you're not going to
do it seriously, don't do it at all" and saying "If
you're going to do it seriously, go all the way and do it very
seriously." I think that is a very consistent position. There
is, and I agree with Yossi, space for an international role which
goes beyond giving just money or voicing slogans. The Europeans
used to take a very robust political stance. If you look at the
history of the EU, going back to 1980, in fact, the Venice Declaration,
I think, was a critical turning-point in the peace process because
it did adopt the principle of incorporation, the principle of
reaching out and it put the PLO in a position where eventually
the PLO became a partner, by recognising the PLO's role and by
recognising the rights of the Palestinians, it played a very positive
role. We do not have that now from the EU. We have an EU that
plays the role of financier, and now, at this particular point,
a selective one, it does not even finance this Palestinian Government,
and it seems to be happy to leave the politics to the United States,
and we have seen where that has led us. I am convinced there is
space for an EU role, a more robust political role, a diplomatic
role which goes beyond mouthing slogans and following in the footsteps
of the United States.
Q44 Lord Lea of Crondall:
I was very interested that Mr Khalidi did mention Iran, and perhaps
he could just clarify how he thinks that is essentially part of
this equation in a practical sense, because some people think
that it might even make the whole thing even more impossible somehow
to embrace it; could he clarify that? Then I would be grateful
if Mr Mekelberg would say whether he thought it was a factor that
we should embrace?
Dr Khalidi: I am glad you asked me that question
because I think it is very important to understand the role of
Iran in this. Iran is a player on the Arab-Israeli scene, it is
a player in different ways, it is a player through its natural
extensions via the Shi'ites of south Lebanon. Iran, incidentally,
has always had strong relations with the Shi'ites of south Lebanon.
It is not something that has come about as a result of the Islamic
revolution in Iran, it is an historical set of relations that
has to do with the movement of people; people study in Iran. The
leaders of one of the main Shi'ite movements in Lebanon, Amal,
actually came from Iran. It came prior to the Islamic revolution
and it exists, and it is a natural zone of influence for the Iranians.
That brings Iran almost immediately onto the borders of northern
Israel. The second thing is that Iran, of course, has relations
with Syria and via its relations with Syria it is an indirect
partner to what happens on the Syrian, and thus on the Arab, front,
because Syria of course is part of a broader Arab front, so Iran
has a role to play there. Iran has built up links with the Sunni
Islamist movements, in particular Hamas, and, by the way, perhaps
surprisingly, with Fatah as well, Fatah on the Palestinian side.
The secular, nationalist, Fatah movement has established over
a period of years good relations with Iran and has been supported
and financed by Iran, so Iran is a player. Does that mean that
Iran is necessarily a negative force? I would argue, not. I would
argue first that one has to accept that Iran has a natural zone
of influence via the Shia of south Lebanon and there is not much
you can do to sever that without creating an artificial situation
in Lebanon. Second, that Iran will not stand in the way, and they
have said so, by the way, the Iranians have said so; they may
object as a matter of ideology to a Syrian-Israeli agreement but
they will not stand in its way, because their relations with Syria
have other dimensions as well. Third, that its relationship with
forces on the Sunni side, such as Hamas, are largely tactical
and they have to do with the arm-wrestling that is going on between
Israel, Iran, the United States; it is a chess board. Hamas is
an offshoot of the Muslim Brothers. There is no serious ideological
convergence between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Shi'ite Iranian
revolution; there may be tactical interests which bring them together,
but they are not identical.
Q45 Lord Lea of Crondall:
Mr Mekelberg, have you got any reaction to that?
Mr Mekelberg: Yes; it reinforces what Ahmad
said. Iran is a player there and it moves between the ideological
and the tactical; part of it is tactical, part of it is ideological.
Where I beg to differ is whether it can play a positive or a negative
role. In the current situation it is bound to play a negative
role because, as any revolution, it tries to create a more conducive
environment for its existence, and revolutions are usually kind
of paranoid entities, that they want to explore the revolution
but at the same time feel it is under attack. There are some reasons
for that, taking into account eight years of war with Iraq and
with all the current issues, and let us not forget the nuclear
issue. In this context, I cannot see, unless there is an engagement
with Iran, and if I can broaden the discussion here, in a sense,
it is about the nuclear, and they can use the nuclear issue to
widen the discussion in the concern with Iran then they might
actually play a positive. If you gain in exchange for some issues
and some compromises on the nuclear issue and put it in a much
bigger package with Iran then they can play also positive. If
it is not, if they feel that they are under constant attack, they
will play also the spoilers on the Israeli-Palestinian track.
Dr Khalidi: I do not disagree with that.
Q46 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
The proposition that it would be better not to try at all if you
are not trying really seriously sounds attractive, until you ask
yourself and what would be the consequences of the international
community stating now that it was not going to try at all because
it was all too difficult? Perhaps the two witnesses could comment
on what they think the likely consequences would be if the international
community imposed effectively a policy of benign neglect on the
whole Palestinian process for the next couple of years? The second
question is this: I sympathise very much with the views, I think,
of both of you that there needs to be a structured and really
continuous effort to get a peace settlement, not just photo opportunities
and flying visits by ministers, and so on. Do you believe that
it is possible to have a peace process which can be sustained
through atrocities committed by extremists who are opposed to
it, on either side, or within either side? In fact, can you get
to a situation, like this country got to in the Northern Ireland
peace process, in which there is a determination to carry on the
process whatever was thrown at it?
Mr Mekelberg: I am not suggesting, and I do
not think Ahmad is suggesting, an imposed solution. Any imposed
solution will not last for long. It is positive encouragement
of a solution which shows both sides, or all sides, involved what
is the price for continuing the conflict and what are the benefits
of ending the conflict. All that I am saying is based on the assumption
that the majority in both communities wants peace. If this is
a disservice to them which actually misleads us then all that
I am saying probably is wrong; but if this is correct, the idea
that you have to find a way to impose and change behaviour and
encourage, so you do not have to impose, you can encourage and
direct and change this behaviour. I think what we have seen since
September 1993 is that the extremists have actually managed to
derail the process and even direct the process, whether it is
hegemony or by assassinating Itzak Rabin, the settlers, we see
the Israeli side and the Hamas and Islamic jihad with the suicide
bomb, whoever wants to keep building the settlements, it all was
in the direction that the minority of both communities managed
to hijack the process. We have a problem, which I do not think
is unique to the Israelis and the Palestinians, which is the problem
of moderates; the moderates are not as keen on their moderation
as the extremists are keen on their moderation. Probably we need
some fanatical moderation in which the people in the centre or
people who believe in co-existence and bring this conflict on
the very basis of what is agreed so many times, they will be there
in the streets, promote these ideas and also elect and vote for
these kinds of parties.
Dr Khalidi: I was not suggesting, and I do not
think Yossi is suggesting, benign neglect. What I was trying to
point to was the suspicion that the United States may now be making
the right noises, not because it really wants to see an Arab-Israeli
peace but because it wants the Sunnis to come on board in some
kind of new alignment against Iran. My comment was that if indeed
this is what the United States is doing then it is better for
us not to pin any hopes and to realise from the very start that
this is not a serious process and to go through the motions of
creating expectations and in the end not delivering, which can
only be negative. On the issue of violence and its impact on the
process, I think it was Rabin who said "We will negotiate
as if there's no terror and pursue terror as if there are no negotiations,"
and I think that, for me, is the right formula. Bearing in mind
one very important fact; since Hamas took a decision to join the
political process, some time in late 2005, over almost a year
and a half now, it is very notable that Hamas, which is the largest
so-called extremist movement on the Palestinian side, has not
actually committed any major act of violence. The Israelis do
recognise this; not much of the outside world recognises this.
It is, in my opinion, a direct result of Hamas' engagement in
electoral politics and vaguely, and broadly, within the confines
of a political process. That is what you get, I think, when you
reject the politics of exclusion and you open up the door for
people to participate, you do bring down the level of violence.
Mr Mekelberg: If I can try to comment on violence
and negotiations with the Israelis, they are negotiations under
fire and you do not negotiate under fire, and that, actually.
By doing so, we let every single suicide bomber decide the future
of the conflict, and this is one of the biggest mistakes. If you
have to move, if you are in any circumstances, sometimes you have
to take a few weeks off, because politically it is not sustainable,
but the direction should be do not let any single sort of violence,
on any side, derail a process.
Q47 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
One final comment on the links between Fatah and Iran. In the
anniversary celebrations of Fatah and Gaza at the beginning of
January they tried to tar the Hamas as Shi'ite because of the
killing of Saddam Hussein; perhaps the relations may not be so
close. On the peace plan and the Road Map, that was obviously
devised in very different circumstances, before the January election
of Hamas. What I heard you say, Dr Khalidi, was this, that the
first two stages should be merged and there should be a timetable;
well there already is a timetable. What possible benefit can there
be in merging stages one and two when the stage one, which foresaw,
one, the freezing of Israeli settlements when there has not been
a freezing of Israeli settlements, and, secondly, the curbing,
or demilitarising, of the military groups in the Palestine Authority;
that has not happened. Is this not just a despair either to imagine
that you could get any further by merging two stages which you
have not reached, or by vaulting over these two stages and addressing
the key issues of refugees, Jerusalem and the final status one
straightaway? Can there be any real mileage in either the merger
or the vaulting over those stages?
Dr Khalidi: I hasten to add, this is not my
plan. It is not something that personally I am endorsing but I
am saying I think this is what is being cooked.
Q48 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
And your comment on that?
Dr Khalidi: I think, for one thing, the Road
Map is largely an illusion now, certainly in the way it was laid
out and the way it was conceived, the phases of it. You point
out rightly, there has been no dismantlement of illegal outposts,
there has been no freeze of settlements, there has not been a
disarming of Hamas and, frankly, I do not think you are ever going
to get these things as small change. Part of our lessons from
the negotiations over the last 10 or 15 years is that, very often,
the amount of effort and energy that you exert into secondary
and minor issues is better deployed in trying to deal with major
issues, because you might as well go for the big bang than for
the small whimper. Sometimes you get neither and very often, as
the case is today, you find yourself in a quagmire. Nonetheless,
what is being conceived of now, as I understand it—I called
it merging phase one and phase two of the Road Map, it does not
have to be characterised as such—the idea is to give the
Palestinians a large chunk of territory, to stick some kind of
flag on this and to link this territorial movement forward to
the outlines of a final status agreement.
Q49 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Presumably, the rationale of the incremental approach is that,
step by step, you begin to build a degree of confidence. How can
that happen, how can there be a sufficient reservoir of confidence
if you are going for the big bang problem straightaway?
Dr Khalidi: I must confess, I never bought into
the step-by-step, building confidence thing. I think, again, our
experience shows us that step-by-step creates mistrust; what it
creates is a sense that what has happened in the negotiating process
so far is that you have entered into a system of mutual obligations
that neither side has kept, and so, rather than gradually increasing
confidence, you have eroded confidence. Rather than getting both
sides to be further engaged and confident they can move forward
together, you are always looking back and the arguments are always
about things that have not been fulfilled. All the time, Palestinians
and Israelis say "Well, you didn't do that and you didn't
do that; because you haven't done that we can't move forward."
You need to find a mechanism where you get out of this log-jam,
where you are not caught in this system of mutual obligations
that are not kept.
Mr Mekelberg: I think we have two approaches.
One is represented by Oslo. Oslo is the step-by-step and building
confidence, with no clear ending. The other one is represented
by Camp David and Taba. Let us deal with all the issues, for once
forget about confidence-building measures, because anyway we destroyed
any confidence, if there was any. Though there were achievements
between 1993 and 2000, economic, social and political achievements,
we ignored a lot of achievements and really we looked on the down
side instead of building on their achievements. So there were
two, and the Road Map tries to go between. The first phase is
about confidence-building measures; the second phase is a combination
of giving some political solution and confidence-building measures;
and the third phase is supposed to go back to Camp David and Taba.
So it is actually to merge the two approaches into one so that
you have an end game, you have a timetable and you have confidence-building
measures. Since we are already in 2007, when according to the
Road Map the launch should have been in the end phase, actually
having a two-stage solution it did not work as well.
Q50 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
We have fallen at the first hurdle. What makes you think that
any other approach would take us forward?
Mr Mekelberg: We are still, according to everyone,
we hear that we are in the pre-phase one condition, so we have
not even reached phase one of this, and the disengagement from
Gaza was supposed to be phase one, as part of pre-phase one, and
then on gradually. It is making a mockery of the Road Map, meaning
that the Road Map is based not even on bilateralism but on multilateralism;
disengagement is based on unilateralism and not engaging anyone
but yourself, or the Israeli Government, in this sense. If you
do not move so you can decide unilaterally, I accept the Road
Map, I put God knows how many conditions, I cannot even remember
how many conditions.
Dr Khalidi: Fourteen.
Mr Mekelberg: Fourteen are there. Then I move
to the first phase, because the idea of the first phase is security
for the Israelis, no violence, the cessation of violence and make
the life of the Palestinians liveable: fewer checkpoints, removing
some of the outposts, and so on, more work permits, and so on
and so forth. If you do not move into this one you cannot move
to the other one.
Q51 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
You were talking a moment or two ago about the violence and how
the moderates do not believe as much in moderation as do the extremists
in extremism. Talking to you on the same day last week, Israelis
and Palestinians, and they both agreed, I spoke to them separately,
that the violence was worse than ever it has been at the moment,
and violence, as far as the Palestinians were concerned, of course,
between the Fatah and Hamas, what do you think are the real sparking
points, the real determinants of the actual violence when it happens
now? It is very important to keep the big picture in mind, but
the things which go wrong, on a day-by-day basis, which start
this terrible cycle going, of revenge and counter-actions against
each other, I would be interested in your view of the Palestinian
community and the Israeli communities, what is the debate about
what really sparks off violence? Somebody was telling me there
are 520 checkpoints now on the West Bank, whereas five years ago
there used to be 100. Is it that sort of thing, on the West Bank,
is it the problems over prisoner exchanges, and we have all the
business, obviously, of Corporal Shalit; is it anything that could
be done about the money which is held by Israel which would help
Palestinians have better lives? What is that debate within the
two communities about what really gets the violence going?
Mr Mekelberg: I think that there is post 2000,
and you know we have the second intifada and Olmert was assured
in the following six and a half years, now he is completely lacking
confidence and everyone works unilaterally, and life for the Palestinians
is not what you could regard as liveable, you cannot really run
any political entity or society or whatever when you have so many
checkpoints and you cannot move from one place to another. The
wall, the security barrier, or whatever one calls it, makes it
even more difficult to have any economic activity, any reasonable
social activity. For the Israelis, number one obviously is their
security, and it was more analysis. I think the damage done by
the suicide bomber to the peace process, to the understanding
and also to understand the nature of the other side, will take
a long time to repair. It is never completely irreparable but
it takes time. The Bush community, if complete, there is lack
of trust, they talk among themselves, they do not speak to each
other, though I must say, within this context, there are a lot
of NGOs, a lot of glasnost organisations that try to do something.
Some will say it is a bit nai"ve, it is a bit basic, but
it is there, it is one of the things which has to be enhanced,
but again they are living in conflict too. The good thing about
1993 and 2000, there was some hope in both communities that it
would lead to something; okay, Oslo did not specify exactly where
it would go but there was a kind of idea, there was a tacit understanding
that it would lead to something. Life became more liveable and
there was more work and more jobs and actually the Palestinian
economy grew at a faster rate than the Israeli economy in these
six, seven years, so there was hope and understanding. Now it
has gone and they cannot see it and the message that is coming
from the leadership is that a viable peace solution, a viable
living process is not there, and this I think has to change.
Dr Khalidi: Sadly, the level of inter-Palestinian
violence today is higher than the level of Israeli-Palestinian
violence. I do not mean that I regret the fact that there is no
Palestinian-Israeli violence; but the situation today on the Palestinian
side is unprecedented. I would say that there are a number of
reasons for this. There is, of course, a power struggle between
Fatah and Hamas; there are certain elements within Fatah that
have never accepted Hamas' victory. I think that there are sharp
political, and even ideological, differences between the two that
should not be ignored. Nonetheless, I think, when you look at
the broader picture you have to remember a number of things. You
have to remember that this is a 40 year old occupation, 1967-2007,
40 years; it is the longest occupation in modern history, as far
as I know. Through that period you have had somewhere between
650,000 and 700,000 acts of imprisonment, Palestinians who have
passed through Israeli jails, including multiple jailings, which
is a vast number, on the basis of around 3.84 million people.
You have today around half a million settlers, if you include
East Jerusalem, in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. You have
a 700 kilometres wall that is going up, in some places twice as
high as the Berlin Wall. You have the hundreds of checkpoints.
You have in Gaza, in particular, after the Israeli withdrawal
in 2005, a very large prison; so you have naturally an enormous
amount of accumulated frustration and anger and a severe process
of impoverishment alongside the failure of the peace process.
In Gaza, in particular, it has been called de-development. If—a
big `if'—Hamas had been given a chance to govern in the
wake of its electoral victory, if the international community
had dealt with it differently, then my guess is that you would
have had a completely different situation today. You would have
had a situation where the Palestinian internal political process
would have been relatively stabilised, where Hamas would have
been put in a position of responsibility. Incidentally, this is
exactly what Abu Mazin had in mind prior to the elections of 2006,
because he was the chief advocate of bringing Hamas into the process.
His argument was "The only way that Hamas is going to be
rationalised, as it were, is to bring them into the process, give
them responsibility and make them understand that if they bear
responsibility in a responsible way there are rewards for them,
and if they do not they cannot survive." This never happened
and the net result of all of these factors is a collapse on the
Palestinian side.
Q52 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
Let me try that out, because you have talked about engagement
with Syria and Iran, what about engagement with Hizbollah and
Hamas from the outside world? This is one of the issues that we
have constantly now. Here we have the people who are engaged in
different sorts of violence and from all different sorts of points
of view. We know that the Israeli Government finds it very difficult
to think of engagement with Hizbollah and Hamas, we know that
the Americans find that difficult, they find it quite difficult
with Syria and Iran but particularly with the terrorist organisations.
What is your view about engagement from the EU, or from others
outside?
Dr Khalidi: As we speak here, we have to remember
that there are talks in Mecca going on between the PA President
and the Hamas leadership. It is not guaranteed, of course, but
the most likely outcome will be a government in which Hamas is
going to be a leading partner, the premiership will be retained
by Hamas, most likely it will be kept or given to the current
Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, so this is not going to be a government
in which Hamas' role is fudged; it may not be a Hamas government
but Hamas will be very evident there. The EU and the United States
and Her Majesty's Government will have to decide how they are
going to react to this, because it will also be matched by a political
programme which, in my opinion, will not meet outright the criteria
which have been set by the quartet, but will also fudge, in one
way or another, find a language that people can interpret in different
ways, but it will not be a clear acceptance on the part of Hamas
of international conditions. It is a question, and here we will
have the opportunity to bring together the main elements within
Palestinian policy, in a national unity framework, and unless
this elicits a positive response from the outside world we are
going to enter into yet another, even more disastrous cycle of
inter-Palestinian conflict and collapse.
Mr Mekelberg: I think we face a real conundrum
as to how you deal with extremist groups. On the one hand, it
is very difficult to sit and negotiate with a party which calls
for the obliteration of a country, so it is problematic; the same
goes for the Hizbollah and the Hamas. If you assume that actually
negotiating within the political process will make them more moderate,
there is a reason for doing it; but if we give them more political
power, the signal that you send them that, yes, it is acceptable
to have such an extreme platform or policy and it is part of the
political discourse to call for the obliteration of another country,
so we send the wrong signal. If they are in government and instead
of dealing with all the big issues, the ideological issues, they
have to deal with cleaning the streets and all the mundane tasks
of government, especially in the sense of the political authority,
because they do not have any legitimacy to negotiate, it is in
the hands of the PLO, then eventually they will prove to be a
failure, so we will actually engage them in politics because we
believe that they will fail, not because we believe that they
will succeed. In this sense, we are in almost a Catch 22 situation,
what do we do—is it better to have them in government or
send a signal that we do not want such an extreme position.
Chairman: I do feel that we ought to be moving
on to the role of the European Union. Lord Chidgey.
Q53 Lord Chidgey:
Gentlemen, it has been quite fascinating so far, listening to
your discourse on the situation in the Middle East and the way
forward, but I cannot help noticing, particularly as this particular
function of ours is the role of the EU, that most of your comments
have been concentrated on primarily the United States's role and
Israel's role and then, latterly, the Palestinian role. It is
almost only in passing that you seem to have mentioned what the
EU has been doing in the past, what it could be doing in the future,
and very little has been mentioned about the perception of the
parties in the Middle East to the EU's role, or a role that the
EU should have or could have. Maybe I am misinterpreting your
views on the importance, or otherwise, of the EU in the Middle
East peace process, and I hope I am, but I would like to hear
from you, quite succinctly, if I may suggest, exactly, precisely
what the parties in the Middle East peace process feel would be
the most productive role of the EU in the next one year, two years,
five years, 10 years?
Mr Mekelberg: I would like to create here a
dichotomy, to set the scene, a kind of split between hard power
and soft power, and it seems the Americans are in charge of hard
power and the Europeans of soft power, and the other one is the
Europeans are more in favour of the Palestinians and see more
poor Palestinians and poor Arabs in America, the Americans are
for the poor Israelis. I think in this dichotomy we have to move
and play around with this a bit to have a viable role for both
and to create a situation in which neither is seen as partial
towards one of the sides, and both of them play on both levels,
on the hard power and the soft power. If the assumption is the
Americans are going to deliver on the issues of security, the
issues of borders, and all that the Europeans can do is give money
and then build infrastructure, then when this infrastructure is
destroyed to throw more money at rebuilding infrastructure, it
will be a bit pointless. The Europeans, I think actually have
to be involved actively in the peace process itself, in negotiation;
but again it is up to the European Union to come up with the common
foreign policy, what Europe as Europe thinks is right.
Q54 Lord Chidgey:
You are suggesting that the lack of a common foreign policy weakens
the EU's involvement and authority in this?
Mr Mekelberg: If there are 27 foreign policies,
or, let us say, if the European Union is divided as to the way
forward, it will be very difficult both for the Palestinians or
any capital in the Middle East to say, "Is it to Henry Kissinger;
who do I call when I talk to the European Union, who do I `phone?"
If there is an address in the European Union, if there is a common
foreign policy towards ending the peace process, yes, the position
of the Europeans will be strengthened. Whether both sides want
it is a different matter. The way it is seen, I think the Palestinians
want a stronger European Union around the table, I think the Israelis
do not want a stronger one. I think, the way I see it, the European
Union, and here I talk also as British, not only as Israeli, if
we see all this money we need to have influence, we have to influence
the process, we cannot say just "Oh, we're just writing the
cheques for you; whatever the Americans say, we are going to pay
for it." No, we have to have a say, to say we have different
interests, as Europeans, we have different interests in the region
from those of the Americans, whatever is left of the transatlantic
relations after Iraq, but it is also European and the Mediterranean
and the Barcelona process, which is our interest, as Europeans
here, to deal in, and that is why we have to be in the forefront
of the peace process.
Dr Khalidi: I could not agree more with Yossi
and in my capacity as a British citizen as well I would like to
emphasise—
Q55 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
And a taxpayer?
Dr Khalidi: I want my tax money to be effective,
and it has not been. I think there are four roles that one can
conceive of for the EU. There is the economic role, of course,
which seems to have become the dominant one and the one with the
least return, it is taken almost for granted that Europe will
pick up the cheques, and I think that has to change. There is
a security role. There are two types of security role. There is
a security role that the Europeans have been playing behind the
scenes, largely in terms of support for the Palestinian security
services. I cannot say that is a bad thing necessarily; it does
not make me jump for joy because I do not think that our main
problem is that of not having enough policemen. Nonetheless, there
is a role for the EU in supporting and building up the actual
apparatus of state. There is also a role for the EU to be looked
at in terms of international peace-keeping, if you like, in support
of any agreement. Although the Israelis have had a traditional
allergy to this, nonetheless, in Lebanon, they have begun to accept
that there may be space or a role for an international force which
can do something in their favour. I would like to see Europeans
thinking in terms of deploying troops on the borders between Palestine
and Israel, in one form or another, either as monitors or as a
peace-keeping force, as part of an agreement. The other role that
the Europeans can play, which they seem to have ceded, is that
of speaking out on issues of substance. As a Palestinian, I would
like to see the EU revert to the kind of stance it took in the
eighties, where it had a strong stand on things like Jerusalem,
things like settlements, not just because it loves the Palestinians
but because of the recognition of the fact that unless some breaks
are put on settlements activities, on the changes of the status
quo in Jerusalem, we are not going to get a resolution of the
conflict, which is in the interests of everyone. Even out of self-interest
I think the Europeans can stand up and say more and do more on
issues of substance. Finally, there is a role in terms of political
engagement, and I go back to what we were talking about a few
minutes ago. I would like to see the EU engaging with Hamas, and
where possible with Hizbollah, being willing to stand up and be
separate from the United States and be willing perhaps even to
take some risky actions in this domain, because the pay-off, in
my opinion, is very big, so I would like to see the EU take a
clear and positive role in terms of engagement with forces that
are generally considered to be on the extreme side.
Q56 Lord Crickhowell:
It is precisely on that point that I was about to ask you the
question of the area for a positive role for the EU and, in the
light of what you have said previously about Hamas, it just happens
that the House of Commons International Development Committee
has just produced a report, in which it says: "The international
community's policy of isolating a democratically-elected government
is questionable under conditions of ongoing conflict. We understand
the reasons for the decision but doubt whether it is, in fact,
the most effective response; indeed, the withholding of revenues
by Israel and the boycott of a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority
by existing donors has led to the Hamas Government increasingly
to look elsewhere."
Dr Khalidi: Moving closer to Iran, yes.
Q57 Lord Crickhowell:
In the light of that, you said there is a role for Europe here;
what do you think then, in the light of what has happened with
Hamas, what is the line that you would like to see the Europeans
taking in order to re-engage Hamas in the process?
Dr Khalidi: I think, at this particular juncture,
we have to see what comes out of Mecca, because one can talk about
what the Europeans could have done last month or the month before,
but now we are talking about potentially a new phase. If the net
result of Mecca is a national unity Government which has Hamas
members in it, which is my guess is what will happen, then my
hope would be that the EU would be ready to engage with it positively
and directly and not try to find other ways of trying to bend
or twist its arm under the guise of not meeting the conditions
that were set by the quartet.
Q58 Lord Lea of Crondall:
My Lord Chairman, can I ask Mr Mekelberg to clarify something,
because it seemed to me that, first of all, on this point about
who wanted the EU to have a more coherent, stronger role, he said,
as I understood him, and correct me if I am wrong, that he rather
regretted the degree of stereotyping that goes on, about Israel
being related to the United States and Palestine being related
to the EU. Then he went on to say it is not just a question of
stereo typing because it is precisely—did he not say this—that
Israel does not want a stronger EU role: is that what he said?
Mr Mekelberg: Israel has very close ties with
the European Union economically; it is the main trade partner,
more than the United States. Politically it is different; politically
Israel prefers to see the United States as the main broker. I
might have different views on this, but the way that it is seen
in Jerusalem is that they prefer to see the United States as the
main broker and, as far as Israel is concerned, the division between
the United States dealing with the peace process, with the negotiations,
or involved in the diplomatic efforts, and the Europeans more
on the economic issues, is fine by most of the Israeli Government.
I think it was the same since Rabin and it is the same now; they
prefer to see the Europeans not part of the peace negotiations,
meaning dealing with issues of security, the issues of refugees,
borders, and so on and so forth. One thing which I absolutely
agree with is that Lebanon has changed a bit; with all the faults,
and we know what happened in Lebanon, the deployment of a multilateral
force is a change. There has been an international force in the
Sinai for the last 25 years and there has even been a small force
in Hebron, for quite a long time; however, this is seen as an
exception. The multilateral, of now almost 12,000 in Lebanon,
I think, changed the perception actually that multilateral, including
a European force, can serve as peace-keepers within there, and
it can set a precedent, an important precedent, as far as agreement
with the Palestinians is concerned.
Q59 Lord Lea of Crondall:
So it is not just stereotyping, it is the fact that perhaps Israel
is happier to have its umbilical links as the main partner with
the United States and it is a bit reluctant to see the United
States cede any role to the European Union which is implicit,
and where does that leave the quartet, by the way?
Mr Mekelberg: Where does it leave the quartet;
the quartet is the United Nations, Russia, the United States and
the European Union. I do not think Russia is much involved anyway
that deeply and the United Nations is in a state of flux, in any
case, which leaves the European Union and the United States as
the two main partners of the quartet; the rest is a bit less significant.
In this context, I think the onus is on the Americans to prove
to the Palestinians that they are honest brokers, because the
Palestinians, and correct me if I am wrong, do not see the Americans
as honest brokers, and I think the same, many Israelis will look
at the Europeans and say "I am not so sure I want them around
in negotiations, I don't trust them enough." From the Venice
Declaration, and even before, in the 1970s, they started supporting
them financially, even before 1971, there is kind of a perception
in Israel that the Europeans are friendlier, with the exception,
by the way, of the United Kingdom, and Tony Blair, in this sense,
who are seen in Israel as different. The perception is the Europeans
are much friendlier to the Palestinians, they see the Palestinian
cause and they prefer this over the Israeli cause. The reality
is different, but this is the perception, or the best perception.
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