Examination of Witnesses (Questions 152
- 159)
THURSDAY 15 MARCH 2007
HIS EXCELLENCY MR GEHAD REFAAT MADI AND DR MAHMOUD
AFIFI
Q152 Chairman:
Your Excellency, I would like to say on behalf of Sub-Committee
C which is carrying out this inquiry into the European Union and
the Middle East Peace Process, that we felt it was very important
in our inquiry and in discovering about the situation and the
potential and the problems that we ought to have a chance to talk
to people from the countries of the region. We were therefore
particularly pleased that you were able to come and accept our
invitation to answer questions this morning. I do not know whether
you have an introductory statement which you would like to make
or whether you would like us to ask you some questions.
Ambassador Madi: Not really, my Lord Chairman.
I do not have an opening statement in that sense. I can answer
your questions.
Q153 Chairman:
Your Excellency, could I ask you if you would like to make a comment
on the current situation regarding the Middle East Peace Process.
How far has the Mecca agreement changed the landscape for current
diplomatic efforts to relaunch the process?
Ambassador Madi: If we are talking about the
peace process in its entirety, I would say that, for the last
six to seven years, we did not have peace yet and we had an eternal
process with no end game in sight. In Egypt we do not think this
is the appropriate way to proceed, from a phase, to a phase, to
a phase, because we have been through many phases in the past,
since the Madrid Peace Conference and Oslo agreements, ending
up with the Road Map right now. We need a credible process, a
process which is sustainable and not to be subject to any incidents
here or there, being used to derail the process and bring us back
always to square one. If one were to compare the situation between
the Oslo time and now, one would see that there is some regression
in the progress. Oslo was an agreement which did raise the hopes
for everyone, and particularly for the Palestinians in the occupied
territories, and Europe had played a tremendous role in sustaining
Oslo, through its commitment for economic cooperation and its
financial aid to the Palestinians, the rebuilding of the Palestinian
infrastructure and job creating projects at the time. Unfortunately,
all this has been destroyed during the second Intifada by Israel—destroyed
totally, I would say. Even all Palestinian institutions were destroyed,
files were destroyed or taken by the Israelis, and the infrastructure
was flattened. We in Egypt are pragmatic. We look at any opportunity
which exists and we try to seize it. We think there is some light
right now which we can build upon. We are seeing the situation
being different from a few months ago. We were vigorously pushing
forward for a sort of perception of an end game. What is the end
game of the process? What all parties are to achieve is the Palestinian
State at the end of the day, so we have to identify the end game
and then work to reach it. The initiative we have right now, like
the Road Map, there is no timetable in it. It has been put to
test for many years but it did not work out. We are not in disagreement
with the Road Map, we are supporting it, but we see now that it
is not enough, so we have to go one step further than that. We
think the United States administration is, also, somewhat understanding
this view. Secretary Rice was talking about the political horizons.
The Europeans understand these views also, and everybody is in
agreement of going to the end game. We have seen many meetings—three
meetings since December, in fact—between Abu Mazen and the
Prime Minister Olmert. There are movements: the Quartet did meet
in Berlin and they are meeting again next month in the region;
Secretary Rice is going to meet with the Arab Quartet in Egypt
this month. So there are some movements in this respect. Of course,
most important, I would say, is the Mecca agreement, which paved
the way for the most important aspect, which is, above all, ending
the Palestinian infighting. Last night, there was an announcement
that they have reached an agreement on the composition of the
National Unity Government and they are going to submit it to President
Abbas, and then on Saturday, I think, to the Palestinian Legislative
Council. Opportunities are there. As they always say: if there
is a will there is a way. We have to work together to establish
that political will and we are very much looking forward to a
more proactive European role in this respect. This is the moment
which we have reached and we have to work together to that end.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed, your Excellency.
We will come back to that.
Q154 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Could I probe a little bit further, Ambassador. I very strongly
support your government's view that we have to look beyond the
Road Map now but you talk about this mysterious phrase "political
horizons and final status issues in very general terms, and of
course that could mean just writing on the back of an envelope:
"Jerusalem; refugees; two state"—or whatever the
components of a final status would have to be—and that does
not get you very far because we all know that. Alternatively,
you could be saying, "Let us engage in formal negotiations
on these final status issues right away, so that when they are
cracked all the rest will fall into place." But that does
seem to be a bit of triumph over experience. If your government
is talking about something between those two, a simple listing
of final status agreements and an actual formal negotiation on
them straight away, could you enlighten us as to what middle process
will be.
Ambassador Madi: Of course one cannot jump tomorrow
into the final status negotiation. First, the Palestinian national
government, the National Unity Government, is to be established.
It has to come forward to meet some concerns. I would add to this
that the new Palestinian government is totally different from
the former one, which was dominated by Hamas, and was boycotted
nearly by the international community, so we are opening a new
chapter in this. This has to be understood in this context. There
is a new avenue being opened. Hamas would have only nine portfolios
in this government out of 24, so it is not a Hamas-dominated government,
it is a National Unity Government. Over and above the negotiating
power with Israel rests only with President Abu Mazen. Hamas has
no role, whether within the government or outside the government.
As I said before, we have a new opening, a new opportunity, we
have to seize it. Otherwise, the situation is going from bad to
worse, and it will go further than that, given of course the other
crisis in the Middle East. We are not indeed pushing for jumping
immediately into the final status negotiation, but we have to
have some sort of a timetable, to be clear to everyone entering
those negotiations that the end game is this and that in the final
status negotiation with regard to Jerusalem, with regard to refugees,
with regard to the Palestinian State borders and so on and so
forth. Of course I would mention also the existence of the Arab
initiative of 2002, which is still alive, and is a comprehensive
one. Combining all those initiatives together will give us a better
idea about how to proceed in the future, provided that the political
will exists. This is a most important aspect: we have to encourage,
together with all parties involved in it, the creation of this
political will in order to solve this problem once and for all.
Q155 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Ambassador, welcome. The timetable of the Road Map has failed
to reach the very first hurdle, the settlements are enlarging,
there is still violence. Do you think possibly the discussion
now of the new horizons, of final status and the problems identified
by Lord Hannay is really no more than a frustration at the lack
of progress or is there a serious prospect of progress on those
major issues, given the extreme weakness of the government of
Israel and the big question marks which still remain over the
Palestinian success or otherwise of the Government of National
Unity?
Ambassador Madi: In fact, if we can describe
the term "political horizon" as a big one, we have to
make our own interpretation, with the help of others, that this
political horizon means the final goal and is not a vague expression.
We have to work for that. At the same time, I think, we have to
work together. The Road Map was not really having an exact timetable,
it was phased procedures: phase 1, 2 and 3.
Q156 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
But there was a clear timetable for part 1.
Ambassador Madi: The problem with these phased
procedures is that any party, particularly the Israelis, will
come in and say, "The Palestinians did not do this and that,
so phase 1 is not being implemented, we cannot go to phase 2."
Any small incident is being used and abused in order to stall
the transfer from phase 1 to phase 2. I think the Palestinians,
also, on their part, did not fully implement phase 1 in that sense.
Q157 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Not in terms of the cessation of violence.
Ambassador Madi: I am saying we are not thinking
that they have fully implemented phase 1. Efforts have to be combined.
Now we have a new approach. We have a new phase, we have a new
chapter, a Mecca agreement, and the composition of the National
Unity Government. We have to work for this approach, to make it
work and to present to the Palestinian people, to the international
community and, above all, to Israel per se that this may
work and give it a chance. Let us see what the government is going
to do with everyday policy. Let us see the international community's
reaction to this government . We want the international community
to support this government, not necessarily to have direct contacts
with Hamas ministers. Abu Mazen is there. The three portfolios
which were the main concern of Europeans before the composition
of this government were the finance, foreign affairs and the interior.
They are not Hamas people in the new government. We have to be
innovative in our approach. We have to be flexible as well. There
are some things, like the renouncing of violence, which is of
the utmost importance for a process to take off and to be credible
and sustainable, but renouncing of violence should be on both
sides as well. Israel should stop its targeted assassination,
Israel should stop its continued incursion into the Palestinian
territories. We should not, as a matter of fact, try to find an
excuse here or there in order to stop our efforts—and I
am talking about the Israelis as well as the Palestinians.
Q158 Lord Chidgey:
Ambassador, you have had the questions already in advance, which
might save a bit of time. You have talked about the pragmatic
approach of Egypt and also the flexibility in this, which is something
we applaud and welcome, but I would like to know from you how
you feel you could apply this more sophisticated political dimension
that Egypt proposes to have too to the problem. What role can
Egypt play in contributing to the peaceful solution to the problems,
particularly given the complexities of the regional situation,
which I think Egypt understands better than many? You have touched
on Lebanon already but you have not mentioned Iran, as far as
I can recall, in your opening remarks. We see Iran as a huge issue
in this whole settlement, as we see Syria as a huge issue in the
whole process. Wrapping that together, could we have your views
on how Egypt can pragmatically and flexibly play an important
role in the process with regard to the regional dimension?
Ambassador Madi: As we all know, we are vigorously
pursuing a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East
for the last 30 years, since Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem.
Thirty years. We have the experience. Egypt is in a unique position,
in that it is the only country in the world that maintains contact
with all parties, no exception to that. This gives us the
advantage of talking, contacting, convincing or attempting and
trying to convince others of our approach. We are in almost daily
contact with everybody, including of course the Europeans, and
of course on a bilateral level with all other friends in the European
Union. We are seeking vigorously the settlement which will be
accepted by all parties. Of course you have mentioned Iran and
Syria in this respect, and we feel that there are some problems,
particularly with regard to Iran. Syria is a part and parcel of
the process. Syrian land is still being occupied by Israeli, and
Syria is ready, as far as I know, to enter into negotiation with
Israel. It has been announced several times and I think the Ambassador
of Syria, who is sitting behind me right now, can better dwell
on this issue. But, with regard to Iran, Iran now, I would say,
becomes a new player within the conflicts of the Arab world, and
this worries us very much. Yet Iran has a serious issue with the
West and is trying to play some cards in its hands in the conflict,
as we see it, in Lebanon, and, as we see it, in Palestine with
Hamas, but, more importantly, in Iraq. Those proxy issues are
very much affecting the process. We have to have a clear vision.
I would say Iran is an important Islamic country; it has its own
interests. Yet for Iraq and Lebanon we think the most appropriate
solution is hands off: hands off Iraq, hands off Lebanon, let
both solve the problem domestically without foreign intervention.
This was also the press declaration being issued after the Baghdad
meeting of the neighbouring countries and the five permanent representatives
of the UN Security Council: the Iraqis do not want outside intervention.
We are calling for that and we have to make every possibly way
to prevent Iran, and the West as well, from using our part of
the world as a theatre for settling any disputes between them.
Of course we are concerned about, also, the nuclear programme
of Iran—very much concerned. We have to acknowledge that
any country member of NPT has a right to a peaceful use of nuclear
energy, but we are going to very much resent any country in the
region possessing nuclear weapons, whether it is Iran or Israel,
and this has to be clear also for the stability of our part of
the world.
Q159 Lord Crickhowell:
Ambassador, the primary job of this Committee is to examine the
role of the European Union in the whole peace process. You have
said that you hope that the European Union would play a more proactive
role and that is something that has been said by a number of or
our witnesses. Europe has played a considerable role in providing
financial support and in electoral supervision and the transfer
to the new electoral arrangements, but what role would you like
to see Europe now play? What is your concept of the "more
proactive role" and the role of the EU in the Quartet?
Ambassador Madi: I remember, during the Oslo
process, the European Union at the time was the main provider
of financial assistance to the Palestinians—and they did
a wonderful job. Again, unfortunately, it all has been destroyed
by Israel during the Intifada. Yet, at the time, I do remember,
as well, that the Europeans were complaining about the fact that
they had been assigned the role of the cheque book only and they
wanted to play a more political role in the peace process. After
over a decade, now an opportunity exists. The European Union and
European countries are the adjacent region to us. Everything happening
in our part of the world is affecting Europe and vice versa. The
geographical proximity and historical, political and economic
interests of the European Union would make it more interesting
in developing its role in the political atmosphere of the whole
situation. The EU now is a party, an active member of the Quartet,
and it can deliver also a political message to other parties.
Again, from the historical perspective and from the excellent
relations existing between Europe and the Arab world, or the Middle
East in general, we look to Europe's role as the role of an honest
broker. This is what we need. This is what can bring about the
political will I talked about: an honest broker, which can bring
both sides together, the Palestinians and Israelis, as well as
others, around the table in a convinced way. It is not to say
that this role should be in contrast or opposition of the US role.
No. It has to be a complementary role. Sometimes we talk to the
European partners about the Middle East Peace Process and they
will tell us, "Go and ask the Americans." We all have
to go and ask the Americans, not only us but the Europeans as
well. We have to have a combined effort in order to stress upon
the United States and Israel, and the Palestinians as well, that
a chance now exists, and if we are really convinced about the
existence of the chance we have to work it through. This is the
most important aspect. I am not talking about pressure but a convincing
approach. Every and each country has interests in the Middle East—and
I am talking about the main players—and we have to understand
the complexity of the situation. All of them understand the complexity
of the situation but some are happy that maybe the United States
is playing a leading role, so keep it playing this role, and we
are not to take any vigorous steps in this direction. I think
we can have a unified EU policy in this respect. I am not talking
about individual country's having a policy but a unified EU policy.
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