Examination of Witnesses (Questions 319
- 339)
WEDNESDAY 18 APRIL 2007
DR KIM HOWELLS, MR DAVID QUARREY AND MR MICHAEL ANDERSON
Q319 Chairman:
Minister, thank you very much indeed for coming to see us this
morning. As you know, we are coming to the end of an inquiry into
the European Union and the Middle East in which we have seen a
number of people here in London, we have been to Brussels and
seen people both from the Commission, the Council Secretariat
as well as Dr Solana. We really wanted, before we finished our
consideration of taking evidence, to talk to you to get the view
from the UK Government on certain of these issues. We of course
did see Mr Quarrey at an earlier stage and we are glad that he
and Mr Anderson from DFID are with you today. I do not know whether
you have anything you would like to say as an initial statement
or whether we should go straight into questions.
Dr Howells: I could say something, My Lord Chairman,
if you would like me to. I do not mind going straight into questions
if you are short of time.
Q320 Chairman:
We are hoping to run until about noon so we have got a certain
amount of time, but if you have something that you wanted to say
initially we would obviously be interested to hear it.
Dr Howells: Perhaps I can just say that I am
certainly very pleased to address the Committee today and I very
much welcome your interest in the EU's role in the Middle East.
It is a very serious inquiry, as you have just described it, and
I am glad you have had the opportunity to interview Javier Solana
and Marc Otte and various officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and others, and I look forward to reading your conclusions.
It is certainly an important Government objective to achieve a
more active and influential role for the EU in the Middle East,
and in the EU we believe there is huge potential to further the
cause of peace and security in the region, especially the Middle
East Peace Process. One of the themes of my evidence today will
certainly be to argue that the EU has the greatest impact on the
peace process when it is pursuing a balanced policy approach,
working on both the political and practical tracks and when it
is able to deploy the full range of foreign policy tools available
to it, including through the European Security and Defence Policy,
the ESDP. Quite what the right mix will be at any time will depend
on the situation on the ground, and it is something that we keep
under constant review. It is frustrating that some of the programmes
we were getting underway to support the Middle East Peace Process
in 2005 we have not been able to take forward in 2006 following
Hamas' entry into government. That may now be changing, but we
need first to see how the new government performs. Even with the
difficult political situation facing the international community
over the last year we have seen the EU make good use of the various
tools available to it. High Representative Solana and Special
Representative Otte continue to be active of course, both on the
ground and in working closely with our Quartet partners; they
are thoroughly engaged and I certainly believe, My Lord Chairman,
that they are real assets for the EU. The Commission led the international
response to Hamas' election victory by setting up and running
the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) and this mechanism
continues to ensure that support reaches the Palestinian people.
I am sure you know, My Lord Chairman, that in 2006 €188 million
of EU money went through the TIM and approximately 900,000 persons
will benefit directly from that. During 2006 the EU gave over
€680 million to the Palestinians and this represents the
largest ever contribution from the EU in a single year. Also,
the two ESDP missions—EU BAM Rafah, which monitors the border
crossing between Gaza and Egypt, and EU COPPS which supports the
Palestinian Civil Police—have proved to be effective instruments.
Although the Rafah crossing point has not been open consistently
it has provided the Palestinians with an international border
crossing and with an important lifeline, and EU COPPS had to scale
down their role in support of the civil police due to the political
and security situation, but they remain ready to continue to work
once the EU is satisfied that their work will not strengthen those
whom we consider to be opposed to peace. If I can say finally,
we are moving into a new phase with the appointment of the National
Unity Government which offers opportunities for greater EU engagement.
There is an emerging consensus within the EU supporting contact
with those members of the government whose policies and actions
reflect the three Quartet principles. The EU is also set to extend
the TIM for a further three months whilst continuing to judge
the government on its words and deeds. The United Kingdom supports
this policy and expects to see it endorsed at the 23 April GAERC
meeting. If the National Unity Government acts responsibly we
hope to see the resumption of technical assistance, Commission-led
capacity building programme and the revitalisation of the ESDP
missions. I understand that in today's discussions here the focus
is to be on the Middle East Peace Process but I also look forward,
if the opportunity arises, to discussion on, for example, Syria
and on Lebanon. In both cases, My Lord Chairman, the EU's role
is important, especially in Lebanon where the Armed Forces of
EU Member States make up the bulk of the expanded UNIFIL operations,
which I had the opportunity to visit just a few weeks ago.
Q321 Chairman:
Minister, thank you very much indeed for that introduction. As
you rightly say, a number of points that you have covered are
ones that we will want to come back to in questions, and I would
really like to ask you if you would like to say a little more
about the opportunities which are open to the European Union,
both in view of the recent developments in the Middle East Peace
Process and, in particular, whether the renewal of the Arab peace
initiative has contributed to the prospects for peace and the
possibility perhaps of two Quartets working together.
Dr Howells: I certainly think that the renaissance,
if I could describe it as such, of Saudi diplomatic initiatives
is a wonderful step forward. I know from my experience recently
in Lebanon that that has galvanised political opinion there in
a way which had not happened for quite a while, and certainly
their involvement in the Palestinian Israeli issue as well has
been a very major boost and very, very important and I am very
glad to see that it has happened. At the same time, the Arab League
seems to have a new lease of life, Aba Moussa seems rejuvenated,
he is very much involved in this now, and that is a very important
step forward too. I do not know what your Lordships on the Committee
feel, but I guess for a very long time many of us have been worried
that the neighbours have not played the kind of role that they
could have been playing, and this is a very encouraging move forward.
It is right to describe it as two Quartets; the new involvement
might happen in a couple of ways. We know, for example, that many
of the Gulf States feel uneasy about pledging money to the Palestinian
states and the new leadership which the Saudis have given to the
process might serve to encourage people to feel more confident
about money that might go towards the peace process in general
and towards supporting those elements in the National Unity Government
that go along with the Quartet's three principles.
Q322 Chairman:
For the European Union, given that obviously there is still a
good deal of American initiative, where do you see the particular
role that they might have in taking the process forward?
Dr Howells: I certainly sense amongst European
Union members in general, talking to other foreign ministers of
course, that they are equally encouraged by the Saudi initiative
especially, and of course our current thrust, if I can describe
it as that, is to try to work to build political momentum towards
a resumption of real talks between the parties—that has
been right at the heart of our EU policy, both through encouraging
active and constructive engagement with the Quartet and through
supporting the bilateral process between Prime Minister Olmert
and President Abbas. Secondly, we have been concentrating, and
will continue to concentrate, on practical measures to build the
capacity of Palestinian institutions and of the economy of course.
The examples are the most obvious ones of trying to strengthen
the office of the president, financial support for President Abbas
and support for the security forces as well as looking at trying
to build the capacity of long term governance and providing economic
support. Those will continue to be the main thrusts.
Q323 Lord Crickhowell:
Can I take you to the second question which you have been given
some notice about: the European Council in December called for
a "comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
including peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon ..." How
does the United Kingdom Government envisage this comprehensive
approach to be pursued in practice? Is there a need to prioritise
or should all the different negotiating tracks be dealt with at
the same time?
Dr Howells: The EU and the UK have long supported
resolving all the strands of the MEPP and the Roadmap also calls
for addressing the Syrian and Lebanon tracks. The conflict last
summer, which I had first hand experience of, highlighted the
importance of addressing this issue. The EU of course is already
engaged in Israel, Syria and Lebanon and in March of this year
Javier Solana visited both Lebanon and Syria and in Lebanon Javier
Solana met Prime Minister Siniora and Speaker Nabih Berri—as
I did indeed. In Syria he met with the Foreign Minister Moallem
and Vice-President Sharaa and with President Assad and delivered
agreed EU messages. He said, specifically, that the EU recognised
the need for a comprehensive peace including the return of the
Golan, but he was also clear that Syria's policies in the region
continued to be a cause for concern. We certainly support this
approach; we think there should be progress on all strands of
the MEPP and that we should not make progress on one strand being
contingent on progress on others. We think it is a reasonable
assumption to make that that would give the spoilers every opportunity
to prevent any progress being made.
Q324 Lord Crickhowell:
The last witness we had before this Committee before the recess
was Dr Eran, the Israeli Ambassador to the European Union, who
has been involved in this whole business probably longer than
anyone. He happened to be particularly strong on this particular
subject and made it clear that he expressed his views very strongly
to the Israeli Government. He said that he was very much against
trying to settle the Syrian issue at the same time as the central
Palestinian issue. He produced an argument that it will take a
very long time and set out the process which would be involved—the
referendum and the carrying of opinion—and essentially he
was saying that he did not believe that in Israel it would be
possible for an Israeli government to be able to successfully
carry its people through two parallel processes, the Syrian one
and the Palestinian one, at the same time. He said "In my
view, the heart of the Israeli-Arab conflict is the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and we should direct all our efforts to solve this issue
and then solve the issue with Syria and, therefore, we should
delay for the time being the discussions or the negotiations with
Syria." Out of all the bits of evidence that he gave us in
a very impressive and very informative session he was almost stronger
on this subject than any other, so what is your reaction to those
comments?
Dr Howells: Obviously that is a matter for the
Israeli Government, but if you want my thoughts on this he has
probably got a very good point. The emphasis has got to be on
the object of constructing two states that can live alongside
each other; that has got to be the main theme of it. Curiously,
when I have been in Israel—I have not been to Syria though
I would very much like to go there—and certainly when I
have been in Lebanon I have had the impression that the Israelis
consider the negotiations with the Syrians to be rather easier
than the negotiations with the Palestinians, and the Golan Heights—I
am sure that your Lordships have been on the Golan Heights—and
the Shebaa farms, tracts of land in Lebanon, these are very obvious
and concrete symbols of this conflict and if there is a deal on
land for peace it is a relatively simple thing to do, but that
is not the situation with the Palestinians, it is a much more
difficult one. The idea that it is possible simply to solve one
issue first and then in a kind of incremental way move on to Syria
or move on to Libya—it is impossible, you cannot do these
things. Syria and the Syrian government continue to support the
Hamas rejectionists, for example, in Damascus and they are playing
a very important role in ensuring that Hezbollah in Lebanon is
re-armed, they continue to have what I think is a pernicious influence
inside Lebanon on Lebanese politics—literally a murderous
influence in some cases—and it is very difficult to see
how, in that tiny geographical area, these issues can easily be
separated from each other and one issue dealt with quite separate
from another. I do not think that is possible actually, but I
do agree with him that we have to emphasise some things above
others and we have to concentrate our resources on certain issues
rather than others and I would agree with him that the most important
of those issues is this question of the relationship between Israel
and the Palestinian state.
Q325 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
You have dealt so far with what I call the geographical sequences
between different countries which are in dispute, but there is
another aspect to the phrase "comprehensive settlement"
which relates to whether you deal with interim measures such as
the Roadmap suggested, or whether you shift the emphasis onto
final status issues which are now called "political horizons"
in a piece of diplomatic gobbledy-gook which appears to be generally
shared around the circuit. Could you say this shift away from
the fairly sterile ground of the interim ideas that were in the
Roadmap towards seriously addressing final status issues is something
which the British Government supports?
Dr Howells: We are certainly very much in favour
of having a picture of what we are aiming to achieve at the end
of it, and that is something which has been lacking so far, so
if this political horizon includes some notion of what Israel
is going to look like and what the Palestinian states are going
to look like, I would have thought that that is a wholly constructive
approach because it is very difficult—it has not always
been British Government policy this—to negotiate the minutiae
of these interim stages if you cannot see what it is you are aiming
for here. It is not rocket science, but it seems to me to be a
very, very important feature of any negotiations that there ought
to be a clear picture, for example, of how the Israelis and how
the Palestinians and how everybody else sees the question of Jerusalem.
In Lebanon, for example, Prime Minister Siniora hardly wanted
to speak about anything other than the Shebaa farms and when I
stood on a crusader castle and looked towards the Golan Heights,
somebody had to point out to me very, very carefully where exactly
the Shebaa farms were because they were a bit of a stony slope
that led to the Golan Heights; I thought what is all the fuss
about. Unless you have got that image in your mind of exactly
what you would like to see come out of this in the end, it is
very difficult to try to negotiate those interim features before
them. It is a shift and it is quite an important one.
Q326 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Minister, you are absolutely right in saying that Syria has played
and is playing a very negative role in the region, Hezbollah,
Hamas and also in Iraq. The question is whether we have really
tested the potential of Syria doing rather more positive things.
There has been a recent article by President Clinton's former
special adviser, Mr Malik, which is headed "US isolation
of Damascus rests on a misunderstanding of Syria's position in
the Middle East" and suggests that rigidly rebuffing Syria
is a mistake fast on its way to becoming a missed opportunity.
Is the European Union, in your judgment, prepared to take a more
open view of Syria? Certainly, they feel upset that the Roadmap
did not give greater priority, as you know, to the Syrian track;
do you feel that perhaps we have missed a trick and at least the
European Union should be more ready to test the willingness of
Syria to play a more positive role?
Dr Howells: I certainly think that Javier Solana's
visit to Damascus was very important, as was Sir Nigel Sheinwald's
visit—they sent out very clear messages, with not an entirely
popular reaction, by the way, throughout the Middle East, as you
probably know. There are governments and countries who feel deeply
uneasy about Syria who are Syria's neighbours, and that is something
which we have to take into account, but I do not think there has
been reluctance within the EU to try to generate more contacts
with Syria. The problem—and it is a very serious problem—arises
not necessarily from Syria's relationship for example with Baghdad;
I am very glad to see that that has warmed up a good deal, they
seem to be paying more attention to their own eastern frontier
and I know that the Syrians themselves from reports that we get
back from our ambassador are very worried about jihadists who
go to Syria in order to try and get to Iraq and then remain in
Syria because they do not particularly like the Syrian government
either; that is something which we certainly ought to have some
discussion with the Syrians about. I know from my own discussions
with Javier Solana that he is very much aware of that and those
tensions, but if you come at it from the point of view of Lebanon—I
went to Lebanon on my last visit a few weeks ago—there is
evidence that we have got to have much greater engagement with
the Syrians but I came away, I have to admit to the Committee,
reluctant to intensify that because of the games that they are
playing within Lebanon, they are very destructive and so they
have to be handled very, very carefully. Above all the EU, just
like the British Government, has to care a great deal about the
way in which the Arab neighbours feel about Syria too, especially
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. So we have to examine this very
carefully, we certainly have to be prepared to engage where we
think it is going to be constructive but we have to be very sensitive
to the feelings of countries like Lebanon and some of the Gulf
States too.
Chairman: Lady Symons was going to come
back to Syria on a later question but in the circumstances, seeing
how far we have gone into it, it might be appropriate to ask the
question now.
Q327 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
The split in the Arab world over Syria is very much something
that stems from last year in particular, not so much because of
Lebanon—although they are uneasy, although Sunni interference
in Lebanon is hardly new, it has been going on for a very long
time—but because of that speech that Bashir Assad made which
got so much attention, understandably. Even so, would you not
say, Minister, that in the Arab world they want Syria back as
one of them, playing an active part in the Arab League and they
absolutely recognise that there is no possibility of a solution
under the Middle East Peace Process without Syria being part of
that? Having said all of that, Minister, I was interested in what
you said about not having been to Syria yourself and we all understand
the reasons for that, but within the Syrian hierarchy it is a
very split hierarchy, there are many different facets to it, and
is it not possible to have more engagement now? There is a ripe
moment now to try to encourage those within the Syrian hierarchy
who are really identifiable as the reformers; without that encouragement
then falling further and further into exactly the sort of destructive
policies you describe seems to me to be a real possibility.
Dr Howells: Yes, My Lord Chairman, Lady Symons
is absolutely right, we have got to be much more assiduous about
the way in which we try to understand and interpret the significance
of the internal divisions within Syria. Having said that, I do
not want to sound as if I am one of these people who believe that
it is possible to create greater divisions within the Syrian Government
or within Syrian society, I do not believe that; we have seen
some of the results of the neocon approach which says just throw
it in and see what comes out at the end—that is the last
thing we want as far as Syria is concerned.
Q328 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
Absolutely.
Dr Howells: My Lord Chairman, Lady Symons is
absolutely right about a general feeling within the Middle East
that Syria must come back into the fold; it has a kind of iconic
significance for the Syrian people and Syria itself which we discount
at our peril. Yes, it is very important that we try to understand
what is going on inside Syria but that we recognise also that
there is a government there that has to be dealt with as a government.
I hear stories, for example, about Iran, that there are big political
divisions within Iran and so on—maybe there are, I know
there are at least 150,000 probably 200,000 Iranians now living
in Dubai and they are very clever. They are not the North Koreans,
they are very clever and very experienced traders and they know
very well that if there are tensions within Iran, if the international
community and the UN decide they are going to impose really tough
sanctions on Iran, they want to be able to trade from somewhere
else.
Q329 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
Do you see the possibility of a follow-up visit to Nigel Sheinwald's?
Dr Howells: What, me go there?
Q330 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
If not you, Minister, somebody of equally important status. It
was a very important point that Sir Nigel went and I just wondered
whether there is a feeling that there might be some opportunity
for follow-up.
Dr Howells: I certainly feel we should be following
up and I know that there are discussions taking place about how
best to do this. The important thing, especially from this hearing's
point of view, is that the EU is very interested in strengthening
contacts with Damascus and I am pretty sure that Javier Solana
will be back there sooner rather than later.
Q331 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Minister, the Quartet stated in March that it will judge the National
Unity Government on the basis not only of its composition and
platform, but also its actions. I wonder whether you can comment
on what degree of flexibility you think should be displayed in
interpreting the three principles. We have been struck in the
evidence we have had that whereas two of the principles are relatively
straightforward to apply, the one that relates to recognition
is far from straightforward to apply because it seems to muddle
up two things, one of which is the de facto recognition
that Israel exists and has to be dealt with, and the other is
the diplomat-speak word "recognition" which is something
that one state does to another state. The Palestinian Authority
is not a "state" and the Hamas government is certainly
not a state. I wonder whether you could comment on the degree
of flexibility that there might be as we move ahead and, secondly,
could you comment also on how much of a handicap it is if the
only form of co-operation with the Palestinian Authority government
can be with individual ministers and not with the government as
a whole? Is this a real handicap in the process of capacity building
and laying the foundations for a viable Palestinian state, or
can it really be done in this rather extraordinary hand-to-mouth
way?
Dr Howells: My Lord Chairman, I certainly think
that Lord Hannay has put his finger on some very important questions
here. Could I say as a top line, if you like, that we do not believe
that the Quartet's three principles—renunciation of violence,
recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements—should
be interpreted flexibly, and I will try to deal with the recognition
issue in a moment. These three principles represent a consensus
and indeed they are deeply-held principles of the international
community and very reluctantly should we begin to meddle with
that. We believe it is right that all parties should understand
what our principles are; we have to have them and they are very
important, and we have certainly said, Lord Hannay, that we will
judge the National Unity Government by its actions and we need
to be able to see just how far they have moved towards the three
principles. I will ask David to come in in a moment to comment
if he senses that there has been an incremental move within the
terms of Jack Straw's description where he said "We want
to see what the direction of travel is." People have tried
to come up with alternative phrases, but it is the best one I
have heard of so far and it is vague enough in diplomatic terms
to give us a bit of leeway. Perhaps David could come in in a moment
and just expand on that a little. As far as the question of recognition
is concerned, there are very few diplomatic precedents for this,
it is a very, very difficult one, but there are some very simple
rules that could be applied and are being applied. When President
Ahmadinejad says he wants to "wipe Israel off the face of
the map", that is a pretty clear expression. We found immediately
after he said that that we had Tehran's ambassador to this country
saying "We must not take that literally", but it sounds
pretty literal to me actually and if the leadership of Hamas continues
to make speeches in which they, for example, say that it is a
perfectly defensible thing for a suicide bomber to blow themselves
up in Eilat and kill innocent people and that that is okay because
we do not recognise this state and we want to see the destruction
of this state, that is pretty clear as well. The moment we start
modifying our position on what is a pretty simple statement—although
I quite agree with you that it is immensely difficult in technical
and diplomatic terms—we are in trouble. David, do you want
to say something on this?
Mr Quarrey: As the Minister says we essentially
make a distinction between the principles to which we hold firm,
on which we are very clear and on which we do not compromise,
but on the other hand we are realistic about the extent and pace
to which Hamas might move towards those principles and that is
what we are in the phase of doing at the moment, assessing how
far they have moved. It is clear that the Mecca agreement represented
a certain degree of movement on those principles and we are now
trying to assess how the National Unity Government and how the
Hamas elements within the government are engaged and what their
behaviour now in government says about how much further if at
all they have moved. For example, on the renunciation of violence
there are discussions underway about extending the ceasefire from
the Gaza Strip to the West Bank—if that were to happen that
would clearly be a positive step forward. If the government as
a whole were to act to stop Kassam firing into Israel that would
be a significant step forward. Coming back to the Arab peace initiative,
the fact that the government of which Hamas was a part reaffirmed
its commitment to the Arab peace initiative, that was another
helpful step on the point about the acceptance of previous agreements.
That is the phase we are in at the moment; the government has
not had long in office so far so it is difficult to make very
definitive judgments, but we will continue to make that assessment
about the extent to which there is or is not movement towards
the principles, but on the principles themselves we stay firm.
Q332 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
The second half of the question has not yet been dealt with, which
is the degree to which dealing in only a partial way with ministers
is a serious handicap to the kind of capacity-building that I
believe everyone wishes to support.
Dr Howells: It is certainly a handicap, there
is no question about that, and it does not make it any easier.
I will ask Michael to come in in a moment on this question of
capacity-building because DFID has a very important role to play
in it; nevertheless, the political principles, those headline
rules if you will, are the most important ones and we have got
to find ways of dealing with the National Unity Government which
allow some progress to be made. It is difficult, but a lot of
other things about this situation are difficult and we have just
got to make it work as best we can.
Mr Anderson: In the recent White Paper in DFID
we emphasised in supporting capacity-building governments which
are capable, accountable and responsive to the needs of their
people. Of those three dimensions the capability component is
one that we can make real progress on some aspects with the Palestinian
Authority, in particular the office of the president where we
have just agreed as one of five states along with the European
Commission to provide them with $5 million in support to the office
of the president, building up President Abbas's capacity to begin
work, along with other donors, in supporting the development of
some of the institutions other than the line ministries. It is
not the case that we are doing nothing, we are making important
advances, and some of those institutions are quite important to
the accountability as well as to the capability. It is the case,
however, that working directly with the line ministries, developing
their capability, we are severely constrained and it would be
impossible to achieve the development of the full Palestinian
State of the kind which is fit for purpose for dealing with the
objectives of the Middle East Peace Process—it will be impossible
to achieve that unless we are able to work fully with the line
ministries, and that is not possible at the moment.
Q333 Lord Crickhowell:
Can I pursue that question of talking to some ministers but not
to others, and of course I understand the importance of sticking
to the three principles and the lack of flexibility and so on,
but at meetings we had both with representatives of the Commission
and the Council in Brussels I came in towards the end of each
meeting and said that I felt very uncomfortable about some of
the answers and that perhaps this is because you and I come from
a background of collective responsibility and it is quite difficult
to be happy about a situation where an election is held, we do
not much like the result and we say we have talked to one group
of ministers, not the dominant, largest group in that government,
but not the others. There are two possibilities: either it actually
encourages and presses Hamas to take a more reasonable view, or
it could have the opposite effect and encourage further factions
and divisions. Mr Cooper, speaking for the Council at our meetings,
responded to the point I was making by saying that firstly he
thought "we should be a little careful about saying we are
prepared to do business with one half of the government and not
the other because we have, after all, been urging the Palestinians
for a National Unity Government. Personally I think it is probably
a condition of the peace settlement at the end. First the Palestinians
need to get their act together and then negotiate with Israel
and so on". This is clearly a very difficult situation, but
would you comment about how we handle this sort of dual—we
will talk to one lot if we approve of particular ministers and
think that they are not representative of the previously rather
corrupt group we would actually direct money into particular forces
through those ministers. It is quite a difficult concept to talk
to some ministers and not to others. Can you comment?
Dr Howells: It is a very difficult concept,
there is no question about it. There is no reason of course, there
is no compunction on us to talk to anyone, let alone give €680
million to anyone, and as Michael has just said one of the big
problems we have got at the moment is accountability. I had not
been to Ramallah for a very long time before 2005, and on my way
there I was told these dreadful stories about how poor Ramallah
had become, how rundown the economy was, and when I got to Ramallah
I saw a city ringed with very, very attractive, brand new luxury
apartments. When I asked where the money had come from to build
these and who they belonged to, they belonged—not to put
too fine a point on it—to very corrupt members of Fatah
who had channelled that aid money into their own pockets. We should
never forget that, so Michael's point is a very important one
in that respect. I would find it very difficult, My Lord Chairman,
as you would have when you represented Pembroke, to go down into
the high street of Pontypridd and say "We are giving money
to a political party that encourages suicide bombers." I
do not know how I could do that actually; I would not do it and
I would not like to be part of a government that does it. It is
a difficult one, there is no easy answer to it, but the participation
of the EU has come to not a bad compromise in a very difficult
situation, and it is about the best that I can see at the moment.
You began by asking whether or not it has had any effect on Hamas,
has it pushed them? I think in some ways it has; the last time
I spoke to President Abbas he told me that he thought there were
three Hamas's now—there was a kind of Provisional IRA Hamas
that was out of control in Gaza, there was a Hamas which had essentially
been elected and was beginning to understand that there would
have to be some real politicking if it is to do something for
the people who had elected it, and there was a very hard line
of rejectionist Hamas in Damascus. There is some truth in that,
so this kind of cyclical disintegration of Palestinian politics
continues, but Hamas is as subject to it as anyone else is.
Q334 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Minister, would you confirm that the policy is to deal with any
individual within the National Unity Government, whatever their
label, any individual who accepts the Quartet principles?
Dr Howells: Yes, they do not have to be Fatah
at all and there are independents in there. My Lord Chairman,
if I could just draw a parallel for a moment with Lebanon, the
first time I went to Lebanon in the middle of the war in July,
it was only when I came away from Lebanon that I discovered that
I may have been talking to somebody from Hezbollah, who was a
minister at that time and certainly did not go under the name
of Hezbollah. Everybody said to me later that he was very close
to Hezbollah, this guy. One can apologise for that but on the
other hand it can be very useful as well, of course, if people
choose—these are very intelligent people, they do this very
carefully—overtly not to identify themselves with the party
but nevertheless might have their finger on the pulse in this
community, then of course we should be talking to them if they
are adhering to these principles.
Mr Anderson: If I could give a brief comparison,
it is possible to overstate how unique this relationship is with
the PA in that it is a matter of routine practice in British aid
programmes for us to select which ministers we work with and to
which ministries we will give aid. There are ministers in many,
many governments we work with where whose probity is not sufficiently
strong or of which we are not sufficiently reassured that we are
willing to trust them with UK assistance. In fact, therefore,
it is actually a matter of routine that we work with some ministries
and not others depending upon their political positions and that
is something which we are well accustomed to handling.
Chairman: That is a very helpful and interesting
answer, if I may say so, and it takes up Lord Swinfen's question,
in which case we could perhaps on to Lady Symons.
Q335 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
I found that very helpful, and I believe that is an EU view too
in the way that they deal with it. My Lord Chairman, I found Mr
Quarrey's answer a moment or two ago about the three principles
very helpful, and I absolutely accept the point about the three
principles that the Minister has made. I thought it was an interesting
extension of that in what Mr Quarrey was able to tell us about
the extent of the ceasefire and it does bring us back to the whole
question about engagement versus isolation as a way of being able
to get through any of these sorts of disputes. Minister, you made
a point a moment or two ago about there being three Hamas's now
and one might say that at various stages there were three IRAs
and that by talking to those who were on the direction of travel
that was towards finding a compromise solution, that was a way
through to try to find some of these very difficult solutions
of course. I just wonder whether this whole question of engagement
now cannot be addressed rather more positively. We know the Israelis
are terribly opposed to engagement with the National Unity Government,
that has been very clear and we recognise that difficulty, but
I am just wondering from the point of view of the British Government
whether there is not now more of an opportunity to recognise those
who are amongst the Hamas members of the government and to talk
to them in the way that engagement did start—albeit there
were different problems, different conflicts—with the IRA
and whether that is not something that we can positively now look
forward to.
Dr Howells: It is a very, very good parallel.
There are great differences but there are many similarities. Last
night I was talking to some friends of mine who have been working
in South Armagh who tell me that they still have not cleared up
some of the more lunatic fringes of the Republican Army down there
and who still are completely rejectionist. They reject the Good
Friday agreement, they reject the ceasefire and, really, are held
in this position by a combination of fear of mainstream IRA reprisals
and the British Army and the police. That is after a very, very
long time, that is after 10 years of a ceasefire and I think that
is one thing we should certainly recognise. The second thing—and
the bit I do not understand—is we know that certainly by
the mid-1980s there were signs that the people in Northern Ireland
were just fed up, they were fed up of killing, they were fed up
of terrorism and they wanted a different future. I cannot tell
you whether there is a sense of that in Gaza and the West Bank
because I really do not know and the difference is that some very,
very prominent IRA members made it very clear quite early on that
they did want to talk and there were some pretty extraordinary
things that went on at that time, and I am sure there will be
somebody who will write a book about it, perhaps a former permanent
secretary of the Home Office and we will hear some of these secrets,
I am sure, in the future, about safe houses, secret discussions
taking place and people being brought out of prison to take part
in discussions. The reason I know about this is because we have
been trying to use the expertise of Northern Ireland to look at
trying to get the LTTE and the Sinhalese government in Sri Lanka
to talk to each other to see if we can open up some of those back
avenues and try to get them discussing in a way which they are
not doing at the moment. Whether we could do that in Palestine
I do not know, because what you are asking also begs another question
which is the bit I am most frustrated about really. I know, because
my closest friend in Parliament, Paul Murphy, was the best Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland we ever had, and Paul now chairs
what we call the spooks committee. I have talked to him a great
deal about this and when he went to Sri Lanka he went with a very
experienced Northern Ireland official called Chris McCabe; when
he went there he identified immediately the big problem, which
is that you can try and build a peace process but if the negotiations
only take place once every six months or every year in Geneva
you are not going to get very far, and if we learnt anything from
Northern Ireland it is that you have got to have everybody around
the table, you have got to have all the issues on the table and
you keep at it, you keep at it and keep at it. We are not doing
that in Palestine.
Q336 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
But you have to do the legwork in between, you have to know to
whom you can talk and how you build those relationships which
means that when you do get everybody around the table you move
forward, because nobody ever solved anything through isolation.
In the end we will be talking to Hamas; in the end that is bound
to happen, there will be no peace without that discussion.
Dr Howells: But it has to be a reciprocal process.
At the moment in Sri Lanka we cannot engage in these discussions
because there is not a ceasefire and although there is a kind
of ceasefire in Palestine, we need to see those signs before we
can engage with those people. I am sure that there are members
of Hamas who would very much like to, perhaps not break cover
but would certainly like to say "Look, we know what the political
reality is and we would like to talk." We have some of our
very best diplomats operating in that area and, believe me, if
there are signs that there is, as Jack Straw called it, that shift
in the direction of travel we will be the first to recognise it
and we will take action consequently.
Q337 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
And we will not wait for absolute perfection.
Dr Howells: No, we never have done, we have
never been very good at waiting for absolute perfection.
Mr Quarrey: Could I just add three quick points?
First of all, at the moment almost our entire engagement with
the Palestinian Authority is of course on the Alan Johnston case
so we do not actually have business as usual at the moment. Secondly,
the Palestinian reaction to the Alan Johnston case says something
about the Minister's point a moment ago about attitudes to violence
in Palestinian society and the disgust and anger that people from
their own society have perpetrated this act. That is consistent
with the popular pressure that there was to form a National Unity
Government and for the Palestinians to come together in a way
that allowed the international community to engage, so there are
some possible positive trends there. My third point would just
be that it is very early days with the new National Unity Government
and if we make clear that our position is about engaging with
people whose behaviour, whose words and actions reflect the Quartet
principles, not whether they are a member of Hamas or not, we
just need a little bit of time to see how this government starts,
what its behaviour is and what its actions are.
Q338 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Would you not agree, Minister, that what you have just said demonstrates
one of the great weaknesses of previous attempts to move the Middle
East Peace Process forward, namely that the process is not immune
to acts of violence by people outside the process. Would you accept
the distinction between acts of violence by people within the
process, which is totally unacceptable, and acts of violence by
people outside the process, extremists on either side, whether
it is murdering Prime Minister Rabin or whether it is suicide
bombers from Islamic jihad? Really, if we are to have the MEPP
resuming, you surely have to find some way in which we can get
the Israelis and the Palestinians and the Arabs who support the
Palestinians to accept that this is a continuous process and one
that cannot be interrupted by people whose sole interest is in
fact destroying the process?
Dr Howells: Yes, I absolutely agree with that.
It is easy for me to say it of course, it is far more difficult
to construct that kind of mechanism and that kind of process but
that is what we have got to have, I am convinced of it.
Mr Quarrey: For example, the case with the most
recent suicide bombing in Eilat in Israel; if a Hamas government
spokesman says that is a legitimate act of resistance then it
is unacceptable.
Chairman: Lord Lea, to some extent we
have covered the question you were going to take but would you
like to raise it?
Q339 Lord Lea of Crondall:
I would like to put this question in a particular way because
we are tending to talk a little bit about the MEPP without the
role of the EU being central to it, and our report is about the
role of the EU. I would like to know on some of the things that
have been said are there any differences in this, for example,
between Britain, France, Germany or anybody else. What are the
internal politics of the EU decision-making process? Recently
we saw Condoleezza Rice in Mecca, with both sides, saying that
she would be available to discuss the political horizon; how is
the EU fitting into this? The Quartet seems to work when the Americans
want it to work; when the Americans want to do their own thing
they do their own thing, but I take that we are not doing our
own thing because, obviously, that is not what ostensibly we have
signed up to. The Israelis often say we really want the Americans
to do the politics, we want Europe to give the Palestinians the
money and so on. The Israeli Ambassador to the European Union
actually said that explicitly, that that was the division of labour.
That is not a view of the division of labour shared by the Arab
League, they say we want the EU to play a more prominent political
role. Could you comment on that sort of contradiction?
Dr Howells: If I could preface that for a moment
just by saying that we certainly welcome Prime Minister Olmert
and President Abbas's commitment to Secretary of State Rice. They
meet every two weeks, the last meeting took place last Sunday
on 15 April and Olmert and Abbas have agreed to discuss humanitarian
and security issues as well as looking in particular at what Lord
Hannay referred to, this new cliché of "political
horizon" issues and what the make-up of a future Palestinian
state would look like. The EU, as you imply, My Lord Chairman,
will not directly be involved in this process but the EU can support
it in a number of ways and I will try and run through some of
them. We could certainly support it through consistent political
support for direct talks between the parties and our political
support for whatever progress they are able to achieve. We can
do it through continuing to articulate our own version of a political
horizon, a two state solution with a secure Israel and peace and
security for a viable Palestinian state; we can do it by working
to build the capacity of Palestinian institutions so that, as
Michael described it, the Palestinians can be a credible partner
for peace and we can do it by continuing to maintain pressure
on both parties, including through the Quartet, to implement their
commitments under the Roadmap and other agreements including that
on movement and access, which we have not had a chance to talk
about so far in this session. Encouraging both sides to deliver
on these commitments, I believe, will help to build confidence
and to improve the climate of talks and through an active EU role
in the Quartet these are achievable aims, we can do this. It certainly
does not seem realistic to expect the parties to move immediately
to final status talks, but we judge that it will be helpful for
them to continue and hopefully develop their dialogue about the
political horizon, but this has got to be a judgment for the parties
themselves. My Lord Lea is quite right to say that there are differences
of attitude, within the EU, there is no question about it, and
it would be silly of us to try to disguise that, but I sense that
that candid agenda that I have described there is holding within
Europe; there will be tensions—there will be creative tensions
and less creative tensions—but this gives us a programme
of work and an agenda to stick to, which I think is a perfectly
valid one and is a very useful one.
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