Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
Mr Jim Murphy, Mr Martin Shearman and Mr Alan Parfitt
25 JULY 2007
Chairman: Minister, thank you very much indeed
for coming to meet Sub-Committee C today. We used to see your
predecessor twice a year to discuss the six months work, particularly
in the General Affairs and External Relations Council and matters
of foreign and defence policy which came up at the European Council
meetings, but we also with him, on one occasion at least, saw
him on a specific topic—he came to see us on Kosovo—and
we hope that there are specific things in future we might be able
to talk to you again about that, but at the moment what I would
like to do is to say that we are very pleased that you are here
with Mr Parfitt and Mr Shearman and that we have some questions,
which I think you have got some ideas about. I would like to start
by asking Lord Crickhowell if he would like to start.
Q1Lord Crickhowell: Can we start on the EU-Africa
summit. In what ways will the Joint EU-Africa strategy, which
we expect to be adopted in the summit in December, represent a
step-change in the level of cooperation compared with the current
EU partnership with Africa?
Mr Murphy: My Lord Chairman, thank you for your
warm welcome. I am happy and eager to see just how we can have
a close working relationship on the issues that we discuss today,
or indeed, if your Lordships were so minded, to have specific
hearings or conversations about events on any of the areas I am
responsible for as they unfold. In terms of the specific point
raised by Lord Crickhowell, two of the things which I think it
is important to emphasise are that in terms of the African Union
what it should be about, I think, as it evolves—and I spoke
to the Portuguese Foreign Minister at lunchtime about this—is
a much greater sense of it being a partnership rather than the
EU saying, "Here's what we're doing and Africa, as a continent
or a collection of nations, accepting that in some sort of sense
of gratitude." That would be important. The other thing which
the United Kingdom is very keen to achieve is some specific outcomes,
rather than simply a well-worded document. This partnership should
add some value based on specific outcomes, and for the United
Kingdom that would be issues predominantly about governance, domestic
governance, and rule of law issues, as well as continuing economic
reform where that can be achieved.
Q2 Lord Crickhowell: I want to follow
that up, if I may, with really a question about aid policy. How
far do you think this will lead to the development and the opening
up of trade from African countries to Europe and how far is the
British Government pressing on that point? One of the documents
we have got before us, which I think has been sent to us on the
final communiqué of the troika meeting, says that ministers
reiterated their strong interest in the development dimension
of trade policies and negotiations, the need to support regional
integration processes and the importance of access to the EU markets
for products of export interests to African countries. I think
the last is in fact very important, and of course David Cameron
has been making a speech about it in the last few days. How do
you see this developing and how far are we likely to get on it?
Mr Murphy: Of course, I did not have the opportunity
to hear Mr Cameron's speech. I am sure it was interesting and
with your Lordship's encouragement I will make time to read it.
Q3 Lord Crickhowell: I have only
read a summary of it.
Mr Murphy: I did read some press coverage of
it, but I have not had a chance to read the speech, but I will
make sure that I do. In terms of the specifics—it may be
helpful to your Lordships—there is a whole series of statistics
in terms of the EU's aid effort, the agreement that was reached
under the UK Presidency in 2005 and specific targets, different
levels of financial commitment, of the 15 Member States, and then
the others a smaller level of financial commitment. My understanding
is that on those commitments from 2005 we are on track and I think
the documents will talk about maintaining that trajectory to actually
hit where we are actually aiming to get to. It would be helpful
perhaps to provide those details to the Committee rather than
reciting them, but on the specific point about the interplay between
development investment versus the investment in the politics and
the process that is needed to bring about a more effective trade
policy, the Government's strong view is that these long-term challenges
just will not be resolved exclusively through aid. It is about
moving away from a governance arrangement which on some occasions
seems to have the appearance of charity rather than self-dignity
and the capacity for self-reliance. We all know that was relatively
easily said as an issue of some controversy in UK politics a few
years ago, but now it is largely established also in UK politics
but it is much more difficult to deliver because it is not just
about a bilateral and multilateral trade agreement, it is about
properly functioning markets, the rule of law and the governance,
the rule of law for foreign investors, a transparent regulatory
regime and all those sorts of issues. So it is multi-dimensional,
but we are committee to trying to achieve just that because that
is the long-term solution for the continent of Africa and the
individual states there.
Q4 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Minister,
I wondered whether the Government has any thoughts about how to
improve the so far not very impressive take-up on the African
peer review group mechanism for looking at human rights, where
a number of countries have volunteered to be submitted to this
mechanism but an awful lot have not? It is highly desirable, I
would imagine we would all agree, that more should do. Have we
given any thought as to how we could—I suppose this is a
slightly loaded word—"reward" counties which do
submit themselves to the African review group mechanism, particularly
countries which then implement the recommendations of the review
group mechanism, because rather than talking about punishment
of those who do not, it seems that rewards for those who do is
perhaps the better way to go?
Mr Murphy: I put my pen down deliberately there
because the one word that I had written down was "reward",
so I do not think it was the wrong word. Perhaps we are both wrong
in using that word, but it was certainly the word that I had scribbled
on my notes. In the same way as in central Asia, which we may
have an opportunity to discuss a little later, it is about, where
we can, having tailored approaches to individual nations. Our
aim is, insofar as it is in any way practically possible, to get
as many of these nations closer to international standards and
the rule of law and the things I have already commented upon,
but it is right that where there is specific progress and better
than expected progress, or greater enthusiasm for progress, then
there should be a degree of differentiation in terms of the UK's
engagement and obviously the EU's engagement because I think that
is a way of sending a very clear signal indeed in terms of what
is appropriate in terms of the European Neighbourhood Policy and
it is also appropriate in terms of the African Union.
Q5 Lord Swinfen: Minister, what is
being done to help African nations improve their communications
so that they can make contact with outside markets and their transport
systems so that they can actually get their goods out?
Mr Murphy: In terms of the communications, one
of the things that I am aware of from my previous role in Government
is what more the international community can do working with some
of the very big, for example, IT companies to ensure that what
we now consider to be well-established communications systems—the
internet, email, and everything else, which is the norm now, of
course, in the international markets—is cleared for access
for African business and African civil society and that some African
states have the opportunity of lower cost access to some of that
established technology, which has not been the case -
Q6 Lord Swinfen: They need good telephone
communications, and they do not exist everywhere.
Mr Murphy: That is true. Your Lordship may know
more about some of the specifics than myself, but certainly in
some of the larger cities where they nevertheless do have well-established
telephone systems, things like access broadband, a very large
number are still relying on dial-up internet access rather than
broadband access. Internet connections are often unreliable and
email systems, where they are available, are only available to
an elite and therefore it has not become the dynamic force for
economic liberalisation that it can be in the proper context.
There is an awful lot of that that has gone on, but I am sure
in the case of most of these discussions more can be done. I have
to be frank with my Lord that in terms of transport, I think that
is about some of the investment with the UN programmes. It is
also about—and this connects with the previous question—whether
we can generate enough domestic tax revenue based on even marginally
more dynamic market economies, which can lead to the type of domestic
driven investment which ultimately is the solution. However, there
is a substantial degree of UN commitment and World Bank commitment
to invest in infrastructure, including transport.
Chairman: Thank you very much.
Q7 Lord Lea of Crondall: Our locus
as a committee, Minister, as you will know, is where does the
EU add value? We have discussed everything else, and it is all
very interesting, but we are supposed to be looking at how the
EU is going to add value. We spent the whole of last year, much
of it anyway, preparing a report on the EU in Africa and there
is now a pretty good correspondence between what the EU and the
African Union countries have drawn up for the Lisbon summit and
ticking the boxes that we recommended. I am not saying that has
got any magical connection, but there is no doubt that our report
was very widely received and the Portuguese have done a lot to
pick up elements in it. Our central theme was, in case you thought
we were slow to take the point, that in fact we can draw up as
many checklists as we like but we cannot just transfer ownership
of them. You cannot say a European strategy for Africa which is
suddenly owned by the Africans, and that was a central theme.
However, laborious as it was, there has been a lot of buy-in by
the African countries and I want to come to the question of the
European Union and the African Union per se. There is a lot of
scepticism about it and even today there is only one man and a
dog working on the Darfur dossier, whatever it is! But would you
say that HMG, in the lead up to Lisbon, is thinking that we have
got to still redouble our efforts in building up the capacity
of the AU because on the governance questions, all the questions
you have touched on, the governance questions, complex management
questions, you cannot do this unless there is a credible and well-resourced
and politically respected source of advice from Addis Ababa (if
that is where it is) so that people do take on board governance
and independent auditing and that no corrupt brother-in-law is
running the Statistics Ministry and all the rest of it. So how
does the AU as such fit in and AU/EU relations help to provide
that framework?
Mr Murphy: Three quick points. One I have already
alluded to, which is, as you have rightly yourself mentioned,
it is about a proper partnership where we do not simply, in effect,
as the African Union to simply sign a document that we have decided
on their behalf and expect them to accept it. I suspect that possibly
could be done if we wanted to. It should not be done, but it possibly
could be done, but I do not think that is the route to delivering
any content of the document. So while on occasion the process
of getting genuine multilateral buy-in may on occasion blunt some
of our ambition, it is important, I think, to get a document that
people are determined to deliver. Of course, the European Union
is the biggest contributor, but I think what would be reasonable
for the African Union to expect from us as the biggest contributor
in the context of the EU is predictability of funds. I think that
is one of the criticisms thus far, that it is a relatively ad
hoc funding arrangement. If we ask for them to make a long-term
political and civic society engagement in change, they have got
to be aware that actually three years down the road the money
will still be there, that there is money in place to deliver on
the challenges that we agreed together, particularly if some of
the leaders may be taking a risk in the context of domestic public
opinion or the opinion of the elites round about them, to make
sure that we are there with them and that it is sustained in a
long-term way. In terms of the capacity of the African Union to
deliver, I think the UK Government has got a realistic expectation
both that the African Union can add value in terms of what it
can do, and in the same way that it has got a realistic assessment
of what the EU can do to add value, because ultimately that is
the big question for the EU in all sorts of different areas, how
does the EU's involvement add value in any field? So in terms
of Sudan, Somalia and Burundi, the EU's investment is helping
the African Union to make a real difference, but I am sure it
is always the case that we can and could do more.
Q8 Lord Lea of Crondall: A lot has
been stated about the huge jamboree in Peking last autumn and
everybody went, 50 presidents, and so on. Do you think, now that
the EU's approach with an awful lot of governance and perhaps,
if not military cooperation, looking at the security side, and
so on, and demanding certain things in terms of human rights,
and so on, there is any sense in which you think the Chinese will
have to start to go along with that in terms of their reputation,
or will they just sweep up the resources like an ex-colonial power?
Mr Murphy: This is one of the age-old challenges,
I think, and the UK through the EU insists, entirely properly,
that partnerships must be based on relationships which respect
and organisations which respect the rule of law, civic norms and
international standards. While some are entirely appropriately
and rightly doing that, but others, perhaps the Chinese, may exploit
the map of opportunity and international relationships with a
different approach. It is something we are conscious of, but it
is our view that the way to actually deliver this kind of long-term
change is not by the second approach. It does not deliver. A long-term
relationship will be based on large parts of the two continents
having a relationship based on a democracy, based on a mature
relationship rather than a kind of opportunistic relationship.
I think that is the way we see it.
Q9 Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed. Perhaps I could just refer, while we are dealing with
Africa and our own report, to something which we did not say we
were going to ask you but which Lord Grenfell wrote to you about
and you replied, and that is of course the appointment of the
European Union's special representative in Addis Ababa. As you
know, we recommended this post should be double-hatted and we
obviously have a considerable interest in this post in view of
the fact that one of our colleagues may well be appointed to the
post. We would obviously be very glad if you can keep us fully
informed, as we shall wish to congratulate the noble Lady at the
time of her appointment.
Mr Murphy: I was remiss, of course, in not mentioning
that.
Q10 Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed. I wonder whether I could go on to the Presidency report
on the ESDP, which was considered at the European Council at the
end of June. Among the discussions, rather interestingly, in that
report there is reference to a European Union civil capabilities
improvement conference, which will take place in November this
year to discuss the improvement of the European Union's civilian
capabilities for crisis management. I wonder whether you could
tell us how the discussions on that are going, including whether
there are going to be some new civilian headline goals for 2012
and what sort of obligations that might imply for the UK?
Mr Murphy: Just to update my noble Lords, work
on the headline goals and negotiations have not actually commenced
yet, primarily because of operational reasons and other commitments
which exist. In terms of the conference and the updating process,
one of the things we need to do is to learn from the increased
experience which we now have in terms of missions. At the time
of the agreement of the previous goals, I think we had only embarked
upon three civilian missions. There have been many more than that
now, and there has been a difference in terms of scenario planning
and what actually then happened. The scenario planning had an
expectation of commitment of personnel between 600 and 14,000,
and that has been nothing like the case at all. The total commitment
across the nine missions is 650 at the moment, so that has been
a learning experience in terms of the scale. At an earlier point
we overestimated the scale of the necessary commitment. There
are wider lessons which have to be learnt, and in scenarios we
tested a variety of these. The lessons we have learned, which
should find their way into the new headline goals, are that there
needs to be greater support from the Secretariat of procurement,
greater central support and also better support of civilian support
teams and better management and coordination of civilian support
teams. There is also a medium-term issue of the coordination of
civilian and military work based on this new set of headline goals,
which would be possibly three years in duration, which would take
us to 2010, the military headline goals up to 2010. There will
be an opportunity at 2010 to better coordinate civilian and military
work. I hope, my Lord Chairman, you find that helpful.
Chairman: You have written to Lord Grenfell,
and therefore to us, also telling us about the way in which the
guidelines for the command and the control structure of the EU
civilian operations are going to develop and that you are going
to send us the precise amendment of the joint actions when they
are agreed. Those sorts of advance notices are extremely helpful
and I would just like to say thank you very much for giving us
that sort of advance warning, particularly when there is a recess
coming up.
Q11 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The
ESDP report called on the Portuguese presidency to take forward
work on closer dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its
partners in the field of crisis management, and it referred to
the UN, the African Union and the OSCE. This brings us on to an
area where the buzz word, I suppose, is hybrid operations because
there is a lot of talk about that in the context of Darfur and
there is clearly a similar situation (though in many ways different
actors) evolving in Kosovo. Could you say, Minister, whether you
think, apart from talking about hybrid operations, we are actually
well-equipped in the EU to participate in them and to really work
together with international organisations? As I am sure you are
aware, the belief that international organisations actually cooperate
well together does not survive five minutes in the field. They
actually tend to cooperate very badly together unless there are
structures and a very strong political hand behind them saying,
"No turf fighting, please. Get on and actually work out solutions."
Are you confident that the EU is well-equipped to regulate the
kind of interface that there will be in Darfur, where it is likely
to be a triple hybrid with an EU involvement, an AU involvement
and a UN involvement, and equally complex arrangements in Kosovo?
Mr Murphy: First of all, on your own point,
my Lord Chairman, about reports, I am glad that you feel we keep
you well-informed, but if at any point you feel that is not the
case it would be very helpful if you would let me know personally.
On this issue of hybridity or the effect of multilateralism and
whether we are good enough at it, my senses say no. Are we getting
better at it? My senses say yes, and Lord Hannay will know from
his own experience just in a practical sense the weaknesses and
the feelings of previous hybrid operations. I do not think it
is something that is in our paperwork today, but there is also
the issue, of course, of NATO and the EU and NATO, the UN, EU
and NATO, the OSCE and the AU, and everyone else. I am trying
to think my way through. Conceivably the EU, NATO, the UN and
there is also the African Union, but certainly the OSCE involvement,
or a combination of some of those organisations and bodies. In
terms of NATO there is the continuing difficulty about Turkey
in terms of the sharing of information, the relationship in terms
of NATO and the EU. In terms of the UN and the EU, the margins
of the most recent G8, the UN and the EU signed a Memorandum of
Understanding, and my noble Lord is aware of that. The expectation—and
I put it in that sense—is that that would significantly
improve the situation on the ground. In terms of Kosovo, as we
move towards a diplomatic outcome—and we can talk later,
perhaps, about what shape that diplomatic outcome will be arrived
at—it is clear that the EU will have a really significant
part to play, but also the OSCE in Kosovo, so that is a challenge,
and the relationship depending on the exact mandate in Kosovo
and the nature by which Kosovo derives its independence, of course,
will determine which bodies on the ground are left with the responsibility
on that crucial coordination in quite a tight timescale. So the
short answer to your specific question, am I confident, is that
I am confident we are getting better but I think we continue to
learn, as the noble Lord is aware.
Q12 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: On the
EU/NATO issue, do you not perhaps think, with the outcome of the
Turkish election, the re-election of the AK Party Government with
an overall majority and the commitment by Prime Minister Erdogan
to resume the reforms and to press ahead with their application
for the European Union, that this might be the moment at which
we could revisit this really rather tiresome EU/NATO problem over
the exchange of information which has come up because of the Cyprus/Turkey
problem, and so on—not immediately, necessarily, but we
really should not just simply sit back and take it as a given,
because it is a real pain, frankly, and it seems to cause a great
deal of irritation to all the players in Brussels?
Mr Murphy: My noble Lord is right, it is a pain
and it hinders what should be a common sense approach to strategic
cooperation. I think the Turkish elections do provide us with
an opportunity, but obviously my understanding is that of course
there are elections due in Cyprus within months, and I think once
both elections have been successfully negotiated then that might
provide the opportunity. But in the very short-term, I do not
think there is cause for unconditional optimism, but post-Cypriot
elections perhaps there may be.
Q13 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Minister,
when in Bosnia the European Union took over from NATO the great
advantage was that the European Union could deploy the multiplicity
of tools in the toolbox ranging from both the military and the
civilian. This is true, also, for example, in disaster relief
operations where military helicopters will probably be needed
to assist, and so on. Is it somewhat artificial to have a conference
solely on the civilian capabilities when as important is the interface
which the ESDP can provide between the military and the civilians?
Mr Murphy: As I said a little earlier, in the
medium term this distinction which has built up over time, for
whatever reason, is an opportunity in terms of a convergence of
work plans on both to have common civilian and military headline
agreements. Until then, I think we are working within the plan
that we have inherited in terms of—I would not describe
them as silos as such, but there is that need for the cooperation
you are alluding to. In terms of the civilian work, it is about
how we get there. The structure we have at the moment perhaps
makes it a little more difficult, but it is how we properly coordinate
the military support, support for police reform, support for judicial
reform, support for the reform of civil protections, and everything
else. Martin may wish to say a word or two about it, but by 2010
there is the opportunity for breaking down those barriers, but
in the short term I am not exactly certain as to how that would
work.
Mr Shearman: Yes, I think you are quite right,
Lord Anderson. This goes back, of course, to when ESDP was devised,
which was originally seen primarily as a military tool. Of course,
since it was devised it has very much proven its worth as a civilian
crisis management tool. I think 11 of the 13 missions have been
civilian and the UK is a very strong believer in the need to try
and bring these two tools together, and of course all the other
tools which the EU has at its disposal. So I think a great integration
of civilian and military approaches is something we will be aiming
for. The recent developments in the civilian command structures
in the secretariat in Brussels, which the Minister has written
about, make some advance on that in that they bring more military
planning discipline and more military planning advice into the
process of civilian planning permissions, which I think is not
a sufficient advance but is a small advance.
Q14 Lord Lea of Crondall: My Lord
Chairman has referred to civilian and military, but I guess that
everybody is trying to figure out the impact of moving from a
position where you have got an EU High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for External
Relations. It has not been agreed—it has got to be ratified—that
there will be one new High Representative. This could have quite
far-reaching consequences in how the Commission and the Council
of Ministers actually work together in this sort of way. Would
you like to speculate about that?
Mr Murphy: I certainly would not invite Martin
to speculate on that. I will not take my noble Lord up on his
kind invitation to speculate publicly, but the fact is that this
is not a change in the relationship on neither foreign nor defence
policy in terms of the responsibility of Member States, despite
what we may read in excellent national newspapers! The fact is
that most people who have looked at this in any great detail assess
it to be an intelligent way to have a more coherent single voice
on these important issues in a way which does not jeopardise sovereignty,
Member States' responsibility, unilateral responsibility or opportunity
within multilateral organisations. I think it is a common, reasonable
reform which should lead to great effectiveness.
Q15 Chairman: But it is the same
person doing two jobs, rather than combining two jobs, and I think
that distinction is rather an important one.
Mr Murphy: Yes.
Q16 Lord Swinfen: I want to move
now to Central Asia. Does the Government consider that the EU's
strategy on Central Asia is providing a good basis for meeting
the goals of the EU's external energy policy?
Mr Murphy: I think it can do, but the energy
markets and the interplay between energy markets, energy supply,
public diplomacy and international relationships is of course
always a complex one and our approach, as the UK and the EU, has
to continue to reflect that. So the short answer is, yes, but
we have to continue to remain relatively nimble, particularly
in Central Asia. There are some specific challenges we still have
to address. One of the big challenges is about the diversity of
routes to market, for example. Your Lordships will be aware of
the continuing issue of the perception—and the reality actually—of
the EU's over-reliance perhaps on imported Russian gas. My understanding
is that, for example on energy policy, specifically the UK on
that matter is a 12% net importer of gas supply with very little
from Russia, whereas the European Union imports about 50% of its
gas, with 50% of the imports being from Russia. So the issue in
respect of Central Asia is also about ensuring those issues of
diversity of supply, and transparency of the market is important
as well.
Q17 Lord Swinfen: If it was secure
the political reasons would not just have the tap turned off?
Mr Murphy: I think it depends whose hand is
on the tap and where these pipelines run through, and those are
matters which the UK Government through the European Union—and
incidentally the G8, because my recollection of the G8 process
at St Petersburg was that all of those nations signed up to the
St Petersburg declaration, which committed those states to an
energy policy which had as its basis stability, transparency and
predictability. The important thing there for the UK Government,
and I suspect also for the EU, is that that has been signed up
to by all of those nations, including Russia. The energy policy
and the dynamics of the energy policy have to be publicly delivered
within that St Petersburg agreement. So what we now have to do,
to my mind, is to make the St Petersburg agreement influence these
individual tactical decisions and deals which are arrived at over
the next few years. So I think the St Petersburg declaration is
pretty crucial in that sense.
Q18 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Meanwhile,
is not the practice of the Russian Government not entirely consistent
with the St Petersburg conclusions, because if one has understood
it rightly the Russian Government's objective seems to be to ensure
that Central Asian oil and gas, as far as possible, transits through
Russia, i.e. it gives them a measure of control and to the degree
possible, too, is under the control of Gazprom? That may not be
in any legal sense against what was agreed at St Petersburg, but
it is hardly within the spirit of it, and it is certainly not
within the objective which the EU is pursuing of diversifying
its supply, because basically it is concentrating more and more
of the supply, including of Central Asian gas, funnelling through
one very large country which lies in the particular part of the
world that it does. Is there any way in which you think we can
develop our Central Asian strategy to make it rather less likely
that the Russians can pursue this policy even further?
Mr Murphy: Mr Parfitt may wish to comment a
little on it, but one of the important things I think we can,
and are, doing is pursuing an EU bilateral relationship with Turkmenistan,
for example, as my noble Lord will be aware. From recollection,
Turkmenistan is, I think, the third largest non-OPEC producer.
Q19 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Yes,
after Qatar and Iran, I think.
Mr Murphy: That is really very important in
this context, but my noble Lord is right, there is a strategic
decision taken by Russia of the importance of domestic supply
and the routing of strategic pipelines. On the basis of the spirit
of St Petersburg and in the context of a properly effective energy
market, that may not cause many people to have a concern, it is
a proper, transparent, effective free market in energy policy,
but on the basis of some of the other dynamics within the energy
market it does lead us in a determined effort to have a diversity
of routes to the market, and that is really an important part
of the EU plan in terms of energy. I do not know if Mr Parfitt
wishes to add anything to that.
Mr Parfitt: I would only perhaps underline that,
as the Minister has already rightly observed, much of this nexus
of issues, it seems to me, boils down to the investment climate
which exists in the Central Asian region for the diversification
which we and our Central Asian partners commonly seek to become
a reality, and it is perhaps the absence of a sufficiently robust
investment climate to date which has allowed Gazprom and the Russian
Federation to have the monopoly which it continues to enjoy. Therefore,
I think the Central Asian strategy is very much predicated on
sending the message to our Central Asian partners that the EU
is interested in seeing the correct investment climate being put
in place in order to make this diversification a reality, but
that certain of the Central Asian states need to take some concrete
steps themselves in order to give market players the confidence
to invest in very large infrastructure projects for that to happen.
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