13th REPORT: PREVENTING PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE EU CONTRIBUTION
Government Response
The Government welcomes the Committee's 13th
report of session 2004-05 into the European Union's contribution
to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
published on 5 April 2005 (HL Paper 96).
76. The Union has a sound general strategy
for contributing to global effort against WMD proliferation. Over
the past decade and more it has taken valuable practical steps
which deserve to be more widely recognised. There is however much
more still to be done; and we are not confident that the Union
has yet organised and resourced itself as well as it needs to
for the full and coherent implementation of the Strategy.
The Government agrees that the EU has adopted
a sound Strategy against the proliferation of WMD and that it
has achieved much without full recognition. The UK has worked
for many years to ensure that the EU contributes to the global
fight against this global threat. But the Government also agrees
that more can be done. The Government is co-sponsoring a Pilot
Project, run by UNIDIR and SIPRI, which will identify priorities
for Community funding of counter-proliferation projects in the
future.
More resources are also required. The Government
welcomes the fact that the amount spent on non-proliferation projects
from the CFSP budget increased by 50 per cent in 2004 (€9.331
million in 2003, €15.526 million in 2004). This is in addition
to around €35 million spent by the Commission each year.
The UK is currently working with partners on plans for the EU's
next Financial Perspective (2007-13). The Government will be arguing
for more resources for the global security agenda, within the
constraints of an overall EU budget of no more than 1 per cent
of EU GNI. In addition, the Government strongly supports increasing
the funding available under the CFSP budget. This will allow Member
States to give effect to their CFSP priorities including counter-proliferation
and small arms and light weapons projects in third countries.
77. We agree with the high priority
given to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
by the EU Strategy. (para 13)
The Government agrees that the EU WMD Strategy
correctly assigns a high priority to this global threat. Countering
the proliferation of WMD remains one of the Government's highest
foreign policy priorities. Work through the EU and in conjunction
with Member States in other fora is an essential part of meeting
this important objective.
78. The technique of "peer review"
should be exploited more widely in relation to other non-proliferation
measures. In several such fields it would be essential to co-ordinate
WMD-related work with that done by the European Union in counter-terrorism.
(para 22)
The Government agrees that the Peer Review to
promote best practice in the implementation of the EU "Dual-Use
Regulation" (Council Regulation 1334/2000, as amended) was
a valuable exercise. The Review's recommendations, agreed last
December, are aimed at strengthening the efficiency of the EU
system for controlling exports of dual-use items and will continue
to be taken forward during our forthcoming EU Presidency. We agree
that this approach is potentially useful in other areas of the
Strategy, although we consider that a peer review is likely to
be more effective where there are at least informal common EU
standards. We will consider the appropriateness of this approach
for such areas, taking into account the need for complementarity
with EU counter-terrorism and other work.
79. In the medium to long term the value
of the non-proliferation clauses will depend on the rigour with
which the European Union applies them. The Union will need to
establish arrangements for systematic monitoring of the observance
of the clauses. There must be a willingness to suspend agreement
if major transgressions occur. (para 24)
The Government agrees with the Committee that
the "non-proliferation clauses" in mixed third country
agreements will only be valuable if the EU lives up to its commitment,
as stated in the November 2003 decision, to act where the "essential
element" part of the agreement has been breached. Such action
will not always be involving suspension of the agreement but could
lead to this if other remedial action, such as intensified dialogue
and technical assistance if appropriate, does not deliver results.
As the essential parts of the clause involve
meeting existing international commitments, the Government considers
that the specific non-proliferation bodies—such as the IAEA—are
best placed to monitor whether a third country is living up to
its agreed commitments. In the Government's view, the non-proliferation
working group (CONOP) should maintain oversight of the performance
of countries to ensure that the Council can take a fully informed
decision to act should it be necessary. To that end, the Government
welcomes the increased assessments from the EU's situation centre
in the field of non-proliferation. Agreement to act in response
to a breach of the clause will need agreement by all Member States
and so will require the political will to take tough decisions.
80. Any priorities for the Strategy
recommended by the European Union should be analysed by the Government
and deposited for scrutiny by Parliament as soon as is practicable.
(para 29)
The Government was fully involved in the development
of priorities for implementation of the WMD Strategy, working
with the Council Secretariat, Commission and other Member States
to ensure that these priorities were indeed the most urgent and
important. During the UK Presidency, the Government will lead
a review of both the WMD Strategy and the priorities for its implementation,
and will deposit any revised documents for scrutiny by Parliament
as soon as is practicable.
81. We welcome the intention of the
Government to seek during its forthcoming Presidency to focus
the implementation of the Strategy on priority issues. The Government
should specify what particular programmes it believes the European
Union can and should carry out. (para 30)
In line with our over-arching Presidency objectives,
our focus will be on running an efficient Presidency and increasing
the effectiveness of EU efforts to counter WMD proliferation.
We will lead a review of the Strategy to examine progress over
the two years since its adoption. We will continue to promote
universal adherence to the major non-proliferation Treaties and
implementation of UNSCR 1540 by all states. We will provide further
financial support to strengthen the IAEA and the OPCW. We will
initiate an internal debate to prepare for the Review Conference
of the BTWC in 2006.
82. The European Union should seize
every opportunity to strengthen the global counter-proliferation
regimes and instruments. (para 33)
The Government agrees that every opportunity
to strengthen the global counter-proliferation regimes and instruments
should be seized. Whilst the EU is not a formal member of the
treaties and regimes, the EU encourages full compliance and universalisation
with them in its contacts with third countries. Furthermore, Member
States co-ordinate their activities within the regimes. This process
takes place between the experts who meet regularly in Brussels
for the two working groups concerned with WMD, as well as through
regular contact over the COREU network. The Government has supported
the conclusion of more formal Common Positions ahead of major
reviews of the treaties, such as the recent NPT Review Conference.
We will work for a Common Position for the Biological and Toxins
Weapons Convention Review Conference in 2006.
83. The European Union should make special
efforts to coordinate the most coherent and constructive approach
possible, both among Member States and with the United States,
before and during the forthcoming NPT review conference. (para
39)
The European Union co-ordinated effectively
before the NPT Review Conference, producing a good Common Position
and Statements which were positively received by States Parties.
The EU worked constructively with all Member States throughout
the Review Conference to help achieve a consensus outcome and
strengthen the Treaty.
84. Negotiations to remove concerns
about possible Iranian moves towards nuclear-weapon capability
should be seen to have the continuing full attention and understanding—and
the political and economic weight—of the whole Union. The
European Union should continue to emphasise, in all its dealings
with other countries, including Russia, its full support for the
work of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. (para 45)
The Government agrees that it is essential to
maintain a firm international position if Iran is to be persuaded
to allay international concerns over its nuclear programme by
providing acceptable objective guarantees that its programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes. To that end, we ensure that
key partners, including particularly EU partners, are kept informed
of the progress of our discussions with Iran. EU institutions
are actively involved in the working groups established under
the 15 November Paris Agreement. Through these mechanisms we have
secured continuing EU support. In the context of the Paris Agreement,
the EU decided to hold further negotiations on a draft EU/Iran
Trade & Co-operation Agreement and a parallel Political Dialogue
Agreement.
85. The European Union should continue
its indirect involvement in the North Korean problem through support
for the six nation process. (para 47)
The Government agrees that it is essential to
maintain a firm international position on the North Korean problem;
we also agree that the European Union should continue its indirect
involvement. However, it is entirely appropriate that discussions
should be led by the US and DPRK's neighbours, the countries with
the biggest stake in regional security. The Government continues
actively to encourage North Korea to remain engaged in the process,
and we keep in close contact with all parties. We have publicly
highlighted our concerns about the DPRK's decision in February
2005 to suspend its participation in the 6 Party Talks, and in
response to recent statements and unconfirmed reports about the
DPRK's nuclear weapons programmes.
86. The European Union should vigorously
study and support ways of strengthening the BTWC, whether by verification
arrangements, security assurances, improved standards of material
safeguarding, or otherwise. (para 51)
The EU is fully supportive of the BTWC and efforts
to strengthen the Convention. The EU has already begun at working
level to discuss its approach to the 2006 Review Conference at
which we would expect these issues to be addressed. This work
will intensify as the Conference approaches, and the UK will play
a leading and active role, including during our Presidency.
87. Special efforts should be made to
ensure that EU financial pledges, especially those made at the
G8 Kananaskis summit in 2002, are reflected more speedily in practical
application. (para 57)
The Government agrees that more resources should
be made available to ensure that the EU meets the commitment it
made at the G8 Kananaskis summit. We have been an active supporter
in the EU of the increase in funding (by 50 per cent between 2003
and 2004) from the CFSP budget on non-proliferation projects.
We are working with the Commission, European Parliament and partners
on the Financial Perspective to ensure that there are sufficient
funds for the global security agenda, within the constraints of
an overall EU budget of no more than 1 per cent of EU GNI. This
includes an increase in the CFSP budget as well as creating a
Stability Instrument that can fund activities such as response
to crisis and global and trans-regional security issues, within
Community competence.
88. If the EU could accept the High
Level Panel recommendations in advance of the NPT Review Conference,
this would be a valuable indicator of the readiness of the Nuclear
Weapon States to take seriously their obligations under the Treaty;
(para 61) and
89. Urgent attention should be given
by the European Union, if necessary in advance of consideration
of other sections, to a study of the WMD-relevant section of the
report of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel. The Government
should deposit for scrutiny by Parliament its detailed reaction
to each recommendation and the actions which it is planning to
take. (para 62)
The EU has welcomed the report of the UN Secretary-General's
High-Level Panel. The UN Secretary-General has subsequently published
his own report, In Larger Freedom. The EU referred to the WMD
recommendations of both reports in the EU Statement to NPT Review
Conference in New York on 2 May, saying that they were useful
and merited close study. The Government's detailed reaction to
the HLP Report WMD recommendations is attached.
90. In all the matters reviewed above
it is essential, as the Strategy recognises, that close contact
and co-operation be maintained with the United States, which is
a critically important actor in the campaign against WMD proliferation.
This interface needs continuous attention to improve understanding,
avoid duplication or incompatibility, and reinforce synergy. (para
63)
As it set out in its response to this Committee's
Report on the European Security Strategy, the Government agrees
that a successful transatlantic relationship is key to an effective
EU response to all global security threats identified in the European
Security Strategy. The Government therefore welcomed the visit
of President Bush to Europe so early in his second term. The visit
reinforced the strong desire of both sides to work in partnership
on all the key global issues. The Government believes that close
contact and co-operation in responses to the threat of proliferation
is particularly important, as the Committee suggests. The last
EU-US Summit, held in Ireland in June 2004, agreed seven joint
statements, one of which concentrated on non-proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
91. The European Union should publicise
more vigorously the substantial contribution it already makes
in the campaign against WMD proliferation. (para 64)
The Government agrees that the EU could and
should promote its achievements in counter-proliferation. However,
the Government recognises the difficulty in securing the attention
of the media for successful counter-proliferation programmes,
which are often technical in nature.
92. Action should be taken forthwith
to implement the 2003 decision of the Council for setting up a
WMD centre to oversee and report on relevant work under both the
Council and the Commission. It must be properly equipped and empowered
to act. We do not believe that the role can be adequately filled
by present arrangements such as working groups of officials not
resident in Brussels. (para 6)
The Government agrees that a WMD Centre could
be a valuable addition to EU counter-proliferation work. However,
the Centre should complement the existing arrangements, which
the Government believes are effective. It is also important to
ensure that an EU WMD Centre does not duplicate work that is better
handled elsewhere. It would need to co-ordinate closely with the
NATO WMD Centre.
The Government does not agree that the present
arrangements are insufficient for the EU to contribute to the
global effort of against WMD proliferation. The successes of the
EU over the past decade, as recognised by the Committee, have
resulted from these arrangements. An EU WMD Centre, properly designed
and tasked, would not replace these, but complement them.
93. The authorities of the European
Union should not permit administrative divisions to obstruct the
flow of WMD-relevant information, or the pursuit of action, either
between the Council Secretariat and the Commission or within the
Commission. (para 69)
The Government agrees. The EU's central institutions
each have much to offer the CP effort. Combining their expertise
with that of Member States maximises the EU's contribution to
meeting this global threat. We recognise that this approach demands
new working methods, but believe that it results in a more effective
overall output. Counter-proliferation is a comparatively new sphere
for the EU. It takes time for roles to be established. Where a
subject crosses several pillars, there are often tensions at the
borders between respective competences. We believe a good working
relationship now exists.
But there remains room for improvement in the
organisational coherence of the Union in tackling security issues
across the board. Developing more coherent, cross-pillar policies
requires a fresh approach and a new way of working, both for member
states and for EU institutions. This requires much more transparency
and willingness to co-ordinate. The Constitutional Treaty would
bring much greater coherence to the Union's external policies—including
tackling WMD—through the post of the EU Foreign Minister
and the supporting European External Action Service.
94. The authorities of the European
Union should take early action to strengthen staffing and financial
support for those within the Council Secretariat and the Commission
working primarily on WMD issues. (para 72)
The appointment by the High Representative of
a Personal Representative for WMD, Annalisa Giannella, is to be
warmly welcomed—her role has helped maintain momentum in
implementing the Strategy so far. The Government agrees that both
Dr Giannella's office, and the WMD Unit in the Commission, should
be considered as a high priority when the authorities of the EU
consider the deployment of new human and financial resources,
or the redeployment of existing ones.
95. Open and ready dialogue at all levels
between EU organs and staffs and their NATO counterparts with
a shared interest in reducing WMD risks should be strongly encouraged.
(para 74)
The Committee rightly points to the importance
of a strong EU-NATO relationship. The Government agrees and welcomes
the broadening of the EU/NATO strategic relationship in 2004,
to cover exploring opportunities for joint responses to the threat
of terrorism and counter-proliferation in addition to the crisis
management agenda. The Government believes that both NATO and
the EU can contribute towards the shared objective of countering
the proliferation of WMD.
As a military body, NATO has developed unique
expertise in the area of countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear attacks, including through its own WMD centre and
through NATO Civil Emergency Planning. NATO can also, through
contacts between militaries, promote the objective of non-proliferation
outside the Alliance.
But the EU is better placed for more general
diplomatic work, and has the capacity to undertake non-proliferation
projects in third countries, often in conjunction with the IAEA
and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
The Government believes it is important that
EU and NATO resources are used to enhance and complement each
other, rather than to duplicate. We work to ensure this effective
co-ordination between the two bodies, and welcome the existing
co-operation NATO has in place with the EU.
96. Action on the recommendations stated
in this Chapter above should not wait upon any particular Presidency.
If shortcomings remain unaddressed, however, remedying them should
be made an important objective during the United Kingdom Presidency
in the second half of 2005. (para 75)
The Government is committed to using the UK
Presidency to build upon the significant achievements of the EU
in counter-proliferation. In addition to promoting new projects
as set out above, the UK will lead a review of the WMD Strategy,
and work to ensure that any shortcomings identified are addressed.
The UK will also seek to secure additional funds for counter-proliferation
work in the next Financial Perspective, in order that the EU might
contribute further in this vital area.
| Recommendation |
UK response |
| WMD proliferation |
|
| 21. Nuclear weapons states should: |
|
| (a) Honour commitments under Article VI of the NPT to move towards disarmament and and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilmet of these commitments.
| (a) The UK is committed to working toward the goal of global nuclear disarmament through the agreed NPT review process, including the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences
|
| (b) Reaffirm previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
| (b) We confirm that our Negative Security Assurance (NSA) given in 1995 and codified in UNSCR 984 still stands, as well as the NSAs we have given through Protocols we have ratified to the NWFZ treaties which are in force. We do not believe that anything further is required.
|
| 22. Commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including where appropriate a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons.
| Following the 1998 Strategic Defence Review the UK reduced the readiness of its nuclear forces. Only one submarine is on patrol at any one time and it is normally on several days' notice to fire with its missiles de-targeted. We therefore believe that the risk of accident war deriving from UK first use is negligible.
|
| 23. The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapons state.
| The UNSC mandate already allows for such action on a case-by-case basis. We do not believe that any further declaration on the part of the UNSC is necessary, particularly if it appeared to give a blanket commitment that undermined the ability of the UNSC to consider appropriate action case by case. In 1995 the UK and other NWS (Nuclear Weapon States) offered Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) to the NPT Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). These assurances, which were codified in UNSCR 984, stated that in the event of a NNWS suffering an attack with nuclear weapons, the NWS would raise the matter in the Security Council and seek Council action "in accordance with the Charter".
|
| 24. Negotiations to resolve regional conflict should include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament.
| We fully agree. Disarmament measures need to come in the context of tackling underlying security concerns.
|
| 25. All de facto nuclear states should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmamemnt, demonstrating this by ratifying the CTBT and supporting negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
| We call on all States to ratify the CTBT and to support an early start to negotiations on an FMCT. Action should be to continue ongoing efforts—for FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament and for CTBT at the CTBT Entry into force Conference in September.
|
| 26. Peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia should launch nuclear weapons disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones in these regions.
| The UK has consistently called for establishment of NWFZs and a WMD-Free Zone in the case of the Middle East. We support the EU's plans to organise a discussion on WMD as part of the Barcelona Process.
|
| 27. All chemical weapons states should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existings chemical weapons stockpiles by their agreed trarget date of 2012.
| Action already underway in the OPCW. The UK regularly urges possessor states to meet their CWC commitments. We are taking a leading role in supporting Russia's destruction programme—two projects worth £9 million of which the UK has funded £7 million.
We also support the Panel's suggestion that attention be given to strengthening verification under the CWC.
|
| 28. BWC states parties should without delay return to negotiations of a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry.
| Action is through the BTWC process. The UK supports verification and would support resumed return to negotiations on a protocol if the HLP support made it more feasible. But this appears unlikely at present. The UK will continue to strengthen BTWC by other means, eg, supporting the new inter-sessional process. The UK is chairing the BTWC's meetings on codes of conduct for scientists in 2005; we will start preparations of an EU position for the 2006 Review Conference.
|
| 29. The IAEA Board of Governors should recognise the Additional Protocol as today's standard for Agency safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguard standards.
| The UK supports. We will need to continue further work on what we mean by "act" in this recommendation—but it will vary case by case.
|
| 30. Negotiation of a scheme, based on Articles III and IX of the IAEA Statute, which would enable the Agency to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civil nuclear users.
| The UK is in favour. We await further discussion of the IAEA DG's group report.
|
| 31. States should, without surrendering the right under the NPT to construct such facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further enrichment or reprocessing facilities, with commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of such services by the present suppliers at market rates.
| This is an important proposal which merits careful consideration. We do not underestimate the difficulties in such a scheme but think we should consider it.
|
| 32. All states should be encouraged to join the Proliferation Security Initiative, on a voluntary basis.
| The UK is a founder participant and already engaged in world-wide lobbying in support of PSI. We hope that all states which share the objectives of PSI and have something to offer will take part. Political support may be more useful than participation for some states.
|
| 33. Notice of withdrawal from the NPT should prompt immediate verification of the state in question's compliance with it, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all IAEA provided assistance should be withdrawn.
| Any such notice would obviously be a cause of concern for the international community. We would expect the UNSC to consider such cases as a matter of course, as well as the IAEA Board of Governors.
|
| 34. The proposed timeline for implementing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should be halved from one decade to five years.
| The UK supports GTRI initiative and would like to see it completed promptly and effectively. Action rests with the US and Russia.
|
| 35. States parties to the BWC should also negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for export of such agents.
| We are ready to consider this idea positively although we would need to consider how it fits with Australia Group export controls. There is a good case for widening this recommendation to include not just export, but also national security standards for internal transfers and access to/work on such agents, as provided for in our own ATCSA. This would be fully consistent with the BTWC work in 2003, which sought to improve biosecurity and biosafety at national level. It would be relevant for dealing with both proliferation and terrorism. But the BTWC might not be the best forum for action.
|
| 36. The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends production of HEU for non-weapons as well as weapons purposes.
| The UK has consistently called for the start at the CD of negotiations without preconditions on an FMCT that would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. We support verification in principle but believe that an early FMCT without verification would be better than no FMCT at all.
|
| 37. IAEA and OPCW Directors General should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the NPT and CWC.
| We would support a deeper relationship between the UNSC and the OPCW/IAEA. It is important for Directors General to keep the UNSC informed of developments within the remit of their organisations.
|
| 38. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.
| This could be an interesting idea, provided we take account of known sensitivities. The 2004 Meeting of States Party to the BTWC agreed to: support the existing networks of relevant international organisations for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases and act to strengthen the WHO, FAO and OIE programmes, within their mandates, for the continued development and strengthening of, and research into, rapid, effective and reliable activities for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases, including in cases of emergencies of international concern.
The UK has also suggested that the mechanism under which the UNSG can be asked to investigate suspicious outbreaks be reviewed and updated.
|
Letter from the Chairman to Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Foreign
Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Thank you for your response to our Report: "Preventing
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The EU Contribution"
(HL, European Union Committee 13th Report of Session 2004-05)
dated 3 June which was considered by Sub-Committee C at its meeting
on 16 June.
We are pressing for an early debate on the response in the
House in order that Members may share with the Government their
views on this important topic. In addition, we would like to ask
for further information on a number of points made in the response.
You note (paras 82 and 86 of the response) that the Government
is working for a Common Position for the Biological and Toxins
Weapons Convention Review Conference in 2006 and that discussions
at working group level have already begun. We look forward to
scrutinising the Common Position and ask that you keep us updated
on the progress of these discussions.
You note (para 92 of the response) that a WMD Centre would
be a valuable addition to EU counter-proliferation work. However,
we remain uncertain from your response whether you will be pressing
for the establishment of the Centre. What is the current position?
Has any firm decision been made to establish the Centre and, if
so, when is it due to become operational?
You argue (para 76 of the response) that more resources should
be made available, within the constraints of an overall EU budget
of no more than 1 per cent of EU GNI. The Sub-Committee has previously
considered the general issue of the budget (letter from the Minister
for Europe, dated 14 March, on the Future Financial Perspectives
2007-13) and does not wish to pursue it further here. We would,
however, ask to be kept informed of amounts spent on non-proliferation
projects and, in particular, be notified of any significant increases
or reductions in the overall amounts allocated each year to non-proliferation
work.
Other areas of concern or disagreement with the response
will be raised during the debate on the Report.
20 June 2005
| 
