Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 160-170)

DR WILLIAM BISHOP

6 DECEMBER 2006

  Q160  Lord Clinton-Davis: Thinking back, it might have been taken at a point by the Commission.

  Dr Bishop: Yes.

  Q161  Lord Clinton-Davis: So formerly the Commissioners would have approved or rejected the idea, but essentially it is done by the civil servants.

  Dr Bishop: Yes, I think that is right, that in effect it is the civil servants. Commissioner Monti was careful to maintain an interest in difficult cases so that he would not get caught up in the feeling, "Oh, it's gone too far. I don't agree with this, but I've got to do it because I need to back my staff". He was very good, I think, at that. The earlier one, it was Carel Van Miert who was the Commissioner in the earlier incident to do with seamless stainless steel tubes.

  Q162  Lord Burnett: Delay is one of the major problems in this matter. You were, in your report, more anxious to say that you favour a more adversarial system. Taking up the point which Baroness Kingsmill made when she said, "What about the investigative role with strict time limits?", you gave other reasons why you thought that the adversarial role was better, in other words, the investigator and the confusion between his role not quite as judge, but in that role. Would you just like to elaborate a little bit further on that and say which system you would favour and whether you think that that would find favour with the Commission.

  Dr Bishop: No, the Commission would hate it. The Commission loves the power that is inherent in mergers and also people tend to be quite committed to the European project and they see competition law as the greatest success story of the European Union, that there is this body of law which is applied all over Europe and which is copied in the Member States, a tremendous success story. They do not want to see a world in which the Commission becomes less important. I know again it is a legal question, but I understand that it would require a Treaty amendment to change the Commission from the decider who is reviewed by the courts to the accuser/proposer who then hears what the courts decide, whether in his favour or not, which is what I was imagining. I defer to the very distinguished legal experts who have given evidence to you on what is practically possible legally. I wrote out my little bit of evidence to you going by the light of nature—and I deliberately did not consult the questions of what might or might not be legally possible under the Treaty and institutionally possible with the courts. I am aware, as everyone is, that in practice there may be insuperable obstacles to what otherwise look like sensible changes.

  Q163  Chairman: In non-merger competition cases, according to Temple Lang and Mr O'Donoghue, the Commission is extremely slow, and it is the Commission, not the CFI, which needs reorganisation. Is that again something you would subscribe to?

  Dr Bishop: Yes, that is still true. It is not as bad as it used to be, but it is still true. Remember, some of these are not of great importance, and let us take a typical case. The Commission has inquired in several different ways into the operation of Visa and Mastercard and other patent card systems. Now, this is a major matter of public interest, we are talking about billions and billions every year, and it is a complicated question as to whether there is anything anti-competitive going on or not and I do not see that there is any imperative in speed. I do not see that it matters at all. I think the right answer matters much more than getting a quick answer. It is quite unlike mergers. Now, there is only one area I can think of where it actually matters a bit and that is where a company is accused of behaving anti-competitively, a dominant company has been accused of behaving anti-competitively, and there are smaller rivals who truly are entitled to better treatment from this dominant company. There, justice delayed is justice denied, that old saying is perhaps as true as it is in mergers, but it is hard, however, to sort those particular cases out. For example, in the Microsoft wars, and I should declare an interest in that I worked against Microsoft on various matters for five or six years, it is the Commission's case that, if Microsoft had honoured legal obligations, companies such as Real Networks, who make a media player, it is called, for playing music on your computer, might have been able to avoid the near destruction which they have suffered as Microsoft has come to dominate the media player market. Now, Microsoft hotly denies all this, and I am not saying the Commission is correct, but that is the type of case in which time may matter in a way where it is somewhat analogous to the way it does in mergers, but there is no doubt that, generally speaking, it simply does not matter very much.

  Q164  Chairman: We might come back to that, but can we go back to questions, on which you can offer us unique help, of composition. What qualifications should competition judges have and, in particular, do they need to be lawyers if the court's jurisdiction is limited, as at present, to reviewing the decision? Are lawyers the right people or, otherwise, who are?

  Dr Bishop: Well, the obvious ones are economists, but then perhaps I would say that, would I not? There are others, business strategy analysts of one sort or another or financial analysts, in particular, would have a relevant skill and people do need to understand accounts, so accountants are certainly relevant too. The principal one is economists and that is actually for an objective reason, not just what I do, but, if you look at the history of anti-trust internationally, you will find that in all the leading jurisdictions of the world, in fact in all the jurisdictions of the world, the trend over the last 40 years has been for more and more economics to come into it and for reforms to be made to what were rather formalistic legal systems in the direction of more economically thought-out ideas. That is reflected if you just take a look at the UK institutions. We have got John Fingleton, the operational head of the OFT today, he is an economist by training and his predecessor was John Vickers and, when Baroness Kingsmill was at the Commission, I think for most of your time there, it would have been another economist.

  Q165  Baroness Kingsmill: Yes, I was the only lawyer.

  Dr Bishop: That is paralleled in systems all over the world, more and more economists all the time. Now, it remains a system embedded in a legal structure. One way of looking at it is to look at the expenditure of private parties on professional services in preparing cases and fighting cases. There are no exact figures, but whenever I have sat down with friends and tried to quantify this, we come up with about the same answer, that in the United States and in Britain plus Brussels, not necessarily the Member States of the European Union, nowadays they spend about 85 to 90 per cent or so of what they spend on legal services and 10 to 15 per cent on economic services, some of which may be provided by accounting firms, but it is basically doing economics. Whichever way you look at it, it is just more economics everywhere and everything in Europe, starting in 1997 with the Market Definition Notice, then through the changes on vertical practices and the horizontal merger guidelines, all of that has been heavily economics-influenced, so it is actually natural to have economists on these things. I think I mentioned Fred Jenny in my written evidence. Actually, just as a suggestion, I am sure Fred would be delighted to come along and he is in a unique position. He was a member for many years of the Conseil de la Concurrence, the rough equivalent of the Competition Commission here, and he was then Vice President of the Conseil de la Concurrence and he is now a member of the French Supreme Court, an economist with no legal training. I am sure he would be delighted to come to London to give you evidence. Alternatively, Anne Perrot, who was a professor of economics in Paris at the Sorbonne, she is a member of the Conseil de la Concurrence at the moment, but she would not have the length of perspective that Fred has.

  Q166  Chairman: We had thought of that, but do you understand that it would need a Treaty change to be able to put on to a judicial panel a non-lawyer?

  Dr Bishop: They do not seem to have any trouble in Paris.

  Q167  Chairman: I do not know whether they have the same rules. I simply do not know whether this matter has ever been considered or decided, but I just notice that, certainly under Article 225A which provides for the creation of judicial panels, on the face of it, it looks as if it requires lawyers.

  Dr Bishop: That may be. I have just one comment. I was not very impressed by some of the arguments that other people put to you, saying, "Oh well, the judges can always call expert witnesses". That is a different role and it is quite different. I remember a conversation with Frederic Jenny in which he said, and this was some years ago now, maybe even 10 years ago, "My role is a sort of a continuing education role here. I am constantly talking to my fellow members of the Conseil, all of them lawyers, about what they might read on this or that or the economics, whether it is verticals or cartels or mergers or whatever", and it is really quite different having someone come in simply for one case and disappear again, quite different from having someone at the table with an office down the corridor, day after day, week after week, year after year. It is quite different.

  Q168  Chairman: Would it be a sort of halfway house to have assistant rapporteurs or some appointment of that character?

  Dr Bishop: Yes, that could work. I think it is always better if the person concerned has a vote and has to be accommodated. In human institutions, the formal power matters, I think.

  Q169  Chairman: The question, as we put it, is: if the jurisdiction is limited, as at present, to reviewing the decision, and it depends perhaps how tight a review process that is and to what extent it is permissible to reopen or review the facts, to what extent are facts reviewed and to what extent is there really live scope for the views of an economist as a judge rather than a lawyer?

  Dr Bishop: It is not really on the facts that he would make a contribution, no, it is about how you think about these things, how you think about the claim that a certain bundling of the offer of a supply of a firm is anti-competitive for whatever reason. An economist will tend to have, and should have, well-developed views about the theory and perhaps the evidence too, but mainly the theory of how you think about that problem. As for the more general question of review of the facts by the court, we are still in this uncertain world and formally what goes on at the CFI is judicial review. Anyone who lived through the Airtours case and the Tetra Laval case, and I and my colleagues went through those, would not see any difference between a court that has, as the Germans courts theoretically have, plenary power and are not simply reviewers and what happens at the CFI, and that was then confirmed when the Tetra Laval case went to the European Court of Justice and the Vesterdorf approach was in fact confirmed. That involved very close analysis of the facts so that this idea that it is only a review certainly does not describe what really happened in that case. Still, the theory is that it is only a review and some future court could spring up and they could say, "Well, there is not much evidence here, but the Commission has a margin of appreciation, so we will not interfere with what they have decided". If the court wanted to have a quieter period, it could find ways of doing so.

Chairman: Dr Bishop, I think, alas, we seem to have run out of your time and we have another witness, as you know, we are going to hear from today, Sir Christopher Bellamy, so unless any member of the Committee has a question they feel impelled to ask you or you have something perhaps arising out of the other questions you were asked to consider in advance which you feel we frankly ought not to leave this committee room without, is there anything on either of those bases?

  Q170  Baroness Kingsmill: I just wondered, Dr Bishop, how many lawyers you come across who understand economics and vice versa?

  Dr Bishop: It is a minority and it is also true the other way round. If you take a simple word like the word "contract", to anyone with legal training, that conjures up a large, complex world. To an economist, it is like the man on the Clapham omnibus with no legal training, he thinks it is a piece of paper; he has no complex views of it. Nevertheless, where competition cases are concerned, the formal legal structure in the interesting, difficult cases is not very informative and is not really decisive. There are a large number of routine cases which look at the procedures, but the more difficult the case, the more economics comes into it and then it becomes decisive. It is that, I think, that tribunals would be lacking if they did not have important economics support and I think that is basically the public policy here in the UK, and rightly so, in the staffing of our institutions over the last decade.

  Chairman: It remains then, Dr Bishop, for me to thank you again for coming. You have been an enormous help to us and we really are most grateful.



 
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