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I agree with the noble and learned Lord that the individual in respect of whom the order is being applied should have the opportunity to be heard. I must insist, though, that individuals are given only one opportunity to be heard, and if for whatever reason that opportunity is not taken, the court may still make an interim order. This is absolutely necessary for the purposes of providing immediate protection to the public from the risk of serious violence.

My commitment today is to bring forward an amendment at Third Reading which requires that an interim order can be made in the absence of the individual in respect of whom the order has been applied for only if the court is satisfied that the individual has been notified of the court hearing date. This would mean that the individual could attend the hearing or make representations on the day if he or she chose so to do. However, as I have already

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explained, interim orders have a specific purpose to provide the public with immediate protection from the risk of serious violent harm. I am therefore unwilling to require that the court cannot make an interim order without hearing the individual in respect of whom the application has been made, as this could introduce significant delays to the proceedings. Such delays could ultimately leave the public and particular individuals exposed to a risk of serious violence.

We have moved to meet the concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, who unfortunately is not here, but I understand that he is satisfied with our approach. We have also moved to meet the concerns of the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. I beg to move.

Lord Thomas of Gresford had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 101E as an amendment to Amendment No. 101D:

Clause 101, line 13, at end insert “but shall not make such an order without first hearing from P, or giving him an opportunity to be heard”

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I was to move Amendment No. 101E, which is an amendment to Amendment No. 101D, in the absence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, but I have heard the Minister’s assurance that he has discussed the matter with the noble and learned Lord and has come to an agreement. In that event, I shall not take the matter further.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, of course one is grateful for concessions. I am flattered that people have actually listened to what one has had to say. One must be thankful for small mercies. That does not stop me still thinking that we have made a bad thing less bad rather than not have the bad thing at all. By their concessions, the Government have made it less bad and I look forward to hearing what the Minister says on Third Reading.

[Amendment No. 101E, as an amendment to Amendment No. 101D, not moved.]

Amendment No. 101D agreed to

[Amendment No. 102 not moved.]

Lord Bassam of Brighton moved Amendment No. 102A:

Clause 101, page 76, line 18, leave out subsections (5) and (6) and insert—

“( ) An interim violent offender order—

(a) has effect only for such period as is specified in the order, and(b) ceases to have effect (if it has not already done so) at the appropriate time.”

The noble Lord said: The amendment would amend the period in respect of which an interim violent offender order may be in force. The order could be made for a fixed period of any duration but could not be renewed after this time.

Amendments Nos. 103 to 105 deal with the same issue, albeit taking a different approach. Interim violent offender orders could not remain in force for

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more than two weeks and could not be renewed after that time. I understand that the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, by his amendments, seeks to ensure that interim violent offender orders are not used as a substitute for full violent offender orders, and nor would they be operable indefinitely.

We have had a lot of discussion about the purpose of an interim order, which is to provide short-term and immediate protection for the public while the decision on the main application is being made. I shall set out exactly why it is important to provide immediate protection and why the period for which an interim order can be imposed should not be overly restricted.

9.15 pm

There will inevitably be occasions when there is a delay to a decision being taken on the main violent offender order. Her Majesty’s Courts Service has indicated that such a delay will typically be at the request of the individual in respect of whom the application has been made in order to secure sufficient time to consider the application fully or to enable attendance at the hearing. This could result in the postponement of a hearing by weeks, or even months, and therefore a possible gap in public protection for the same period. The length of adjournment will obviously vary on a case-by-case basis. The Courts Service has indicated that in the majority of cases it is likely to be in excess of two weeks. However, it has also advised that the court will know the exact time period for which an interim order should apply according to the length of adjournment granted.

On this basis, government Amendment No. 102A requires that interim violent offender orders be made for a fixed period of time as specified in each individual order, or until a decision on the main order has been taken, if that is sooner. It also removes the provision to renew interim orders. This will ensure that interim violent offender orders are not used as a substitute for full violent offender orders and that they cannot be applied indefinitely. Other government amendments we have considered today will ensure that an interim order will be made only when the court is satisfied that the application for the main order is likely to be successful. I hope that that explanation will satisfy the House and that the noble Earl will feel that we have made a considerable move in his direction and will be able to withdraw his amendment.

The Deputy Speaker: My Lords, I have to inform the House that if Amendment No. 102A is agreed, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 103, 104 and 105 because of pre-emption.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, one again has to say thank you, but, in this case, thank you for slightly less than in the last case. In this case, as I understand it, an interim order now has to be specifically timed, but there is no limit on the specific time. Interim orders seem to me to be even more a case of “We’ve been told by somebody down the pub that somebody might go and kick somebody’s teeth in next Tuesday,

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but we’re not sure who it is”. They will be based on much less evidence, as far as I understand them, otherwise they would not be interim. Again, there is no point in dividing the House on this. I wish that the Government had gone further. From what the noble Lord said just now, he and the Government still do not understand the general and persistent assault on the liberties of the subject that they have done and are slowly and gradually beginning to wake up to it. Having said that, thank you for the smidgeon. I shall not move my amendments—I will not be able to do so anyway because of pre-emption.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I want to be sure that I understand what lies behind the Government’s proposal here. As I understand it, the Government’s amendment changes interim VOOs from being limited to four weeks but renewable to being unrenewable, but without a specified time limit. The time limit will be set at the time of the making of the order and is intended to be tied to the date the court expects to be able to impose the full VOO. That is the Government’s position as I understand it.

Is this really practical? We all know that there are problems about the timing of court hearings and that garnering evidence in the circumstances of assessing a future risk is an extremely complex matter. How can the Government be sure at the time that the time limit is set that it will be adequate for the authorities to assemble all the evidence they will need to make their case at the full hearing? If they are unable to assemble their case at the full hearing, what will they do? They cannot renew the interim order.

I hope that the Government will take this observation as being entirely practical, not coming from any particular direction of the political compass. The Government ought to be very clear about whether, from a practical point of view, this is really what they want to do.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I appreciate the noble Lord’s intervention; he asks a sensible and practical question. We have had a lot of discussion with the Courts Service. It believes that we can meet the requirements; it thinks that it is deliverable.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, the Courts Service is one problem, but the Government also have a potential evidential problem here. I hesitate to call those involved the government prosecutors—although many of your Lordships here this evening may—so let us refer to them as authorities. It is the authorities’ responsibility to put together the case. Making an assessment of putting together a compelling case on day one may turn out to be overambitious by the time that you arrive at the court, when you cannot renew the order. How will the Government handle that?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, the noble Lord should be reassured by the fact that the order cannot be renewed. That is a real pressure on the authorities bringing forward the case. I can also say that this is the same procedure as has been adopted for sexual offences prevention orders. They work effectively. We have carefully followed the advice of the Courts Service. Because the court has the discretion, over

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time, it will be able to assess at first hearing the period that will be most appropriate before the full hearing must take place. Those reassurances should work. That is based on experience.

It is also worth saying that an application for an interim violent offender order can be made only at the same time as or after an application for a violent offender order. Most—I would argue, all—of the evidence should be properly in place, but of course we must ensure that that evidence is fully tested in a full hearing on the full order.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord. We—that is to say, the Opposition Front Bench—have not tabled an amendment on the specific point. Our preference would be for a much shorter period but renewable. That would give the court flexibility to deal with both the procedural and the evidential problems. I do not know whether the Minister would be prepared to respond to this, but I would like to think that he will look at this matter before Third Reading. As I said, it is a practical point and one that I think has some substance.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I always listen to the noble Lord on practical matters about how courts work. He makes a valid point. I undertake to the noble Lord that we will examine how the SOPO process works and provide him with a description of that in correspondence, so that it can be better understood. In the end, we will probably not be a million miles apart, but I appreciate that the noble Lord has raised a practical issue.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, will the Minister enlighten me on something that I am beginning not to understand? Let us say that an interim order is applied for. Presumably this is like prima facie evidence; they think it is needed. Is it possible for them to say, “Actually, we didn’t need this because the tittle-tattle that we have is not good enough”? Can the order lapse and be found to be unnecessary? I am in a slight muddle and groping for information.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I cannot accept that these things will be based on tittle-tattle, but I realise that that was a provocative observation by the noble Earl. I understand that he is really talking about hearsay. We must be guided by the process, which should be carried through. Clearly if it is felt that it would be inappropriate to proceed, the matter must be considered by the court because the case is the court’s property. I will happily clarify this in the correspondence which the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, has provoked by asking his very practical and practically focused question.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Deputy Speaker: My Lords, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 103 to 105.

[Amendments Nos. 103 to 105 not moved.]

[Amendment No. 105A not moved.]

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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendment No. 105B:

Clause 101, page 76, line 31, leave out from first “applies” to “a” and insert “in relation to the variation or discharge of an interim violent offender order as it applies in relation to the variation or discharge of”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 106 not moved.]

Clause 103 [Review of violent offender orders in respect of young offenders]:

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendment No. 106A:

Clause 103, leave out Clause 103

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 105 [Notification requirements: initial notification]:

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendment No. 106B:

Clause 105, page 78, line 39, at end insert “or kept in service custody”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 107 [Notification requirements: periodic notification]:

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendment No. 106C:

Clause 107, page 80, line 31, at end insert “or kept in service custody”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 110 [Notification requirements to be complied with by parents of young offenders]:

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendment No. 106D:

Clause 110, leave out Clause 110

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 111 [Parental directions: notification requirements imposed on parents of young offenders]:

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendment No. 106E:

Clause 111, leave out Clause 111

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 112 [Offences]:

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendment No. 106F:

Clause 112, page 83, line 25, leave out “, 109(4) or 110(3)(b)” and insert “or 109(4)”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 116 [Interpretation of Part 7]:

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath moved Amendments Nos. 106G to 106M:

Clause 116, page 85, leave out lines 40 and 41 and insert—

““custodial sentence” means—

(a) a custodial sentence within the meaning of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6) (see section 76 of that Act), or(b) a relevant service sentence (see subsection (1A) below);”

23 Apr 2008 : Column 1592

Clause 116, page 86, line 3, at end insert—

““kept in service custody” means kept in service custody by virtue of an order under section 105(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52);”

Clause 116, page 86, line 8, at end insert—

““service detention” has the meaning given by section 374 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52);”

Clause 116, page 86, line 12, at end insert—

“(1A) The following are relevant service sentences—

(a) a sentence of imprisonment passed under the Army Act 1955 (3 & 4 Eliz. 2 c. 18), the Air Force Act 1955 (3 & 4 Eliz. 2 c. 19) or the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c. 53);(b) a sentence of custody for life, or detention, under section 71A of either of those Acts of 1955 or section 43A of that Act of 1957;(c) a sentence under a custodial order within the meaning of—(i) section 71AA of, or paragraph 10 of Schedule 5A to, either of those Acts of 1955, or(ii) section 43AA of, or paragraph 10 of Schedule 4A to, that Act of 1957;(d) a custodial sentence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52) (see section 374 of that Act).”

Clause 116, page 86, leave out line 20

Clause 116, page 86, leave out line 22

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 20 [Closure orders: premises associated with persistent disorder or nuisance]:

The Earl of Onslow moved Amendment No. 107:

Schedule 20, page 234, line 17, at end insert—

“(3A) An authorisation under subsection (2) or (3) may only be given after—

(a) all other reasonable steps have been taken to deal with the anti-social behaviour and the persistent disorder or serious nuisance referred to in subsection (1), and(b) the needs of any children or vulnerable adults residing at the premises have been taken into account.”

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