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Where I am critical, almost to the point of feelings of anger and impotence, is because we in Europe are able to do so little. We talk a great game. Even the critics of the treaty talk a great game about what we can do, what they can do, what they will do and how they will drag us into it, but the reality is so puny. The European Union is an economic giant, yet it is a military nonentity. If we take the graphic statistics, boots on the ground are what count in most missions today. There are 1.5 million Europeans in regular forces and another 1 million in reserves. That is about twice what the United States of America has, yet of all these people whom the taxpayers of Europe are paying for, only about 2 per cent can be deployed in the kinds of missions that will be required for the future. Lots of them are ready and prepared and are part of grandiose plans to stop the Soviet Union invading Europe; there are still tank formations that have that primary objective. However, in terms of what we need to do now, only 2 per cent of all those troops can be used. We have twice as many fast jets in the European portfolio than the United States of America has, but only 10 per cent of them can fly day and night in all weathers and deliver guided precision weapons, the only kind of weapon that will have any utility in future.

In each of the catalogues—apart from tanks, of which we have more than enough—we are grossly and seriously deficient. If a decision about Kosovo had to be taken today, I sometimes wonder whether we would be in any better position, almost 10 years on, to be able to do what we did then—to complete a mission in 78 days without a single casualty on the allies’ side and to achieve all the objectives that we set out. I fear and worry that we cannot. We are not much further on, but I certainly hope that, in this treaty, we have started to do what is necessary.



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In the previous debate, and probably in this one as well, we will talk about the reality of what is going on. My noble friend Lady Ashton outlined a number of the areas where the common foreign policy is working and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, mentioned a few areas where there is great potential for the future.

One experience during my time in NATO has almost disappeared from the scene. It was an insurgency in the small country of Macedonia—still obliged by the United Nations to be called the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It was scandalously—and I say that with great deliberation—excluded from an invitation to NATO membership at the recent Bucharest summit because of an unreasonable and indefensible veto by Greece on that country, simply because it will not change its name. However, in 2001, it was beset by an insurgency and all of the agencies came together—the European Union, NATO, the OSCE, the World Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the European Union’s representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown. Everyone got involved.

Javier Solana and I went to Macedonia 11 times between March and November of that year. It got huge coverage and was the biggest story of that time. In the Times, Sir Simon Jenkins, wrote an article saying that it was an unmitigated disaster that we were getting involved in yet another Balkan swamp. The strap-line to his front-page article said, with the characteristic understatement for which Simon Jenkins is so well known, that I would not be content until the Balkans were aflame from the Adriatic to Istanbul.

However, all those agencies came together, worked together, on the ground at the highest and lowest levels. A peace plan was designed and, of course, Macedonia is now on the brink of both European Union and NATO membership. If people would like to learn a little more about it, the Royal United Services Institute has just published a small book by Mark Laity, who used to be my representative in Macedonia at the time, chronicling both what happened there and the lessons from it. It is well worth reading for those who would like to know, not about the scary prospects of European defence, but about how it works in action. I think that is of more relevance, frankly, than a lot of the scaremongering we have heard as each stage of the European integration debate has gone along.

However, I say, and I know that my successor would also say, had he been here in the House of Lords as well, that what the treaty proposes—the Berlin-plus arrangements and European defence as part of the common and foreign security policy—will strengthen and not compete with NATO. It will not duplicate NATO but provide assets that will be useful to NATO as a whole. Overall it will add to our capability as Europeans to be able to defend ourselves from the threats of the future rather than the enemies of the past.

Lord Lee of Trafford: If I may, I will start my comments on these amendments with a quotation:

Those were the words of the noble Lord, Lord Astor, at Second Reading on 1 April—words which I and my colleagues on these Benches happily endorse. The fundamental difference between us is that while we believe that the Lisbon treaty takes us in this direction, the noble Lord believes that it risks taking us in the opposite direction, or at least gives rise to certain doubts to that effect, a number of which are reflected in the amendments that we are discussing this evening.

Since its first peacekeeping operation in 2003, the European Union has undertaken roughly 20 missions under its European security and defence policy. Although these operations have been relatively small—the largest was a 7,000-strong peacekeeping operation in Bosnia that is now down to 2,500—most ESDP missions have not been primarily military operations. More interesting have been their complexity and range: preventing civil unrest in Macedonia, reforming the Congolese army and the Georgian judicial system, training Afghan and Iraqi police forces, monitoring the Rafah crossing point in Gaza and overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh. Demand for EU action is growing—witness the developing deployments in Kosovo and eastern Chad.

The UK has always supported foreign policy co-operation with our EU partners. If we now want meaningful foreign policy co-operation that amounts to common policies and action among 27 countries, it is in the UK’s interests to support the arrangements needed to make this possible. The UK has the ultimate safeguard in the CFSP in that no decision can be taken without its consent or at least acquiescence. Under the Lisbon treaty, the important decisions will continue to be taken unanimously. There is a provision in the existing treaties for implementing decisions to be taken by qualified majority voting, but it is never really used. There is also the so-called emergency break, or safety net. If a likely QMV decision will affect a member state’s vital interests, no vote can be taken. If no agreement can be reached, the issue can be referred to the European Council, but the European Council decides the issue unanimously.

On the relationship between a closer European defence policy and NATO—it is a great privilege to follow the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson—we on these Benches do not believe that there is any conflict, and we fully accept the primacy of NATO. As the impact assessment from our own committee on the treaty of Lisbon concludes:

As Victoria Nuland, the US ambassador to NATO, made clear in a speech on 22 February,



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Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Astor, said, again in his Second Reading speech,

We concur with that sentiment. As the impact assessment concluded:

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: This debate, like many others in this Committee, brings déjà vu all over again. It strikes me that Her Majesty’s Opposition are now more concerned about the United States attitude towards European defence than the United States is, as the noble Lord, Lord Lee, has just demonstrated by the quotation that he gave and as the various quotations from the US Secretary of State and the President of the United States showed in the run-up to the Bucharest meeting. The US actually wants the European Union to move in this direction. It knows perfectly well what is in the Lisbon treaty. If it did not like it, it would say so, but it is not; it is saying the opposite. There we are, then—or, rather, there Her Majesty’s Opposition are, manoeuvring themselves into the position which they got into over the reunification of Germany while in government. We all know where that ended: in tears. That should not happen again; frankly, it is clear that things have moved on and that the United States wants Europe to get its act together.

9.45 pm

Secondly, the provisions in the Lisbon treaty seem important for European defence capacities. The noble Lord is quite right to emphasise that capacity is very important, but we should just reflect on this: for every country in Europe which might find the need to strengthen its capacity in NATO compelling, which I believe would be this country’s view, three or four are more likely to be moved by the argument that they need to make the European capacity to fulfil the Lisbon treaty a reality.

We have to understand that other people sometimes look at these things a little differently from us, but that the net outcome will benefit us. If their defence capacity increases and they are members of NATO, that will be good news for us too. If they do so because of the provisions in the Lisbon treaty—including those for enhanced co-operation, which will invite people who really want to put their backs into this to go ahead—then that will also be good news for this country.

I hope that the Opposition will be convinced that this amendment should not be pressed. I find it a bit puzzling that they seem to be constructing a completely new set of provisions to deal with powers that will be covered by the war powers resolution that the Government have committed to bring to this House. I imagine that we would all agree that European Union operations involving hostilities should be treated in exactly the same way as all other such operations, not by a different and more restrictive set of provisions.



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Lord Stoddart of Swindon: I listened with respect, as I always do, and with interest to the dissertation on defence matters by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. He, of course, has wide experience in government, in NATO and elsewhere on defence matters. I would not, perhaps, have been on my feet had he not referred to scare stories on defence matters. There have been no scare stories; such matters, in my experience, were introduced into discussions on the European Union in the Single European Act. They first appeared then, so when, for example, we first discussed the issue in 1972 there was no suggestion that there would be a European Union with a defence aspect.

Bit by bit, defence has been introduced into the treaties—and piece by piece, the defence aspect has been built up as being far more important than we were assured in previous debates that it would be. For example, while discussing the Nice treaty, I well remember testing the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, about a European army. She was a Minister of State at that time and really set about me, saying that I was talking absolute rubbish about that—so I, of course, accepted what she said. I respected her as a good Minister and thought, “Well, that’s put me in my place”. The following day—the noble Lord referred to this—we found that Mr Prodi was saying:

Mr Prodi was then the President of the Commission. So I thought about who was right, and I thought that it had to be the noble Baroness, Lady Symons. But it appears that it was not because, on 23 March 2008, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said:

On 16 July 2007, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, said:

Those of us who do not really want a European army, which would be responsible to the institutions of the European Union, want proper co-operation between independent nation states. I think we all want that. Some of us are afraid of a European army per se. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, said, “It ain’t gonna happen”. I hope he is right, but the problem is that ratchet by ratchet the whole defence aspect is growing. A sort of high-command structure and a procurement structure have been set out. We are rationalising—if that is the right way to do it—defence equipment, so that bit by bit the whole basis for a European army is being built up.

Do not blame those of us who mentioned these things before. We are borne out by the remarks and statements of the former President of the European Commission, the German Chancellor and the French President. I hope that in future people will not say that we are putting scare stories about. This is a serious debate, which deserves great scrutiny and intelligent scrutiny, which it has had so far. We must

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not be afraid of discussing these things openly and saying what we feel about them. That is what we are here for.

Finally, I support Amendment No. 18A, which proposes that both Houses of Parliament should not only be consulted, but also give their consent to the employment of British troops under the arrangements proposed in the treaty. That is extremely important. I believe that somehow or other we must get assurances that that will be so. The Government will find that easy to do, because Mr Brown, on becoming Prime Minister, promised that British troops would not be committed in Europe or anywhere else without the consent of both Houses of Parliament. I hope that the government spokesman will give us that assurance tonight. He can safely do that in the light of the promise made by our Prime Minister, who is an honourable man and, I am sure, would not have made that statement unless he intended to see that it was carried out.

Lord Blackwell: I intervene in this debate with trepidation, given the expertise in this Chamber. But I find myself searching to understand what these words in the treaty, like so much else in it, mean. The trouble is that we seem now to have a common pattern where we are told that the words should not be taken to mean what they say, because somewhere else in the treaty there is a declaration or protocol that says exactly the opposite, or the Government assure us that the words do not need to be taken seriously because they have them under lock and key, and that they would never be used.

As an example, the article referred to by Amendment No. 20 talks about,

It goes on to say:

To me a common defence means an integrated force. It does not say “a common policy” or “an alliance”; it says “a common defence”, which sounds as though we are forming a common force with our allies to defend ourselves jointly. That may well be what is intended and it does say,

But many of us have a problem with the thought of a common defence. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, assures us that it would be a building block of NATO rather than duplication and yet, in the cold light of day, we know that many of our European neighbours have a very different view of NATO—indeed a fairly antagonistic view. The thought that we would be forming a common defence force with those other members of Europe that would not be antagonistic—

Lord Robertson of Port Ellen: Who are these other countries in the European Union that are antagonistic to NATO?

Lord Blackwell: I defer to the noble Lord’s greater knowledge on this but many instances have come to my attention where the French, in particular, are quoted as taking an antagonistic view towards the United States and its role in NATO, and to NATO

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more generally. The point remains: are these words meant to mean that we end up with a common defence force or are they not? If they are, that is quite consequential for the United Kingdom’s future policy. The Government may say, “This will never happen. We are not advocating a common defence. When the European Council acts unanimously, we will do this. We will never agree to it. You can forget all about it because this is a locked room”. The trouble is, this treaty is full of locked rooms with the Government saying, “You do not need to worry about what is in this room because we will keep it locked”. I feel slightly uneasy about agreeing to a treaty that has lots of rooms that the Government will keep locked because they can veto them. Or are the Government saying, “Actually, we are very keen that this room should be part of the treaty. We want this common defence”? In that case, this seems a very significant step to include in one article of the treaty without explaining more fully to the British public and to the House what “a common defence” means.

I support these amendments, Amendment No. 20 in particular, until such time as the Government explain to us whether they agree to the formation of a common defence and what a common defence in reality would mean for the UK.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: I think my noble friend had something to do with the drafting of the Maastricht treaty. Does he remember whether the words in that treaty were,

We have here:

Would my noble friend agree that that is a very important example of the way this project proceeds step by step, piece by piece, as a “salami slicer”, in the words of my noble friend Lord Tebbit?

Lord Blackwell: I must correct the noble Lord; I had nothing to do with the drafting of the Maastricht treaty. But he is correct in saying that the wording continually moves. That is the point I was trying to make. We need to know whether we are supposed to take this wording seriously or whether we can disregard it because it does not mean what it says or the Government will veto it.

10 pm

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: In that case, I have two specific questions for the Minister. The first is: what has happened to the framework agreement, signed at Farnborough in August 2000, between France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland,

I have the document before me; I am not quite sure of its status. I merely ask the Minister: what has happened to it and does it still apply? I shall briefly quote further from it:



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of the countries that are signatories to the document. I quote again from Article 4:

—

that is, transnational defence companies—

I shall not go on quoting the agreement, but would like to know—

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: I am doing my best to follow the noble Lord’s fascinating reasoning. Does he think that there should not be transnational defence companies? Does he think that they are a retrograde step? Has he noticed that transnational defence companies have emerged generally across the world during the past 20 years?

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: I have. The point that the noble Lord may have missed, because he may not have studied this document with the attention which it deserves, is that the United States of America is referred to in it as “third parties”. I merely ask what has happened to the document, what has happened to our procurement and defence industries since August 2000, and what is the present state of play with the United States of America and our European friends?

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