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Paybill costs—The paybill for special advisers in 2007-08 was £5.9 million3.
- 2 Includes the three members of the Council of Economic Advisers who are employed on special adviser terms
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Terrorism: Hazardous Substances
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord West of Spithead): My right honourable friend the Minster for Security, Counterterrorism, Crime and Policing (Tony McNulty) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
My right honourable friend the Prime Minister announced in his Statement on 14 November 2007 a review of what more we need to do to strengthen security to protect against the use of hazardous substances for terrorist purposes. This review has been completed. I do not intend to publish it, because I do not wish in any way to compromise our security. However, this Statement provides a summary of the main conclusions of the review.
The review shows that a substantial amount of work has been undertaken in this area. It also identifies areas where further improvements could be made but recognises that we must ensure that protective security measures are proportionate to the risk. We need to ensure that individuals and businesses are free to carry on normal social, economic and democratic activities and, as a result, there will always be some vulnerability to the use of hazardous substances for terrorist purposes.
First, it is important to underline that considerable progress has already been made in recent years to reduce our vulnerability to the use of hazardous substances for terrorist purposes. The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) provides specialist advice regarding the security of a variety of hazardous substances. It has undertaken a range of activities to reduce the vulnerability of hazardous substances. These include “Know Your Customer” campaigns, to raise awareness about the “dual-use” nature of certain products and encouraging suppliers to be more inquiring of new customers and to report suspicious enquiries to police. NaCTSO has also played an important role in overseeing local police counterterrorism security advisers who implement Part 7 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which provides the police with powers to impose security measures at laboratories that hold certain dangerous pathogens and toxins.
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is the government authority on protective security in relation to national security threats. The CPNI works with NaCTSO to advise businesses and organisations on the security of hazardous substances and sites.
The Environment Agency has managed a government-subsidised programme that has disposed of more than 9,000 disused radioactive sources from hospitals, universities, museums, schools and other sites across the UK. The Environment Agency, and its sister agencies in Scotland and Northern Ireland, working in partnership with NaCTSO, are also regulating the security of radioactive sources used at hospitals, universities and industrial sites throughout the UK. This review did not cover those nuclear or radiological materials used in the civil nuclear sector, as they fall under the specific regulatory regime led by the Office for Civil Nuclear Security.
The Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate of the Department for Transport (Transec) enforces a statutory regime for the security of dangerous goods
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The Government also welcome the steps that industry has been taking, through a knowledge of its customers and through codes of conduct, to help reduce the chances of abuse of hazardous substances. For instance, the UK Fertiliser Industry has developed, at the request of the UK Government, the Fertiliser Industry Assurance Scheme (FIAS).
The main outcome of the review is a new risk-based strategic framework to drive prioritisation of work to reduce the accessibility of hazardous substances for terrorist purposes. This will enable work to focus on reducing the accessibility of hazardous substances considered to be at highest risk, taking account of the need for a proportionate, cost-effective and practical response. This will allow us to target resources where most needed and to improve the security of hazardous substances even further.
The framework will direct a cross-government programme of work to reduce the vulnerability of highest risk substances. This programme will be delivered under the “protect” strand of the Government’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST) and will be led by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office.
This framework has prioritised hazardous substances on the basis of the risk that they pose, taking account of the threat, vulnerability and impact of those substances. The review examined the vulnerability of substances across their life cycle, from their precursors through to their disposal.
We are reviewing the pathogens and toxins listed under Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 with the assistance of the Health Protection Agency. We are also considering whether further legislative changes are required to clarify the scope of the application of the legislation and will consult on any proposed changes in due course as appropriate.
Another example of specific work under way as a result of the review is a joint Department for Transport/Home Office project, which has been established to agree an impact-based list of substances of most concern, to inform our assessment of the risk and to identify areas for further reduction of the vulnerability of these substances throughout the supply chain, including transportation.
We will continue to reduce the risks from the illicit transportation of hazardous substances at the UK border. We will build upon existing initiatives such as Programme Cyclamen, which provides radiation-screening capability at UK points of entry to prevent the illicit importation of radiological substances, and we will use the strategic framework to inform counterterrorism requirements at the UK border, in conjunction with the UK Border Agency, the national co-ordinator of ports policing and other stakeholders.
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We are also considering what further work may be appropriate to reduce the vulnerability of hazardous sites and substances to insider action. This will build on existing work led by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and take account of the findings of the independent review of personnel security in the transport sector by Stephen Boys Smith.
In taking forward this work, the Government recognise the importance of engaging fully with industry and academia. In particular, we are committed to working with them to identify proportionate, risk-based measures. Equally important is the need to work with international partners to reduce the risk of terrorists acquiring hazardous substances. For example, we are currently working with our European partners to reduce the availability of high-grade ammonium nitrate fertiliser.
Taken together, the various recommendations of the review will further reduce the risk of terrorists obtaining hazardous substances and will increase the likelihood that those attempting to access such materials will be detected.
Transport: Personnel
Lord Bassam of Brighton: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport (Ruth Kelly) has made the following Ministerial Statement.
Last December I commissioned an independent review of personnel security across the transport sector. This followed Lord West’s review last year which focused on physical infrastructure and confirmed that, although it is impossible to eliminate every risk, a robust transport security regime is in place. The review of personnel security was conducted by Stephen Boys Smith who has now delivered his report. It contains a detailed assessment of current security processes and recommendations of where changes might be needed. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, it is not appropriate to publish it in full, but I have published a short summary of the report, and of its key recommendations.
The Government and the transport industries are committed to countering the threat from terrorism. The existing security regime encompasses a wide range of measures which seek to reduce the potential threat from insiders. These measures include both personnel security measures, such as background checks, and physical security measures, such as the searching and screening requirements. Many of these physical security measures apply to industry staff as well as passengers. For instance, the UK requires airports to screen 100 per cent of staff working in the restricted zone, and has played a leading role in ensuring that this approach has been incorporated into European regulations, as well as promoting it elsewhere.
Stephen Boys Smith's report acknowledges the effectiveness of the UK transport security regime, which overlaps multiple layers of security measures in this way. But the report also points out that the more effectively the security regime mitigates external threats, the more likely it becomes that terrorists will look for vulnerabilities elsewhere. I therefore agree with the key message of the report: that there should be an increased
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The most important challenge will be to integrate fully a risk-based approach to personnel security into industry practices. This clearly cannot be delivered by the Government alone. Only the industry has the detailed knowledge of its operations and systems that is needed accurately to identify the specific personnel security risks that it faces and how they might be mitigated. But the Government have a vital role to play in raising awareness of personnel security issues within the industry, providing guidance and support to the industry, and ensuring that full and rigorous assessments are carried out and that appropriate action is taken where vulnerabilities are identified
For this reason, I have asked my department to ensure with immediate effect that industry's attention is drawn to the advice which is already available (for example, that issued by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure), and to enhance the personnel security elements of our existing training programmes. Alongside this, my officials will urgently work up policy options over the summer for a cross-industry conference, to be held in the autumn. This conference will identify the most effective approaches to embedding risk assessment in the personnel security regime. The next phase will be for government and industry to work together, including through ongoing working groups such as the National Aviation Security Committee, to ensure that the necessary risk assessments are carried out and a clear programme of work delivered. This will require sustained effort by all.
I agree with the report’s view that identity is a key factor in personnel security regimes and note its conclusion that ID cards are a useful addition to identity assurance. This endorses the announcement by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary on 6 March that ID cards will be part of the identity assurance regime for airside workers, starting in 2009. Officials from the Home Office and my department are currently in discussion with the industry about how best to do this.
I also accept the report’s advice that, in the light of experience both in the Security Industry Association (SIA) and within some sectors of the transport industry, overseas criminal record checks are now a more viable option than they have been in the past.
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While checks of this kind are primarily intended to reduce crime, they can also provide a useful additional check on an applicant's integrity as part of the overall personnel security regime. I have therefore asked my department to produce clear guidance, building on the approach taken by the SIA, to support those organisations whose risk assessments identify posts for which checks of this kind are necessary. Wherever such posts are identified, I expect the industry to take rapid action, and my department will be engaging closely with them over the coming months to ensure that this is the case.
Alongside this voluntary approach, which extends existing good practice in the industry, I believe there is also a case for introducing a mandatory requirement for those posts which present the highest risks, such as those with specific security responsibilities (and which are already subject to a counterterrorism check). However, before such a requirement can be put in place, there remain a number of legal and practical challenges to be overcome. These include identifying an effective means of dealing with the variability of international criminal records systems and documentation, and developing an approach which does not have undue implications for the ongoing efficiency and security of industry operations.
I have therefore asked my department to begin immediate discussions with employers and employees in the industry to agree a workable and effective approach to introducing such a requirement, with a view to implementation by the end of the year. In line with Stephen Boys Smith's recommendation, I expect this to apply to new applicants for these posts, as employers can assess the integrity of existing employees in other, more effective ways.
Over the longer term, as the exchange of information between countries becomes more efficient, it may be appropriate to extend this requirement to other posts. I note here also the Statement made on 16 July by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary about Sir Ian Magee’s review of criminality and the potential for overseas information to be more readily available to UK criminal record offices.
Finally, I agree with the view that while there should be some rebalancing of priorities between physical and personnel security activity, this should not result in a weakening of physical security programmes.
Copies of the report summary and recommendations have been laid in the Libraries of both Houses and will appear on the department’s website.
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