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With some of my contacts in Moscow, I have found that they talk about the Georgians in the same way I imagine that Members of this House talked about Irishmen in about 1850. There is a real sense of superiority about the peoples around them—that they are part of the world—and a clear ambivalence towards Europe. In the 1980s, when I was secretary of the British/Russian round table, we found ourselves with Russians who insisted that Russia was a European power and had to be accepted as such. I remember causing offence at a meeting in Moscow by suggesting that many of us regarded Russia as at least as European as Turkey. I was told by an outraged senior member of the Community Party that one could not say that because “Russia, after all, was a Christian country”. There are all sorts of ambivalences in that.
Now we find Russians saying that they are not to be judged by European rules—that they are a great power to be compared with the United States. The whole concept of sovereign democracy is that Russia, like America, is allowed to play by different rules from smaller countries such as Britain and France, which is part of the problem with which we have to deal.
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I also share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, that part of our problem in dealing with Russia is the loss of the western moral authority that we have suffered in the past eight years and more. We have to recognise that some Russian actions now are deliberately saying, “We can behave like the United States. Okay, they are going to send a fleet into the Black Sea; we will send ships into the Caribbean. They are going to supply the Georgians; we will send aircraft to Venezuela”. There is an in-your-face assertion that, “If you want a sphere of influence, we will have one too. If you are going to influence us, we will do the same to you”.
The summer before last, my wife and I cruised into Sebastopol harbour and, I have to say that the fattest I have ever been was returning from a Black Sea cruise because they feed you so well. The Russian naval base in Sebastopol is a great deal smaller than Guantanamo Bay. It has the same post-imperial echoes as that large base on sovereign Cuban territory. The American approach to Georgia has been irresponsible and provocative, which I regret, but that is only part of the set of issues with which we need to be concerned. The pace of NATO enlargement clearly has been too fast. Some of us were never happy entirely about NATO enlargement disregarding Russian sensitivities. I attended the German Marshall Fund’s parallel conference in Bucharest to the NATO European Council. I was not sure which was worse, the aggressive expansionism of some Republican Americans or the arrogant nationalism of some of the Russians who were invited to answer them. The future of NATO is a very large question to which we in this House and elsewhere should return. If NATO is an anti-Russian alliance, there are large questions for us about how we see our future relationship with Europe. What are the objectives of NATO enlargement? Are we sure that we agree with the consensus in Washington about the purposes of NATO enlargement?
However, the most important question is: what is to be done? I strongly agree with the committee’s statement in paragraph 320:
“The EU will always be more effective when it can agree a united approach in its dealings with Russia”.
A common European policy towards Russia is clearly in the British interests. Sadly, we have seen a number of defections from solidarity. The most appalling was Mr Berlusconi’s action in inviting President Putin as his first foreign visitor when he again became Prime Minister. But we understand all the sensitivities and hang-ups which the Germans have, as well as their business interests, in their very special relationship with Russia.
We have been very lucky that we have found ourselves with France in the presidency when the crisis with Georgia came up. One can think of a number of other presidencies that would have handled this much less successfully. But the British Government have not contributed enough. British policy on the whole has been passive. We want a British Government who engage in the debate here and in other European countries about why we share common interests in a stronger policy towards Russia.
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I also agree with paragraph 284, which states:
“The EU should resist any attempts to isolate Russia”.
We need to engage with the Russians as far as we can, but—the report does not spell this out quite as much—we need to speak plainly and bluntly about our interests and theirs.
Last February, I led a cross-party delegation from this House to Moscow. The memory I most enjoy is our discussion with the foreign affairs committee of the Duma in which the temperature and the noise level rose quite considerably as it told us what it most objected to about British policy and our welcome of particular Russians to whom it objected, and we told it what we thought about Russian neglect of the rule of law, murders of opponents, corruption in the armed forces, et cetera. One has to talk at that level, sadly, to make sure that one gets the Russians’ respect.
We need a more active policy towards the EU’s eastern neighbours. In his reply, can the Minister give us the view of Her Majesty’s Government on the new Polish/Swedish initiative for an eastern partnership? I see that the European Council has asked for a report from the Commission in December, targeted as we know particularly at the western former Soviet countries of Ukraine and Belarus—that is not easy, but I see that the Finnish Foreign Minister has just been to Minsk—Moldova and the southern Caucasus states. We need action on these frozen conflicts. We have neglected Transdniestra at least as much as we did Abkhazia and South Ossetia. One of the things we can learn from this is that we need to engage with Moldova and Transdniestra as actively as we can. We also need to engage with the Ngorno Karabakh problem, which is very similar to the Abkhazia and South Ossetia problem, particularly given that the relationship between Turkey and Armenia, which is part of the jigsaw here, is at last beginning to improve.
I hope that the Minister will also be able to tell us about what he expects to come out of the meeting in Geneva next Tuesday, 15 October, on how post-conflict Georgia should develop and what the role of the EU monitoring mission is going to be inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We cannot concede to the Russians that the EU monitoring mission, which I think includes a number of British officers, will not be allowed to operate inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As we know, there has been not just ethnic cleansing but looting in those countries. I was in both places four years ago and noted that there was clear indiscipline, with the local militias disorganised and even at that point conducting operations of ethnic cleansing. I recall vividly that I was there with Anna Politkovskaya, who was herself murdered not long afterwards, and that for her it was clear that what was happening in the south of the Caucasus and what was happening in the north was all part of the same problem—how the Russians mishandle the smaller nationalities to their south. The point was also made by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, in his speech.
Next, we have to negotiate on partnership, and we have to negotiate hard, and I hope that the Minister will reassure us on that. The rule of law is absolutely non-negotiable. However, the Russians do want to negotiate the rule of law. The rule of law that they
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“Accession candidates need to be aware that the political aspects of like-mindedness will also be raised”.
I hope that they will be raised very robustly when it comes down to it. Incidentally, the idea of Russian EU membership is absolutely off the table. On my last visit to Moscow, one of my oldest Russian acquaintances said, “We want to be offered EU membership so that we can turn it down”. There is a real sense of, “We demand to be treated as equals, but sod it, we are not going to behave as if we’re like that”. The idea that the Russian elite would ever accept the disciplines of EU membership is way beyond the pale. We need also to grapple with energy security, and I hope that the Minister will be able to say something about a positive British attitude to investing in Nabucco and making sure that external energy security as well as progress towards a more integrated EU energy market is on the table.
A common European Union policy on Russia ought to be the core of a common foreign policy. One of the real weaknesses of the whole process of a common foreign policy is that we have not made more progress towards this. It is clearly in Britain’s interest, and even some Conservatives recognise that that is the case. I argue that European interests and assumptions in its relations with Russia are closer than British attitudes and assumptions are to those of the United States. I know that the Governor of Alaska believes that if one sits in Alaska one sees relations with Russia much more clearly than those of us who are more distant, but I and members of this party think that it is very clearly in Britain’s interests that we should be working actively towards a more coherent European response of negotiating with the Russians and managing the relationship, but not allowing them to bully the West in the way they would like.
12.25 pm
Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, the House is grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Roper, and his committee for its hard work in preparing this excellent report on the EU and Russia, and I apologise to the noble Lord for missing the first half minute of his speech. We have enjoyed some very well informed contributions. The noble Lord, Lord Truscott, spoke with great authority on energy issues and Russia, as one would expect given that his wife is Russian. The noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, both believe strongly that Georgia and Ukraine should not join NATO. However, I agree with my noble friend Lord Hamilton that not now doing this would send the wrong message to Russia. There is a strong argument for offering them a pathway to joining NATO, despite Russian insistence that this would transgress a very thick red line. Moreover, I certainly
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When this report was written, EU-Russian relations, although already displaying signs of tension, were of a different temperature than they are today. As my noble friend Lord Sheikh said, events have moved very quickly. I believe that the disproportionate Russian response to Georgia must dramatically alter the EU’s view of its neighbour. Even in May, the committee observed:
“The European Union is not facing a new Cold War, but EU-Russia relations are perhaps in a negative phase in a long process of transition which could last for some time”.
This assessment has undoubtedly been corroborated by recent events, and indeed relations have deteriorated further. Although Prime Minister Putin has said that there is,
much of Russia’s recent conduct undermines confidence in that statement. Russia’s genuinely felt resentment and anger over the Western response to the Georgian crisis stands to continue to dog relations despite the recent cooling of the rhetoric, and as several noble Lords have mentioned, NATO expansion remains a potential flashpoint.
Russia’s actions in Georgia have been rightly condemned as disproportionate. The scale of Russian militarisation on the Georgian border always belied Russia’s claim that it was only reacting to a Georgian attack, and mobile phone intercept evidence presented by Georgia now supports the assertion that, despite Georgia’s misjudgments, Russia was the aggressor. Russia believes that it has the right to assert itself in its “near abroad”. Indeed, the EU has acknowledged the sensitivity of the area in the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, as the report makes clear, this should never,
We should go further, as has my right honourable friend William Hague, and say to Georgia:
“That your right to live in peace and freedom was long-awaited and hard-won, that your democracy has every right ultimately to join the alliances of the world democracies, and that the bullying of you or your neighbours must never be allowed to pay”.
Violating a neighbour’s territorial integrity must not translate into increased influence.
Although they have now withdrawn, Russian forces stayed in Georgia for far too long. They dug in around strategic interests such as the port of Poti, hundreds of miles from the south Ossetians they claim they were there to protect. The return of Russian forces to pre-war lines, as outlined in the original agreement, has seemingly been forgotten with the announcement that Russia would keep 7,500 troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Will the Minister confirm that negotiations on a new EU-Russian partnership agreement will not take place under such conditions?
Can the Minister also tell the House whether the 19 observers that Britain has contributed to the EU observer mission have seen any evidence of offences against the civilian population and whether Georgian refugees are being allowed to return to their homes in the region? We must not allow what would be, in all but name, ethnic cleansing.
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The recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence is also unhelpful. There can be no comparison with Kosovo. It has taken eight years to strike the balance between the Kosovo Albanians’ insistence that nothing short of independence would be acceptable, and Serbia’s insistence that it would not yield sovereignty. The Ahtisaari plan is a product of the,
that UN Resolution 1244 called for—a process, if not the result, that Russia supported. The EU must, above all, use the strength of united resolve to defend its interests and oppose aggression.
The EU certainly needs good relations with Russia. Last year the combined trade in goods between the EU and Russia was €232 billion, while the EU was by far the biggest investor in Russia, with €17 billion. The creation of a cyber-terrorism research centre in response to the attack on Estonia is one example where co-operation can help. Support for Ukraine from outside interference regarding its upcoming elections would also be welcome.
Russia will need major investment in the upstream and midstream gas and oil sector in the next two decades. In that context, the recent difficulties that TNK-BP’s joint venture underwent were not helpful to build investor confidence. But it is clear that Russia’s leaders remain in denial, at least publicly, of any connection between their own actions, whether over energy issues or, especially, Georgia, and the loss of investor confidence. So I ask the Minister whether, in Her Majesty’s Government’s discussions with their Russian counterparts, it has been made clear that such belligerence damages business confidence and makes investment less forthcoming.
Last year the EU imported almost €100 billion in oil and gas from Russia. As the committee warned in May, all countries are vulnerable, such is the magnitude of gas imported from just the one country. Russia could,
much as it did to Ukraine in 2006. Do the Government accept the Conservatives’ long-held view that there is an urgent need for a review of our energy security?
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to whom I always listen closely when he speaks on international matters, was critical of EU countries which make their own energy agreements with Russia. My noble friend Lord Hamilton disagreed. There is an argument that we must be careful not to look at Russia only through the EU prism, thereby ignoring all the possibilities for protecting and furthering this country’s interests on a bilateral basis or in concert with other partners away from the collective EU system. It is clear that, on the energy front, our concerns are different from anything that might emerge from a common EU energy policy, which the report anyway concedes is virtually unachievable.
Although, as my noble friend Lord Crickhowell said, our energy position is exposed, we—unlike continental Europe—have the opportunity via Norway and our own North Sea, plus LNG imports, to depend less on Gazprom and the Russians generally. But I
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On the subject of trade, Russia dropped to 143rd out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s corruption perception index. What work is being done to minimise corruption in Russian business practices and its impact on British companies operating there?
We also need strong relations with Russia to deal with important foreign policy challenges. The Russian veto of the UN Security Council resolution on Zimbabwe was deeply disappointing We cannot afford similar divisions to debilitate negotiations with Iran on nuclear proliferation. What conversations have Her Majesty’s Government had with their Russian counterparts on this pressing issue?
Russia has nothing to fear from the EU or NATO and much to gain. We have an obligation to convince Russia that the US missile defence system to be based in Poland and the Czech Republic is not a threat, but rather to mitigate a threat from the Middle East. The Russian president’s response that Russia would upgrade all its weapons platforms including its nuclear deterrent by 2020 is unwelcome and suggests that we have not yet succeeded.
Despite our differences, we have held out the hand of friendship to Russia. We want to continue to do so, for we genuinely believe it to be to the benefit of all. But our relationship must be based on mutual respect, and I support the committee’s view that this should be combined with a hard-headed and unsentimental approach by the EU as well as by our own Government.
12.37 pm
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Malloch-Brown): My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Roper, and the European Union Committee on producing this detailed and thoughtful report, which makes an important contribution to our understanding of EU-Russia relations. My officials wanted me to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Roper, on both the publication of this report—rather perversely in that case—and the scheduling of the debate. While we can certainly agree that the debate is well timed, it is a little harder to conclude that the report’s timing was perfect given what has happened since its publication. Having heard earlier from the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, that this was the second time that this had happened to the committee, we can only fear what its next subject might be and devoutly hope that it is not the global economy.
Whatever the inevitable redundancy of some of the report given what has happened since, the basic analysis holds up extraordinarily well and the events of the summer do not shake its fundamental conclusions. Before we return to the circumstances of Georgia, it is worth reminding ourselves that the common challenges that the EU and Russia face—tackling climate change, the long-term security of our energy supplies and the broader issues, which have not been much mentioned today, of promoting peace in the Middle East and combating the threat of a nuclear Iran—are key issues on which we must be able to maintain a constructive
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My noble friend Lord Truscott said that the economic costs of the conflict had no doubt been very much underestimated by the Russians, who I am sure had not foreseen the impact on stock prices. He suggested that this was their Suez, a point to which the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, returned. Well, perhaps—it was certainly their sub-prime. Suez has an association that we should perhaps question because our near east is very different from their near neighbourhood. It is worth observing that, for the Russians, real issues of their security and confidence in the motives of the West have been raised by NATO enlargement. Whatever the agreement that we will all find in needing to deal firmly with the Russians and remind them of Europe’s collective red lines, we also need to recognise, as many noble Lords have said today, just how provocative recent events have appeared in Russian eyes, beginning with the promise of enlargement and continuing through the events of August. In that regard, a proper part of any long-term response is to find ways to reassure Russia that we want a peaceful, constructive relationship and that, just as we expect Russia to live by the rules of a civilised international order, we remain equally devoted to that ourselves.
In dealing with Georgia, while I hear noble Lords who say that we must look at UK national interests as well, even if those might in some ways diverge from those of Europe as a whole—allowing that as a debating point for a moment—I do not think that it detracts from the fact that our power to influence Russia comes from our ability to forge a common European position. It is the voice of Europe that will stall Russia in its actions, not the voice, I believe, of the UK alone. Our effort to make sure that there is a common European position is enormously important to our handling of this crisis since it began.
Russia’s response to what happened in South Ossetia and Abkhazia was clearly utterly disproportionate. Whatever the rights and wrongs of how this began, Russia breached all the expectations and rules of the international community in the scale of their response and their slowness and reluctance to withdraw troops since. Even if, as many noble Lords have said, the Georgian actions were ill considered and provocative, that does not excuse the Russian response.
It is in that context that we have sought to work with the French presidency as well as our fellow members to forge a clear strategy. It began with the extraordinary European Council meeting on 1 September, which sent a clear message of support for Georgia and underlined the importance of Russia living up to all her international commitments and obligations, including honouring the commitments that it had made under the peace plan brokered by President Sarkozy. I join others in saying how fortunate we were that France has the presidency at this time, because there was an astonishingly swift and united response to the crisis.
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As to the ultimate issue of complete access under the agreement with President Sarkozy, we need to hear the reports next week to the GAERC and the European Council before confirming that we believe that complete access has been secured. However, we can already say that not just the EU but the OSCE and the UN appear to be receiving the access broadly that they need to carry out their mandate.
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