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On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 58, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 59 [Notification of changes]:
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendments Nos. 97E and 97F:
97E: Clause 59, page 42, line 34, at end insert “, or
(d) from detention under the Immigration Acts,”
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendment No. 97G:
97G: Clause 59, page 43, line 9, leave out “or section 60 (periodic notification)” and insert “, section 60 (periodic notification) or section (Notification on return after absence from UK) (notification on return after absence from UK).”
The noble Lord said: These are amendments to the notification scheme in Part 4. They make provision in relation to circumstances where someone subject to the notification requirements is abroad, voluntarily on holiday or on business for example, or following a removal, such as having been deported or extradited from the United Kingdom.
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Under the Bill, a person subject to the notification requirements who is abroad when they are due to notify technically commits an offence if they fail to return to the UK to notify any changes to notified information or to make their annual re-notification. We do not think this is appropriate; these amendments rectify that by effectively suspending the requirement to notify while a person subject to the requirements is abroad. They would then be required to notify their details, if notification was due, within three days of their return to the UK. The amendments also tighten up the rules so that a person who voluntarily goes abroad must notify of any details due to be notified before they go, even if this shortens the normal three-day period a person has to notify such information.
The new clause suspends the requirement for a person to make an initial notification where a person is removed from the UK within three days of the end of their detention. Where a person is deported immediately following their period in custody for the terrorism offence or immigration detention, they will not have to make their initial notification, but where a person leaves the country voluntarily because, for example, they want to go to France immediately they come out of prison, they will have to make their initial notification before they go, even if they go less than three days after their release. Such a person will also need to inform the police of the details of their intended travel plans because of the provisions in Clause 63 which allow the Secretary of State to require those subject to the notification requirements to provide such information. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 59, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 60 [Periodic re-notification]:
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendment No. 97H:
97H: Clause 60, page 43, line 18, at end insert “or
( ) section (Notification on return after absence from UK) (notification on return after absence from UK),”
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendment No. 97J:
The noble Lord said: These amendments simply seek to improve the drafting of Clause 60. They do not change the policy or the operational use of notification requirements. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendments Nos. 97K and 97L:
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 60, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 61 [Method of notification and related matters]:
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendment No. 97M:
97M: Clause 61, page 43, line 31, at end insert “, or
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( ) section (Notification on return after absence from UK) (notification on return after absence from UK).”
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 61, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 62 [Meaning of “local police area”]:
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendments Nos. 97N and 97P:
97N: Clause 62, page 44, line 17, leave out from “court” to end of line 19 and insert “of trial was situated.”
97P: Clause 62, page 44, line 19, at end insert—
“(1A) In subsection (1)(c) “the court of trial” means—
(a) the court by or before which the conviction or finding was made by virtue of which the notification requirements apply to the person, or
(b) if that conviction or finding was one substituted on an appeal or reference, the court by or before which the proceedings were taken from which the appeal or reference was brought.”
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 62, as amended, agreed to.
7.15 pm
Clause 64 [Period for which notification requirements apply]:
Baroness Falkner of Margravine moved Amendment No. 98:
The noble Baroness said: These amendments are also in the name of my noble friend Lady Miller. Before I go to the specifics of this clause—and I am having a second bite of the cherry—I want to say a few words by way of background briefing to these amendments. The noble Lord knows that situations will arise where the court and indeed the authorities accept that a person convicted of a serious terrorist offence in the past has genuinely and permanently renounced violence. A notable feature of the Northern Ireland peace process has been the involvement of those previously associated with sectarian violence. The notification requirements are not intended to be a punishment. If they were, they would be in breach of the bar on retrospective punishment contained in Article 7 of the Human Rights Act. Instead, they are intended to allow details of those convicted of terrorist offences to be kept for public safety purposes. It would serve no purpose and would be a questionable use of police resources not to allow scope within the Bill to review the notification requirements for those who, at some future assessment, are found to present no risk to public safety.
As the Bill is constructed, there is an indefinite period for serious cases and a 10-year period for less serious ones. The amendments would effectively put break clauses in those periods every five years. The initial notification period would be five years, and in the case of serious offences it could be renewed on a five-yearly basis to the point of being an indefinite notification. For less serious offences the period would be five years in the first instance but could be renewed
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The most important thing is to allow the courts to consider the individual’s circumstances, the environment in which the order is made, and to ensure that the notification orders are still appropriate. They may be inappropriate because the person has changed their views and conduct entirely, and can demonstrate that to the satisfaction of the courts—so the bar remains the same in terms of demonstrating that. People who have engaged in terrorist activities can sometimes make quite substantial changes to their lifestyles to the point where they become part of society here in the UK and abroad. Those would be cases where I assume it would be inappropriate to retain a notification procedure.
The circumstances of the individual and their propensity to be a danger to the public may well change. It is appropriate for a court to consider all the matters before it and to decide in a quinquennial review whether the notification procedure is still required. If necessary, the courts can renew it; if not, onerous requirements on the individual will be lifted at the point where they cease to have an effect in protecting the public rather than being a burden on the individual. That is a punitive burden rather than one for the wider good. On that basis, I hope the Minister will consider reviewing the requirement and accept the amendments. I beg to move.
Baroness Hanham: We have some sympathy with the amendments. There are many objections to people being put on a register for ever without any kind of break time or reconsideration. I accept that it will be for serious charges and offences, but there will be gradations, and it seems only sensible that the registration period should be looked at again.
Lord West of Spithead: I have some sympathy with the amendment but the thresholds for the periods of application are set at a level proportionate to the risk posed by convicted terrorists on their release into the community. Where the individual is sentenced for five years or more for a terrorism or terrorism-related offence then, given the evident seriousness of the offence, an indefinite notification period is appropriate. Where a person is sentenced to between one and five years, a period of 10 years is appropriate.
Amendments Nos. 101 and 103 would give the court discretion as to whether the notification requirements should continue to apply beyond the five-year period proposed in the previous amendment. They would allow the notification requirements to be renewed by a court if it considered it necessary for protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism. However, it is not clear to us on what basis an assessment would be conducted of whether the offender is considered to present a continued terrorist risk to the public. It would involve difficult decisions. The fact that a person has not reoffended is not sufficient to establish the absence of such a risk.
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It must be remembered that the notification requirement will apply only to convicted terrorists—that is, those who have been involved in supporting, organising or plotting the most serious of crimes, where often the ultimate purpose is to terrorise and harm large numbers of the public. It is right that the police should have the tools to help monitor those who have been involved in such crimes.
Secondly—this is important—the notification requirements are not onerous; they do not stop the person from doing anything. All they require them to do is to provide the police with information such as where they live, where they are staying for periods if they are not at their home address, if they change their name and if they intend to go overseas. That is all that is required and represents a proportionate interference with a person’s right to a private life given the serious crimes in which they have been involved; they do not stop the person from doing anything.
The notification requirements we are proposing are less onerous than those applied to sex offenders. Terrorism is surely as serious in many ways—if not more so—as the sexual offending that triggers sex offender notification. So, although I have some sympathy with the amendment—I like to think that people can look at something and see whether they can shorten it—in this case we should stay as we are. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine: I am disappointed with the Minister’s reply for a number of reasons. First, he keeps reminding us that the offences would be serious ones and that is why it is necessary to have an indefinite requirement to notify the authorities. Of course, the sum of the measures in the amendments is not necessarily to reduce the term for which the person would be required to notify the authorities. We are seeking to put in place a periodic review so that it can be seen whether or not the person still posed a risk. In the cases I outlined and the examples I gave, the net effect for the different tiers of offences would still be exactly what the Government want in the legislation. But the amendment would provide an opportunity to decide that public safety was no longer threatened at some point in the person’s life.
There is another reason why I am disappointed. I do not go in for cultural relativism and, as noble Lords will remember from Second Reading, when I reassured the House on this matter, I do not go in for special pleading for communities or religious groups, particularly not those that I belong to. However, the repetition that we have had throughout the course of the Bill, comparing terrorist offences, particularly in the area of notification, to sex offences, sex offenders’ registers and so on is unhelpful. The Minister knows the community I am talking about extremely well—I am full of admiration for his knowledge in that regard—and he knows that for this particular religious group there is enormous stigma attached to being associated with or compared in any way to people who might be on a sex offenders’ register. Perhaps we might move away from those kinds of analogies.
The requirements may not be onerous but they can affect periods of a person’s life, particularly when they last decades. We know from demographics how long
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I am trying to inject a degree of pragmatism while recognising that people change, which is the whole basis of our belief in rehabilitation. On that basis I feel a little frustrated.
Lord West of Spithead: I am moved and my view has shifted as a result of the noble Baroness’s words. I will take this away and look at what pragmatically can be done. There is a real difficulty in making these assessments at certain stages but there should be some break points. If I take this away and look at it, it is to be hoped that that will meet the requirement.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: After listening to the noble Baroness, perhaps I might make a suggestion. Her basic idea is that a person may have changed fundamentally—as happened, for example, in Northern Ireland. One way of dealing with that would be for the person who is the subject of a notification requirement to be able to apply to the court to have it lifted on satisfying the court that there is no longer any danger. Something of that kind might meet the point rather than having a quinquennial review. Different people may not be affected at all during the five years whereas an individual may have a good case. It would limit the amount of bureaucracy required by a quinquennial review.
Lord West of Spithead: I thank the noble and learned Lord for his suggestion. I shall look at it as a possibility.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine: Sometimes it is advantageous to have fewer people in the Committee because we can shift positions and reach a consensus more easily when we are lonelier. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his interesting suggestion. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for his emollience in this matter. I look forward to working with him to see whether we can get anywhere. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendments Nos. 98A to 100:
99: Clause 64, page 45, line 35, at end insert—
“(iia) an indeterminate custodial sentence under Article 13 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1216 (N.I. 1),
(iib) an extended custodial sentence under Article 14 of that Order for a term of 5 years or more,”
On Question, amendments agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 101 to 104 not moved.]
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendments Nos. 104A and 104B:
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 64, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 65 [Offences relating to notification]:
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendments Nos. 104C to 104E:
104C: Clause 65, page 46, line 38, after “Kingdom)” insert “, or
section (Notification on return after absence from UK) (notification on return after absence from UK)”
104D: Clause 65, page 46, line 44, after “Kingdom),” insert “or
section (Notification on return after absence from UK) (notification on return after absence from UK),”
104E: Clause 65, page 47, line 18, after “Kingdom),” insert “or
section (Notification on return after absence from UK) (notification on return after absence from UK),”
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 65, as amended, agreed to.
Lord West of Spithead moved Amendments Nos. 104F and 104G:
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