Select Committee on Communications Written Evidence


Memorandum by the Competition Commission

OVERVIEW

  Certain mergers between large companies raise competition concerns because they might reduce the competitive pressure on the merged companies, so allowing unnecessary price increases, and/or reductions in product range or quality, and/or reduced innovation. Ministers no longer decide whether such mergers should take place. This task was in effect delegated to expert competition authorities (the Office of Fair Trading—"the OFT" and the Competition Commission—"the CC") by the Enterprise Act 2002.

  Whether or not they raise competition concerns, certain mergers raise public interest considerations. Media mergers in particular may raise plurality concerns because they might concentrate newspaper and other media ownership in too few hands, to the detriment of the quality of journalism and broadcasting. The Communications Act 2003 accordingly gives the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform the power to intervene in such mergers. Following his intervention, he receives advice from the OFT, Ofcom and his departmental officials. If he decides to make a reference, the CC undertakes a detailed investigation and makes recommendations to the SoS. He then receives further advice as appropriate before he finally decides whether the merger is allowed to go ahead. Parliament did not feel it appropriate for an unelected body, with a specialist competition remit to make decisions on broader public interest concerns.

  There are slightly different processes for newspaper and broadcast media mergers.

  There are also slightly different processes for:

    —    Smaller media mergers (ie those too small to be caught by general competition law—called special mergers in the legislation), and

    —    European relevant merger situations (those whose competition aspects fall to be dealt with by the European Commission).

  The rest of this note summarises:

    —    the standard UK merger regime;

    —    public interest considerations;

    —    the public interest regime, including;

    —  the newspaper public interest provisions, and

    —  the broadcast media and cross media public interest considerations.

    —    The public interest regime process;

    —    the special rules applying to special merger situations;

    —    the special rules applying to European relevant merger situations;

    —    the remedies available in public interest cases;

    —    the role and resources of the CC; and

    —    the chronology of the current investigation into BSkyB's 17.9% shareholding in ITV.

THE STANDARD UK MERGER REGIME

  Under the standard UK merger regime, transactions may be subject to review where a "relevant merger situation is created". This applies to share acquisitions and asset acquisitions provided that what is being acquired is an enterprise. A relevant merger situation is created where "enterprises cease to be distinct" and either the turnover test or the share of supply test is satisfied. The concept of "enterprises ceasing to be distinct" is a relatively broad one. It is defined as enterprises coming under common ownership or common control. Three levels of control are identified in the Enterprise Act:

    (i)  a controlling interest (legal control);

    (ii)  de facto control of policy; and

    (iii)  material influence over policy.

  The turnover test will be satisfied if the UK turnover of the acquired enterprise exceeds £70 million. The share of supply test will be satisfied if, as a result of the merger, at least 25% of goods or services of any description supplied in the UK or in a substantial part of the UK are supplied by or to the merged entity. In order for the share of supply test to be satisfied, there must be an overlap in the activities of the parties.

  Under the standard merger regime, the initial review of mergers is carried out by the OFT. Where the OFT considers that it is or may be the case that a merger may give rise to a substantial lessening of competition (an SLC), it is under a duty to refer that merger to the CC for in-depth investigation. However, the OFT has the ability in such cases to accept undertakings from the parties in lieu of a reference to the CC. It may decide to do this where the competition issue identified is clear and where a comprehensive solution of the problem can be easily identified.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS

  The Enterprise Act retained the ability of Ministers to intervene in mergers where certain specified public interest considerations are raised. Intervention is only possible in relation to public interest criteria that are specified in the Enterprise Act. It is possible for additional public interest criteria to be added by primary legislation or by affirmative resolution placed before both Houses of Parliament.

  At the time that the Act was introduced, the only public interest specified was national security. Although often regarded as synonymous with defence, national security is defined in the Act as including public security and is broader than defence. It could for example cover security of supply issues in relation to energy companies or the maintenance of essential medical treatment facilities within the UK.

  The Communications Act 2003 added further public interest criteria to the Enterprise Act. These relate to:

    —    newspaper mergers,

    —    mergers involving broadcast media, and

    —    cross media mergers involving both broadcast media and newspaper enterprises.

  The newspaper merger public interest provisions were introduced to replace the special newspaper merger regime that applied under the Fair Trading Act 1973 (and which had not been repealed when the Enterprise Act was introduced). The special newspaper merger regime was introduced in 1965 in response to concerns that increasing concentration of newspaper ownership in too few hands could stifle the expression of opinion and distort the presentation of news. As a result, newspaper mergers were subject to a stricter regime than other mergers and where the relevant jurisdictional tests were satisfied, a transfer of a newspaper was unlawful and void without the prior consent of the Secretary of State. With certain limited exceptions, the Secretary of State could not consent to the transfer without a reference to the CC. This regime was felt to be too burdensome and it was decided that introducing a discretion for Ministers to intervene in newspaper mergers that appeared to raise public interest concerns was more appropriate.

  Under the Enterprise Act, the public interest considerations that relate to newspaper mergers are the need for:

    —    accurate presentation of the news in newspapers;

    —    free expression of opinion in newspapers; and,

    —    to the extent reasonable and practicable, a sufficient plurality of views in newspapers in each market for newspapers in the UK or a part of the UK.

  These considerations were ones that had been identified in cases that had been examined under the Fair Trading Act special newspaper merger regime.

  One of the changes brought about by the Communications Act 2003 was a relaxation in the media ownership rules. In return for a relaxation in these rules, it was considered appropriate for Ministers to have an ability to intervene in relation to such mergers. As a result, the broadcast media and cross media public interest considerations were also added to the Enterprise Act. These public considerations are:

    —    the need for a sufficient plurality of persons with control of media enterprises serving each audience;

    —    the need for a wide range of high quality broadcasting; and

    —    the need for persons carrying on media enterprises to have a genuine commitments to the broadcasting standards objectives set out in the Communications Act 2003.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST MERGER REGIME PROCESS

  There are three different types of public interest merger situation identified in the Enterprise Act: public interest mergers, special public interest mergers and European relevant merger situations. The procedures and considerations that apply differ according to which of these types of merger is under review.

  A public interest merger is a relevant merger situation (ie one that satisfies the jurisdictional test described above) which raises one or more of the specified public interest considerations. The OFT has a duty to bring to the Secretary of State's attention any mergers that it consider may raise public interest issues. Also by their very nature, mergers raising public interest concerns are likely to attract media coverage. Cases raising national security concerns tend to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State by the Ministry of Defence.

  Where the Secretary of State has concerns about the impact of the merger on public interest grounds that he considers require further investigation he will issue an intervention notice. The Secretary of State can issue an intervention notice at any point until the OFT makes a decision on whether or not to refer the merger to the CC on competition grounds. In practice, the Secretary of State has indicated an intention to make a decision on whether or not to intervene within 10 working days of the later of: the transaction being notified to the OFT, or the transaction being brought to his attention. The parties to the merger are given an opportunity to make written representations to the Secretary of State on whether he should issue an intervention notice.

  If the Secretary of State decides to issue an intervention notice, the notice must specify the public interest consideration that the Secretary of State considers may be relevant. The procedure following the issuance of an intervention notice differs according to the public interest consideration specified in the notice.

  Where national security is specified, the effect of the notice is to require the OFT to prepare a report for the Secretary of State by the date specified in the notice. The issues to be addressed in the report are whether the transaction in question is a relevant merger situation, the OFT's competition analysis and an assessment of whether the merger does give rise to public interest concerns. In order to prepare its report, the OFT will carry out a consultation seeking third party views on the public interest issue.

  Where the intervention notice specifies a newspaper or media public interest consideration, the effect of the notice is to require both the OFT and Ofcom to prepare reports for the Secretary of State. The OFT's report will address jurisdictional issues and the competition assessment. It is Ofcom's role in such cases to advise the Secretary of State on the public interest issues raised by the merger and to carry out the consultation seeking third party views on the impact of the transaction on the media public interest consideration specified in the notice. The OFT's report may include a summary of any representations on the media public interest considerations that it has received, but it is not under an obligation to seek out those views.

  The Secretary of State takes these reports into account in deciding whether or not to refer the merger to the CC for further investigation. If he decides that the public interest consideration specified in the notice is not relevant to the transaction, the case will revert to a competition only assessment and the OFT will decide whether or not to refer the merger to the CC on competition grounds. Otherwise, the Secretary of State will balance any identified competition detriment against the public interest considerations in deciding whether to refer the merger, seek undertakings in lieu of a reference or to clear the merger outright. The Secretary of State is obliged to accept the OFT's assessment on the jurisdictional issue and on the impact on competition. If no impact on competition is identified then the Secretary of State cannot refer the merger on competition grounds but he may make a reference on public interest grounds alone. If a competition problem is identified by the OFT, then the Secretary of State must treat this as being adverse to the public interest unless he considers that the competition concerns are outweighed by the national security or newspaper/media public interest considerations.

  Where a merger is referred to the CC on competition and public interest grounds, the investigation carried out by the CC is broadly similar to an investigation carried out on competition grounds alone. There are certain differences in relation to media mergers: where the reference decision specifies a newspaper public interest consideration, the Group of members appointed by the CC to conduct the investigation must include at least one member of the CC's specialist newspaper panel and if three such members are appointed to the Group, the Group may consist entirely of those members. This only applies in relation to newspaper mergers or cross media mergers where a newspaper public interest consideration is specified. The other difference to the CC's procedures is that where the reference specifies a media public interest consideration, the CC is under a duty to have regard to the need for consultation in order to obtain a representative cross section of opinion of those who may be affected by the media merger. In practice, consultation forms an important part of CC investigations regardless of the industry involved.

  The CC carries out its investigations and prepares a report for the Secretary of State. In cases referred on both competition and public interest grounds that report contains the CC's decisions on whether the transaction qualifies as a relevant merger situation, and whether taking account of any SLC identified by it and the public interest consideration(s) specified in the reference decision, the merger operates, or may be expected to operate against the public interest. If the CC decides that the merger does operate against the public interest, the CC must decide whether remedial action should be taken by the Secretary of State, or whether the Secretary of State should recommend that others take remedial action in order to address the adverse effect on the public interest. The CC's report also contains its decision as to what remedial action is appropriate in the circumstances.

  If the reference was made on the basis of public interest concerns alone, the CC does not carry out any competition assessment and its report will address only the jurisdictional issue and the public interest issue(s).

  The CC has 24 weeks (extendable by up to 8 weeks) to carry out its investigation and send its report to the Secretary of State. Where the reference decision contained a newspaper or media public interest consideration, the CC is also required to provide a copy of its report to Ofcom and Ofcom can provide the Secretary of State with advice on the newspaper/media public interest consideration and on any appropriate remedial action. Following receipt of the CC's report the Secretary of State is required to publish his decision on whether or not to make an adverse public interest finding within 30 working days of receipt of the report. The Secretary of State must accept the CC's conclusions on jurisdiction and on competition (where applicable). If the Secretary of State makes an adverse public interest finding, he must consider the question of remedies and although he must have regard to the CC's findings on this issue, the final decision on remedies lies with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State also has responsibility for publishing the CC's report (subject to any excisions that may be required).

SPECIAL MERGER SITUATIONS

  The Enterprise Act recognises that public interest considerations may be relevant in relation to mergers that fall below the jurisdictional thresholds that apply in the standard merger regime. As a result, it is possible for the Secretary of State to intervene in certain mergers that fall below these thresholds. In cases raising national security concerns, intervention is possible if one of the parties is a defence contractor. In newspaper mergers intervention is possible if one of the parties has a pre-existing share of supply of newspapers of any description in the UK or in a substantial part of the UK of at least 25%. This differs from the standard jurisdictional test in that there is no need for there to be an overlap between the parties' activities under the special merger regime. Similarly, in mergers involving broadcast media enterprises, intervention is possible where one of the parties has a pre-existing share of supply of broadcasting of any description in the UK or in a substantial part of the UK of at least 25%.

  In order to investigate the public interest issues in relation to such smaller mergers, the Secretary of State can issue a special intervention notice. A special intervention notice can be issued at any time up to four months from the date of completion of the merger, but as for public interest mergers, the Secretary of State has indicated that he will aim to decide whether or not to intervene within 10 working days of the merger coming to his attention. The effect of the special intervention notice is similar to the effect of an intervention notice. However, in such cases, no competition assessment is carried out by the OFT. If the Secretary of State decides to refer a special merger situation to the CC for further investigation, the CC will not carry out a competition analysis and its report will deal only with the jurisdictional and public interest issues.

EUROPEAN RELEVANT MERGER SITUATIONS

  The Enterprise Act also makes provision for the Secretary of State to intervene on public interest grounds in relation to mergers that are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Commission under the EC Merger Regulation. Again intervention is only possible in relation to one of the public interest considerations specified in the Enterprise Act and provided that the jurisdictional thresholds under the standard merger regime are satisfied (ie that the merger would be a relevant merger situation if it were not subject to the European Commission's jurisdiction). Intervention is such cases starts with the Secretary of State issuing a European intervention notice. Since the European Commission had exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the competition assessment in such cases, the OFT's report will not include assessment of the impact on competition of the merger. Any reference to the CC will be on public interest grounds alone and the CC's report will deal only with the jurisdictional and public interest issues.

REMEDIES IN PUBLIC INTEREST CASES

  Remedies in public interest cases can take the form of undertakings given by the parties and accepted by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State also has power to impose an order remedying the issues identified. The Enterprise Act has specific provisions relating to matters that may be included in an order made in relation to mergers specifying a national security public interest consideration or a newspaper public interest consideration. The measures identified in relation to mergers raising newspaper public interest considerations are based on remedies that were used in relation to newspaper mergers under the previous special newspaper merger regime and illustrate the sorts of remedies that the CC may consider in its reports on mergers involving newspapers. They include:

    —    an ability to alter the constitution of a body corporate (for example in connection with the appointment of directors to ensure their independence or the establishment of an editorial board);

    —    an ability to require the agreement of the Secretary of State or another person, before taking specified action such as appointing or dismissing editors, journalists, directors or shadow directors;

    —    attaching conditions to the operation of a newspaper; and

    —    prohibiting consultation or co-operation between subsidiaries.

  The Role and Resources of the Competition Commission

  Only a relatively small number of mergers are referred to the CC for investigation (12 so far in 2007, including BSkyB). The investigations are these days quite substantial affairs, to which the parties (ie the companies) will devote considerable resources. The CC itself is therefore well resourced with strong teams of economists, lawyers and others supporting "Groups" of decision makers ("Commission Members") who are quite independent from the Government and drawn from a wide range of professional, business and other backgrounds. It is free to (and frequently does) employ industry experts, consultants and others, depending both on workload and on the need for particular expertise.

  As well as investigating mergers, the CC also investigates markets (such as the groceries market and London Airports) and acts as an appeal body from certain decisions by utility regulators. Its total budget is just over £20m pa. The CC feels that it is well resourced and has the necessary experience to decide competition questions applying well-established tests.

  The CC believes that it has access to the necessary resources, and appropriate skills, to investigate media mergers, to report facts, and to give advice to Ministers. But it does not seem appropriate for a specialist competition authority to make final decisions where broader public interest concerns are at stake.

10 December 2007





 
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