Select Committee on Constitution Eleventh Report


RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE, THE JUDICIARY AND PARLIAMENT: FOLLOW-UP REPORT


Introduction

1.  In July 2007, we published a report on Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament which analysed the evolving constitutional relationships between the three arms of the state and made a series of recommendations to both the Government and the judiciary.[1] The report in particular focused upon the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the creation of the Ministry of Justice, which occurred during the inquiry.

2.  In the report, we emphasised the importance of the Lord Chancellor fulfilling his duty to defend the independence of the judiciary (recognised by section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) by ensuring that ministers do not impugn individual judges (and to restrain and reprimand those who do) and recommended the inclusion in the Ministerial Code of "strongly worded guidelines setting out the principles governing public comment by ministers on individual judges".[2] We also criticised the Government's handling of the creation of the Ministry of Justice and called for a transparent process for the setting of the budget of Her Majesty's Courts Service, with appropriate judicial involvement.[3] Other recommendations to the Government concerned the status of the Lord Chancellor, the involvement of the Law Officers in policy-making and legislative drafting, and the possible use of advisory declarations by the courts to rule on whether recently enacted legislation is compatible or incompatible with the Human Rights Act.

3.  The report also examined the judiciary's channels of communication with the media and the public. Whilst we criticised sections of the media for irresponsible coverage of judges, we also concluded that the senior judiciary should act more quickly in explaining judicial decisions in controversial cases and recommended that "consideration be given to appointing one or more spokesmen with appropriate qualifications and legal experience who would be permitted to speak to the media with the aim of securing coverage which accurately reflects the judgment or sentencing decision".[4] We also considered the appearance of judges before select committees, the role of the Lord Chief Justice and his annual report, and the interaction of individual judges with the media.

4.  In October 2007 the Government published their response to our report[5] and the Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw MP, appeared before the Committee. The judiciary also provided a response that month—their first to a select committee—and the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, subsequently gave evidence to the Committee on two occasions. Both of the responses and the three transcripts are reproduced with this report. Our aim in publishing this report is to analyse the responses by the Government and judiciary and to assess progress made since the original report. The report would have been published sooner but we wanted to hear the reaction of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers to the Framework Document for HMCS[6] and to complete our correspondence with the Editors' Code of Practice Committee[7] before finalising our position on the issues.

The Government's Response and Evidence

MINISTERS AND JUDGES

5.  In our original report we discussed in particular the political reaction to the Craig Sweeney case. Sweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment for abducting and sexually assaulting a three-year-old girl in June 2006 but, in accordance with the sentencing guidelines, he was given a minimum tariff of five years and 108 days. The then Home Secretary, Dr John Reid MP, subsequently attacked the sentence as "unduly lenient" and asked the Attorney General to examine the case as the tariff "does not reflect the seriousness of the crime". On a BBC Radio 4 programme, Vera Baird MP, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Department for Constitutional Affairs, stated that the sentence was wrong (an assertion she later acknowledged was incorrect and for which she issued a formal apology). In our report, we found that there had been a "systemic failure" in the operation of the new relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary, concluding that Lord Falconer, then Lord Chancellor, had failed to fulfil his duty to ensure that ministers do not impugn individual judges and to restrain and reprimand those who do and that the senior judiciary could also have acted more quickly to head off the inflammatory and unfair press coverage that followed the sentencing decision.[8]

6.  We are disappointed that the Government response did not accept our criticism of the conduct of Lord Falconer.[9] Whilst it is true that he eventually spoke out "fully and forcefully in public in defence of the judge in the Sweeney case", we continue to believe that he should have done so sooner and that the Government should have disassociated themselves more quickly from the comments of the Home Secretary. It remains our view that the Home Secretary's comments were wholly inappropriate.

7.  We note that the Government response stated that Lord Falconer's successor, Jack Straw MP, "will not shirk his responsibility in reminding ministers that they need to be extremely careful not to attack judges".[10] In oral evidence, Mr Straw commented that "we [the Government] are regularly going to be respondents to actions and quite frequently will lose those, and we have to take it on the chin without a huge amount of complaint" and that "we may regret a particular decision and we are entitled to say that, but not to do that in a disrespectful way" (Q 10). He also made clear that, if the Government was in imminent danger of infringing the rule of law, he would speak "first of all privately to colleagues, and then publicly, if necessary". Pushed further, he stated that "publicly" meant "on the floor of the House of Commons or in the public print" (QQ 11 and 13).

8.  In the original report, we concluded that the Lord Chancellor's execution of this responsibility would be made easier if the Ministerial Code was amended so as to set out "the principles governing public comment by ministers on individual judges".[11] We are therefore pleased that the Government said in their response that they would "further consider the Committee's recommendations when the Code is next updated".[12] We reiterate the importance of amending the Ministerial Code so that it gives clear and unambiguous guidance to ministers about how they should or should not comment about judges in public. We will review the position when the Government next update the Code.

THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

9.  We now turn to the creation of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Whilst we do not wish to prolong the debate about the way in which this episode was handled by the Government, we do draw attention to the statement in the response that the then Lord Chancellor "discussed the possibility of a Ministry of Justice with the Lord Chief Justice as soon as he judged it appropriate".[13] This overlooks the fact that Lord Falconer himself only found out the plans the day before the then Lord Chief Justice read about them in The Sunday Telegraph.[14] It is bad enough that the Lord Chief Justice was not consulted in advance about the proposed MoJ, but it is completely unacceptable that the Lord Chancellor—the minister who, under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, has express duties to be the guardian of the rule of law and the Government's main conduit to the judiciary—was kept in the dark. We trust that the Government will, in the event of future constitutional reforms or "machinery of government" changes impacting significantly on the judiciary, involve both the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice at a sufficiently early stages of the policy-making process.

10.  In spite of the failure of the Government response to recognise that the Government seriously mishandled the creation of the MoJ, it is encouraging that Jack Straw has since recognised the concerns that the judiciary felt at the time:

    "There was very great frustration by the senior judiciary about the manner in which the announcement had been made about the establishment of a Ministry, which was made over one weekend in January, and then the subsequent speed with which it took place, and from their point of view they are concerned that they have been presented for the second time—I paraphrase what they are saying but I think very accurately—in the space of three years they have been presented with a fait accompli" (Q 30).

11.  Moreover, when he took over as Lord Chancellor Mr Straw took a commendably conciliatory approach towards reaching agreement with the judiciary on the unresolved issues surrounding, primarily, the status of Her Majesty's Courts Service and the funding of the courts.[15] In particular, in the light of concerns expressed[16] by the judiciary about the tight parameters that Lord Falconer had placed on discussions, he broadened those parameters[17] and expressed willingness "to consider all issues which are of concern to the judiciary" (Q 37). Furthermore, he told this Committee that "I intend to move heaven and earth to ensure that what happened a couple of years ago, where the Court Service took a hit because of pressures on the legal aid budget, will not happen again" and that "I am not willing to see … the Court Service and the judiciary pay for increases in legal aid" (Q 32). He also made clear that he would not move money from the courts budget to pay for prisons, which had been one of the judiciary's key concerns (Q 34).

12.  Finally, in January 2008, the Lord Chancellor and the then Lord Chief Justice reached agreement on a partnership model for the operation of Her Majesty's Court Service (HMCS), including the funding of the courts system.[18] Subsequently, on 1 April, a formal Framework Document for HMCS was laid before Parliament.[19] Under the agreement, the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice would jointly agree the aims and objectives of HMCS and the priorities for, and division of, funding within HMCS. The Lord Chief Justice would also have the right to communicate to the Chancellor of the Exchequer the views of the judiciary on the provision and allocation of resources during Spending Review negotiations. HMCS staff would owe a joint duty to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice for the effective and efficient operation of the courts. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers told us on 9 July 2008 that the agreement had resolved the tensions between the judiciary and ministers. He also stated that the HMCS budget would be subject to "a kind of ring-fencing" (QQ 10 and 11).

13.  We welcome the agreement between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary on Her Majesty's Court Service and look forward to seeing it operate smoothly. We further commend the Lord Chancellor for his constructive and open approach towards reaching an agreement acceptable to the judiciary.

14.  We do however have one concern. The original written statement in January stated that the Framework Document for HMCS would be laid before Parliament "together with the consequential amendments to the Concordat".[20] But in the end it was decided that no amendments would be made to the Concordat, even though the new arrangements would supersede paragraphs 24 and 25 of that document. We believe that the Concordat is a document of constitutional importance. We are concerned that the Concordat has not been updated to reflect the new arrangements for Her Majesty's Courts Service, and we call on the Government and the judiciary to establish a practice of amending the Concordat whenever necessary to ensure that it remains a living document reflecting current arrangements rather than being merely a historic document recording the outcome of negotiations in 2005. Consideration should be given to introducing a formal mechanism for laying revised versions of the Concordat before Parliament.

THE POST OF LORD CHANCELLOR

15.  In our report we considered the likely impact of having a Lord Chancellor who, for the time being at least, would also be Secretary of State for Justice and a member of the House of Commons rather than this House. We concluded as follows: "We believe that the role of Lord Chancellor is of central importance to the maintenance of judicial independence and the rule of law. Prime Ministers must therefore ensure that they continue to appoint to the post candidates of sufficient status and seniority".[21] Jack Straw, a longstanding and experienced cabinet minister, certainly fulfils these criteria. It is also clear that he takes his duties as Lord Chancellor very seriously: "I am very conscious of the responsibility that I have as the first Member of the Commons and senior politician to have this role, of the importance of me ensuring that I not only follow to the letter what is required of me in the Constitutional Reform Act but to the spirit in terms of protecting and sustaining the independence of the judiciary". He rightly noted that "the practices and precedents that I set for this job [should] set a baseline for how others comport themselves in the post in the future" (Q 5). Mr Straw also thought it "possible" but "very unlikely" that the posts of Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice would be split up in future (Q 7).

16.  The former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, had some very warm words for Mr Straw: "The Prime Minister … could not have done much better than to appoint somebody with the experience and seniority of Jack Straw [who] went out of his way to state how seriously he took his responsibilities to the rule of law, his responsibilities to the judiciary and his responsibilities to make sure that the justice system is properly resourced". Moreover, he continued, "my relationship with him has been excellent; I have not observed any adverse effect from the size of his portfolio" (6 December 2007, Q 29).

17.  We believe that the posts of Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice should continue to be combined in future. Lord Chancellors in the future, with their responsibilities for the rule of law and the judiciary, should continue to have the authority necessary to fulfil their duties.

The Judiciary's Response and Evidence

ACCOUNTABILITY

18.  One of our key concerns in producing the original report was to ascertain how, under the new constitutional arrangements, the judiciary could remain accountable in what one of our witnesses termed the 'explanatory' (rather than 'sacrificial') sense.[22] This became an even more important question once the Lord Chief Justice was given a greater role in the operation of HMCS, as described above. In our report, we concluded that select committees had a central role to play through the questioning of senior judges in public on the administration of the justice system and on certain key legal issues, but not on individual judgments. We also welcomed the Judicial Executive Board's decision that the Lord Chief Justice should lay an annual report before Parliament, concluding that such a report would "provide a useful opportunity … for [him] to engage effectively with parliamentarians and the public".[23]

19.  The judiciary's response accepted that "if the judiciary is to have the input we would like into all aspects of the administration of justice, then we should account for the way in which we have discharged our administrative responsibilities". With this in mind, it continued, "we see merit in the suggestion that select committees can represent an appropriate and helpful forum for the Lord Chief Justice … to explain his views on aspects of the administration of justice that are of general interest or concern and upon which it is appropriate for the judiciary to comment". However, the judiciary were "cautious" about the suggestion that judges might discuss "key legal issues" with select committees. Whilst it was appropriate "for a judge to comment on the operation and procedures of his or her jurisdiction and the implications of any Bill or Act in these respects", it was important to bear in mind that "a senior judge might, at some stage in the future, be asked to adjudicate on an issue they had commented on in the past". Moreover, they were concerned that "the appearance of judges and magistrates before select committees should not become routine for fear of stepping beyond the proper boundary between the judiciary and Parliament" and that any such appearances should take place only when "truly necessary and appropriate".[24]

20.  We welcome the judiciary's express acknowledgment of the need for accountability in respect of their administrative responsibilities. Whilst we understand and accept the judiciary's concerns about the frequency of judges' appearances before select committees and the topics that should or should not be discussed, we reserve the right to call judges to give evidence whenever we feel it necessary and to ask them about any issues which to us seem appropriate in the circumstances. Select committees can be expected to respect the position of judges when doing so.

21.  The other key accountability mechanism that we identified was the proposed annual report by the Lord Chief Justice. We were therefore pleased that the judiciary's response reaffirmed the commitment to an annual report and suggested that this would be "a key part of the judiciary's explanatory accountability".[25] The then Lord Chief Justice, giving evidence to this Committee on 6 December 2007, elaborated further: "I see the annual report as an answer in large measure to those who ask the question how the judges are going to be accountable. I would say to them that if you want to ask us how we are accountable the answer is that I am going to produce an open report on which I shall be open to questioning and if you want to see what we are doing read the report, and if you have questions raise the questions" (Q 13). The first such report, entitled The Lord Chief Justice's Review of the Administration of Justice in the Courts, was published in March 2008.

22.  In the light of the judiciary's comments, and the importance that he originally placed on an annual report, we were surprised that Lord Phillips subsequently resiled from the commitment to publish such a report on a strictly annual basis. In a letter to Greg Knight MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Procedure Committee, on 25 April 2008 he said that "I do not see that it is either necessary or desirable formally to commit future holders of this post to produce reports on a strict annual basis".[26] Lord Phillips later explained to us that he was "not intending to suggest that we would not be producing [a report] every year"—indeed, he thought it would probably be "a good idea that there should be a regular review each year"—but he did not want to "bind" his successor (9 July 2008, Q 12). Sir Igor (now Lord) Judge felt that "it may not be sensible to produce [a report] every year" but he did "see the force of the point that we are dealing with a public area and you must be able to take us to account whenever you want to" (Q 13).

23.  We agree with Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers that an annual report by the Lord Chief Justice would be an effective way for the judiciary to remain accountable.

COMMUNICATIONS

24.  In assessing the way in which the judiciary communicates with the media and public, we concluded that the Judicial Communications Office (JCO) should be more "active and assertive" in its dealings with the media and suggested that "consideration be given to appointing one or more spokesmen with appropriate qualifications and legal experience who would be permitted to speak to the media with the aim of securing coverage which accurately reflects the judgment or sentencing decision".[27] The judiciary's response accepted that "there may be occasions … when the timely use of a judicial spokesperson, rather than a JCO press officer, to explain sentencing process might help provide a balance in the reportage" and noted that "the Judges' Council is, therefore, considering the best means of developing a proposal … to provide in certain circumstances information through certain serving judges that will assist public understanding".[28]

25.  Subsequently the then Lord Chief Justice confirmed that "we have identified five judges representing different areas of judicial activity and different geographical areas, who are going to receive training in talking to the media and who will then be available as a resource when we need—urgently, very often—a judicial spokesman to perform that role". He added that "deciding which circumstances are appropriate [for comment by those judges] and which are not is the most delicate matter and it has to be done essentially on a case by case basis" and "these judges should be used as a last resort" (6 December 2007, QQ 18 and 23). Lord Phillips told us that "it is important that judges get used to getting on to the communications office if they anticipate that a judgment they are about to give, a sentence that they are about to impose is going to be controversial, so that we can be forewarned that it may be necessary to deal with media comment" (Q 21). He later told us, on 9 July 2008, that the panel of judges had so far given four interviews on sentencing, bail and housing repossession (Q 17).

26.  We welcome the judiciary's decision to appoint five judges to act as judicial spokesmen where appropriate. We hope that this additional resource for the media will help to minimise the kind of misleading and damaging press coverage that resulted from the sentencing of Craig Sweeney.

ADVISORY DECLARATIONS

27.  In our original report, we considered whether the courts could, in appropriate cases, provide greater guidance on the compatibility or otherwise of proposed or recently enacted legislation with the Human Rights Act. We concluded that the Government and the judiciary should look again at using advisory declarations, whereby the courts would make a declaration on the compatibility of recently enacted legislation after hearing submissions from two or more parties in the normal manner.[29] The Government rejected this recommendation.[30] Lord Phillips, when he appeared before us, also had "reservations" about the recommendation because he feared that the judiciary would be "committing itself in advance to an issue that it might then be asked to resolve in an adversarial process" (6 December 2007, Q 3). However, when Lord Woolf—a member of this Committee—explained that we were envisaging advisory declarations being made only after the usual adversarial process, Lord Phillips said that "if it were postulated that this should be done in accordance with our normal court process of having a party on each side putting the rival arguments, then my conclusion might well be different" (Q 4). He added that he thought "there might well be merit" in the proposal as envisaged (Q 5).

28.  It is our view that advisory declarations following an adversarial courtroom process could, with the permission of the Court and in the right circumstances, be a useful way for the courts to give guidance on key questions relating to Convention rights. We note that Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers is open to this proposal. We call on the Government to keep an open mind on whether in appropriate cases seeking an advisory declaration may be beneficial.

The Media

29.  In our original report, analysing the media's impact on public perceptions of the judiciary, we came to the following conclusions:

30.  We sent a copy of our report to Sir Christopher Meyer, Chairman of the Press Complaints Commission (PCC). In his reply, he suggested that "the current Code of Practice, with its rules on accuracy and opportunity to reply, should already provide a way for those wishing to hold to account the sort of newspaper reporting you are concerned about".[31] He did, however, pass on our concerns to the Editors' Code of Practice Committee which reviews the Code.

31.  The Secretary to the Code Committee, Ian Beales, subsequently wrote to us. Echoing Sir Christopher, he explained that the Code Committee "believes the points raised in your Report are already covered by the Code's comprehensive rules on accuracy and opportunity to reply, which provide an effective remedy for erroneous reports of the sort you highlight". He further cautioned that "any further moves to give specific protection to the judiciary would risk interfering with freedom to comment and—by appearing to make the judges a special case—might increase public perceptions that they were out of touch".[32] For these reasons, the Code Committee would not amend the present rules.

32.  We are not in any way convinced by this response. In a follow-up letter, we noted that judges were unable to use the opportunity to reply because they could not discuss their judgments or sentencing decisions outside the courtroom. We said that "judges cannot engage with newspapers in the same way as politicians, businessmen or other individuals. In that sense, they are indeed a 'special case' and should be treated accordingly".[33] We also pointed out that the existing provisions were clearly not working because otherwise newspapers would not continue to publish wholly inappropriate attacks on the judiciary.[34]

33.  In response, Mr Beales asked for a number of clarifications,[35] which we provide here. We are not suggesting a restriction on press criticism of judges, but we are calling for an end to the inflammatory and misleading coverage that has all too often appeared in recent years, particularly in some of the tabloid newspapers. Such coverage is in our view likely simply to undermine confidence in the judicial system and its independence. The consequences of this would be extremely serious. It is for this reason that we again emphasise the need for media coverage to be factually accurate and temperately expressed. The Judicial Communications Office can help to clarify any points of factual uncertainty but, as the judiciary have acknowledged, it would be inappropriate for the Office to attempt to justify individual judgments or sentencing decisions. In our view, it would be helpful for journalists and editors if the Editors' Code of Practice reflected the principles set out above. We expect to see an outcome to the Editors' Code of Practice Committee's deliberations which will respond to our concerns.


1   6th Report (2006-07). Back

2   Ibid, paragraphs 49 and 51. Back

3   Ibid, paragraph 83. Back

4   Ibid, paragraphs 49, 146 and 171. Back

5   Ministry of Justice, Government's Response to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution's Report: Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, Cm 7223. Back

6   See below, paragraphs 11 and 12. Back

7   See below, paragraphs 29-33. Back

8   Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, paragraph 49. Back

9   Cm 7233, paragraphs 1-3. Back

10   Ibid, paragraph 4. Back

11   Paragraph 51. Back

12   Cm 7233, paragraph 6. Back

13   Ibid, paragraph 8. Back

14   Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, paragraph 61. Back

15   See ibid, paragraphs 75-87, for an explanation of the points at issue. Back

16   Ibid, paragraph 65. Back

17   Cm 7233, paragraph 8. Back

18   WS 7, 23 January 2008. Back

19   Her Majesty's Courts Service Framework Document, Cm 7350. Back

20   The Concordat, agreed in 2004 by Lord Falconer of Thoroton (then Lord Chancellor) and Lord Woolf (then Lord Chief Justice), set out the division of responsibilities between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.  Back

21   Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, paragraph 71. Back

22   See ibid, paragraph 122 for an explanation of these different forms of accountability. Back

23   Ibid, paragraph 139. Back

24   Response from the Judiciary, p 24. Back

25   Ibid, p 24. Back

26   Letter not published. Back

27   Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, paragraph 171. Back

28   Response from the Judiciary, p 24. Back

29   Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, paragraph 111. Back

30   Cm 7233, paragraph 18. Back

31   See Appendix 4. Back

32   See Appendix 4. Back

33   See Appendix 4. Back

34   In our report on the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill (9th Report, Session 2007-08, HL Paper 147) we noted that, "The judgment of the Appellate Committee in the Davis case naturally prompted interest in the news media. While most of the coverage was accurate and informative, some journalists and sub-editors in the tabloid press sought to sensationalise the judgment by disparaging the judiciary. We deprecate misrepresentations of the Appellate Committee's role and the Davis judgment." (paragraph 25) Back

35   See Appendix 4. Back


 
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