Select Committee on the Crossrail Bill Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 9300 - 9319)

  9300. MR PURCHAS: If it is going to help your Lordships, we will deal with that later this morning. It is a document from Transport for London to the Department.[15] I will come back to it with Mr Gisby but for the moment can I take your Lordships to paragraph 10. This is the bid from TfL to the Department. "Control of Network Rail activities: It has been agreed that Network Rail will be the Infrastructure Manager for the end-to-end Crossrail services for the purpose of Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems Regulations." That is the qualification that is being added in. "TfL believes that the Department shares TfL's view that Network Rail's role as Infrastructure Manager will be limited to the application of the ROGS. TfL has not agreed that maintenance will be carried out by Network Rail, or that Network Rail will be responsible for capacity allocation. On the issue of maintenance of the central tunnel section, TfL believes that it has been agreed in principle with DfT that TfL will manage the regime and that maintenance will be carried out on a commercial basis, i.e. there will be a commercial contract for maintenance services that may be carried out by Network Rail, subject to performance incentives." Your Lordship will see the stark contrast between that and what the Government has been seeking, and successfully seeking, to secure since 2004 through the rail industry and ensuring that negotiations by TfL and anyone else on a commercial basis for the safety of the system is really inappropriate on the rail network.

  9301. My Lord, it goes on if we go to paragraph 14 at the bottom to "Exemption of the Crossrail tunnel section from regulation under the 1993 Act".[16] This is the first time we have actually seen this suggested: "In the light of DfT's intention to withdraw the railway provisions—your Lordships will recall the ORR's interim decision—"TfL has considered how these concerns might otherwise be addressed." (So we have lost that one, we will see if we can get it in through the back door in some other way). "There are precedents for the exemption of railways from regulation under the 1993 Act. In addition to the LUL and DLR networks, both the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and the section of line from Airport Junction to Heathrow Airport owned by BAA are exempt from the provisions of the 1993 Act. TfL understands that BAA is anxious to retain its rail system as an exempt network." Mr Gisby will show the differences between those and what we are talking about with Crossrail in the middle of the national network. "If an exemption from the licensing and access provisions under the 1993 Act could be granted for the central tunnel section"—and my Lord, Lord Colville, referred to that and the power is there indeed under the Act—"then this would address the issues identified above and specifically offer certainty in order to assist the establishment of a funding mechanism to deliver the required infrastructure. This exemption could be achieved by amendment to the Bill or (and this is the power to which I referred) by order under sections 7 and 20 of the 1993 Act." It goes on to talk about CTRL being privately financed and then 17, and I will pick it up halfway through if I may: "TfL as owner of the CTS would be able to ensure that any usage rights for the CTS are consistent with the regulated access rights over the national network. Certainty of usage charges could be established to maximise the value of the re-financing proposition. If third parties wished to use the infrastructure, TfL would enter into commercial negotiations as to terms." It is driven by commercial incentive. There is nothing wrong with commercial incentive unless it is going to imperil operation, maintenance and safety. "Network Rail would exercise functions as Infrastructure Manager under the ROGS"—that is just the safety regs—"but its role to provide timetabling, train control and engineering access would be carried out under contract. Other services could be unbundled with for instance maintenance being contracted directly by TfL or through Network Rail. The key point being that this would be at TfL's discretion. The nature and extent of Network Rail's role would be controlled through commercial negotiations as would its costs and performance." One might ask where does the ORR fit into all of this. Perhaps I will just read paragraph 20—

  9302. CHAIRMAN: Would you just go on to tell us about the access and management regulations because I am not sure how those fit in with the ROGS.

  9303. MR PURCHAS: The access and management regulations are the senior regulations. They provide for the management of the network; they provide for charging through the ORR; and they also provide for inter-operability. In other words, they deal with the practical operation and access to the railway. They are the senior regulations if you are looking to see who runs this railway. The safety regulations also are effected by the European Directive and deal specifically with the safety management system which has to be in place to run a railway, or indeed other railway assets, and within that there has to be identified an infrastructure manager who is ultimately responsible for safety. But the non sequitur here is to suggest that the infrastructure manager under one set of regs is for all the commercial reasons it makes sense, TfL, being separated from the infrastructure manager for the senior regs, the access and management regulations.

  9304. CHAIRMAN: But does safety include maintenance?

  9305. MR PURCHAS: The standards of safety will be those required under the safety management system. In other words, within that system you will have the safe railway but the responsibility we want for maintenance and operation, who actually plans when the maintenance will be carried out, to what standard, and on what basis, that is something that will be normally looked for as the operator and maintainer, which would be under the access and management regulations. But, my Lord, this is the problem—

  9306. CHAIRMAN: There is no statutory provision which lays down who shall do it?

  9307. MR PURCHAS: My Lord, to say who will actually do it, the responsibility under the safety regulations will be for a safe railway, but so far as the ability to deliver that is concerned, we want that assurance that we should be the operator and maintainer, and normally the network licence would take into account whether you have suitable provisions in place to ensure a safe railway. The conditions that would be imposed are the sorts of duties that your Lordship has seen in our Petition that have been summarised that are placed on us under our network licence.

  9308. CHAIRMAN: The safety must include the maintenance?

  9309. MR PURCHAS: My Lord, you are pushing on a totally open door as far as we are concerned. The idea of making us responsible as safety manager and whether we would be prepared to be safety manager without actually having the ability to deliver an integrated, safe and efficient railway system is a very difficult one, and we for our part find it very disappointing that for commercial reasons this should be the stance taken by the Promoters in this Committee.

  9310. LORD BROOKE OF ALVERTHORPE: Are you saying that unless you could have full responsibility you could not operate the safety regulations?

  9311. MR PURCHAS: My Lord, at this point in time—and this only emerged in the course of the last few weeks and I mean that because although the document was provided to us on 9 April it only filtered upstairs, or down the corridor as I put it, rather more recently—we have asked the Promoters three times for a straight answer on "Are we to operate and maintain this railway?" The first time we got a clear "No" was yesterday. That decision has not yet been taken but clearly we have to consider very carefully whether you could responsibly take on the safety of this system without having the operation and maintenance of it.

  9312. LORD SNAPE: Railtrack did that for years, not particularly successfully, did they not?

  9313. MR PURCHAS: My Lord, that was in the unhappy days before the new White Paper.

  9314. LORD SNAPE: They operated the regime that you are now saying would not be satisfactory from the point of view of your clients but that is how Railtrack operated.

  9315. MR PURCHAS: And Network Rail came into business to put that right under the new approach.

  9316. LORD SNAPE: To put a stop to all that.

  9317. MR PURCHAS: To put a stop to it, my Lord. My Lord, indeed—

  9318. MR ELVIN: I wonder if I could help Mr Purchas, at least to this extent, the document from TfL—and I would like to see the way in which it was provided because that may shed some light on it—is not a document which is endorsed by the Department. It is TfL's bid to the Department just as much as Mr Purchas is making his bid to the Department through your Lordships as to what should happen. Although TfL says, "We think the Department thinks this, we think the Department may think that," it does not represent departmental policy; it represents TfL's bid for power or bid for a position to the Department and no more. Mr Purchas can rest assured that that paper does not represent departmental policy.

  9319. LORD SNAPE: Perhaps you could go a bit further.



15   Committee Ref: A54, TfL-Regulation of the Crossrail Central Tunnel Section, Control of Network Rail activities (SCN-20080430-023) Back

16   Committee Ref: A54, TfL-Regulation of the Crossrail Central Tunnel Section, Exemption of the CTS from regulation under the 1993 Act (SCN-20080430-023 to -025) Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008