Select Committee on Economic Affairs Second Report


CHAPTER 2: GENERAL ISSUES

10.  During the course of our inquiry, we became aware that there were issues that were common to the topics that we examined. These cross-cutting issues arose mainly from the topics of CGT and residence and domicile, but also to some extent from that of encouraging enterprise

11.  Before looking at the detail of the topics that we examined, this chapter examines two major cross-cutting issues: consultation and international competitiveness.

Consultation

THE CONSULTATION ON CAPITAL GAINS TAX AND RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE

12.  It was a widely-held view amongst our private sector witnesses that the consultation on both CGT and residence and domicile had been very poorly handled and fell well short of the good practice they had seen on other topics. Ian Menzies-Conacher for the British Bankers' Association (BBA) thought that "In process terms, this certainly was not a good consultation process" (Q 162). Francesca Lagerberg for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) commented that "They were two very good examples of how not to do consultation" (Q 81). John Cridland for the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) concurred "So I think from the CBI's point of view the consultation was inadequate" (Q 181).

13.  Our witnesses had a number of reasons why the consultation on these two topics fell short. It was put to us that there was from the outset a lack of a clear and consistent policy statement. Commenting on residence and domicile Ian Menzies-Conacher (BBA) said "we did not have a comprehensive understanding of the policy rationale that was driving these changes" (Q 140).

14.  Others commented on a lack of openness. The CBI wrote of[1] "the 'rabbits out of a hat' announcements in PBR 2007 of changes to come into effect with Finance Bill 2008 came as a shock to those affected". In oral evidence Frank Haskew (ICAEW) said "There is a trend which we cannot ignore which is that there needs to be more open consultation at an earlier stage in policy formulation otherwise we just keep running into these sorts of problems all the time" (Q 81). The CIOT commented[2] "the process in all these and other areas would have been so much more effective for the development of the UK's tax system had consultation taken place in the right sequence—before the announcement of how changes would be made, not afterwards and against a background of decisions already largely made".

15.  Michael Snyder for the Corporation of the City of London (City of London) saw consultation being about "preparedness and really hearing as opposed to going through elaborate listening mechanisms, and being able to get the correct information to Ministers" (Q 158). Alex McDougall for the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) would "like to see the process move more logically to fuller and more effective consultation" (Q 90).

16.  Some highlighted what they saw as a further difficulty in a lack of coherent communication and understanding between HMT and HMRC. Michael Snyder (City of London) commenting on a meeting he had had with Ministers "When they [Minister/Special Adviser] understood what was being said, despite the attitude of the Revenue and Customs, which is a major problem in this country at the moment and it is perceived to be a major problem because of the attitude that they adopt, fortunately in this particular meeting it was adopted in such a way that it was obvious to Jane Kennedy and Andrew Maugham that it was ridiculous and therefore they did make some changes" (Q 158). Chas Roy-Chowdhury for the Association of Chartered and Certified Accountants (ACCA) saw things from a different perspective, "I do not think the problem is with HMRC, I think it is with HMT where, because the policy process is now with them, they seem to be on a learning curve and that is one of the reasons why the consultation has not been as effective as one may have hoped" (Q 90).

17.  These witnesses considered that these problems had led to proper consultation being late and too short with timetables not being met. The draft legislation on residence and domicile appeared much later than expected; on CGT there was an expectation that an additional relief for businesses was going to be provided long before details of it became available. Francesca Lagerberg (ICAEW) told us "The difficulty we had with this particular series of announcements in the October PBR was that it was in the public domain for quite a long time because there was a very early statement from the Chancellor that there were going to be changes to his original proposals and then it took such a long time to actually find out what they were" (Q 80). The Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP) wrote of[3] "A process of consultation on the domicile regime stretching over many years was suddenly curtailed, leading to rushed changes …" Isobel D'Inverno for the Law Society of Scotland (LSS) agreed "it seems to us there is absolutely no reason at all why the domicile changes had to be brought in so quickly, with the result that the Finance Bill is only half finished in relation to these provisions and they are being developed on the hoof" (Q 211).

18.  As a consequence it was considered that there were harmful uncertainties, raised expectations which were not realised, insufficient time for outside interested parties to react to the changes and for taxpayers' decisions to be informed. John Cullinane (CIOT) put it this way, "I think the net effect is to create a climate of uncertainty around policymaking which it will take a bit of rowing back to get away from" (Q 56). Francesca Lagerberg thought people "knew changes were coming in from 6 April so they had a real reason to have concern, very limited information on which to act and a very, very long time before they had any concrete proposals on which they could base sensible decisions" (Q 80). Commenting on the residence and domicile provisions, Ian Menzies-Conacher (BBA) said "If you look at the history of it, we have PBR statements, consultative documents, draft clauses, amendments to the draft clauses, letters from the Director General, end of the consultation, the Finance Bill, more promised changes. None of that suggests a clearly thought out rationale" (Q 140).

19.  There was acceptance amongst our private sector witnesses that welcome changes had been made: the entrepreneurs' relief had been introduced subsequent to the announcement on CGT and helpful changes had been made to the draft legislation on residence and domicile. The IoD wrote[4] "We would also like to record that once officials did sit down to discuss the details of the proposals, they did so in a very constructive way". Alex McDougall (ICAS) would "accept and congratulate all those concerned on the advances that have been made" on the residence and domicile draft legislation (Q 90).

20.  Our private sector witnesses contrasted the experience of CGT and residence and domicile with other consultations which had been handled well. Richard Stratton for the Law Society of England and Wales (LSEW) explained how it might be possible to separate out the high-profile political points from the technical ones "I was reminded of the consultation on REITS, real estate investment trusts, where there were a huge number of technical points. The technical points were all dealt with through a very well organised consultation, a very sophisticated consultation, but there was also the rather controversial issue of how much a company had to pay to get into the REITS regime. The Chancellor cleverly took that point off the table and said, 'I will decide about that point at the end, I will decide whether we are going ahead and go through Parliament and I will announce my proposed number', which he did and it was a good way of taking a controversial element out of the technical side of the structure" (Q 210).

21.  Chas Roy-Chowdhury (ACCA) was also complimentary about the consultation on "the income shifting legislation which was proposed to start this year we had a lot of consultation and that has now resulted in a deferral. If you like, that is probably a blueprint of how consultation should progress rather than the way it has happened in these two areas" (Q 80). Isobel d'Inverno (LSS) gave the example of "the recent consultation on the gift aid scheme seems to have been extremely helpful and perhaps the difference there is that it was taking place over a long time and a lot of people who use the system on a day to day basis were involved" (Q 219).

22.  We put these points to HMT and HMRC officials. Mark Neale (HMT) said that "consultation is a key part of getting tax policy and delivery right, and I think I can say that in the two and a half years I have been back in the Treasury I have seen a very substantial increase in both the depth and quality of the consultation that we have undertaken on tax matters. I think it is though important to emphasise that we do not consult—and never have consulted—on everything. Governments of both parties have stopped short, for example, of consulting on tax rates and changes in tax rates, and that was what was in issue on both the development of policy on capital gains tax and residence and domicile. What we do do, and what we did in the case of both capital gains tax and res and dom, is consult very extensively about the implementation of the policy, in the case of res and dom publishing a consultation document, and in the case of both CGT and res and dom publishing draft clauses, and inevitably that process of consultation throws up issues to which ministers have responded" (Q 303).

23.  Mark Neale (HMT) continued "I do not agree there was a lack of any clear statement of policy on either capital gains tax reform or on res and dom. The capital gains tax changes were very clearly set out in the PBR 07 document, as were the Government's proposed changes to the taxation of non-domiciled residents. The proposals for non-domiciled residents were then further developed in a consultation document which set out the Government's objectives very clearly and we then moved into a consultation on the implementation of those changes" (Q 304). He added that there had emerged from the evidence of private sector witnesses a tension between uncertainty created by consultation and the need to take the time to explore issues fully (Q 304).

24.  Mark Neale (HMT) resisted any suggestion that HMT and HMRC had not worked well together, "I do not agree with that. I think we are both concerned with successful tax policy and delivery. That is why the policy partnership between HM Revenue and Customs and HM Treasury was created following the O'Donnell Report" (Q 305).

25.  We are firmly in favour of consultation and, although we have considered carefully what officials said to us, we have little doubt, given the strength of feeling of our private sector witnesses, that something went wrong in the development of these initiatives. We see no reason why there could not have been earlier, better and more open consultation on both CGT and residence and domicile. We are particularly disappointed that the progress on consultation, which we welcomed in last year's report, has not been maintained.

26.  If clarity and certainty are to be achieved, consultation should in principle take place as early as possible whenever there is any significant technical content. Even if it were necessary to keep back certain aspects—such as the £30,000 charge or the level of the single rate of CGT—we think consultation on many aspects could have taken place on a "what if" basis before announcements. If the argument were—and it was not put by officials—that consultation was not possible in the time available, our response would be that the proposals should not have been announced without that consultation.

27.  We therefore recommend that HMT and HMRC should critically consider these consultative processes. Officials should analyse why the private sector bodies are so unhappy with what took place and why those bodies thought that what they were saying was not getting through to Ministers. Officials should learn the lessons.

28.  We also recommend that HMT and HMRC should look at their record of consultation as a whole, learning from well-handled examples and striving to apply uniformly the points of best practice.

FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONSULTATION ON CAPITAL GAINS TAX

29.  It has been put to us by some of our private sector witnesses that for a period after the announcement on CGT, the consultation was restricted. As the LSS wrote[5] "There was an unacceptable degree of uncertainty about the changes in the period since the Pre Budget Report, with announcements promised and then postponed, limited consultation with a very few bodies and the prospect of a relief of some kind but with details becoming available very late in the day".

30.  This was explained more fully by Isobel d'Inverno (LSS) who said "I am sure we could do better than deal with it in this on-off way as it has been and also involving a number of meetings of a select few behind closed doors; consultation we feel should be open" (Q 211). Francesca Lagerberg (ICAEW) also thought that there was a very closed discussion on the CGT change in itself and a very strange process about how the relief was going to be dealt with (Q 81). Chas Roy-Chowdhury was more specific in his criticism "the point seems to have been specifically with the capital gains tax changes that there was no hook or mechanism to get into the consultation process other than if you shouted loudest, hence four trade bodies were actually brought into the process and were consulted but the people who actually need to make the tax work, the accountants, the lawyers, tax practitioners on the ground, were not at any stage that I am aware of really involved in the consultation process" (Q 80).

31.  Officials declared themselves mystified by these comments. Mark Neale (HMT) confirmed that "We have very close relationships with the professional bodies and their associations" (Q 308). David Richardson (HMRC) agreed: "We held a number of meetings with various bodies, I think about 16 different organisations whom we met to talk to, and we had six meetings including one in Edinburgh" (Q 308).

32.  We are at a loss to explain the difference in views as to how open the consultation on capital gains tax was in the period after the PBR announcement. Whatever the position, the important general point is that consultation has to be, and be seen to be, as even-handed as possible. Limited, secretive consultation breeds suspicion and mistrust.

33.  We recommend that consultation should be even-handed and open, involving as many as possible of the professional bodies and other parties which have a valid interest.

FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONSULTATION ON RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE

34.  Residence and domicile had been under review over many years, and no definite proposals had emerged. The present review started in 2002 and there was some consultation with interested parties in the early stages. The review was kept alive over subsequent Budgets and Pre-Budget reports, but our private sector witnesses told us that expectations had faded that anything significant would emerge. The feeling outside government was that change had been put on the back burner.

35.  So the proposals came as a complete surprise. As John Cullinane (CIOT) put it "The proposals that were made, and even more than the proposals that were made, but the way they came out a clear blue sky, caused people a great deal of angst" (Q 56). Others saw the emergence of the proposals in exactly the same way. Francesca Lagerberg (ICAEW) said "on the residence and domicile, after years and years of consultation, we suddenly had very dramatic proposals put down in January which seemed to bear no relation to previous discussions" (Q 81). John Cridland (CBI) added that "the furore over this issue was really in the New Year when draft clauses were available which made it clear that the application went well beyond what most stakeholders were expecting at the time of the Pre-Budget Report" (Q 181). Not only were the proposals announced in the PBR unexpected, but also those set out in the draft legislation of 18 January went much further than indicated by the PBR.

36.  Many of our private sector witnesses thought that party politics played its part in the PBR announcement. As Michael Snyder (City of London) said "… and to therefore be forced into a situation of doing something for accidental, political reasons across the political spectrum … was very unhelpful. I think we ended up in a position which was not very good from a perception point of view in particular" (Q 138). As the BBA wrote in their evidence to us[6] "Even when external political pressure for change is acute, governments should not be propelled into precipitous action without careful and detailed consideration of the potential outcomes of the proposed changes".

37.  Officials responded by pointing to the tension between rapid consultation, and therefore early certainty, and longer consultation which enabled a fuller appraisal of the issues (Q 304).

38.  Although we accept there can be tension between early certainty and full appraisal, we doubt if it applies to the consultation on residence and domicile. A high degree of certainty may not always be attainable in formulation of tax policy. But a review which starts with consultation, continues in a desultory way and appears to have petered out, only to be followed by the announcement of wide-ranging proposals which bear little relation to the matters previously under discussion, tends to devalue consultation.

39.  We recommend that consultation should be genuine and meaningful and must be active on an appropriate timescale. Subject to limited exceptions, for example rates of tax, it should cover the issues on which Ministers will make decisions. If it is not leading anywhere, Ministers should decide to close down the consultation to provide the certainty that everyone agrees is desirable.

HOW SHOULD THE CONSULTATION PROCESS BE CARRIED OUT?

40.  During our evidence session with the accountants, we asked them for supplementary evidence on the essential elements of a good consultation process. ICAEW[7], ICAS[8] and ACCA[9] made many points in common. In their view, consultation should:

  • be the default, the exceptions being extremely rare;
  • take place early in the policy formulation process, discussing options and impacts;
  • take place informally to discuss ideas, before a formal written consultation document; be genuine, with considered and rigorous testing of the ideas and options;
  • feedback should be impartial recognising dissenting views;
  • draft clauses should be consulted on and amendments made where necessary;
  • a post-enactment review should take place to pick up and address defects in the legislation.

The ICAEW saw the Cabinet Office Code of Practice on Consultation published in 2004 as important and suggested the Code might be extended to include the agreed principles of consultation on tax policy changes.

41.  We welcome the ideas put forward and agree with many of them, though we think that some may have to adapt to political realities. We also accept that these ideas come from a limited number of professional bodies and think it important to open a wider dialogue.

42.  Mark Neale (HMT) agreed to look at these ideas and others and commented that "We meet the professional associations on a very regular basis, consultation is almost always one of the issues we discuss with them" (Q 311). After drawing attention to a number of favourable comments in the evidence where consultation had been successful he concluded "Clearly we can and will improve but HM Treasury and HMRC get it right much more often than we get it wrong" (Q 311).

43.  We recommend that the professional bodies should send their ideas to HMT and HMRC. And we recommend that HMT and HMRC should come forward with their own ideas on how consultation processes should be handled. There should then be a dialogue between HMT/HMRC and the professional bodies and other interested parties to bring out the essential elements of good and timely consultation on a tax policy initiative and to identify the limited circumstances when consultation would not be possible.

44.  We further recommend that any agreement reached should be developed into a Code of Practice governing consultation on tax changes, extending and amending as necessary the Cabinet Office Code of Practice on Consultation. The onus would then be on the Government/HMT/HMRC to consult in all circumstances outside recognised exceptions.

HMT AND HMRC WORKING TOGETHER

45.  It was put to us by some of our private sector witnesses that the problems with the CGT and residence and domicile policy initiatives might have been partly created by the separation of tax policy and delivery and that there was a case for recombining these in one department. Alex McDougall (ICAS) implicitly questioned the way that HMT and HMRC worked together in the context of the suggested entrepreneurs' relief for CGT "When we met with HMRC to discuss the PBR in November we raised that issue and were told that HMRC had no knowledge of any relief, the Treasury had not told anybody that there was to be such a relief, even though it was allegedly released to the press" (Q 83).

46.  The ACCA was more forthright in the view expressed in their supplementary written evidence[10] "it is becoming clear that the separation of tax policy and tax administration is not working effectively and it is time that the two parts were brought back together. The separation happened when HMRC was created and tax policy moved to HM Treasury. Consideration should be given to putting policy and the consultation surrounding its formulation back into a single arm of Government, which should probably be best within HMRC".

47.  Mark Neale (HMT) vigorously resisted such a suggestion "I am a fan of the policy partnership between HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs as it currently operates. I think that it has enabled us to deliver better tax policy. I think it is important that ministers have access to professional advice on tax policy which is independent of their delivery arm, HM Revenue and Customs, but that advice should always be informed by a clear understanding of the deliverability of the policies and policy options under consideration. That is why we work so very closely with HM Revenue & Customs" (Q 315).

48.  We cannot tell whether there is any substance in the point put to us by our private sector witnesses that the policy partnership between HMT and HMRC is not working well. We note the forceful rebuttal by officials. We recommend that the review of the consultative processes (which we recommended previously) should include consideration of how well HMT and HMRC are working together.

International Competitiveness

49.  In this section we consider the effect of the changes to CGT, residence and domicile and encouraging enterprise on the international competitiveness of the UK.

50.  There are of course other changes which will affect the UK's international competitiveness. For example[11] "the major package of business tax reforms announced in Budget 2007 will take effect from April 2008. The reduction in the main rate of Corporation Tax to 28 per cent will deliver the lowest ever rate in the UK and the lowest in the G7, improving competitiveness and encouraging investment".

51.  Other announcements in Budget 2008 were similarly targeted at enhancing competitiveness. The announcement on the taxation of foreign profits said[12] "Budget 2008 announces that the Government will bring forward proposals and publish a consultation document before summer 2008. The objective of any reform is to enhance the competitiveness of the UK tax framework, while being broadly revenue neutral".

52.  There is also recognition of the importance of the City of London as a financial centre[13] "The Government is committed to ensuring that the City of London remains the world's leading international financial centre. The financial services sector makes a significant contribution to the UK economy, accounting for 9.4 per cent of GDP in 2006, up from 6.2 per cent in 1997, and supporting over 1 million jobs. The continued prosperity of the sector is vital to the UK's national economic interest".

CAPITAL GAINS TAX

53.  From the outset of the changes in the Finance Bill relating to capital gains tax, the Government made it clear that one of its aims was that the tax should be competitive internationally. The 2007 Pre-Budget Report said,[14] "The Government is committed to ensuring that the UK has an internationally competitive capital gains tax (CGT) system that promotes flexibility and competition, and responds to the changing needs of investors". In the debate on the Bill in the Committee of the Whole House the Financial Secretary to the Treasury said,[15] "In progressing the capital gains tax reform, the Government have been guided by three key principles … Secondly, the Government have maintained a fair and competitive capital gains tax regime … Overall, the UK continues to be an excellent place to do business".

54.  We have received mixed evidence from our private sector witnesses as to whether the new capital gains tax system, whether before or after the announcement of entrepreneurs' relief, is internationally competitive: there are different methods of assessment and different comparator countries, which will account for the different interpretations.

55.  For example, John Whiting (CIOT) said "In terms of simplifying the system, which undoubtedly it has done, and getting a rate that looks reasonably competitive internationally, going for 18% seems a reasonable compromise" (Q 34). He added "Yes, it is expected to raise more money, and we will have to keep an eye on that, as to whether this is going to work in the longer term, because it is quite possible it begins to look uncompetitive internationally, so it is definitely something to keep under review" (Q 36).

56.  By contrast, asked whether this was an internationally competitive regime, John Cridland (CBI) said "I feel it failed the Government's own test" (Q 170). He gave as reasons the altering of reasonable expectations, that business assets held for a reasonably long period were not better treated than speculative investments, the removal of frozen indexation, and that serial entrepreneurs would not qualify for entrepreneurs' relief once they had exceeded their lifetime limit (Q 170).

57.  Similarly the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA) wrote[16] "The Capital Gains Tax moves announced in the Pre-Budget Report 2007 and which came in to force in April 2008 have made the UK less competitive. The new rate of 18% has pushed the UK down the international competitiveness league, and means capital gains tax is higher in the UK than in other countries including the US, and European competitors like Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands". Simon Walker (BVCA) spoke to its written evidence in similar terms saying "I think our view was that it [competitiveness] has been very considerably eroded, but perhaps not fatally" (Q 289).

58.  Michael Devereux (Oxford University) put things differently: "It depends to some extent on how it is being competitive and the nature of the tax. If it is a tax on UK residents who stay in the UK, this is going to affect the investment decisions of those UK residents. It is rather different from something like corporation tax for example where we are taxing the profits which arise in the UK. Having a high tax there may induce companies to move abroad. The comparator here would be whether it induces individuals to move abroad because of high capital gains tax rates. That seems rather less likely than corporation tax" (Q 245).

59.  Mark Neale (HMT) had quite different views. He said "[The tax] has met our ministers' objectives. We believe it is both very much simpler, so reducing costs to business and individual citizens, but also remains very internationally competitive with an 18 per cent flat rate on capital gains and subsequently a slightly different regime for entrepreneurs disposing of their businesses. The international comparisons are not completely straightforward because not many other countries have as simple a regime as we have introduced, but looking at the international comparisons I do think our rate remains very competitive" (Q 316).

60.  It is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion as to the competitiveness of the UK in relation to capital gains tax, given that the Government has not published its economic case for the new regime. However, in the light of developments both here and in other countries, the overall impression being given today is of a less competitive tax environment. We also think that announcing unexpected tax changes adds to the perception of reduced competitiveness.

61.  We recommend that the Government and HMT should publish the economic case for the new regime, justifying the single rate of 18% as internationally competitive. We also recommend that they should work now towards reassuring investors and potential investors of the advantages of investing in the United Kingdom; and that further unexpected tax changes should be avoided wherever possible.

RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE

62.  The consultative document on residence and domicile gave the following as the rationale for the changes[17]:

    "Maintaining the UK's competitiveness by ensuring that the UK remains an attractive place for workers with key skills was at the heart of the recently concluded review of the residence and domicile tax rules. Equally important was the principle that the rules applying to people from abroad should operate fairly.

    It is only fair that people who have chosen to make the UK their home (and who enjoy favourable tax treatment over the long term, and even pass this on to their children) should make a reasonable tax contribution to the modern public services which support our society".

The Budget documentation stated that, overall[18] "The package of changes to the rules on residence and domicile announced in the 2007 Pre-Budget Report was intended to strike the right balance between fairness and competitiveness".

63.  There was a widely-held view amongst our private sector witnesses that the Government may have failed to achieve its objective of maintaining the UK's competitiveness. STEP wrote[19] "After a leisurely consultation process the speed and intensity with which the Government introduced measures targeted at non-doms and their investments has left this important part of this country's business community feeling uncertain and unwanted".

64.  In their written evidence the City of London wrote[20] "Individuals have already based their decisions to spend significant parts of their careers in the UK on the fiscal status quo. The proposal to impose a levy of £30,000, with no explicit guarantee that it will not be raised in future years and with inadequate time to prepare for the new circumstances, has clearly alarmed many". And then later in that memorandum they concluded[21] "In conclusion, it is relatively clear from the City's view that even in their amended form the proposals have the potential of damaging the competitive position of the UK, especially in the area of financial and related business services—a sector on which the national economy is heavily reliant".

65.  Echoing this concern, John Cridland (CBI) said "I think the damage which has been done is now done and it will be very difficult to unravel that damage. It has damaged sentiment I think more than anything, my Lord Chairman. It is only a year ago, or less, that we prided ourselves that the City of London had through its own good efforts established a significant competitive advantage over a number of other world financial capitals and we have managed to knock ourselves down a pitch" (Q 184).

66.  The LSS saw it in these terms[22] "There appears to be a perception that the changes amount to a political attack on non-domiciled individuals". The LSEW was equally gloomy about the effect of these proposals[23] "Many of those affected by these new rules have lost confidence in the UK as a jurisdiction that welcomes foreign investment. Some took immediate action to reduce their links with the UK. Others await the outcome of the deliberations to see if the reputation of the UK can be salvaged".

67.  The IoD wrote[24] "There is a very good chance that the Treasury has scored an own goal here, harming the British economy and decreasing total tax revenues". John Whiting (CIOT) thought it hard to see how these proposals would raise significant amounts of money (Q 64). In response to the question "Has anybody gained from this?", Richard Stratton (LSEW) replied "I do not think so … The deeply upsetting thing about this is probably that there is not much gained by these changes. There is just a lot of irritation for people" (Q 230). The BVCA wrote in their evidence[25] "The BVCA believes the changes to the residence and domicile regime have had a negative impact on the UK's position as a competitive place to do business". And in his evidence before us, Simon Walker (BVCA) said that they were "concerned about the situation that has been created and I do regard it as having this effect on the welcome mat, that it at least is looking pretty shabby" (Q 300).

68.  Others focussed on the need for a published economic impact analysis to explain the Treasury's thinking and gauge the effect of the changes. Frank Haskew (ICAEW) was less sure that there would be a net loss to revenue, but said that "our main concern is that in previous consultations on this we have said if you are going to make changes you need to do a proper economic analysis of what the result of it is going to be to see whether there is a net benefit to the UK … the fact is we have not had any figures to justify what is a fundamental change in policy" (Q 116).

69.  In his evidence, Mark Neale (HMT) stated that "The Treasury always looks at the economic impact of tax changes because economic efficiency is one of our objectives for the tax system … In this case we do not expect there to be any material, economic impact as a result of the changes in the taxation of non-domiciles. We expect only a very small number of people to cease to be resident as a result of the changes. We expect that those will [be] people who have the least economic attachment to the UK and the fact that they cease to be residents does not by any means mean that they will cease to spend time in the UK and undertake economic activity here" (Q 347).

70.  We are very concerned by the weight of evidence coming from our private sector witnesses that these proposals seem likely to have a negative effect on the UK's competitiveness. We think it vital that everything that can be done is done to retrieve the position.

71.  It is clear to us that the Government has failed to communicate successfully the message that these changes are not intended to discourage non-domiciles from coming to the UK and that non-domiciles are important to the health of the UK economy. We therefore recommend that the Government does all it can to communicate this message and to maintain the UK's competitiveness by ensuring that the UK remains an attractive place for workers with key skills.

72.  We also think it important that those outside Government have the opportunity to see HMT's assessment of the economic impact of these changes so that they might form their own judgment.

73.  We therefore recommend that HMT should publish its economic impact analysis of these changes to residence and domicile so that everyone can share their thinking on this matter. We also recommend that HMT should update this analysis in 12 months' time in the light of events.

74.  More generally, we recommend that, in future, economic impact analyses should be published at the same time as any significant tax changes are announced; such analyses are clearly a vital element in the decision on whether any tax changes should go ahead.

ENCOURAGING ENTERPRISE

75.  The venture capital reliefs aim to encourage access to capital for small companies carrying on higher risk activities. Issues of international competitiveness are likely to be less to the fore.

76.  Simon Walker (BVCA) however gave us an interesting comparison when he reviewed the position as he saw it of the British venture capital scene:

77.  This perceived shortage of finance for smaller companies is relevant to chapter 5 on encouraging enterprise, where we consider the effectiveness and targeting of venture capital schemes.


1  
Memorandum of Evidence by the CBI (Volume II p 89) Back

2   Memorandum of Evidence by the CIOT (Volume II p16) Back

3   Memorandum of Evidence by STEP (Volume II p 22) Back

4   Memorandum of Evidence by the IoD (Volume II p 92) Back

5   Memorandum of Evidence by the LSS (Volume II p 113) Back

6   Memorandum of Evidence by the BBA (Volume II p 70) Back

7   Memorandum of Supplementary Evidence by the ICAEW (Volume II p 62) Back

8   Memorandum of Supplementary Evidence by the ICAS (Volume II p 67) Back

9   Memorandum of Supplementary Evidence by the ACCA (Volume II p 61) Back

10   Memorandum of Supplementary Evidence by the ACCA (Volume II p 62) Back

11   Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report paragraph 3.13 Back

12   Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report paragraph 3.14 Back

13   Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report paragraph 3.20 Back

14   2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review Paragraph 5.79 Back

15   Hansard, 28 April 2008, cols 63 & 65. Back

16   Memorandum of Evidence by the BVCA (Volume II, p 132) Back

17   Paying a fairer share: a consultation on residence and domicile HM Treasury December 2007 Back

18   Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report Budget 2008 Box 4.3 Back

19   Memorandum of Evidence by STEP (Volume II p 19) Back

20   Memorandum of Evidence by the City of London (Volume II p 75) Back

21   Memorandum of Evidence by the City of London (Volume II p 76) Back

22   Memorandum of Evidence by the LSS (Volume II p 114) Back

23   Memorandum of Evidence by the LSEW (Volume II p 103) Back

24   Memorandum of Evidence by the IoD (Volume II p 91) Back

25   Memorandum of Evidence by the BVCA (Volume II p 133) Back


 
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