Select Committee on Economic Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 600 - 610)

TUESDAY 22 JANUARY 2008

Professor John Salt

  Q600  Lord Turner of Ecchinswell: Although it does have the consequence, if you do that, that people assume you are going to do it again; it is presumably an incentive for illegal entry because they assume it is going to be legalised.

  Professor Salt: That is another matter. One should add that there are different sorts of amnesties. You can have what is called backlog clearance, and the Home Office has done some backlog clearances, or you can have a full-blown amnesty. In other countries, amnesties have never tried to cover all of the illegal population; there has always been some kind of selection in there, you must have lived here for so long, you must be working, you must have come in legally and become illegal. There are problems of eligibility conditions. Who do you include? Do you include family members? And there is also a common problem of what I call recycling. There is an amnesty. I apply, I am accepted, I am given a year's temporary status, I stay on and I work quite openly for a year, and after a year what happens? I do not go home. I stay on and by definition I become illegal again. Then another amnesty comes along, so I put myself forward and I get amnestied again. So there is a problem. The debate about amnesties will go on and on and on. Again, I come to the fact that there are practical difficulties which need to be addressed by anybody who is actually saying "yes, we must have these", and I know there is greater transparency, human rights are better looked after and it prevents abuse, and they are all very valid arguments, but there are also difficulties down the line in coming up with something that is appropriate.

  Q601  Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: Would identity cards help, in your view?

  Professor Salt: Not if they are capable of being forged, and that is probably likely to happen. They have identity cards in France and there are probably as many illegal migrants in France as there are in the UK.

  Q602  Lord Layard: In your paper on international migration in the UK you focus on foreign nationals rather than the larger group of foreign-born persons. Why do you make that choice and how do you think we should define migrants for our basic debate on these issues about the scale and impacts of immigration?

  Professor Salt: We have actually used both. In Home Office Occasional Paper 75, which was published in 2001, we used foreign-born for part of the analysis, because that gave us a larger sample; we were asked by the Home Office to do that. There are three reasons why we use nationality. The first is that rules of entry and regulation tend to be based on nationality and not on where you were born, and if you are looking at a managed policy that is quite important. Secondly, comparative international studies tend to use foreign nationality for similar reasons; and, thirdly, in quite a lot of past work, particularly at the European level, we have used nationality as the basis for differentiating. We need to be aware of the differences across national groups in terms of rates of naturalisation. For example, if we look at LFS data for 2007, of those who were born in Europe 81% still have the nationality of European countries; of those who were born in Africa and Asia, only 49% had nationalities of those countries. So you are looking at quite different populations which will vary across the world. For the European population, you are much more likely to be looking at similar sorts of people if you look at foreign-born and look at nationality. If you look at Africa, you are probably looking at rather different sets of people if you look at foreign-born and if you look at nationality. I am afraid—it is always good to double the work, I suppose—you actually need both because they are telling you different things. If you are working on sample data, as we often are in this country, then country of birth gives you about twice the size of the sample of nationality and you can do a bit more with it than if you have nationality only. But ultimately we come down to the fact that as long as rules of entry are based on nationality, then that should, I think, be the principal thing that we look at as far as possible.

  Q603  Lord Moonie: Do you have any comments on the written submissions received from the Government and from the ONS on the scale and impacts of immigration in the UK?

  Professor Salt: How long have you got?

  Q604  Lord Moonie: As long as you like.

  Professor Salt: First of all, it is good to see this engagement with what is going on as far as migration is concerned and attempts to estimate the advantages and disadvantages, but I think at the end of the day I look back and reflect that we have still got a long way to go in reaching a balanced view. The Government paper is, if anything, rather too aggregate-based, it is focused on the advantages to the national economy without paying sufficient attention to the distribution effects. I did some work for the OECD back in the early 1990s which involved quite a good familiarity with the literature and one thing that kept coming through there was that it is the distribution effect that counts, and I think that is very much still the case, my mind has not been changed since then. There is not much research on the distribution effects across different sorts of people, across different regions, across different sectors of the economy, across different occupations. More attention should be paid to the change in GDP per capita rather than GDP total, especially in light of such factors as female activity rates, which vary across populations, particularly across immigrant population, and also how we treat children in the various calculations. I know that in some of the literature there was a bit of a spat about what constitutes a child and do you treat a child up to the age of 16 the same as a child after the age of 16 and so on. There are uncosted externalities that need some thought. I have worked for a long time on the basis that migration is a business and there are institutions which want to foster the business, and if you look at business there are all the externalities as well. Some of these are very difficult to cost and we need to spend a bit of time on those.

  Q605  Lord Lawson of Blaby: Which are the most important externalities?

  Professor Salt: The provision of services specifically for migrants, for migrant integration, and to help migrants become more absorbed into the workforce and so on. I do not think we have sufficient idea of how these costs actually work out. One of the principal things that I would like to see in the paper that is not there is more on the perspectives of employers. At the moment the arguments in the paper are too focused—perhaps for obvious reasons—on the UK and do not show an appreciation perhaps as they might on how migration relates to the global economy and particularly the globalisation of corporate labour markets. There is global competition for skills. We are in competition for skills. I can go to a whole series of pieces of work and reports from different countries and find that, yes, we want skilled workers, we want skilled workers, we want skilled workers. There is also nothing on the loss through emigration of British skills. It is a debate about immigration and we need to balance that out with who is going, what sort of holes are they creating and is it perhaps a bit easier to try and stop them going or at least bring them back rather than bring in new people. Those are some of the comments that I would make on the Government paper. As far as the ONS is concerned, it does its professional best. It has got first-rate statisticians but there are issues beyond their control in sample size, emigration and short term moves. I get quite frustrated sometimes when people talk about the need for better data and why does the Government not provide data and why does the ONS not give us better data—that is what the local authorities say. I think we have pushed existing data as far as we can. There has been quite a lot of good statistical effort in trying to massage what are predominantly sample surveys as far as we are able. E-borders will give us some improvement, although it is not clear by any means yet what data will come from the e-borders system. They will rely on the quality of documentation in the other countries so it is quite like the slowest ship in the economy. The least good passport system of one of the EEA states will probably determine what happens. But we have got quite a long time to go yet, we are not going to get the data until perhaps 2013 to 2014. Ultimately, and I suppose this is a bit of a plea, we need to begin seriously thinking about a step change in data availability, and there is only one direction that takes us and it is into the form of a population register, which would probably have to be divided into a register for the domestic population and a register for the non-domestic population, some kind of aliens register. Registers are not perfect: they always over-estimate stocks because everybody registers when they come in but they do not always register when they go out. But I do not think we are going to get better data on international migration without something really very seriously changing and that means serious money.

  Q606  Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market: You said that the Government paper focuses on national effects and not on distribution effects and I understand you mean regional and local et cetera. Do you think that leads to misleading conclusions or perceptions?

  Professor Salt: Yes, I think it does, and this is where I begin to move away from my territory. As I said, I am not an economist but the advantages of immigration to the national economy always seem to come somewhere between plus one and minus one—it is there or thereabouts—and of course if you increase the labour resources you make the economy bigger and of course the economy grows. So it is how the benefits are spread around the population, who is there to gain and who is not, they have to be spread around everyone in the domestic population and the immigrant population as well.

  Q607  Lord Layard: You have looked at these trends for so many years and one of the big issues is how we expect the net migration to develop over the future, because it sets the context, with so much for the housing market and so on. Some people say it is a pool that is beginning to run dry and we can expect it to level off and would come down in terms of net migration; other people think of it as a snowball that is still building up. What is your general line on it, how is it likely to go?

  Professor Salt: We have first of all to look beyond the EEA and one of the more interesting countries at the moment is Ukraine which is a big population and it is filling in gaps all over the place. Even if the European Union does not expand beyond its present limits for some time, then I think there are countries which are just beyond, which are going to become part of the system anyway. "There is nothing so permanent as a temporary migrant: discuss", is an examination question I have been setting for a long time. Every bit of migration literature and all migration theory does indicate that some proportion of the population is going to stay. At the moment the flows from the A8 countries are coming to the UK because they cannot go to many other countries freely to work—they can go to Sweden, but not very many of them are and they can go to Ireland, a lot of them go to Ireland. Ireland has probably had relatively more than we have. What will happen when the transitional arrangements run out in other countries I do not know, but I would expect that once chain migration has already begun between Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and so on and the UK it is going to be difficult to break because you have got an established network, you have got trans-national populations already growing. The key to my mind is what happens to the demography of the flow. If we go back to the 1960s, to the European guest workers, you had young, unattached people coming in first, temporarily, and 90% of those went home as far as we can gather. Later you had older people, married people, people bringing their families, people bringing their children, people having children and 90% of those stayed. One thing I would like to see is fairly close monitoring of the demography of the migration flows from those regions because it will give us a reasonable idea how many of them will stay. So, as far as future temporary migrants are concerned, we will probably have to look beyond the immediate boundaries of the European Union to see what is actually going on there and how countries are interacting with the EU, particularly with the Eastern European states, and then in the longer term it is the demography. May I add just a rider to the point about the Olympics? I was talking to a Polish colleague just before Christmas and she said "Of course, with Poland having the European football championship in 2012 we are about to embark on a large programme of new stadium building." That did sort of chime in with certain things happening in this country. Where are the workers going to come from to build Poland's new stadia as well as to build ours?

  Q608  Lord Vallance of Tummel: Could I just push you a little bit more on distribution because you say in your paper that around two-thirds of foreign workers are in South East England by comparison to around 30% of UK nationals, and of course the concentration in the capital is even greater. Can you expand a little on what bearing does that level of concentration have on framing an immigration policy for the UK as a whole?

  Professor Salt: Let us separate out what was being said there from what has been happening since with the flow of people from the A8 countries who have distributed themselves much more widely. For a long time, 25 years or maybe more—but that is the length of time for which we have data—the distribution of foreign nationals coming to the UK has been concentrated on London and the South East, it has been a constant. When immigration went up, the proportion of people coming to London and the South East stayed the same; when immigration went down, the proportion of people going to London and the South East stayed the same. It has been something that is fairly constant. If you increase migration into the UK, then inevitably, particularly if it is skilled workers, which has tended to be the case, then you are increasing the economic benefits to the South East and not to the other regions. The stickability of labour—a lot of it seems to refuse to want to move internally—means that it is often much easier to get the right skills into London and the South East from abroad because the links have been set up for people to come. Other things then begin to come into operation, like if you are highly skilled and come with your company you have probably got subsidised housing; if you are coming in and you are willing to share, then three or four people sharing a house can always outbid the family of a fire worker coming down from the North East.

  Q609  Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: Whether there are 500,000 irregular or illegal immigrants—and there may be more or there may be less—surely what is true is that of the relatively few of those who are identified, even fewer are then deported from the country, so is it worth all this great cost and effort to identify even more immigrants who are already here who might be irregular or illegal, because the number that eventually go, would you accept, will be marginal? Is this therefore just a political gesture rather than any effect of intervention in the market?

  Professor Salt: We do not know how many people who are here illegally actually leave voluntarily. We do not know how many people who have been told to leave actually leave voluntarily. So there is an unknown as far as that is concerned. Deporting people is terribly difficult and there was an interesting paper some years ago asking why do we find it so difficult to send home those people who have no right to be here. There is an enormous emotional thing as well as a resource thing involved. The same newspaper will demand that illegal migrants are deported and then demand that a single individual who is illegal but, for whatever reason, whether it is health or education or something else, should stay. I do not think that sufficient resources are ever going to be available to find and then deport all those who have no right to be here. But I come back to the point I mentioned earlier, and that is that there are a lot of countries which will refuse to readmit people who you do not want here, and for many years now that has been the case. They say: "we do not believe that these people are our nationals, they have not got any papers. It will take us six months to check up, we do not have the resources to do that, we cannot promise you an answer even after six months". So where you try to send them is also a problem. There is a whole network of issues that is in there which makes it difficult to send people back home.

  Q610  Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: Yet we are spending a great deal of money on it.

  Professor Salt: I do not know how much we are spending on it. I have not checked that up. There are a lot of people who know that better than me. What I do know is that if we are to do the job properly then it would cost a darn sight more than it does now.

  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We are most grateful to you for the information and your skill in answering our questions by posing other questions to us as you were making your points indicated something which I found very interesting. Thank you very much indeed, we are very grateful to you.






 
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