Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
Ms Meg Hillier, Mr Tom Dodd and Mr Kevan Norris
19 MARCH 2008
Q40 Chairman: Yes, but you keep talking about a balance. It seems to me that on one side of the balance you have got an effective and as good a monitoring system as you can get, and at the other end of the balance you have got a great big black hole, where someone using Lastminute.com and people who just line up—I think we have all at various stages in our lives got on a train or a plane at the last minute—and following what Lord Marlesford was saying, I do not really follow how you can prevent this unless you say that you cannot book less than an hour ahead.
Mr Dodd: We cannot have 100% of what we want. It would be unreasonable to require passengers to turn up two hours before they travel in those circumstances. What we are trying to get is as much data as we possibly can. In terms of the maritime and rail carriers, we are working with them to see the best way in which we can collect that PNR data.
Meg Hillier: It cannot be as far in advance but, for example, if you take a ferry, very rarely does someone turn up to a ferry and just go very quickly, because of the queuing mechanism that they have—the incoming ferry has to arrive, disembark and then embarkation takes place. It may become more challenging to turn up and pay in cash, depending on the outcome of these current negotiations, and in fact in many environments—I do not know when members of the Committee last tried to buy a rail ticket but you have to hunt around for a machine that will take cash only, at Victoria, for example—it is very much card-based. Those kinds of mechanisms can make that Advanced Passenger Information more effective. That is probably where we will end up with a balance; while not restricting the rights of passengers to be able to travel relatively freely and easily, that will be where the negotiation comes down, but I would not want to predict the outcome.
Mr Dodd: If our systems detect an individual turning up repeatedly at the last moment and not booking in advance, then interest will be triggered in the individual and we may then take secondary action to look at that person or that vehicle as a consequence.
Q41 Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Is this wish to hold the traveller in the field for as long as possible part of this background to the Terminal 5 decision not to allow people to fly if they have not arrived 25 minutes before a flight?
Meg Hillier: I have no knowledge of that at all. I have not had any involvement in those discussions. Certain airlines are very strict about their check-in times and I suspect it is more to do with the airlines but I am not au fait with the details.
Q42 Lord Marlesford: We have the impression that you are trying to extend the system so that it covers intra-Member State travel as well. That, presumably, in terms of Schengen, where there is no checking in between States on land journeys particularly, it is not doable; where there is no control, there is no record.
Meg Hillier: For flights, it is possible, and that is really the main focus because, clearly, criminals do not restrict their activities to the boundaries of Europe, but they will travel within. That flight information is handled in very much the same way as international flights so that people buy their tickets in advance and Advanced Passenger Information will be available. For Eurostar, for example, there will still be a degree of checking between Paris and Lille.
Q43 Lord Marlesford: It is the "weakest link" argument; people will be well aware of where you can check and therefore will focus on where you cannot.
Mr Dodd: The reason why we have retained our border controls and we are not part of Schengen is precisely so that we can screen and control people coming to the UK from mainland Europe.
Q44 Lord Marlesford: Yes, but my understanding is that you are seeking to amend the Commission's proposal so that it includes something that is really not included.
Meg Hillier: We are trying to get a balance. Clearly, there are going to be different interests. We are trying to get a common European framework that protects Europe, while allowing individual Member States to do what works best for them. For example, the landlocked countries will not have any interest in maritime borders. We want it to be permitted to allow the UK to continue to do what it does. I have had some very interesting and fruitful conversations—I do not want to declare them publicly on the record—with European ministers who are very interested in what the UK is doing. We have had a number of people visiting the Joint Borders Operation Centre and more have been invited and are planning to come. The Minister in Ireland, Mr Brian Lenihan, is very keen to meet the LIBE Committee when they visit and in joint hosting by ministers, because the Irish feel very strongly about this issue also.
Chairman: Just to comment on what Mr Dodd said with regard to the UK's exclusion from Schengen, you may recall that in our Frontex report we endorsed and supported the Government's policy in excluding the UK from the Schengen Agreement.
Q45 Lord Dear: Minister, I have a couple of questions, inevitably, about data protection. There have been many much publicised and embarrassing breaches recently and against that background, I wonder if you can satisfy us that the data that will be collected in and concerning the UK will be kept securely and whether you have a view about how our own information will be kept abroad, and whether that will be secure also? And if you are satisfied, why?
Meg Hillier: It will certainly be held very securely; we have to meet a number of strict requirements. I am very aware of the sensitivity because of the data loss at the end of last year, so not only do we need to do it, but we need to demonstrate that to the public. Data will only be released if they can prove that there is a valid need to have that data. Under the Framework, this is one of the key areas of debate about making sure that the data protection is applied appropriately. I have had some very interesting discussions in Europe about the data protection framework that currently exists and whether that is enough to cover this issue, or whether there needs to be some greater comfort for some countries. We have passed e-Borders legislation through without any party in the Commons disagreeing with our proposals; the legislation went through straightforwardly last month. What I am hearing from colleagues in Europe is that a number of them were worried that they would not be able to get this through their parliaments and we need to look at that very closely to make sure that we have that effectively worked up. The Commission's proposal includes a number of articles to ensure safeguards and we support the majority of those. That includes retention periods, automated data processing, notification to data subjects—it is important that people know what information is held on them—and requirements to ensure data security. As I said to other Member States, data transferred across an EU border will be under the Data Protection Framework Decision the terms of which have already been agreed.
Q46 Lord Dear: Do you find our non-membership of Schengen causes problems in this field? With every country the holding of data and the relationships around that are inevitably sensitive. Do they view us as being different? My Lord Chairman has already mentioned the differences we spotted with Frontex and I wondered if it has come onto your screen in this particular area.
Meg Hillier: The mood music that I feel as a representative of the Home Office and the Government when I am in Europe is that I need to work particularly hard to prove the UK's common interests in Europe because we are not in Schengen. I make a particular point of working very closely with and talking to ministers to stress that while we are not in Schengen, we have some shared interests. While we are not in Schengen we explain what the reasons are for that. The reasons are quite clearly understood, certainly in the operational discussions I am having with colleague ministers. On this issue, it has not been a particular concern. I presented to ministers, when we went to an informal Justice and Home Affairs Council in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in January, and the discussion, with no rankle from colleagues around the table about the UK's position, rather interest in how we were doing it, could they visit, what were we doing about data protection and what would happen with the timescale and the practicalities. So, we were very much bedded into practical discussions rather than the issue of the UK's position on Schengen. I have found that once we start discussing practical issues and solutions, politicians are politicians, and in the end ministers want to be able to go back and satisfy their parliaments and their electorate and they are looking very much at that, so the practical issues appeal to the political mind.
Q47 Lord Dear: Taking the data issue that little bit further, inevitably there will be a wide range of UK agencies that will have access to the data. I wonder if you could give us a list, either now or later, of the UK agencies that currently have access to the data. If we are right in the assumption, why is it wider than in other Member States?
Meg Hillier: I will give you what I know, off the top of my head, but I will make sure we write to you so that it is clear. Currently, the Police, the Border and Immigration Agency, HMRC and the security agencies have access to the data. Mr Dodd may be able to answer about what is the equivalent in other European countries.
Q48 Lord Dear: Do you think Work and Pensions have access?
Meg Hillier: They could. As with other data, it is the same rules that apply; if anyone else wanted to have access, they would need to have a reason to ask for access; they might go through the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, they might raise possibly with the Police. It is possible, I suppose, that the DWP could have a criminal issue that they would raise with the Police, who would then access that as a check against and if necessary there would be discussions about release of that data on the individual.
Mr Dodd: We have been discussing with other government departments the utility of this data. Obviously, in terms of the DWP, it is a question about benefit fraud and people who are out of the country when they are claiming benefit, etc. To my knowledge, we are not doing that at the moment but we may do in the future.
Meg Hillier: It is worth saying that no one can "mine" the data. No organisation or individual without clearance can go in and start looking up individuals by name or finding things out; it has to be that they have a concern that a person has done something and therefore they are asking for information about the individual, there will be a check against them and then that information may or may not be released, depending on whether it is felt appropriate.
Q49 Lord Dear: From what you say, those four agencies would be mirrored exactly in other EU countries.
Meg Hillier: I cannot tell you precisely what every other EU Member State is doing.
Q50 Lord Dear: But it is more or less in step.
Meg Hillier: Yes. The big difference from the UK's point of view is that the Borders and Immigration Agency use it as an immigration tool, and in the European Framework it is not proposed as that, partly because of our relationship with Schengen.
Q51 Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: When we send information, we have our watch list and are dealing with our European colleagues, do we run on any check on speciality? That is to say, the issue that bedevilled the Extradition Bill Act was the issue of whether a crime committed, which was something that was not a crime in this country but was a crime elsewhere, and how the extradition would work. Are we sending information, do we know what information is being requested and why? And if so, do we run any speciality check for offences which are offences in certain countries in continental Europe and not offences here, or do we just send the information without any check?
Meg Hillier: No data is just released, there have to be some checks -you are thinking of Holocaust denial perhaps? I am not sure but perhaps Mr Dodd can answer.
Mr Dodd: It is like any legal aid, mutually-policing request, if they are asking to check our database, whether it is for fingerprints or whatever, they would have to come up with the justification as to why they want us to do that, and it would be dealt with by the authorities in the normal way.
Q52 Lord Mawson: Article 8 of the proposal limits the onward transmission of data to third countries. What changes would be needed to ensure that the UK retains its current powers for the onward transfer of data?
Meg Hillier: We believe that the purpose limitations proposed are too narrow because the current restrictions would prevent co-operation with third countries to catch, for example, the serious criminals that I was talking about earlier, whose crimes are not connected with terrorism and they are not part of an organised conspiracy, for instance, the single sex offender that I highlighted. We also believe that it would be important to safeguard our ability to enter into bilateral arrangements with third countries on this. But we want a standard at least as high as the Data Protection Framework Decision and we believe that the Data Protection Act is comparable. We are discussing with EU partners a shared code of practice and have invited them to see the Joint Borders and Operating Committee to make sure that we deal with this issue. When I met MEPs a few weeks ago with Sophie Int'Veld, the Rapporteur for the LIBE Committee, and Baroness Ludford, among others, this was an issue of great discussion and debate, which is one of the reasons the LIBE Committee is coming to visit. We are also going to provide them with information about our data protection approach so that we can bottom this one out across Europe.
Q53 Lord Mawson: Obviously, we are all very sympathetic to the present situation and the need for government to know a great deal more about us and about these situations; we understand that. But, do you foresee a day when it might be necessary to reduce the level of government knowledge about all of us as individual citizens and we might be given again more private space?
Meg Hillier: That is a big question, and I am the Minister responsible for identity cards and data across the Home Office, in many respects. Talking to members of the public on the doorsteps of my constituency, for example, most of this information is not information that people will see or even know about. It is triggered at the point of travel. It is about you as a traveller and it enables and supports the traveller to carry out their journey easily. People cannot mine into that, so it is sitting there but not necessarily used and no one can look into it unless they have a good reason. It is about balance between privacy and safety and I would say, as a Home Office Minister, that safety of the public has to be paramount. What I would be concerned about is if we had a system where everybody was being checked going through an airport, which obviously would not be workable and would cause great disruption for passengers. I think this is proportionate because it means that most people can carry out their journeys quite reasonably and manage without knowing what is happening. In effect, they are entitled to know and the airlines should be telling them about what the data is being used for but it is not going to affect them on a day-to-day basis because most people will just go through and will not even be matched against the lists; there will be no flag, no problem. Those who are flagged will be looked into in more detail, and I think that is proportionate.
Q54 Lord Marlesford: I would like to come back to profiling for a moment. Presumably the object of the whole exercise is that you identify people in whom you might be interested and the only way you can focus your attempt is to use all the information you have, and presumably profiling is the essential part of the whole system and must be done. You indicated at the beginning that there were certain aspects of profiling that you were rather worried about but if, for example, you take Her Majesty's Customs, they are trained very much to profile on a non-electronic basis—because they do not have it—appearance, behaviour and all the other things. There would not be restrictions on the extent to which you can profile from any of the data you are collecting under PNR, surely?
Meg Hillier: All these interventions will require a manual check by trained officials in the relevant agencies, but the point about the profiling that takes place this way is that it matches clearly to patterns of behaviour and, as you indicated, behaviour is one of the mechanisms that indicate that someone may be of interest. What does not happen, for example, is that people are not profiled because they ordered a halal or kosher meal on an aeroplane; those things would not be a reason to stop somebody—it is about the pattern of behaviour. In answer to your direct question, trained officers are still able to use their training, but the point about PNR and API is that it will flag up people of greater interest so it saves them stopping people who are not of any interest. We have found that the number of people stopped, for instance, from an ethnic minority background has decreased since PNR was introduced—in the pilot, anyway.
Q55 Lord Marlesford: Where people come from and what passport they hold may be very relevant.
Meg Hillier: Yes, but that information would be picked up through PNR, and indeed, it may be a route that someone has travelled and their national passport. When I visited the Australian immigration system in Sydney airport last summer they were showing me some of the forged documents—pity anyone Greek during that fortnight last summer, because a number of forged Greek passports were picked up, so through their systems for a couple of weeks they were stopping all people with Greek passports. That was proportionate; I think it was very tough for the legitimate Greek travellers, but it was because they had picked up a risk. That information is available through PNR; it does not require only a manual check. The point is that the manual check of the information might stop some of those individuals being stopped but it will also help identify those who do need to be stopped and questioned.
Q56 Lord Marlesford: But in general, the stop process depends crucially on what is now called a watch list and which, when you have full e-Borders control, will be something rather broader?
Meg Hillier: Yes, that is right. Currently, the watch list is individual and the PNR proposals that are going on now within the UK means that people with a pattern of behaviour. Let us be really clear and it may be worth laying out: it is where people bought their ticket; how they paid for it; their passport; the airline they travelled with; the route they travelled; and maybe people they travelled with. It may be worth giving an example of one case where two suspected people trafficking facilitators were identified at the border which was as the result of a watch list check using just Advanced Passenger Information data at check-in. They produced a copy of an itinerary, but it was suspected that they had travelled by a different route and were attempting to conceal their link with other individuals. Not long after that, four passengers were stopped at a border control with false documents. By checking the PNR data—this is where it really came into play—it was possible to demonstrate that all six passengers had travelled together, and that caught people traffickers.
Q57 Lord Marlesford: You are talking about America, now, presumably where they have got it.
Meg Hillier: No, that was our own Project Semaphore.
Mr Dodd: We capture at the moment something like 30 million passenger journeys a year already—that is PNR and API on a number of routes.
Q58 Lord Marlesford: Which is what percentage of the total?
Mr Dodd: It is something like 15%.
Q59 Lord Marlesford: Fifteen per cent already, and you will have 95% by the end of 2010.
Meg Hillier: Yes.
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