Memorandum by Shetland Ocean's Alliance
(SHOAL)
BACKGROUND
Shetland is an island community with a high
level of economic and social dependence on fish catching. As such,
it has a strong interest in how fisheries are managed, and in
ensuring a sustainable future for the fishing industry. It also
has considerable experience of the effects that the Common Fisheries
Policy has had.
The Shetland Ocean's Alliance (SHOAL) is a partnership
between the Shetland Islands Council and the Shetland Fishing
Industry to promote the industry's sustainable long-term future.
REVIEW OF
THE COMMON
FISHERIES POLICY
0.1) In general terms, our view is that
the 2002 review has had little substantive effect on the CFP or
its implementation. Although some new initiatives have been introduced,
the basic structure, mechanisms and philosophy of the CFP remain
unchanged, and little has been done to address the well-known
problems from which it suffers.
CONSERVATION / MANAGEMENT
1) New methods of ensuring conservation and
sustainability
1.1) Up to a point the new (and existing)
management measures may be said to have been at least partially
successful. However, the new measures share many of the problems
of existing ones. In general they serve as fairly blunt instruments,
lack flexibility, are often draconian in nature, and may create
as many problems as they are supposed to solve. Difficulties commonly
arise from the fact that single management measures are often
applied universally across a diverse and complex fishing industry
in a "one-size-fits-all" approach.
2) Management Tools
2.1) A major failing of the CFP is that
new management tools are added in a cumulative manner, constantly
increasing the complexity of the fisheries management system.
These tools may frequently have unintended consequences, which
then engender further new management measures in an endless cycle
of "tinkering" and increasing complexity. Fisheries
managers appear unable ever to admit that a management mechanism
hasn't worked, to scrap it, and to start afresh.
2.2) A general problem with the management
tools used under the CFP is that their application lacks flexibility
or adaptability.
Total Allowable Catches
2.3) A major problem with Total Allowable
Catches (TACs) is that they are always based on out of date information
(due to the time-lags involved in collecting and analysing fisheries
data, producing scientific advice, and formulating and implementing
management measures). This can give rise to substantial discrepancies
between the amount of fish available and the amount that fishermen
are allowed to catch. As well as undermining the credibility of
the management system, in the minds of fishermen, this can give
rise to substantial discarding of marketable fish.
2.4) A second major problem with TACs is
that they are not really suitable for mixed fisheries, such as
those common in UK waters. Whitefish fishermen generally catch
a mix of different species, but will have a separate TAC for each.
Again this can give rise to substantial discarding of marketable
fish.
2.5) Overall, many fishermen view TACs as
very crude management tools, which lack flexibility, are poorly
suited to the fisheries many of them pursue, and often seem to
cause them to have to dump marketable fish.
Effort Limitation
2.6) Effort limitation offers considerable
potential, and would be favoured by many fishermen. However, although
it is generally viewed as an alternative to total allowable catches,
under the CFP fishermen are currently subject to both TACs and
limits on effort. If TACs work then we don't need effort limits,
but if TACs don't work then they should be replaced by effort
limits (ie we should have one or the other).
2.7) There are substantial anomalies in
the way effort limitations are currently implemented under the
CFP. For example, at present North Sea demersal fishing boats
that use a small mesh (80-90 mm) net get substantially more days
at sea than boats that use large mesh (120 mm) nets, although
the latter catch much less small and immature fish. This has encouraged
a large-scale shift of fishing vessels into the small-mesh fishery.
2.8) Along with many fishermen we retain
significant reservations about the value of marine conservation
areas, although we accept that they may be appropriate for particular
areas of high conservation value. A major risk of any sort of
area closure is that it simply concentrates fishing effort in
other areas. One important point we would make is that fishermen
can make a considerable contribution to selecting appropriate
areas and their boundaries, and should be involved in any selection
process. In general we believe that marine conservation areas
should not be viewed as a universal panacea.
2.9) In general, we believe that adaptable
real-time closures offer substantial potential as a management
tool, provided they can be applied in a manner which is sufficiently
flexible, adaptable and responsive. Such closures are now being
piloted in Scottish waters.
Rights-Based Management Tools
2.10) We have substantial concerns about
rights-based management tools, especially over their potential
to concentrate ownership of fishing rights, and over the potential
loss of fishing rights to fisheries-dependent communities. We
consider that the supposed benefits of rights-based management
are largely based on economic theory, fail to take account of
non-economic considerations, and remain unproven in the real world.
2.11) We would, however, strongly support
the allocation of fishing rights to fisheries-dependent communities
(ie community ownership of fishing rights).
Technical Conservation Measures
2.12) We believe that Technical Conservation
Measures (TCMs) have some value, but the current system of TCMs
is too complex, and characterised by too much "fiddling around".
3) Levels of Discards and Bycatch
3.1) In general, we believe that for the
Shetland whitefish fleet current management measures have almost
eliminated the discarding of under-sized fish (due to the larger
mesh sizes now used in nets). However, the mismatch between low
TACs and a relative abundance of fish has led to substantially
increased discarding of marketable fish.
4) Climate Change
4.1) On this point we would note only that
current management measures take no apparent account of climate
or environmental changes. Instead, fishermen are generally held
solely responsible for any decline in fish stocks, even where
there is evidence that other factors may be involved. A key element
of adapting to climate change will be for managers to accept that
changes in fish stocks and the marine environment may not be entirely
the fishermen's fault, and that recovery cannot be guaranteed
no matter how hard the fishing industry is squeezed.
CONTROL AND
ENFORCEMENT
5) Efficacy of Systems / Community Fisheries
Control Agency
5.1) We believe that the current control
systems can be effective if they are properly, effectively and
equitably implemented. We would point out that the Scottish fishing
industry is now subject to very tight monitoring and control,
and is (we understand) viewed as an example of good practice.
This appears to have been achieved entirely through improvements
at domestic level; we are not aware that the Community Fisheries
Control Agency has had any effect.
5.2) In general, however, we believe that
there are substantial inequalities between Member States in the
efficacy of their control systems, and that some states make little
apparent effort to enforce fisheries regulations. As examples:
in some member states large quantities of under-sized fish are
openly sold; and some member states appear to export much more
of particular species than they should have been able to catch
under existing TACs.
6) Equality of Penalties
6.1) It is widely known that there are gross
inequalities in penalties between Member States. A recent notorious
example was the disparity between the penalties imposed on the
Scottish and Irish mackerel fleets and the French tuna fleet for
exceeding their quotas. While the Scottish and Irish fleets are
having to "pay back" the excess fish they caught (through
substantially reduced TACs over a number of years), no penalties
were imposed on the French fleet.
6.2) As well as the basic injustice, such
blatant inequalities play a substantial role in discrediting the
CFP in the eyes of British fishermen.
STRUCTURAL POLICY
7) Fleet Capacity Adjustment
7.1) On this point, we would note only that
this measure has been used to scrap a large proportion of the
UK fishing fleet as a short-term measure. There appears to be
little if any long-term planning in fleet capacity adjustment.
For example, large-scale scrapping leads to a loss of not just
vessels, but also knowledge, expertise and a wide range of ancillary
industries. Assuming such measures are successful and fish stocks
recover, where are the vessels, knowledge, etc, to exploit them
to come from?
7.2) A second important consideration is
that it is necessary and desirable to replace fishing vessels
on a rolling basis. Older vessels are substantially less efficient
(eg in terms of fuel and other operating costs) and become less
safe as time goes on.
8) European Fisheries Fund
8.1) In fact the European Fisheries Fund
is not expected to come into effect in the UK until late in 2008,
at the earliest. We thus have no experience of the instrument
on which to comment. It is clear, however, that the UK is well
behind most other Member States in implementing this programme.
This delay has resulted in a serious gap in the availability of
funding following the end of the previous FIFG programme.
9) WTO / Fisheries Subsidies
9.1) No comments.
GOVERNANCE
10) Regional Advisory Councils
10.1) In our view it is still early days
for Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) and their full potential
remains to be demonstrated. To date, we believe that they have
had some limited successes, but a major problem has been the European
Commission's ongoing tendency to ignore their advice and recommendations.
10.2) A particular problem that we see with
the North Sea RAC is that Norway's membership of this RAC appears
to give it an unfair advantage in the EU-Norway fisheries negotiations,
when management arrangements for the main North Sea fish stocks
are agreed (ie as a member of the RAC, Norway gains fore-knowledge
of the EU's negotiating position).
11) How EU Fisheries Should be Managed / Regional
Management
11.1) In our view, many of the failings
of the CFP have resulted from its attempts to manage fisheries
throughout Europe in a centralised, "one-size-fits-all"
manner that lacks flexibility and adaptability and takes little
account of regional and local variations. Management under the
CFP often seems to be driven by political ideology rather than
practical realities, and is generally overly politicised. Above
all, the CFP has proved to be an inefficient and ineffective management
system, which has failed to deliver either sustainable fish stocks
or sustainable fishing industries.
11.2) It follows that we would strongly
favour a "regionalisation" and de-politicisation of
European fisheries management. We also believe that fishermen
and fishing communities need to be given a much greater role in
fisheries management, both to make it more effective and to give
it some credibility. We consider such a management model to be
entirely practical and feasible; the only hindrance would appear
to be political.
11.3) In general terms we would like to
see the UK take a much more proactive leadership role in the (further)
reform of the CFP than it has to date.
15 February 2008
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