Memorandum by the National Federation
of Fishermen's Organisations
INTRODUCTION
The NFFO is the representative body for fishermen
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Our member vessels range
from 40 metre stern trawlers operating at North Norway and Greenland
to small, under 10metre vessels, beach launched and with limited
range. The Federation holds seats on the EC Advisory Committee
for Fisheries and Aquaculture, and the North Sea, North West Waters,
Pelagic and Long Distance regional advisory councils. The NFFO
is also a member of Europeche, the European trade federation for
the fishing industry.
THE ISSUE
The reformed Common Fisheries Policy had as
its objective the sustainable exploitation of aquatic resources.
Whilst some progress has been made in this direction over the
past five years, there are important institutional and policy
obstacles to a fully effective CFP.
GOVERNANCE
A senior Commission official remarked recently
that 95% of what is wrong with the CFP is poor governance; although
the precise percentage might be open for debate, we would not
disagree with the central thrust of that remark. An impossible
role has been imposed on the Directorate for Fisheries and Marine
Affairs and the attempt to control (some would say micro-manage)
a wide range of fisheries, in a broad spectrum of circumstances,
through 40 degrees of latitude, has led to the use of blunt and
often ineffective measures.
A further phase of reform is required. Managing
commercial fish stocks is an environmentally, economically and
socially sustainable way requires that the Commission's role evolves
from micro-management to an auditing, overseeing, and refereeing
role. Day to day management should be devolved to the fishing
industry, regional advisory councils and the member states within
a coordinating framework. The need to move in this direction is
recognised by the Commission. Its Communication on discards published
in 2007, contains the elements of such an approach: Discard reduction
initiatives would be advanced by the fishing industry, and supported
by the member state. The member state authorities would ensure
that the arrangements in place are valid and verifiable. Economic
incentives in the management system would be aligned with the
objectives of that system, rather than as is often the case at
present in contradiction to them. These are the components of
a successful fisheries management system that could deliver its
objectives, and would have a high degree of buy-in from the people
it affects.
The present CFP relies on too much on setting
targets and producing legislation rather than managing for outcomes.
The result is a cycle in which failure is built in from the outset.
Even where there are signs of progress, for example in the recovery
of Northern Hake or North Sea Cod, it is not at all clear that
the stocks are responding directly to the management measures
in place.
TOTAL ALLOWABLE
CATCH, TACS
It is widely recognised that from a conservation
perspective, TACs and quotas are a blunt instrument. In fact their
primary function has been as a convenient mechanism to share fisheries
resources between member states and, within the member states,
between groups of fishermen. Any alternative would have to offer
a similar distributive mechanism.
TACs aim to adjust the fishing mortality rate
to a level which is consistent with the desired replacement rate.
As such, the system depends upon scientific advice, currently
provided by ICES. One of the weaknesses of the system is that
for a variety of reasons there can be a high degree of uncertainty
surrounding stock assessments; for around 50% of the stocks there
is insufficient data for a full analytical assessment. Nonetheless,
it should be noted that there are a number of joint initiatives
between fishermen and scientists aimed at improving the quality
of assessments and that there are moves to long term management
that would not be so dependent on the annual cycle of assessments.
Annual volatility in the level of TAC is a cause of inefficiency
within the industry. Dramatic cuts in quota are difficult to plan
for and cause uncertainty and significant economic hardship. All
this supports the need to move to more stable stocks through Long-term
Management Plans. TACs can be successful where they are accepted
as legitimate, or fair, and are effectively enforced. It should
be emphasised, however, that applying TACs in a multi-species
fishery, with major by-catches, poses its own challenges.
Historically, the TAC system and the fish stock
assessment process on which it is based was seriously undermined
by over-quota, and unreported, landings. In the UK the introduction
of Buyers and Sellers Registration, in 2005, along with a range
of other controls has meant that any "black fish" in
the system have been pushed to the margin. As a result the price
of fish and quota has risen significantly.
The use of TACs in mixed fisheries poses particular
challenges, not least in the area of discards. For this reason
TACs have been supplemented by other measures. These include rules
to require more selective fishing gear, restrictions on time at
sea (effort control) and more innovative approaches such as cod
avoidance plans.
EFFORT CONTROL
Effort Control, or the limitation of Days-at-Sea,
was introduced by the EU in 2003 to deal with the fact that, due
to endemic unreported landings, TACs were ineffectual in controlling
fishing mortality. Effort Control has the advantage that it can
be applied easily at a distance but it remains a crude and economically
perverse instrument. In addition, its effects are not always those
that are anticipated.
Experience in the Pacific, Norway and Iceland
indicates that the effect of Effort Control is to intensify fishing
during the available period. At its worst an effort regime is
capable of causing a spiralling decrease in fishing stocks. In
addition, there are negative consequences for prices and costs.
In European Fisheries effort control generates
the same kind of response—an intensification of fishing
pressure during the time that vessels can go to sea. Examples
include reducing steaming time in a variety of ways, "capital
stuffing" and technological creep as well as high-grading
of stocks to maximise the return on capital.[1]
Effort Control is best understood as a policy
response to excess capacity. The real solution is a reduction
in capacity through a voluntary, publicly funded decommissioning
scheme.
The NFFO has consistently argued against the
imposition of effort restrictions for the reasons given above.
DISCARDS
The Commission has announced and already begun
to move in the direction of a total ban on discards.[2]
The NFFO believes that a total ban is unworkable in our mixed
fisheries but it does support the Commission's philosophy involving
pilot schemes, incentives, the involvement of stakeholders and
an incremental approach. The gradual introduction of measures
to reduce discards on a fishery by fishery basis, focusing on
the outcome to be achieved, rather than being simply prescriptive,
is welcomed.
It is, however, important to recognise the varying
reasons that underlie discarding. Some discarding is caused by
prescriptive regulations (minimum landing size, catch composition
rules, quotas, effort control, etc), some by the difficulty of
species selectivity in a multi-species fishery (by-catches, unmarketable
fish), yet others are due to biological factors in a wild environment
(fish spawn and are immature juveniles, catch densities are not
uniform)
A simple ban will not, of itself, remove all
the reasons for discarding fish. The NFFO believes that Avoidance
Plans, Real Time Closures, RTC, and MLS, properly enforced and
coupled with gear selectivity offer the best way forward so long
as TACs exist, provided the proper incentive structures exist.
One of the principle concerns with moving to
a total ban—so that everything caught is landed—is
that it may encourage the targeting of small fish. The experience
of other countries, particularly Norway, has been studied and
has relevance but could not safely be slavishly applied to our
fisheries.
COD AVOIDANCE
Drawing on its own experience, the industry
has suggested Cod Avoidance Plans as a way of reducing discards
whilst moving towards sustainable fisheries. The main features
of such plans are:
Use of fishermen's knowledge—The
Cod Avoidance plans draw on the fishermen's knowledge of the target
species and their habits, thus increasing their commitment as
stakeholders in the process.
Bottom up management—The initiative
comes from the bottom up with the industry taking responsibility
for its own activities at the grass roots level. Cod Avoidance
Plans are drawn up for individual vessels, or a fleet of similar
vessels. They provide precise details of the target fishery (or
fisheries), the gear that will be used, the precise location of
the activity and the period of time over which activity will take
place. Provision is made for inspection and verification.
Incentives aligned with management objectives—The
plans seek to optimise the fishing activities of the vessel by
changing fishery, gear, place and period in order to avoid catching
cod, thus contributing towards the Cod Recovery Plan. In exchange,
the vessel, or vessels, will obtain a degree of freedom with respect
to effort control.
Discard reduction/elimination—With
such Cod Avoidance Plans, vessels will significantly reduce their
by-catch of cod (it should not be forgotten that 60% of cod is
caught as a by-catch). In addition, such plans encourage greater
gear selectivity with a view to decreasing, if not totally eliminating,
discards.
Need for safeguards—Verification
is obviously key to any successful scheme. The Cod Avoidance Plan
makes provision for verification through on board observers, random
inspections, prior notification of landings and certification
of sales.
The Cod Avoidance Plan is supported in principle
by the North Sea and North West Water RACs, and they are currently
working on the detail.
The NFFO strongly supports the Cod Avoidance
Plans and believes that they provide a valuable guide for future
action.
REGIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCILS, RACS
The RACs in which the UK participates have made
a promising start, and their growing maturity has enabled them
to start the process of moving from confrontation among the stakeholders
to cooperation.
Much has been expected of the RACs, since the
reform of the CFP which envisaged the RACs as providing a means
for stakeholders to influence policy. The NFFO is committed to
this development since it believes that the future of European
fisheries lies in a more devolved structure of governance, as
opposed to the top/down control approach that characterised the
earlier years of the CFP. Although RACs have already made a substantial
contribution, the RACs will demonstrate their worth mainly though
the development of long-term management plans.
It is a matter of concern, therefore, that the
funding of the RACs has not kept pace with the role that is expected
of them. Without such support it will be difficult to continue
the development of Long-term Management Plans. The NFFO strongly
believes that more funding should be made available for the RACs.
LONG-TERM
MANAGEMENT PLANS
At the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable
Development in 2002 the EU underlined its commitment to sustainable
development, first made with the Rio Declaration of 1992. The
Johannesburg Implementation Plan committed the EU[3]
to:
Maintain or restore stocks to levels that
can produce the maximum sustainable yield with the aim of achieving
these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent basis and where possible
not later than 2015;
These objectives effectively meant that the
CFP became concerned with the need to elaborate Long-term Management
Plans for those fisheries deemed to be under threat. Plans were
to be introduced on a fishery by fishery basis.
The NFFO agrees in principle to the introduction
of Long-term Management Plans which offer the benefit of stability
to the industry. Such plans can not, however, be implemented without
reference to the industry capacity or they will create economic
and social hardship. The NFFO believes that the key requirements
for the success of such Long-term Management Plans are sound science
and buy-in from stakeholders. The RACs have played a critical
role both in assisting with the science and also in securing the
buy-in of stakeholders. In addition they have provided a forum
in which negotiations can take place. Developing Long-term Management
Plans is an intensive process requiring funding for both the science
and the stakeholders meetings.
Progress has been slow. Whilst the CFP stresses
the importance of Recovery Plans and Long-term Management Plans,
in fact only six have been adopted over the past five years (Cod,
Northern Hake, Biscay Sole, Nephrops off the Iberian Coast, Southern
Hake and North Sea Flatfish). At the present time, Northern Hake
is moving from a Recovery Plan to a Long-term Management Plan.
Haddock, mackerel and saithe are considered to be at around MSY
but should be able to sustain a Long-term Management plan.
SUMMARY
The reform of the CFP has not so far delivered
the benefits in terms of sustainability of fish stocks that was
its primary objective.
The NFFO believes that a major reason for this
shortfall is poor governance and lack of clarity in decision-making
in a multi-species environment. The move away from a top-down
control structure to a more devolved, stakeholder driven, form
of organisation has only just begun to take place and risks being
stifled. It accepts TACs as an allocatory mechanism and as the
least worst solution in an MSY world. It continues to view them
as a very blunt instrument. In the recent past illegal fishing
has been a problem, but the NFFO believes that, the evidence shows
that, since 2005 this is no longer the case. The NFFO has never
viewed effort control as a solution because it intensifies pressure
on resources.
In so far as the future is concerned, the NFFO
believes that the development of Avoidance Plans offers positive
benefits. In addition, there should be more Long-term Management
Plans, drawn up by stakeholders through the RACs whose role should
be expanded.
3 March 2008
1 There has been extensive academic criticism of Effort
Control. One of the most prominent critics is Professor Lee G.
Anderson. A brief introduction to his position may be found in
The Microeconomics of Vessel Behaviour: A Detailed Short-Run
Analysis of the Effects of Regulation, Marine Resource Economics,
Volume 14, pp 129-150. Back
2
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament A policy to reduce unwanted by-catches and eliminate
discards in European fisheries, COM(2007)136 final. Back
3
Article 31. Back
| 
