Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum by the Marine Directorate, Scottish Government

INTRODUCTION

    (i)  The Scottish Government welcomes the House of Lords EU Committee Review of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). This response provides an overview of some of the key issues of the CFP as seen from the Scottish Government's perspective.

CONTEXT

    (ii)  Scotland is the major fishing nation within the UK and one of the most significant fishing nations within the EU.

    —    Scotland's fisheries zone comprises 60.1% (470,063 km2) of the UK total area and represents the biggest share of EU waters (excluding overseas territories). These waters are some of the most productive fishing grounds in the world.

    —    69% of key UK quotas are held by Scottish Producer Organisations.

    —    Scotland lands around 66% of the UK quota stocks by value, (England and Wales 28%, and Northern Ireland 6%).

    (iii)  The Scottish Fishing industry (sea fishing and processing sector) is the lifeblood of a large number of coastal communities. In overall terms, it accounts for 1% of Scottish GDP compared to 0.1% for the UK as a whole. Thus fishing is 10 times more important to Scotland in pure economic terms than it is to the UK.

    (iv)  The Scottish industry is beginning to emerge from a period of decline. Since 2001 the over 10 metre whitefish fleet has reduced by 25% with knock on impacts on fishing communities across Scotland.

    (v)  The Scottish industry has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure sustainable fisheries. Fishermen in Scotland use larger mesh sizes and have additional gear measures which go beyond those of their EU counterparts. Around half of all Scottish fisheries are engaged in the process of Marine Stewardship Council certification. Most recently, Scotland has implemented a ground-breaking series of Real-Time Closures (RTCs) in EU waters to protect young cod. These closures are being voluntarily adhered to by fishermen. Statutory closures are not feasible through the CFP within a timescale which would provide meaningful protection to young cod. This is an example of how the CFP fails to protect stocks, while national action backed by stakeholders can provide effective conservation.

THE CFP AND SCOTLAND

    (vi)  The CFP has to deal with the most complex fisheries in the world. This complexity is both technical (managing over 50 commercially significant stocks and many other minor stocks) and political (with 27 Member States involved in decision making, around a dozen of whom have an interest in commercial sea fishing).

    (vii)  Given this context, it is unsurprising that the CFP often fails to meet its objectives. In Scotland's case, the CFP's disbenefits have outweighed its benefits. Most tellingly over the course of the CFP's existence both the Scottish fishing industry and the majority of stocks have declined.

    (viii)  The political arrangements for the CFP leave Scotland, as a major EU fishing nation, disenfranchised. Although fisheries management is fully devolved to Scotland, EU negotiations remain a function reserved to the UK Government. In principle, landlocked countries such as Austria can have a greater influence on fishing matters than can Scotland. This situation is both nonsensical and unjust. The Scottish Government remains committed to seeking to lead for the UK on fisheries matters in Europe to help address this in the short term.

    (ix)  From Scotland's perspective, the CFP has often appeared a distant, centralised, unresponsive and discredited policy. It has been marked by the Commission's attempt to micro-mange every aspect of fisheries (TACs, net sizes, where to fish, catch composition, vessel power, days at sea etc) from Brussels. This approach has led to a top down, control heavy regime which has done little to win the support of individual fishermen. As a result the CFP has become increasingly complex and much harder for even well informed stakeholders to follow. The resulting mutual suspicion from fishermen and the Commission has impeded mutual respect and trust leading to a corresponding decrease in effective policy making

    (x)  The Commission may have recognised that this version of the CFP can no longer work and appears to be considering moves towards greater regionalisation and self management. In this context it would be for the Council of Ministers to set broad policy goals (to reduce cod mortality to a set level for example) and for Member States to decide how to achieve that: in effect a move towards a more "directive" based approach rather than a `regulation' based approach. In this sense the Commission's decision to allow Scotland to pilot its Conservation Credits scheme is revolutionary and very welcome.

Scotland's approach to the CFP Review

    (xi)  The Scottish Government does not believe that membership of the CFP serves Scotland's interests and is committed to seeking withdrawal. While working towards this it is recognised that the current constitutional set-up and UK Government policy would have to change before such a course of action became feasible. This will not prevent the Scottish Government from developing alternative models of fisheries management drawing on experience from outside the European Union.

    (xii)  In December 2007 the First Minister Alex Salmond announced the Scottish Government's intention to establish an expert panel to consider and develop fisheries management models which better serve the needs of Scotland's fishermen. There are examples of fisheries management practices outwith the EU which show greater success in supporting fishing communities and protecting fish stocks. For example, the Faroese regulate fishing through effort and gear controls rather than quotas. With no minimum landing size all fish can be legally landed so discarding of non-quota or undersize fish does not occur. Iceland, on the hand, has adopted as system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). While not necessarily an appropriate system for Scottish vessels, it has increased the profitability of many of the Icelandic fishing companies.

    (xiii)  We will also seek ways to improve the CFP in the context of the 2012 CFP reform process. Given the substantial shortcomings of the CFP, even taking account of the 2002 reform, we will argue that the European Commission should be ambitious and radical in seeking to reshape EU fisheries policies if unwilling to abolish the CFP in its entirety.

    (xiv)  The remainder of this document responds to the Committee's specific questions. The Scottish Government is also aware of the response provided by Fisheries Research Services in Aberdeen, the Scottish Government's statutory scientific advisors on fisheries management, and concurs with their points.

CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT

Q1.  Recovery plans, management plans and emergency measures

Recovery plans

  1.1  There have been two distinct periods of EU recovery measures. The first period, from 1998, relied on increasingly restrictive catch and quota limits supported by complex technical conservation measures. By the end of 2002 it had become clear that these measures alone had not had adequate impact on the prospects of some stocks, which remained in decline. Further measures were added for 2003. These included fishing effort management (`days at sea') and improved landings controls arrangements, complemented by national decommissioning schemes in several Member States.

  1.2  It has become clear that the second period of attempted recovery has been more successful than the first, although still not ideal. At the very least, for example, in the North Sea it can be demonstrated that fishing mortality rates have declined across most stocks. However, scientific assessments indicate that some stocks have not yet recovered to within safe biological limits, and that there is a risk of their not doing so without further reductions in fishing mortality rates. The Scottish Government's views on the cod recovery plan were set out in its paper of October 2007.

Management plans

  1.3  We welcome the improved stability offered by long term management plans. Developing and adhering to such plans, on the basis of moderate fishing pressure, should be a priority. In doing this explicit account needs to be taken of socio-economic factors: there is little point in seeking to ensure long-term stability of stocks at commercial levels if, in the meantime, the fishing industry and communities exploiting the resource have disappeared. Greater involvement of stakeholders in the development of long term plans would help address this.

  1.4  The development of management plans needs to take into account the overall health of both the stock and the industry. A weak fishing industry is not able to sign up to challenging long term plans if the projected benefit is in the distant future. As an example, both the haddock and the saithe stocks are healthy. It was possible to agree a long term management plan based on moderate fishing pressure which was acceptable to all sides. This was possible as it "locked in" current levels of effort only allowing fishing effort to increase or decrease in line with the size of the stock.

  1.5  The greater stability this brings to both the stock and the industry is welcome, but it would not be possible at this stage for a stock like cod where cuts in effort (and therefore boat income) would be sharp and remain so for a number of years before the increased stock could be fished. In the interim a number of boats would undoubtedly go bankrupt. Therefore, there should be a clear distinction between recovery plans and management plans and an understanding that management plans can only be put in place once a stock is healthy.

Emergency measures

  1.6  Emergency measures have been used in Scottish waters previously, for example to close the area known as the Darwin Mounds to bottom trawl fisheries to protect deep sea corals. However, the process, although speedy by EU standards, is still too time-consuming to provide real-time management of fisheries. For example, real-time closures, such as those voluntarily agreed to by Scottish fishermen, are not practicable through emergency measures.

Q2.  TACs, Effort limitation, rights based management, technical conservation

TACs and effort limitation

  2.1  We agree with the emerging consensus in support of adopting management targets based on fishing mortality rates (F), which we are easier to control, instead of biomass (SSB) targets. But TAC constraints alone are a far from perfect tool for controlling fishing, and especially fishing mortality rates in the mixed fisheries which characterise the North Sea. Unrecorded landings, grading of the catch and the prevalence of discards have all contributed to undermine the effect of quota limitations, and an over-reliance or excessive emphasis on this single management tool would be a failure to learn from our experience so far.

  2.2  Instead the revised harvest control rules should be treated as a firm template for recovery, but a greater emphasis should be placed on the full suite of measures adopted and developed for the different stocks, region-by-region. This approach would enable Member States and national fleets, co-operating as necessary, to develop the solutions which they agree are most able to deliver agreed targets effectively. Agreed harvest rules should set the desired framework for sustainability but not the full prescription for delivery mechanisms.

  2.3  We disagree with the continued reliance on the blunt instrument of further general cuts in effort or quota. We believe it should be for individual Member States to draw on the full range of measures which might make a contribution to further reductions in mortality, constructing packages that are appropriately balanced to meet the specific needs of distinctive fisheries interacting with different stocks. In appropriate places that might include further fishing gear developments, new spatial or seasonal management measures such as closed areas or further changes to fleet capacity or fishing entitlements. In devising measures we must go with the grain of behaviour on the fishing grounds, taking full account both of fishermen's expertise and their legitimate associated interests.

  2.4  We endorse adoption of the approach described by the Commission as "decoupling". The starting point for decoupling fisheries is to manage all fisheries in the best possible way for themselves. This measure has already been adopted in the haddock and saithe fisheries, with agreement reached on long term management plans based on moderate fishing pressure consistent with maximum sustainable yield. A commitment has also been made to move towards managing the plaice and sole fisheries this way. Adopting the MSY-derived approach has been beneficial for health of the target stocks, for the long term commercial interests of fishing-dependant businesses built around them and for the protection of the marine environment from any damaging impacts of fishing behaviours.

Rights based management

  2.5  It should be noted that under the current system of "Relative Stability" each Member State's share of a stock is guaranteed. Therefore it is for each Member State to decide how national quota is distributed to individual fishermen. Within the UK this is a devolved matter.

  2.6  Under plans for a Scottish Quota Management and Licensing system, we are looking to resolve the uncertainty that exists on the current definition to harvest this important resource, and look to provide more stability to quota holders, while maintaining the Scottish Government's interest in this national asset. We plan, therefore, to consult Scottish stakeholders on proposals to establish "stewardship rights". Subject to the outcome of consultation, these (user) rights would be granted on a long-term basis but not in perpetuity.

  2.7  We will not strengthen property rights on fishing quotas, and move towards a "pure" rights based management system. In order to encourage sustainable economic growth and support prosperous fishing communities, a shared approach between quota holders and the Scottish Government is required. This will help facilitate industry stability, and encourage fishing rights to remain in fishing communities for the benefit of future generations.

Technical conservation measures

  2.8  Technical conservation measures have a major role to play in managing fisheries, particularly in mixed fisheries. They also have a role in reducing adverse environmental impacts. Previously technical measures have been effective in principle, but less successful in practice. This is often because fishermen wish to avoid the unwanted effect of technical measures (the loss of some marketable fish) and have proved adept at circumventing these measures. Experience therefore suggests that, in order to ensure technical conservation measures do provide real benefits to sustainable fishing, measures must be appropriate and accepted by the industry and designed and implemented in close liaison with not only scientists but also enforcement experts. Implementing measures through incentives is likely to be more effective in practice than compulsory measures. Provided these conditions are met, technical measures can make an important contribution.

  2.9  The most effective technical recovery measures will be developed regionally, drawing fully on the expertise of active fishermen. It is clear that fishing conditions differ in different areas and solutions developed for one area may not work, or have unintended consequences, in another area. Attempts to impose technical measures across the whole of Europe without sufficient consultation or buy-in from the fishing industry are likely to be circumvented.

Q3.  Discards and bycatch

  3.1  Discards and bycatches occur for a range of reasons, some of which are aggravated by CFP policies. It is very important that steps are taken to tackle this issue. The Scottish Government and Scottish industry have undertaken measures which go beyond those required by the CFP to reduce discards and bycatches and will continue to seek new means of further reductions, including under the Conservation Credits Scheme. However, we are sceptical of the merits of a discard ban. In the absence of root and branch reform of the CFP such a ban would have serious practical implications, in particular for enforcement.

Q4.  Climate change

  4.1  In the face of environmental change the CFP is a cumbersome and inflexible policy. Whilst quota shares established regionally and based on historic catch records give important reassurance to national fishing industries, they will obviously be inadequate in the face of rapid change. Thus there is an inherent difficulty in accounting for changes in fish stock population and distribution in terms of allowing fleets to follow fish stocks.

  4.2  There is evidence of certain species extending their range northwards. These may, in time, provide new fishing opportunities available to fishermen, while other fishing opportunities decline. Establishing a "relative stability" key for such new stocks may disadvantage northern countries with southern countries having benefited from a longer track record in exploiting these species. However, as yet we have little evidence of any major migration of stocks from their current recognised grounds.

  4.3  A major concern is the impact of climate change on food webs. Changes in planktonic species in the North Sea have been noted, which in turn affects food availability of primary and secondary consumers with the potential to impact on commercial populations.

Control and Enforcement

Q5.  Court of Auditors report

  5.1  We welcome opportunities to compare levels of controls and enforcement. However, the position described on control, inspection and sanction systems by the recent Court of Auditors Report is in many ways a historic perspective with many of the deficiencies identified already addressed. As the assessment of UK systems only referred to England and Wales, the Scottish Government would not wish to offer specific comments on the detail of the Report. Having said that, the Scottish Government recognises the importance of ensuring continuing compliance with the Common Fisheries Policy To that end we have been working extensively with the European Commission and key stakeholders to promote responsible and sustainable fishing practices, and to protect vulnerable fish stocks. National measures operating in Scotland to protect juvenile and spawning cod are two recently established examples. The very significant progress we have made in this area has been widely recognised. A key priority both for the current CFP and for whatever arrangements apply after 2012 must be to ensure equity throughout the EU in terms of the standards of control and enforcement.

  5.2  The Community Fisheries Control Agency ("CFCA") exists primarily to promote and coordinate co-operation between Member States in work, primarily through inspections at sea, related to stock recovery programmes. Much of that work took over from bilateral arrangements that already existed between Member States. The Scottish Government works closely with counterparts in Norway, Russia and key EU Member States on fisheries control issues and continues to play a lead role in initial CFCA operations in the North Sea.

Q6.  Harmonisation of penalties

  6.1  We recognise that this is a sensitive issue with associated questions of Commission competence. The emphasis should be on equivalence in terms of the rigour and severity of monitoring, controls and deterrence, rather than on imposing uniform approaches which do not correspond to the systems applying in the different jurisdictions.

Structural Policy

Q7.  Capacity reduction

  7.1  Since 1993, Scotland has decommissioned 361 Scottish vessels. As a result of this considerable sacrifice by our industry and our fishing communities, we believe capacity in the demersal fleet is now in much better balance with the available resource. We do not believe other Member States have reduced their effort to a corresponding degree (see Fig 1). The principle of equity to which we refer in paragraph 5.1 should also apply here.

Q8.  European Fisheries Fund

  8.1  The Scottish Government welcomes the European Fisheries Fund as the successor to the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance. We will seek to maximise the value of European Fisheries Fund (EFF) resources to support the sustainable and strategic development of the Scottish fisheries, processing and aquaculture sectors and their dependent communities.

  8.2  EFF funding will make an important contribution to the Scottish Government's commitment to promoting and supporting national and community strategies for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources. It will build on the existing competitiveness of the Scottish fisheries industry and sustainably developing new markets for the export of product and expertise and the development of fisheries activities outside community waters, as well as the longer term sustainable development of Scotland's fisheries communities.

Figure 1. Effort (KW days) in the CRZ using CRG for selected nations 2001-06


Governance

Q10.  Regional Advisory Councils

  10.1  The Scottish Government believe that the establishment of RACs represented a positive step in EU fisheries policies in terms of greater stakeholder involvement and a more regional approach to fisheries management. We have provided significant support to the RACs to help them establish themselves and Scottish stakeholders have been particularly active in these forums. Certain RACs have been more successful than others in influencing and cooperating with the Commission. The role of the North Sea RAC on cod recovery has been a good example of what can be achieved. Crucial to the success of RACs will be their ability to provide credible, responsible and timely advice and the Commission's willingness to engage in genuine dialogue. We would like to see the role of RACs enhanced in the future in terms of genuine participation in fisheries management, such as the development of long term management plans and wider marine environmental policy issues.

Q11.  Future governance

  11.1  This is a crucial issue to which there is no quick answer. This is precisely the issue which we intend the expert panel, alluded to earlier, to address. It is expected that the panel will wish to cast its net widely to review and analysis alternative fishing regimes from across the globe and which have had notably more success than the CFP.

Conclusion

    (i)  The Scottish Government believes a radical approach is needed in addressing the future of the CFP. We would welcome further opportunities to help the Committee with its work on this important issue.

Marine Directorate, the Scottish Government

February 2008


 
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