Memorandum by the Directorate-General
for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, European Commission
In response to your call for evidence of 18
January 2008 the Commission can offer the following comments:
CONSERVATION/MANAGEMENT
1. Chapter 11 of Regulation 237 1/2002 on
the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources
under the Common Fisheries Policy introduced new methods of ensuring
conservation and sustainability, including recovery plans, management
plans and emergency measures. To what extent have these been effective?
Recovery plans were introduced in 2002 with
the main objective to reduce fishing mortality on stocks that
were in very poor state. A reduction in fishing mortality decreases
the pressure on a weak stock, thus allowing for the recovery of
the stock, regardless if the recovery was caused by nature and
not a direct product of lower fishing pressure. These programmes
were set up for several stocks of cod, hake and sole in European
waters.
After a few years of implementation the results
are mixed. For most of the cod stock fishing mortality did not
decrease as expected and the stocks have yet to recover. For northern
hake, there was a reduction of fishing pressure that allied to
good recruitment. This has allowed for the stock to recover. Nevertheless,
the southern hake stock still remains subjected to high fishing
mortality.
Recovery and management plans are a very useful
"tool" to progressively bring stocks, and associated
fisheries, to sustainable levels, and they will continue to be
used in the management of European fisheries. However, the plans
are been reviewed and improved (particularly the cod plan) with
the introduction of measures, such as for example changes in target
objectives or specific control measures, to make them more effective
in reducing fishing mortality.
2. A wide range of management tools are available
to fisheries managers. What are your views on the following tools:
— Total Allowable Catches
— Effort limitation, including "days
at sea", marine conservation areas and real-time Closures
— Rights-Based Management tools
— Technical Conservation Measures
Management tools should not be seen in isolation
but can only be analysed within an overall management framework.
Fisheries management should apply a mixture of tools which should
be adequate to the specific situation. The efficacy of various
management instruments is very different for different fisheries.
While effort management may be a useful tool for demersal mixed
fisheries, it may not achieve its objectives in relation to pelagic
fisheries.
TACs will remain a basic management instrument
as long as relative stability exists. TACs have however proven
insufficient to ensure sustainable fisheries for several commercially
important stocks. The reasons are many but include that the control
of landings has been insufficient as indicated in the recent report
of the Court of Auditors[2],
that under the present management regime discards will occur in
mixed fisheries when the quota of one species is exhausted while
there is still quota for others. The Court also stated that TACs
create incentives to high-grade in order to maximize the value
of the quota. This is especially a problem when stocks which are
outside safe biological limits and therefore subject to recovery
plans are taken in mixed fisheries. In these cases the intended
effects of recovery plans fail to materialise because the amount
of fish killed remains constant, because what was formerly landed
now becomes discarded. The Community has therefore supplemented
TACs in these cases with measures to keep the effort at a level
which should be equivalent to the effort needed to take the quota
of the recovery stock.
Rights based management instruments can be an
important supplement to management measures if they are coupled
with responsibilities to harvest responsibly. The Commission has
presently no competence on this issue as the allocation of fishing
rights are a Member State competence. A Communication has however
been published in order to inspire a debate about this instrument
in the Community[3].
Technical conservation measures are very useful
to effect the exploitation pattern reduce by-catches of juvenile
fish or non-targeted species. Technical measures thus has a completely
different role than other measures such as TACs or effort control,
which aim to reduce the overall fishing pressure, and technical
measures can therefore not replace such measures. Many years of
experience have proven that technical measures in most cases result
in very modest outcomes relative to what was expected. The reason
is simple, technical measures, which not only result in reduced
by-catches but also in some loss of the targeted fish, will be
seen as an economic loss by the industry and ingenious (legal
and in some case illegal) ways which neutralise the economic loss
are therefore found in response to such measures. The countermeasure
has been to make ever more detailed technical regulations resulting
in a negative spiral of micro-legislation and industry adaptation.
More selective fishing gear and fishing practices are better promoted
through results-based management whereby standards for the outcome
of the fishery (such as maximum acceptable by-catch) are established
and it is left to the industry to find the technical means to
fish within these standards. This is the basic thinking in the
new policy to reduce discards as explained in the Communication
on discards[4].
3. To what extent have current management
tools increased the levels of discards and bycatch? What is your
view on how these problems can best be tackled?
Discards of species of commercial interest are
caused both by specific management tools and by economic drivers.
As for management instruments, the emphasis on landing quotas
as the main instrument to distribute access to fisheries between
countries and within countries leads to discards when above-quota
quantities of some species are taken while there is still quota
left over for others. The use of minimum landing sizes also leads
to discards, especially in mixed fisheries where species of different
adult size are caught together. By-catches and subsequent discarding
of species without commercial interest is entirely driven by economic
considerations. The relative importance of economic and management
drivers vary between fisheries and is difficult to measure. In
some fisheries discarding due to market considerations (high grading)
dominates. There will be unwanted by-catches in mixed fisheries
even in the absence of TACs for economic reasons and it is therefore
important to work on means to reduce these by-catches independently
on whether TACs are used or not.
One should note however, that the large amount
of discarding of under size fish is due to the fact that most
fish stocks are overexploited. Overexploitation results in few
large fish left in the sea and the fish stocks are dominated by
small fish. Landings are for many stocks dominated by fish which
have just grown above the minimum size and in order to catch that,
large amounts of smaller fish have been caught and discarded in
the process. The main measure to reduce discards is thus to reduce
exploitation as the Commission intends with the MSY policy linked
to long term management plans.
Beyond that the Commission considers that a
combination of tools is required including temporary closures,
requirements to move when unacceptable by-catch rates are encountered
and eventually a discard ban. The most effective approach is considered
to be results-based management rather than detailed technical
regulations because that approach will leave it to the industry
to find the most feasible technical solutions and will best support
bottom-up initiatives. The discard policy was described in a recent
communication[5]
and implementation regulations will now be prepared for specific
fisheries.
4. Do you consider that fisheries management
policies may need to adapt to climate change? If so, how might
this be achieved?
The impact of climate change on marine ecosystems
and the fish populations will have implications for fisheries
management.
Fisheries management will, also without climate
change concerns, need to integrate closely with environmental
management in order to get to an ecosystem approach, and this
will be even more pertinent when climate change impacts are considered
as adaptations will only be meaningful if seen in an ecosystem
context. The Commission is preparing a Communication on the ecosystem
approach to fisheries management and integration of environmental
concerns to be adopted in March 2008.
The main expected impacts are that distributions
of fish stocks change, that the productivity and vulnerability
of fish stocks and marine ecosystems will change and more generally,
that it must be accepted that predictability may be low and management
(and industry) therefore must be robust to insufficient knowledge
about the future.
This means that new allocation mechanisms may
need to be established as fish stocks change their distribution,
that reference points will need to be adapted to changed productivity
and that management plans must be increasingly adaptive rather
than predictive.
Knowledge will be important to guide policies
and the Commission is developing a comprehensive research effort
regarding climate change and adaptations, including marine and
fisheries, under the 7th Framework Programme.
One should not forget that fisheries should
also be expected to contribute to mitigation. Some fishing practices
are very energy hungry spending 3-5 kg of fuel for each kg of
fish landed. The Commission is facilitating interchange of information
and experiences on energy saving but does not presently foresee
specific measures regarding the energy use in fisheries beyond
the general policy to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
CONTROL AND
ENFORCEMENT
5. Chapter V of Regulation 237 1/2002 lays
down the responsibilities of the Member States and the Commission
as regards the control and enforcement of the rules of the Common
Fisheries Policy. The recent Court of Auditors Report on the control,
inspection and sanctions systems relating to the rules on conservation
of Community fisheries resources was very sceptical of the systems
currently in place. What is your view of the efficacy of the systems
in place? To what extent has the Community Fisheries Control Agency
already assisted in improving matters?
Despite certain progress illustrated by the
strengthening of cooperation between the Member States, the introduction
of a satellite monitoring system for the European fleet and the
adoption of electronic reporting, it must be noted that not all
objectives have been achieved. Numerous weak points were identified
in the various reports published by the Commission on control
of the CFP as well as in the report of the Court of Auditors.
It can be concluded that the control system is inefficient, expensive,
complex, and that it does not produce the desired results. The
major efforts undertaken over the last years to achieve sustainable
exploitation and long-term management of stocks simply cannot
bear fruit in the absence of an effective control system.
There is an absence of a European culture of
control. National systems are largely ineffective and there are
limited means at the disposal of the Commission to put pressure
on Member States to take their control obligations seriously.
Due to the aforementioned weaknesses a review
of the whole control and enforcement system is undertaken and
a revised system is foreseen to be in place during 2009. The review
concerns development of a new strategy as regards fisheries control,
rationalisation of the rules, strengthening the capacity of the
Commission, harmonisation of sanctions, strengthening of cooperation
and of assistance, development of a culture of compliance, use
of modern technologies, increase in cost effectiveness and adaptation
of the mandate of the Community Fisheries Control Agency.
The community fisheries control agency (CFCA)
is currently establishing itself and the recruitment of staff
is ongoing. However, it has started its operations but it is not
possible to make an evaluation yet on its impact on coordination
and improvements of control as only a few joint missions organised
by the CFCA are undertaken so far.
6. The European Commission has regularly highlighted
how serious infringements of the CFP are penalised differently
across the Community. This was a matter that was also raised by
the Court of Auditors and sanctions were included in the recent
Commission Proposal in IIJU fishing. What is your view on the
issue?
The Commission set up common regulations for
control at Community level, but their implementation and enforcement
are the responsibility of the Member States. This leads to differences
in the way regulations are applied. Both implementation rules
and sanctions vary greatly from one Member State to another. In
order to reduce the disparity in the way the regulations are applied
the Commission has proposed in October 2007 a first harmonisation
of sanctions in the context of the fight against IUU fishing.
In parallel, the possibilities for revising the list of serious
infringements as well as establishing a catalogue of all sanctions
will be explored in the context of the revision of the Control
Regulation.
STRUCTURAL POLICY
7. Chapter 111 of Regulation 2371/2002 obliged
Member States to put in place measures to adjust the capacity
of their fleets in order to achieve a stable and enduring balance
between such fishing capacity and their fishing opportunities.
To what extent has this been successful?
First it should be underlined that, although
Member States are obliged to adapt the size of their fleet to
the available resources (Article 11 of Regulation 2371/2002),
no mandatory capacity reductions are established under Community
law. Having said so, it is clear that globally the capacity of
the Community fleet has not been sufficiently reduced.
During the past five years, after the reform
of the CFP which entered into force on 1 January 2003, the total
fishing capacity of the Community Fleet has been reduced by approximately
2% per year in terms of tonnage and power. This reduction is for
the most part the result of public aid for decommissioning. The
reduction trend is similar to the one observed during the previous
10 years, under the MAGP programmes when capacity reduction targets
were in force. Capacity reduction rates in the order of 2% are
insufficient, given the magnitude of the effort reductions required
to achieve a sustainable exploitation in many community fisheries.
In addition to that, this reduction may not compensate for the
technical progress, which is estimated to increase the catching
power at similar or higher rates. This result is no real decrease
in effective fishing power.
The assessment of overcapacity from a biological
point of view is difficult to carry out because fishing capacity
cannot be completely isolated from economic considerations. Vessels
often target different fisheries, making overcapacity assessment
more complex. Reductions in activity complement the reductions
in capacity so as to adjust fishing effort and reduce fishing
mortality. However, a significant and permanent capacity underutilisation
and economic underperformance are commonly seen in most Community
fleets, and these are clear signs of overcapacity.
With or without a fleet management programme
it remains an economic decision of a vessel owner to stay or to
leave the sector and decommission his vessel. It is therefore
important that Member States within any fleet policy framework
make it attractive for fishermen to leave the industry by putting
in place attractive and recurrent decommissioning schemes. With
the present overcapacity Member States should therefore increase
their efforts, including financial efforts, to reduce the capacity
of the fleet.
8. The new fisheries structural fund, the
European Fisheries Fund (EFF), has now come into force. What has
been your experience thus far with the new instrument?
The experience gained to date with Council Regulation
(EC) No 1198/2006 on the European Fisheries Fund is limited in
terms of practical implementation. Most Member States submitted
their National Strategic Plans and their proposals for Operational
Programmes (OPs) (covering the period between 1 January 2007 and
31 December 2013) to the Commission in the course of 2007, and
it has been possible to adopt 19 OPs by the end of 2007. The UK
has not yet formally submitted its OP.
The Commission expects all OPs to be adopted
by mid-2008.
All OPs will cover the period 2007-13 and according
to the regulation and expenditure incurred after 1.1.2007 will
be eligible for aid under the EFF, under certain conditions, even
if the OP is adopted after this date.
The total EFF budget committed for the 19 adopted
OPs amounts to 3,299,636,833 euros.
This sum is shared between five Priority axes
defined by the regulation as follows:
— Priority axis 1, measures for the
adaptation of the Community fishing fleet: 888 M€ (26.9 %).
— Priority axis 2: aquaculture, inland
fishing, processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products:
1056 M€ (32 %).
— Priority axis 3: measures of common
interest: 929 M€ (28.2 %).
— Priority axis 4: sustainable development
of fisheries areas: 314 M€ (9.5 %).
— Priority axis 5: technical assistance:
112 M€ (3.4 %).
In its guidance to Member States on OPs, the
Commission has invited Member States to put more emphasis on the
decommissioning of vessels.
For the OPs adopted, the Managing authorities
are preparing the first meetings of the Monitoring committees,
and a clearer picture concerning their implementation will be
available in the near future.
9. What are your views on the possible impact
on EU fisheries structural policy of WTO level discussions as
regards subsidies in the fishing sector?
On 30 November 2007 the Chair of the WTO Negotiating
Group on "Rules", Ambassador Valle (Uruguay), circulated
a draft consolidated text to Members on the subjects covered by
the "Rules" chapters, ie anti-dumping and countervailing
measure and subsidies, including fisheries subsidies.
The Commission notes that a number of elements
included in the aforementioned text reflect the two key principles
guiding the EU's policies for aid to the fisheries sector, namely
to prohibit subsidies that encourage overcapacity, leading to
overfishing, while allowing subsidies that help to remove capacity
in excess of available fish resources. These elements of the draft
negotiating text are incorporated in the so called "red"
(prohibited) and "green" (allowed) box types of subsidies.
Nevertheless the Commission is concerned that
the proposals by the Chair, as they now stand, could prevent public
authorities from granting support to the fishing sector to ensure
the transition to a sustainable state. Examples of this are the
case of aid programmes intended for a smooth and efficient restructuring
of parts of the fishing industry. Furthermore the proposed exceptions
("green" box) seem insufficient to allow for the implementation
of cleaner technologies, including the replacement of engines,
in order to limit emissions harmful for the environment.
Besides the proposals to prohibit or to allow
certain types of subsidies, the Chair's text includes certain
provisions to reinforce the notification of subsidies. In this
respect, the Commission would like to see a very ambitious result
of the negotiations, one which would bring WTO Members at least
to the same level of transparency as the one shown by the EU internally,
when implementing structural funds, and externally, when notifying
aid to the WTO. Increased transparency will not only generate
knowledge about the types of subsidies given but will also provide
a much needed insight into the impact of such subsidies both on
trade and on the sustainable use of fishery resources.
In sum, the Commission's assessment is that
the current negotiating proposals, as set out in the Chair's text,
should be more balanced. In other words, the WTO should be given
the tools to tackle the problem of overcapacity and overfishing
while allowing for the provision of aid that positively contributes
to the sustainable exploitation of available fishery resources
and that mitigates the negative impacts of adjustment measures
on fishing communities. This assessment is shared by other WTO
Members in the developing world as well as developed countries.
More details on the positions of the European
Union in the fisheries negotiations are available in the three
submissions made to the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules on 23 April
2003 (WTO document TN/RL/W/82), on 11 April 2005 (WTO document
TN/RL/W/178 and on 26 April 2006 (WTO document TN/RL/GEN/I34).
These documents are public and can be downIoaded from the WTO's
website.
GOVERNANCE
10. As a result of Regulation 2371/2002, Regional
Advisory Councils (RACs) were established to advise the Commission
on matters of fisheries management in respect of certain sea areas
or fishing zones. What is your assessment of the success thus
far of the RACs? What is your view on their future evolution?
In terms of process, six out of the seven RACs
foreseen in the relevant Community framework, have been established
since 2004. The Mediterranean RAC should also be established in
the course of 2008.
Recognizing the important contribution of RACs
in the development of the CFP, the Commission proposed and the
Council decided in 2007 to provide RACs with permanent and increased
Community co-financing.
As foreseen by Council Decision 2004/S8SIEC,
the Commission is preparing a review on the functioning of Races,
which will be discussed at the April Council of Ministers. The
review will evaluate the input of RACs to the development of the
CFP, highlight good practices and put forward suggestions to improve
the functioning of RACs.
In parallel, the Commission is also evaluating
the performance of ACFA (Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture)
which is the second pillar of the CFP governance. One of the issues
under evaluation is the co-operation between ACFA and the RACs.
The evaluation study will be available in June 2008.
The on-going evaluations of both RACs and ACFA
will offer a good opportunity to start a discussion about the
performance of CFP governance. The discussion will involve Member
States, European Institutions and stakeholders. The Commission
is not in a position to prejudge the outcome of this debate.
11. How do you consider EU fisheries should
ideally be governed? How appropriate and feasible do you consider
a regional management model to be?
The Commission is presently considering options
for future governance in EU fisheries; at this stage some considerations
can be made on the qualities of a good management system. There
are three components to an effective management system: that the
institutional setup for decision making is adequate, that industry
incentives promote a responsible and productive production chain
for fisheries products and that all players are willing to utilise
the instruments available effectively.
The institutional setup for decision making
should be such that there are clear objectives which support accountability
by enabling outcomes to be measured against objectives, that there
is a clear hierarchy in responsibilities for decision making between
decisions on principles, community standards emerging from these
principles and technical implementation decisions. A regional
management model may contribute to this if it is a part of a setup
whereby there are clear objectives and principles decided in co-decision,
community standards for implementation by the Commission and technical
implementation decisions are delegated to member states which
will need to organise themselves on regional level, subject to
community control of outcomes against standards and objectives.
It needs to be considered how the industry can
best be motivated to support the objectives of the policy. Industry
incentives need to be turned around from the present setup where
it pays to be irresponsible. An option is to link longer term
access rights closely to responsibilities where access is contingent
on a demonstration from the industry that exploitation of public
resources takes place within the standards set by society. This
implies a reversal of the burden of proof within a results based
management and a sharing of management costs. Other options may
include parts of this but should always be based on the principle
that rights and responsibilities should be coupled.
Any setup, including the present, will only
work if it is used effectively and supported by all parties concerned.
Creating a supportive environment is crucial. Good communication
with the public and close interactions between policy makers and
stakeholders is therefore a key to the success of any management
system.
28 February 2008
2 Special Report No 7/2007 on the control, inspection
and sanction systems relating to the rules on conservation of
Community fisheries resources. European Court of Auditors 2007. Back
3
Communication from the Commission on rights-based management tools
in fisheries. COM(2007) 73 final Back
4
Communication from the Commission To The Council And The European
Parliament. A policy to reduce unwanted by-catches and eliminate
discards in European fisheries. COM(2007) 136 final Back
5
Communication from the Commission To The Council And The European
Parliament. A policy to reduce unwanted by-catches and eliminate
discards in European fisheries. COM(2007) 136 final Back
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