Supplementary Memorandum by the Directorate-General
for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, European Commission
THE POLITICAL
CONTEXT
1. The adoption of decisions affecting Community
fisheries is dominated by the Member States working through the
Council. To what extent do you consider there has been any change
in the basic constellation of interests in the Council since the
last CFP reform in 2002? What impact, for example, have the 2004
and 2007 accessions had on policy outcomes?
It is difficult to give a straight answer to
such a question. At first sight it would seem that the last accessions
have consolidated the more conservative tendencies in conservation
policy. The new Member States seem to share the same approach
to fisheries management, based on short term socio economic considerations.
Adopting a longer term approach remains difficult for both old
and new Member States. The new Member States also justifiably
went through a period of adjustment but now have come to realize
the objectives set by the Commission and whilst clearly still
fighting their corner tend to join in the forming of consensuses
in the Council much more easily.
2. Looking to the future, the European Parliament
will gain co-decision powers upon entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty (assuming ratification by all 27 Member States). To what
extent is that likely to alter fisheries policy outcomes at EU
level?
Co-decision may introduce a longer term perspective
in the fishery policy outcomes (in contrast to the present focus
on short term perspectives dominating in Council) because in practice
it will be impossible to continue to make decisions on technical
details in a co-decision procedure. The annual TACs are specifically
exempted from co-decision but the annual TAC decisions may be
bound by longer term principles if such principles have been established
through co-decision. Long term management plans (to be decided
in co-decision) are examples of such longer term principles which
may guide the annual decisions on TACs so that the combined result
will be the development of sustainable fisheries.
At present some Members of the Fisheries Committee
of the EP tend to defend the short term socioeconomic interests
of their fishing constituencies. In the future decision making
in the EP in general terms will have to take broader considerations
and other general concerns into account, either because other
Committees take an interest in the matter or because voting in
plenary will involve broader interests.
3. How has the relationship between fisheries
policy and environmental policy changed since the last CFP reform,
and how do you see it developing in future?
The last reform introduced the ecosystem approach
as a basic element of the CFP. We think this entails important
developments. We have tried to explain in the recent communication
on the ecosystem approach how this has been implemented and how
we see it develop.
An ecosystem approach cannot be implemented
through one sector alone—an approach involving all relevant
sectors must be established. In the EU this is done through the
Marine Strategy, and the Communication therefore does not deal
with an ecosystem approach to fisheries management as such but
how CFP measures can contribute to this cross-sectoral ecosystem
approach.
The key elements in this approach are to minimise
the impacts of fishing on the wider marine environment by reducing
the overall level of fishing pressure, and to ensure that fisheries
measures are used fully to support the cross-sectoral approach
defined by the EU's Marine Strategy and Habitats Directives.
The eco-system approach is already being enacted
through the introduction of multi-annual plans which set target
rates for fishing mortality in line with the EU's commitment to
manage for maximum sustainable yield, and with the Commission's
new policy to reduce by-catches and reduce discarding in European
fisheries. In the longer term these measures will not only lead
to lower fisheries impacts on ecosystems but also to a more profitable
fishing sector as fish stocks recover their productivity. Beyond
this, specific supplementary measures are taken under the CFP
to diminish impacts of fisheries on sensitive species or sensitive
habitats. A number of specific measures have been implemented
since 2002 specifically to address particular environmental issues
for example, to protect specific vulnerable habitats, to reduce
incidental by-catch of sea mammals, to protect specific stocks
on which sea bird colonies depend, or to ban destructive fishing
practices.
CONTROL AND
ENFORCEMENT
4. The Court of Auditors issued a scathing
report on the Community system of CFP control and enforcement
last October. Could you please comment on why serious problems
remain? To what extent do you consider that there is political
will in all Member States to make use of the available control
and enforcement tools, let alone of potential new ones?
As you rightly point out, numerous weak points
were identified in the report of the Court of Auditors but also
in various reports published by the Commission on the control
of the CFP.
The major underlying problem is overcapacity and
the fact that the harvest capacity is much larger than legal catch
opportunities. There are in that situation very strong economic
drivers for illegal behaviour. Better compliance must therefore
be achieved by simultaneously removing the strong drivers for
non-compliance (ie ensuring that the harvest capacity does not
exceed legal catch opportunities) and strengthening control and
enforcement.
Despite successive reforms aimed at solving
the deficiencies in the implementation and enforcement of the
CFP, the control system remains inefficient, expensive, complex,
and it does not produce the desired results. The reasons for that
are the following:
1. The regulatory framework is fragmented
and obsolete.
2. There is an absence of a European culture
of control.
3. National systems of control are ineffective.
The means at the disposal of the Commission
to put pressure on the Member States are limited.
In fact, the control system is so inefficient
that it undermines the system of TAC and quotas and fishing effort
management. The major efforts undertaken over the last years to
achieve sustainable exploitation and long-term management of stocks
simply cannot bear fruit in the absence of an effective control
system.
As to the second part of your question, Member
States generally share the analysis of the Court of Auditors and
of the Commission. Without waiting for new enforcement tools to
be in place, the Commission, in agreement with the Member States,
has launched a series of initiatives to ensure that current control
provisions are respected. For instance:
— Member States have committed to implement
fully the VMS system in conformity with Community rules by the
end of 2008.
— Also, Memorandums of Understanding
have been signed with several Member States regarding Community
financial contribution towards expenditure incurred by Member
States in implementing the monitoring and control systems applicable
to the CFP. These memorandums represent a change of approach,
as they contain clearly defined benchmarks for improvements in
the fisheries control systems in the MS concerned.
5. In response to the Court of Auditors Report
the Commission issued a consultation paper in February with a
view to revising the Control Regulation in late 2008. Could you
explain to us what your priorities are? How do you see the role
of the Community Fisheries Control Agency evolving as part of
your overall Control strategy?
Against the background identified above, it
has become necessary to envisage a reform of the current control
system of the CFP. The main objective of the reform will be to
ensure the respect of the CFP by building a new standard framework
which will enable the Member States and the Commission to fully
assume their responsibilities. To this end, in the context of
the new legislative framework the priorities will be to:
— Develop a harmonised approach as
regards inspection and control covering all aspects from the capture
right through to the consumer.
— Increase compliance with the CFP
rules, and contribute to the development of a common culture of
control, through harmonised proportionate sanctions, a systematic
cooperation and exchange of information and a simplified system
ensuring a uniform implementation of the control measures.
— Increase the overall cost-efficiency
of the control policy with a view to reducing administrative costs
both at the level of operators and at the level of administrations,
while at the same time ensuring that the CFP rules are effectively
applied.
— Regarding the role of the Community
Fisheries Control Agency, let me first of all recall that the
Agency is still very young. It has been operational since 2007
only. The competencies of the Agency remain limited: it can only
coordinate Member States' control and inspection activities at
sea and not at land.
— However, in order to address some
of the shortcomings identified by the Court of Auditors, the reform
will envisage an extended mandate for the Agency, in order to
cover the development of cooperation between Member States and
with the Commission, to include extended responsibilities for
the coordination of inspection at land, and cross checking of
data.
We intend to present this legislative proposal
for a new control regulation to the European Parliament and to
Member States in October 2008 and we hope that this proposal can
be adopted in Council by summer 2009.
REDUCING CAPACITY
6. It seems that capacity continues to exceed
available resources. To what extent is there real political will
among Member States to address excess capacity where it persists?
What can the Commission do to promote capacity reduction in the
absence of such political will? What is the possible role of the
European Fisheries Fund in this regard?
The Commission considers that the size of the
Community fishing fleet is well in excess of the available fishing
opportunities. Although the capacity of its fleet has steadily
decreased during the past 15 years, at an average yearly rate
between 2 and 3%, the Commission considers that this reduction
is not enough to bring capacity in line with fishing opportunities.
This is even less so considering that technological progress allows
an increase in the efficiency of a capacity unit in the order
of 3-4% per annum. The harvest capacity of the fleet has therefore
been stable at best, in spite of nominal capacity reductions.
This fact is not reflected by the trend in nominal capacity and
has never been taken into account in fleet capacity management
under the CFP.
The result of continued overcapacity is excessive
pressure on the resource base and strong economic incentives for
non-compliance. Overcapacity is therefore a key problem to be
addressed. This was also the conclusion of the Court of Auditors
which identifies fleet overcapacity as a major risk factor for
the CFP in its special report on the control, inspection and sanction
systems.
The new regime after the 2002 reform handed
back to Member States the responsibility to find a balance between
capacity and resources. Under the current legal framework, the
Council cannot impose fishing capacity reductions on Member States.
They are nevertheless obliged (Article 11 of the basic regulation)
to seek a sustainable balance between fleet and fishing opportunities,
established by the Council in the form of quotas or fishing effort
allocations.
This system is a considerable simplification
relative to the former system. It ensures that nominal capacity
cannot increase but real reductions depend on the will of MSs
to establish the balance between capacity and resources. We do
however not see real political will among most Member States.
This is indicated by the annual reports from MSs which in nearly
all cases fail to analyse the relation between harvest capacity
and resources and which therefore demonstrate that MS do not seriously
consider this balance. It is also difficult to see that capacity
reduction is an important objective for MSs when they submit their
programmes for the European Fisheries Fund. There are however
some exceptions. Since 2002 an important number of vessels have
been decommissioned for example in the Scottish whitefish fleet.
While this has been a painful exercise for those fishermen that
decided to leave the industry and take the decommissioning premium,
it has been proven a successful move overall. The profitability
of the industry has increased and it has taken off pressure from
stocks such as cod in the North Sea.
The increasing fuel prices have led to a situation
where for the first time we find ourselves in a situation where
the industry is asking for adaptation and for decommissioning
plans to be offered and the governments hesitate to take action.
In the short term the Commission can take action
to better monitor and enforce compliance with limitations on fishing
opportunities, especially quota and fishing effort consumption.
Effective enforcement is one way to make overcapacity visible
and reduce the economic incentives to maintain overcapacity. The
Commission can also closely watch that rules on fuel subsidies
are respected in order to avoid maintenance of fleet capacity,
which would no longer be able to operate economically.
The Commission is also working with Member States
and the STECF to better assess fleet capacity, which is a technically
controversial issue. It is necessary to establish methodologies
to objectively determine what the adequate fleet size is so that
MS has a common guidance for their analysis and reporting and
to enable the Commission to argue in favour of concrete capacity
reductions. If fleet overcapacity is clearly and openly displayed,
Member States will be better motivated to take action.
It may in the longer term be necessary to make
some modifications to the present regulation to address some of
the weaknesses which have been identified.
The EFF provides for funds to reduce the size
of the fleet. Additional funding may be available in some cases
if Member States are willing to re-programme the initial allocations
from fleet modernisation or other axis to fleet decommissioning.
But again this would only be possible if MS had the political
will to do so. Member States may provide additional funding by
the way of state aid for decommissioning although the current
economic context makes it difficult.
REGIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCILS
7. We have taken a range of evidence regarding
the Regional Advisory Councils, the advent of which was a key
development arising from the 2002 CFP Reform. What is your view
on the development of the RACs? To what extent does the Commission
take on board the opinions produced by the RACs? What sort of
relationship does the Commission have with the RACs and how does
that vary across the different RACs?
RACs have become active players in the CFP.
The number of recommendations addressed to the Commission is increasing,
as well as the number of meetings/seminars with participation
from both sides. Whereas many recommendations have been in response
to requests from the Commission, the RACs also often take the
initiative and organise events and workshops on various issues
such as rights-based management and control and enforcement.
Overall, RACs have contributed to softening
hostile attitudes towards the CFP, allowing for further direct
contacts between stakeholders, EU officials, Member States and
scientists. The quality and timeliness of RAC advice has increased
over time. Some RACs submitted particularly well grounded advice
on long-term management plans, and the Commission took these recommendations
into account. When consulting the RACs, the Commission is looking
for concrete comments to factor in more effectively the regional
and local realities or those linked to specific types of fisheries.
The quality and hence the Commission's follow-up
of RAC advice depends on whether that advice is compatible with
the CFP objectives and sustainable fisheries. There have been
cases where the Commission could not follow RAC advice. A difficult
case in RACs input on TAC and quota proposals. Due to the nature
of the exercise (annual decision) and the resulting short-term
interests of the catching sector, it has proven difficult in some
cases to reach consensus. In fact, several environmental organisations
withdrew from discussions and refused to endorse RAC proposals.
The Commission has repeatedly explained that
it cannot follow RAC recommendations when they are widely at variance
from scientific advice, or in contradiction of international obligations
or Community long-term management plans.
There are some differences between RACs which
partly are due to differences in previous experience (the North
Sea RAC had for instance benefited from former regional initiatives
in place), partly to different industry structures as fewer and
larger enterprises are in a better position to utilise the RACs.
The reorganisation of DG Mare will allow for
a closer follow up of RACs work and closer relations with the
stakeholders through the work of our new Regional Units.
8. An important question that we have been
considering in the course of our inquiry is how RACs might most
usefully develop in the future. Looking forward, how do you see
the RACs evolving? Do you see any possibility that a level of
management responsibility might be transferred to them?
In the longer term the RACs should continue
to play a key role as advisory bodies and their focus on longer
term issues should be strengthened. The balance between different
societal interests may need to be redressed to correspond better
with changing markets and more public focus on marine management.
The RACs can also play an important role as a forum for exchange
of experiences from initiatives by the industry and as a forum
for communication between stakeholders and scientists.
Initiatives from the industry will also become
increasingly important to an extent that there is a change towards
results based management where legislation specifies outcomes
but leaves it to industry to develop a more management responsibility
within such a framework in the sense that results based management
will leave more implementation decisions and initiatives to be
with stakeholders. It is however, difficult to envisage at this
early stage of their operation that the RACs should be transformed
from being advisory bodies into bodies having some level of wider
management responsibility outside a results-based management framework.
DISCARDS
9. In the Commission's written evidence (Q2)
it is suggested that more selective gear and fishing practices
are better promoted through results-based management whereby standards
for outcomes in a particular fishery are established and it is
left to the industry to find the technical means to fish within
these standards. Could you explain how this might work in practice,
including its monitoring and enforcement?
In the past more selective fishing gear and
fishing practices were promoted through direct regulation of the
legal design of fishing gear. This has lead to increasingly detailed
and unenforceable regulation similar to what one would have if
speed in traffic were regulated by specification of legal car
designs and not by speed limits. This is why the Commission in
its new policy on discards is suggesting a reversal to results-based
management.
A change to results-based management is a challenge
to everybody including the industry and public authorities. We
consider it a necessary step as it engages the industry in taking
responsibility and gets us out of the very detailed management
we have had regarding technical measures so far.
We have initiated a debate with stakeholders
about the options for some specific fisheries, based on the comments
we have received to the Communication on a new discards policy
published last year and analysis made by STECF. The idea is then
to issue regulations regarding these fisheries and then proceed
with regulations on other fisheries until the policy is generally
implemented.
It is suggested that maximum allowed by-catch
limits (MABL) are established for each fishery accompanied with
a plan for annual reductions until these limits are achieved.
An MABL would apply to the total by-catches for a national fleets
and it is left to the member state to decide how it would allocate
this. Member States are invited to utilise the options of the
EFF to support adaptations to the necessary changes in respect
of more selective fishing gear etc.
Monitoring and control will require both some
observer coverage and comparisons of landings across vessels with
and without observer coverage. Minimum requirements for observer
coverage may be set out and there may be provisions to encourage
voluntary schemes for reporting including reference fleets.
The Commission intends to come forward with
an initial legislative proposal to decrease discards in two fisheries
by October 2008.
RIGHTS-BASED
MANAGEMENT
10. The Commission published a Communication
on rights-based management tools in fisheries last year. How have
stakeholders responded to your Communication? What further steps
do you plan to take as regards this agenda?
There has been considerable interest in discussing
this sensitive subject. The European Commission has received 25
written contributions from stakeholders and held several meetings
with industry, other stakeholder and authorities in several Member
States. The European Economic and Social Committee adopted a constructive
own initiative opinion on the Communication in mid-February 2008.
The European Parliament also adopted recently
a resolution on the Communication. The EP resolution strikes a
delicate balance between the need for caution regarding the use
of RBM, as they can have significant impacts on small scale fisheries,
coastal communities, and the recognition of the positive aspects
thereof such as reduction of capacity, and simpler monitoring.
Questions raised most frequently in contributions received pertain
to the competence of MS vs. EC (currently RBM are responsibility
of positive/negative effects of different types of RBM—particularly
of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), to which nearly all
contributors refer—the impact of RBM on relative stability,
the degree of transferability of rights, the likely concentration
of quota in fewer hands (and its social impacts), the legal ownership
of a public resource—in particular the question whether
private property rights can be envisaged for common fisheries
resources-, the related issues of allocation of rights and access
by new entrants and the likely effects on discards. There have
also been negative opinions based on two main sources of concern:
the privatization of a public resource and the protection of coastal
fisheries and communities.
Some contributors see ITQs as unavoidable in
order to redress the poor economic performance of many fleets.
Some others see RBM as an opportunity to crack relative stability.
The European Economic and Social Committee has gone as far as
envisaging the setting up of Community-wide management system
based on tradable fishing rights, managed at Community level.
Other contributors have held, more moderately, that the European
Commission should investigate about quota imbalances following
the yearly TAC and quota negotiations and propose ways to reallocate
unused quotas to other MS which could use them, within the framework
of relative stability.
The European Commission will continue working
on RBM over the coming months. A study to provide a knowledge
basis of all RBM tools currently applied in the EU is on-going
with results expected by the last quarter of 2008. The most likely
follow up in the short term could be information documents or
guidelines on RBM (including good/best practices) addressed to
Member States. In the medium to long term, the European Commission
will consider RBM in the context of the forthcoming CFP reform.
LOOKING FORWARD
11. The Commission's written evidence gives
an indication (Q11) that the Commission would be willing to move
towards a scenario whereby principles are adopted at the Council/EP
level, standards emerging from those principles are adopted by
the Commission and technical implementation decisions are delegated
to Member States. Could you comment further please on how the
governance of the CFP might evolve in the medium to long term?
To what extent might any of the possible future governance models
exacerbate control and enforcement problems?
The Lisbon Treaty introduces co-decision for
most issues relating to the CFP. This change will broaden the
political scrutiny to which the CFP is subject and it will also
make it impossible in practice to continue with a set-up where
both strategic decisions and decisions regarding very detailed
implementation issues are taken at the political level. It may
be necessary to move towards a set-up where more technical implementation
decisions are left to lower levels, within principles established
in co-decision. There are furthermore limits to how far the services
of the Commission can continue to be involved in implementation
on as detailed a level as has been the case in the past. Member
States will have a better basis for addressing very specific implementation
issues. Clearer division of labour could help to keep the policy
better on track in the long term because lower level decisions
will be accountable to decisions about principles taken at higher
level. In the present setup, where the competence for strategy
and tactics are at the same level, it is possible for the Council
to decide on a management plan in one Council meeting and then
deviate fro it in another Council meeting where the fishing opportunities
for next year are decided.
This division of labour already exists today
as regards control and enforcement: it is the responsibility of
Member States to deliver control and enforcement, subject to Community
control. A clearer hierarchy in decisions may even be the basis
for more effective control and enforcement because it will be
required that there are very specific standards on Community level
against which performance can be measured. However, the main challenge
with regard to control and enforcement is obviously to develop
the "culture of compliance" that was referred to above
and to put an end to the present situation of relative neglect
by several Member States of their control responsibilities. It
may also be considered to give the Control Agency more power to
ensure compliance.
In agreement with the forthcoming French Presidency,
the Commission intends to launch a debate on the future of the
Common Fisheries Policy six and a half years after the last reform
in 2002. An informal discussion between the Ministers will take
place in September. My services have already started the work
on a mid-term evaluation of the reformed CFP. Given the serious
challenges that our policy is facing and in the light of the Court
of Auditors report, we need to start working immediately on a
reform of the CFP framework.
May 2008
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