Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 300-319)

Mr Kim Darroch, Mr Vijay Rangarajan, Ms Sally Langrish, Mr Paul Heardman, Ms Clelia Uhart and Mr Gian Marco Currado

8 MAY 2008

  Q300  Chairman: Indeed, we get very polite letters and have recently had one on the Supervision Order proposal from the Commission saying that account has been taken of our views.

  Mr Rangarajan: I was going to mention that one, and Prüm and PNR, all of which they read quite attentively what you had written and I think it had a material effect.

  Mr Heardman: One place where they are read very avidly in Brussels, of course, is in the European Parliament where they have a very high reputation and with this growing network of links between national parliamentarians and MEPs, that is a trend that will only increase in the future.

  Chairman: That is helpful, if only to encourage us!

  Q301  Lord Wright of Richmond: A very quick question which arose from our previous evidence session with the lawyers. Are you aware of occasions when there has been an assumption that the British Government might opt out and that, therefore, we are no longer worth consulting? I am shorthanding what they said.

  Chairman: I think perhaps the evidence was no longer worth taking account of in the proposals produced because if the common law was not going to be involved you did not have to cater for it. We were concerned and interested by that answer.

  Lord Wright of Richmond: Is this a real problem?

  Mr Rangarajan: I am not aware of any specific case where that has happened. It is clear on the development of Frontex they expected us initially to be in and then it became clearer once the legal development was underway that we probably would not be, and that was one of the reasons why we challenged our participation in the passport case. Obviously when it comes to the more purely Schengen-related areas, and there is a grey area at the edge of that, sometimes the Commission thinks, "Well, the UK will not be in it". I am thinking particularly of issues like the development of some of the biometric documentation. There is a counterbalance to that which is the expertise which parts of the UK machine have developed. Although we may not be bound by the final legislation or be barred from participating in it if it is purely Schengen building, there is still quite a lot of policy dialogue on how you do these biometrics in the first place and we need to make it interoperable. It is not quite, "We will not talk to the UK" because quite often, and pretty well across the board in the JHA area, we at least have expertise and experience in these areas which they would anyway find useful.

  Q302  Lord Wright of Richmond: And in the case of Frontex, membership of the board?

  Mr Rangarajan: Yes, a place on that as an observer. Where I think it is a little bit complicated is in some of the issues to do with the common law where we have examples of proposals which do not take sufficient account of common law interests. There are two reasons for that. One is we feel there is a lack of expertise on the common law in some parts of the Commission, and we are trying to help them and to remedy that. The other is partly I think there is a sense of, "The chances of the UK being in this are small and we do not really understand their system either".

  Q303  Chairman: Can you help us on how you are trying to help them?

  Mr Rangarajan: For example, we have been trying to get the civil law part of the Commission to the UK to do a joint set of training with the Irish on the common law system, take them in to see a case and have a series of eminent speakers. I think you were on our hit list at one point, my Lord Chairman, to come and describe why this is different, how we see things, how we interpret legislation in a very different way and explain that the problems we have, for example on applicable law in family courts, are not made up but are part of the intrinsic nature of having an adversarial system.

  Q304  Chairman: What about the personnel? Recently there has been discussion about the number of common lawyers in the Commission. Is that a problem which has been resolved or is it a potential ongoing problem?

  Mr Rangarajan: That one is a potential ongoing problem.

  Q305  Chairman: Is there something that we should say in this area? What is the problem and how does it arise?

  Mr Rangarajan: I think it arises partly because you can get a concentration of policy officials, and to take the example of family law again, who come from a predominant background and in this case the predominant background of quite a lot of the Family Unit is a French legal background, which makes it quite difficult to understand our system. The Ministry of Justice are quite seized of this and are trying to increase their secondment budget and trying to increase slightly more strategically where they put people. One of our wishes is to put someone who is a good common lawyer particularly to work inside DG JLS.

  Q306  Chairman: So there is no unwillingness on the part of the British Government to second or send people to the Commission?

  Mr Rangarajan: No, we are trying quite hard to do that.

  Q307  Chairman: They are positively trying to do that?

  Mr Rangarajan: Yes.

  Q308  Lord Norton of Louth: You mentioned the Annual Work Programme of the Commission and my question is how effective that and the Strategy Policy is in influencing the legislative agenda. You made the point earlier the Work Programme itself is not created in a vacuum so I assume that has quite an impact in developing the agenda.

  Mr Darroch: That is one of the pleasures of crawling through this every year. It is not really a vehicle for initiating new ideas. You do not go through it and think, "My goodness, they are going to do this or that", it is about primarily the prioritisation of stuff that is in the pipeline already. It is a significant document, but not one that you are going to find usually will surprise you.

  Q309  Lord Norton of Louth: As you say it draws together something that is in a coherent shape for the year, so does that then influence, if you like, non-agenda setting in terms of what is then kept out once that has been drawn together?

  Mr Darroch: If there is something not on the Work Programme that you expected to be there it is an indication that it is not a priority for the Commission and they have put it on the backburner. If it matters to you, you have to go to them and say, "Why is this not there? Could you put it back?"

  Q310  Lord Bowness: When we have been talking to other witnesses about the area of Freedom, Security and Justice they have said to us that the legislation there is developed in a somewhat unsystematic way and part of that is because of undue influence by other groups. Do you think that is the case? If it is the case obviously it matters. Does it arise out of the fact that this is the area where there is the shared initiative?

  Mr Darroch: My Lord, we do not agree with that assessment is the short answer. For the longer answer, I will pass to Vijay.

  Mr Rangarajan: There are three points on that. The first is because of the Tampere Programme and the Hague Programme, in a way the work on this is quite heavily structured and has a certain focus. But I can see why it gives the impression of being unsystematic. I think that is partly because the number of proposals going on and the length of time they take to negotiate means that it can appear from the outside as if there are just individual little things being picked off one-by-one and even though the legislation may have started at one point it ends up at very different times, so people will wonder why on earth did you do the European Arrest Warrant first and then procedural rights several years later. It is partly negotiating and partly resource constraints in the Commission and partly the political priorities at the time. In the end, is it unsystematic, and I would add a question, if I may, is that a bad thing? The danger of a purely systematic approach seen from where we sit is that it rather implies the EU is going to legislate progressively over everything and I do not think that is what we would like to see. What we would prefer to see is where there are particular issues, where there are problems, an impact assessment. Where there is an identified problem where EU action will help, then a piece of legislation should be brought forward. There is a strong counterview, particularly on the civil law side, and contract law side. Some people have been calling for something which is much more systematic on the civil law side, a complete codification and a wide-ranging piece of legislation covering the whole of civil law. Sometimes people have brought forward quite ambitious proposals which cover a tremendously wide area and have not had very much success. The premise that it is a scattergun approach and does not have any focus, I would say the Hague Programme at least sets quite a clear set of directions. The successor to that is being negotiated now—these "future groups" are working up a series of ideas for what is going to be the successor to the Hague Programme and that is going to be even more focused, I think. They are setting themselves three or four particular directions to go in, one on data sharing and one on police co-operation. The scattergun nature of the proposals themselves is inevitable given the process, but I am not quite sure it is necessarily bad that we do not cover everything in the fullness of time.

  Mr Darroch: Just a word in support of being unsystematic. You want a basic structure and a basic programme, but you need some flexibility in the system so that you can respond quickly to new events and new circumstances, especially in this area of new threats. You need to be able to put through legislation quickly but, as it were, leapfrog over the stuff in the pipeline and do something if you are to be effective in this area. It is a new area of policy and the priorities in 2004 do not always look the same in 2007. An obvious example is 9/11 changed everything and initiated a whole new set of measures and issues which inevitably overtook the established agenda.

  Q311  Lord Bowness: Can we just touch on the shared right of initiative. Does the shared right of initiative cause any difficulties and do you think the revised proposals under Lisbon will improve the situation, if indeed you think it needs improving?

  Mr Rangarajan: Yes. The right of initiative by individual Member States has not caused enormous difficulties but it has wasted quite a lot of time and political effort. There have been several examples of initiatives which have been drawn up by an individual Member State, largely to do with a particular event or their domestic politics, which have not really got very much resonance with the rest of the EU but, nevertheless, because they were the Presidency, say, have taken quite a lot of negotiating time. In general, Member State initiatives which have got significant backing, and if we take the Eurojust proposal which has just come out, that had seven or eight Member States backing it, or trials in absence where a large group of Member States were co-sponsoring, tend to be much better thought through, having been through a kind of internal negotiation and testing process first, and they do not cause anything like as many difficulties. That is except in one respect, which is they almost always lack a proper impact assessment and that really is a major lacuna because sometimes we are getting a major piece of legislation and it has been drawn up by a group of Member States' experts thinking, "This is okay in my country", but they have not taken into account what the Commission does at least do, which is a wider view as to how it interfaces with other legislation. I think that was a point made in your Prüm report, for example.

  Q312  Baroness O'Cathain: Can I just ask a question on that, my Lord Chairman. How come that actually occurs? If the people who are dealing with this legislation are promoting ideas, having initiatives, and do not realise that an impact assessment is fairly fundamental to anything proposed, surely there must be a set of guidelines somewhere which say, "If you are going to initiate something you make sure you have got an impact assessment".

  Mr Rangarajan: I think there is a set of JHA Council Conclusions that requests Member States who make their own initiatives to draw up impact assessments.

  Q313  Baroness O'Cathain: But they ignore them?

  Mr Rangarajan: But they have not been followed.

  Q314  Baroness O'Cathain: I see. They ignore them.

  Mr Darroch: Dare I say this is a sort of cultural—cultural may be the wrong word—issue. The impact assessments are well-established in the British system but are completely unknown in some Member States, quite a lot of Member States.

  Chairman: Lord Burnett?

  Q315  Lord Burnett: I wonder if I could go on a slight frolic of my own. That is, as a Committee, are we being far too parochial? In other words, should we take evidence or try to take evidence from the representatives of another Member State or other Member States and, if so, who do you recommend? I suppose the main question is, is sufficient account taken of national laws and systems, eg the common law tradition, when preparing draft legislation whose effective implementation depends on the national legal framework? Are fundamental rights adequately taken into consideration?

  Mr Darroch: I will let Sally answer the second part while I think about the first part.

  Ms Langrish: Fundamental rights—yes, they are very much taken into account, at least in theory. As you probably know, there is clear ECJ case law that fundamental rights being observed is part of the validity of an EU Act, so if an EU Act breaches fundamental rights it can be challenged in the Court of Justice. We routinely have recitals in draft EU legislation saying whether relevant fundamental rights have been taken into account. Explanatory Memoranda also should include an assessment of compatibility of a proposal with fundamental rights. We now have the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union which monitors EU legislation for fundamental rights compliance and, of course, the Charter of Fundamental Rights has given greater prominence to those rights which are already observed in the European Union. Certainly, in theory, fundamental rights are observed and are part of the system.

  Q316  Chairman: Can I just ask whether, in practice, there may have been a greater focus on measures to counter things like terrorism? I am thinking of the terrorist legislation, money laundering legislation, the European Arrest Warrant and so on, all of which have given rise to some concerns, I think, as to whether it would not have been better to accompany them with some counterbalancing legislation, such as the procedural protection, and possibly things like the in absentia proposal which are now still in the pipeline. Can you comment on that general possibility?

  Mr Rangarajan: I think you are right. The timing at this juncture between the various proposals has not made life at all easy, partly procedural rights, partly the political priorities which made the European Arrest Warrant very urgent after 9/11 and then a much slower working out of some of the rights legislation. I think the picture is not quite as bad as it looks on that because all EU Member States are in the ECHR and in practice it has been difficult to identify what value some of the EU legislation can add in terms of fundamental rights, given the extensive case law and the working out of the ECHR. Yes, in some cases it is possible. But it has just taken quite a long time to ensure something which is both useful and does not duplicate entirely what already exists. One of the problems that we do have, of course, and I think this was a point that Lord Lester made last time, is that the ECHR with 47 Member States is not as good as the EU at making sure that all of the procedures which it sets down are actually followed in Member States. Increasingly, we are seeing a process where the EU gets involved in making sure, for example, on procedural rights, the ECHR procedures are much more strictly observed and in a level of detail which the ECHR itself does not get into.

  Mr Darroch: Two comments on your first question. First of all, you would always find it interesting and educative to talk to representatives of other Member States about their approaches and their views on the sorts of issues you have covered with us today, or anything else European for that matter. On legislation, in particular, if you were to go and talk to the Germans you would see two things, probably neither of which would surprise you but they would be quite marked differences with us. One, they have a much less questioning attitude than the UK as a whole as to whether regulation and legislation is the right route. We have a wider mix of approaches, non-legislative approaches, and we do not always believe that legislation and regulation is the right route, and they tend to, so they do not bring any, or little, of the questioning to it that we do. Second, of course, life is much more complicated for them because of the difference between the Länders, the regional governments and the national government, and that does complicate things for them quite a lot in the way that it does not yet for the UK. That would show quite a difference of approach. You would find the northern Scandinavian European Member States much closer to our approach. As you go further south, they believe much more in regulation. Yes, you would find it interesting and useful.

  Q317  Lord Burnett: Who should we approach, through you probably?

  Mr Darroch: My other point is you could get quite an interesting snapshot of the differences, of course, by talking to a range of MEPs of different nationalities who are probably quite representative of the Member States' views. As to who you would approach, if you are thinking of visits to Berlin or Paris or wherever, then you would do it through the normal channels and the embassies there would take care of you. If you wanted to see Permanent Representatives here you do it through us, but you might find it better to talk to the capitals.

  Q318  Lord Burnett: It would be interesting to see how powerful the Germans are as initiators.

  Mr Darroch: Yes.

  Q319  Lord Bowness: With respect, my Lord Chairman, it is a question that we could ask Mr Darroch.

  Mr Darroch: I do not know. I do not think anyone, apart from our neighbours immediately across the Channel, does as much interaction with the Commission about the shaping of legislation as we do. We like to believe that we are one of the more effective operations in Brussels.


 
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