Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1 - 19)

WEDNESDAY 21 MAY 2008

Mr Peter Storr and Mr Ben Judah

  Q1  Chairman: Mr Storr and Mr Judah, welcome. It is most kind of you to come. You will understand that this is the first session that this Committee has had with regard to our new inquiry into Europol. We expect to carry on with evidence sessions and visits between now and some period in July. We are hoping that we shall be able to report to the House of Lords some time in the overspill, which will be October or November, some time of that sort. It is helpful that you should both be here for this first session. I think you have seen the outline of the questions we wish to ask you. You know you are on the record. Let us begin with me asking the first question. Could you give the Committee a brief overview of the current UK policy arrangements for combating international organised crime? Could you clarify who holds the UK's responsibilities for developing law enforcement co-operation policy in the European Union?

  Mr Storr: I should start by saying that the lead role in developing policy falls to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) which every year prepares an Organised Crime Threat Assessment based on the analysis of information and intelligence that it receives from a number of sources. From that Organised Crime Threat Assessment, it develops a list of priorities for action, identifying which are the key threats to UK interests, both domestically and internationally.

  Q2  Chairman: You will be aware that we are having an evidence session with SOCA on 4 June.

  Mr Storr: Yes, and I am sure that the Director of SOCA will be able to provide greater detail. From the threat assessment, as I said, the priorities are identified, and those priorities are agreed with ministers. The SOCA budget is shaped around those priorities. A key part of SOCA activity is fighting crime at the European Union level and more widely internationally. We co-operate very closely in the Home Office with SOCA in its international business. SOCA provides the UK member on the Europol Management Board, which is the body that controls the UK's Europol budget, so SOCA has a direct influence over the budget in the overall direction of Europol as an organisation. Home Office Ministers are represented at the Justice and Homes Affairs Council, which is the senior European body to which the final decision relating to Europol's budget, its overall direction, as well as most recently the Council Decision to set up a new constitutional arrangement for Europol, are referred to for ministerial decision. That, broadly, is how things work. In addition, at the more operational level, SOCA has a network of SOCA liaison officers in the countries which have been identified as priorities for UK action as well as in organisations such as Europol itself.

  Q3  Lord Marlesford: Which of the countries that have been prioritised for UK action?

  Mr Storr: It varies quite a bit. There are very good relations with most of our European partners, but, broadly speaking, if you look at the issue of drug trafficking, you will find that SOCA is particularly active in areas like the Western Balkan countries, Afghanistan obviously. That is mostly to do with heroin trafficking. As far as trafficking in cocaine is concerned, SOCA is active in certain countries in South America, which are either countries of origin of cocaine or countries of transit.

  Q4  Lord Harrison: Could I ask if the liaison officers have language skills?

  Mr Storr: Most of them do have language skills. I think in fact probably when you see the Director of SOCA he will be able to provide you with chapter and verse on exactly what those language skills are.

  Q5  Lord Marlesford: Europol is an agency for co-operation on information and intelligence matters. What is the policy for managing operational co-operation within the EU and particularly how are operational decisions further to information and intelligence received arrived at? If I could expand a particular concern that I have, if I were running an international organised crime syndicate, one of the things that I would want to do is to know what the enemy, i.e. the forces of law and order, were going to do about me. I would therefore be seeking to penetrate through Europol that information, to obtain that information. There would be certain countries, for example Romania, I would think I had a jolly good chance of using. What do you do to make sure that this whole Europol operation does not leak like a sieve?

  Mr Storr: Could I start by describing how information or intelligence might be turned into operational action? If we go back to the way in which SOCA operates on the basis of intelligence received, it will then identify a number of threats and other intelligence will enable it to identify particular criminal activities that are planned. If that intelligence suggests that there is a European dimension, which in many cases it does, involving activities of criminal organisations or people in a number of Member States, then SOCA will take a decision as to whether it either involves the SOCA liaison officer network, for example, or the SOCA liaison officers based at Europol, or whether, if it is a particularly serious case, it wants to involve Europol's full facilities, which include analytical capacity and ability in particular operations to open an analytical work file. Structurally, that is how the decision is taken, but it is largely controlled by the Member State, in our case it would be SOCA, which originates the intelligence and brings the particular problem to the Europol table. The question of how you stop information falling into the wrong hands is one that traditionally troubles law enforcement, whether it is in the UK or elsewhere. Within the UK, SOCA has very carefully developed handling procedures designed to ensure that information relating to UK activities does not fall into the wrong hands. There is no denying that the standards that apply in the UK are not met universally in other countries, and so in that particular case SOCA officers will decide whether there is a need to know the information, for example. At the Europol level, I am assured by the SOCA experts that there are handling arrangements for information held on Europol's s systems that are actually robust and which allow the Member State providing the information to impose certain qualifications and restrictions on who might have access to that information.

  Chairman: I think that because of the long history of leakages from EU organisations over the years, Lord Teverson will wish to return to this later in our session. He wants to come in now.

  Q6  Lord Teverson: I want to come in on the general section, my Lord Chairman. Is Europol a significant point of discussion in G6 meetings?

  Mr Storr: I am just trying to remember whether it has come up. Certainly the organised crime issue has come up at the G6, which I am sure you are familiar with, where ministers of the six largest European countries get together to discuss common interests. There have been discussions mostly aimed at trying to identify which are the key problems for those countries and for Europe more widely and how we deal with them. I can remember at recent meetings there have been discussions on how we might best get together to decide the arrangements for tackling drug trafficking through the Mediterranean. While that would not directly involve Europol, Europol would no doubt have an interest in it, but there have been no discussions to my recollection which have directly impinged on Europol's direction, future or key priorities.

  Q7  Lord Teverson: Do you think there is a temptation that that could become the case in that the G6 meeting could become a kitchen cabinet of European decision-making on Europol after it becomes an institution?

  Mr Storr: It is a question which you might want to pose to our Minister Tony McNulty if the Committee wants him to give evidence. I am very happy to give you my view, which is that we have regarded the G6 group of countries not as being a kitchen cabinet, not as being the driving engine for the wider 27, but simply as being an opportunity for the ministers who deal frequently with each other on, for example, terrorism, which affects many of those countries very deeply, just to exchange information, to exchange best practice.

  Q8  Lord Mawson: I understand there was an article recently in The Times which suggested that SOCA was quite a bureaucratic organisation and that there were real questions about what it was really delivering. I would be interested in having your comments on that just to get a feel for it.

  Mr Storr: My overview of SOCA is primarily concentrated on its international work, rather than its national work. What I can say at the international level, particularly within the EU, is that SOCA is highly regarded. It is highly regarded for its professionalism; it is highly regarded for the way in which it co-operates with other law-enforcement bodies within the European Union; and it is highly regarded for the competence and professionalism of its officers. It can point to a number of successes working with European partners and working more widely with other partners. So from my perspective, SOCA is well regarded. I do not think it is perceived within Europe as being overly bureaucratic and, as I have said, it has a number of successes to which it can point.

  Q9  Lord Dear: I would like to ask a couple of questions around the business of intelligence. Those who have watched policing over the last 15 or 18 years have seen intelligence move from something which was isolated to something that sits between an art and a science and certainly it has been developed in this country, or has it tried to be developed in this country, in a meaningful way. I wonder, first of all, if you could help us with the Home Office view on intelligence-led policing in the context of Europol and the interface with the UK and whether you are satisfied that in Europe what we have seen as something that we have led policing thinking about is in fact a reality or have we in fact been following on the best practice elsewhere?

  Mr Storr: I think the intelligence-led policing concept is one which the United Kingdom pioneered, and certainly within Europe there was intense interest in exactly those developments to which you have referred in the last 15 or so years.

  Q10  Lord Dear: That would be the National Intelligence Model within this country.

  Mr Storr: The National Intelligence Model was the outcome of that thinking. When we took over the Presidency of the European Union in 2005, it was one of our key objectives to do two things; one, to try to establish intelligence-led policing as a concept within Europe; and, two, to ensure that intelligence and the analysis of that intelligence led to a very good quality threat assessment. In that context, we achieved two things: one was the adoption of a new revised and better Organised Crime Threat Assessment; and the other was the adoption of a European Criminal Intelligence Model, a sort of business model for intelligence-led policing. We managed, in the six months that we held the Presidency of the European Union, to get that adopted. I think it is fair to say that in many European Union Member States the idea of intelligence-led policing was, and probably still is, slightly counter-cultural. The investigative model in some Member States involves a reported crime, which is then investigated under the jurisdiction of an investigating magistrate, and a lot of Member States still think of crime simply in those terms, that once it is committed, it will be investigated thoroughly. The idea of actually using intelligence to identify and spot crime trends and to uncover operations of criminal activity in progress and to take necessary pre-emptive action were all interesting changes which we had to work hard to convince some European partners that it was worth doing, but we managed to get it adopted. My own view is that at the moment both the Organised Crime Threat Assessment compiled by Europol and the concept of intelligence-led policing are established but very much work in progress. I think it is certainly a priority for us to keep emphasising the importance of this because I suspect there will always be a tendency to go back to arrangements with which some Member States are rather more familiar and comfortable. So we will keep pushing the intelligence-led policing concept. I think we are reasonably satisfied that since the new threat assessment process was introduced within Europol there has been a gradual increase in the quality of the assessment. We think what you are now seeing is a link between the analytical process through the Organised Crime Threat Assessment and a more proactive approach to policing those threats.

  Q11  Lord Dear: Is this the migration from NIM, the National Intelligence Model we understand in this country, into what is known as the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM)?

  Mr Storr: That is it.

  Q12  Lord Dear: In other words, they have taken one model and hopefully upgraded and improved it. Do you think there has been an upgrade and an improvement in that migration?

  Mr Storr: It is broadly the same concept. I think the improvement will come when all Member States are convinced that it is in their interests to provide really good quality information and intelligence to Europol to allow them to produce the sort of threat assessment that I was talking about, and once the concept of intelligence-led policing is established. As I said, I think there is still some way to go, but progress is being made.

  Q13  Lord Dear: Indeed, the problem with intelligence or information as it used to be called is that he who holds the information as got the power and does not want to give the information because if you give it out, you lose the power base. I am over-stating it to make the point, as I am sure you understand. At an operational level it is very difficult but essential to get people to divest themselves of information that they know into some sort of central point, a database perhaps, where others can share it and others can analyse it. That is a problem at an operational level with individuals. Of course it becomes a bigger problem between agencies and countries, agencies within one country and then country to country. We will probably touch upon this when colleagues talk later on about databases and how they are handled. Have you a view at all about how one begins to solve that rather basic problem of getting people, organisations or countries, to share the information, and whether that is moving along at a pace and in a direction that you would applaud?

  Mr Storr: It is certainly improving, and in many cases I think SOCA when it gives evidence will be able to point specifically to operations where intelligence has been shared between its own officers and other countries, either bilaterally or through SOCA liaison officers at Europol, but there is a number of factors that will influence any officer in sharing information. One is the point which was raised earlier about the processes under which information and intelligence are held and made available. The other is simply a question of working with colleagues who can be trusted. Others include things like the language issue, which was mentioned earlier. I have seen a trend over the last 10 years or so very much towards trusting and sharing. Once an operation is established and successful with a particular country or group of countries, then that, as it were, sets the tone for future co-operation along those lines. There is more work to be done, as with many aspects of public policy. I think this is moving very much in the right direction.

  Q14  Lord Dear: In short, priorities are rising rather falling on that point?

  Mr Storr: Yes. I think there is a tendency and a trend in favour of sharing more information within law enforcement communities across the European Union, matched indeed by some parallel experience amongst policy makers or, under the Swedish initiative in recent years, the principle of availability, the idea that unless there are good reasons not do, the bias should be in favour of sharing your information with Member States, obviously subject to handling conditions.

  Q15  Chairman: Can I just follow that up? You said you thought that the development of ECIM would speed up when more Member Stases became convinced of the value. Can I ask you whether it is the relatively slow speed of take-up has been caused by Member States not fully understanding it or positively obstructing it?

  Mr Storr: I do not think there has been positive obstruction.

  Q16  Chairman: Or resistance, if you like, which is not quite such a strong word.

  Mr Storr: I think there is a need to overcome the tendency to keep information within national structures in some Member States. If you look at the history of some Member States, the culture has not been one of sharing information all that widely within the Member State, let alone outside the Member State. In some cases you are starting from an understanding of the value of information and the value of sharing information that is rather different from that within the United Kingdom. I think it is actually a task for Europol, its Management Board and indeed for officials and ministers to push constantly the need for countries to populate the Europol database to provide quality information to it and to use Europol's facilities. I think what I am saying is that there is still some way to go in advertising to Member States the services which Europol can provide.

  Q17  Lord Mawson: You say it is different to what happens in the United Kingdom. It does not sound very different to what my experience of large parts of the public sector in this country has been about. They are perhaps not very good at communicating outside their silos and something else has to happen to enable that to happen. We talk a great deal about partnership but in reality it does not happen to a very great degree. I just wondered what investment has been made in terms of building relationships and the types of partnerships and trust between these various bodies where communication and partnership working can begin to develop to a level that makes it real. I think it is a very difficult thing to do, even in this country.

  Mr Storr: I think it is rather different, and again I am sure the experts from SOCA will be able to give you a much better answer than I can, but my impression, having worked closely with law enforcement over a number of years, is that you do find that when there is a particular task in mind or a particular operational activity—investigating a murder with implications in a number of countries, or tackling terrorism with cells in a number of countries, or indeed international drug trafficking—where those Member States' law enforcement authorities working together can identify a common interest and a common purpose, barriers tend to come down and silos tend to be broken down. As far as wider partnerships are concerned, we are fully behind Europol's efforts to establish working relationships with third countries outside the European Union, with European and other bodies involved in law enforcement. We think that partnership approach is very much the way to go.

  Q18  Baroness Henig: I want to follow up on the Chairman's point. Clearly across Europe both the model of policing and the role the police play within countries domestically is very different and it varies a lot. I was trying to get a handle on whether the difficulties to which you were alluding earlier arise from the differences in the way policing actually operates or whether it is more about cultural issues.

  Mr Storr: There are some difficulties caused by the different nature of the way in which police and law-enforcement is established in various Member States and some that are cultural. That leads you down a number of possible paths. In recent years, we have moved away, certainly the UK has moved away, from the idea of harmonising everything. In my view it would be unproductive if we were to try to establish any sort of harmonised system of policing or any sort of harmonised system of legislation because attempts to do so in the past have really got nowhere. I think the better route is mutual legal assistance and mutual recognition of the differences in each other's structures and laws. I think as Europol establishes itself and its systems start working and it shows what value it can add to the work of individual Member States, those barriers to co-operation, whether they be legal, constitutional, police arrangements or cultural, will gradually be overcome. I think I am fairly positive that we are moving in the right direction in overcoming them.

  Q19  Lord Young of Norwood Green: I was looking at your report on threat assessment on page 3. Notwithstanding all the complexities and the difficulties, it seems quite an optimistic assessment really. One can detect the green shoots of progress because you say that the annual Organised Crime Threat Assessment is becoming, in your words, a vital Europol product. That seems to me an example of good progress. Then over the page you talk about the EU Terrorism Situation and the Trend Report, which gives an overview, as another very useful product, both of those combining to encourage development of intelligence-gathering and sharing of information in the Member States. Do you stand by that? When I read that I thought that that seems to me a positive assessment of what is happening and real progress being made.

  Mr Storr: Yes, I think it is encouraging. If you compare where we were before we launched our 2005 initiative, we used to have a threat assessment that was not really all that much more than 27 separate national reports on threats, some of it anecdotal, some of it intelligence-based and properly analysed, but it was all stitched together in a rather large document. You really did not see any coherent or cohesive overview. I think what you are seeing emerge now from Europol is a rather more useful product. It still bears some signs of being stitched together, but it is a work in progress, as I said, and it is more recognisably similar to the sort of product that the Serious Organised Crime Agency produces by way of a threat assessment than it was a few years ago. In that sense, there is progress being made. Some of the analysts that Europol has recruited to work on this assessment are of very high quality. I think the role of Member States is constantly to push Europol to produce more and better and to keep moving in this direction of travel, and that is what we are doing.


 
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