Adapting the EU’s approach to today’s security challenges—
the Review of the 2003 European Security Strategy
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Oral Evidence

Mr Dan Smith OBE, Secretary-General of International Alert, London
Oral Evidence, 22 May 2008

Major-General (Retd) Messervey-Whiting CBE, Birmingham University,
formerly Dr Solana’s head of design team for the EU’s military structures,
then the first Chief of Staff of the new EU Military Staff, and Mr Nick
Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations
Oral Evidence, 5 June 2008

Professor Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics, and Dr Bastian
Giegerich, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Oral Evidence, 12 June 2008

Professor François Heisbourg, International Institute for Strategic Studies;
and Professor Alyson Bailes, University of Iceland
Oral Evidence, 19 June 2008

Mr Andrew Mathewson, Director, Policy on International Organisations,
Mr Bob Regan, Director, International Relations Group, Defence Equipment
& Support and Mr Ian Hall, Head of Research Collaboration, Ministry
of Defence
Oral Evidence, 26 June 2008

Mrs Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External
Relations, Mr Patrick Child, Head of Cabinet, and Mr Richard Wright,
Director for Policy Coordination in the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Directorate-General External Relations, European Commission
Oral Evidence, 30 June 2008

Mr Maciej Popowski, Commission Directorate-General Development,
Director of DEV A, Ms Daniela Dicorrado-Andreoni, Head of Sector,
Peacekeeping and Security Unit, DEV2, and Mr Paul Clairet, Adviser to
DEV A, Commission Directorate-General Development
Oral Evidence, 30 June 2008

Dr Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the EU
Oral Evidence, 30 June 2008

Mr Robert Cooper, Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs, and
Mr Richard Crowder, Policy Unit, both General Secretariat, Council of the
European Union
Oral Evidence, 30 June 2008
Mr Kees Klompenhouwer, Director of Civilian ESDP Operations, and Lieutenant-General David Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union
Oral Evidence, 1 July 2008

Mr Jim Murphy, MP, the then Minister for Europe and Ms Jennifer Cole, European Security and Defence Policy & EU External Spend Team Leader, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Written Evidence
Oral Evidence, 3 July 2008
Supplementary Written Evidence
Further Supplementary Written Evidence

Rt Hon Caroline Flint, MP, Minister for Europe, Ms Katherine Fox, Deputy Head of the Russia Section (RuSCCAD) and Mr Adam Bye, Deputy Head of Department, Western Balkans Group (Europe Directorate), Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Oral Evidence, 16 October 2008
Supplementary Written Evidence

Written evidence
Centre for European Reform (CER)
Department for International Development (DfID)
Mr Michael Emerson, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Mr Andris Piebalgs, Commissioner for Energy, European Commission
Mr Helmut Kuhne, MEP
Mr Luis Simón Navarro, University of London and Mr James Rogers, University of Cambridge
Mr Timothy Othieno, Overseas Development Institute
Oxford Research Group
Quaker Council for European Affairs

NOTE: References in the text of the report are as follows:
(Q) refers to a question in oral evidence
(p) refers to a page of written evidence
FOREWORD—What this Report is about

The EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was a milestone document representing the collective thinking of the EU Member States on the challenges and security threats facing them at the beginning of the 21st century. Our report aims to contribute to the review of the ESS currently underway in the EU which will be discussed at the December 2008 European Council. We assess the Strategy and its implementation, and the changes in the international security environment since 2003, and we make a number of recommendations. We do not, however, set out to evaluate every event or trend, or all the security challenges which were dealt with in the original strategy.

We believe that the 2003 Strategy was a good, concise document and that any revision should not be significantly longer. It should, however, include references to areas where there have been significant changes since 2003: climate change (where the UK and the EU should play a leading role); the links between security and development (where action should include achieving human security, preventing and resolving conflicts, and tackling the root causes of conflict and radicalisation in developing countries); energy security; the concept of responsibility to protect (which should be put into operation); and multilateral nuclear disarmament. We consider that implementation, a key area, could be covered in a separate document.

Given the importance of Europe’s security, we encourage the European Council, Commission and Member States to make greater use of the Strategy as a point of reference and to attempt to increase public interest in the Strategy. We point to the importance for Europe’s security of the EU’s enlargement process and its Neighbourhood Policy and the need to work with partners as part of effective multilateralism. In particular, events in Georgia have brought the relationship with Russia into focus and emphasised the challenge which Russia presents both as a partner and a source of risk and instability.

We conclude that implementation of the Security Strategy is a key area on which the EU should focus its efforts; action plans or sub-strategies could take implementation forward. We express concern that, despite improvements, the EU still suffers from major shortfalls in the provision of military and civilian capabilities by its Member States, and needs greater resources if its capacity to take on new crisis management operations abroad is not to reach its limit. We also believe that coordination between the EU’s external and internal security policies should be strengthened.

Finally, we say that the question of coherence in the EU’s institutions and policies will need to be addressed seriously with or without the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty if the effectiveness of the EU’s actions in the security field is not to fall far short of its aspirations.
Adapting the EU’s approach to today’s security challenges—the Review of the 2003 European Security Strategy

CHAPTER 1: THE SECURITY STRATEGY

Introduction

1. In December 2003, the Member States of the European Union (EU) agreed a “European Security Strategy” (ESS) in the wake of the divisions among Members caused largely by the invasion of Iraq. Four years later, in December 2007, in the light of the changing international situation, the enlargement of the EU and developments in the EU’s own Security and Defence Policy, the European Council called on the Secretary General/High Representative, Dr Javier Solana, to review the Strategy, and in particular its implementation. This was to be done in full association with the Commission and in close cooperation with the Member States. Since then, events in Georgia in August 2008 have re-focused public attention on the question of possible threats to the security of Europe. The outcome of Dr Solana’s review will be on the agenda of the European Council in December 2008. Our aim with this report is to contribute to the review process.

2. In this Chapter, we look at the 2003 European Security Strategy, the review process, including its timing, and the different concepts of threat and security. In Chapter 2, we look at how useful the Security Strategy has been. In Chapter 3, we examine some of the issues whose importance has increased or changed since 2003, including climate change, the links between development and security, energy security, the adoption in 2005 of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” by the UN Reform Summit, and the prospects for multilateral nuclear disarmament. In Chapter 4, we look at developments in the EU’s strategic security objectives and lastly, in Chapter 5, we look at implementation issues by examining how far the EU has achieved the aims which were set out in the 2003 Strategy, of becoming more active, coherent and capable.

3. The 2003 Strategy is in three parts: the first section lists the global challenges, which it describes as interdependence and globalisation,
including conflicts, inadequate development, pandemics, global warming and energy dependence. This section also lists a wide range of threats—terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. A second section outlines the strategic objectives for the European Union (EU) as addressing the threats, building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and an international order based on effective multilateralism. In a third section the ESS calls for the EU to be more active, more capable and coherent, without determining how the EU should achieve this. This last point is to be a key focus of the review, with which we deal in Chapter 5.

4. As can be seen from the above, the Strategy describes broad categories of threat but does not cover every possible security risk or specific threat. We did not therefore attempt to address them all, nor did we seek to make a comprehensive assessment of all the threats and challenges which are covered in the European Security Strategy. Rather, our report focuses on the developments in the European security environment since 2003, especially those of a global and long-term nature. We recognise that some threats and risks, such as electronic attacks, non-military espionage and maritime piracy have become more important since 2003; interestingly, our witnesses did not go into great detail on these or other risks such as a possible meltdown of the world’s financial systems, a global pandemic or nuclear accident, perhaps because they are not the focus of the Strategy.

5. This report was prepared by the European Union Sub-Committee C whose members are listed in Appendix 1. The list of those from whom we took evidence, to whom we are grateful, is listed in Appendix 2.

6. We make this report to the House for debate.

The 2003 Strategy

Origins

7. The European Security Strategy was presented by Dr Javier Solana to the European Council meeting on 12 December 2003. Its aim was to formulate a European approach to the EU’s security, particularly after the divisions caused by the Iraq war, as we have noted. The Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner told us: “It was essential to develop a structure around which EU foreign policy could coalesce, come together ... It was essential to develop the EU’s ESDP capacities also, both civilian and military” (Q 166). Dan Smith, Secretary-General of International Alert, believed that the Balkans and Kosovo had lain in the background, but what had driven forward the recognition of the need for a strategy were the disputes [about Iraq] in the first half of 2003 and the question of counter-terrorism (Q 7).

8. Professor Alyson Bailes (University of Iceland) thought the Strategy had been “quite fortunate in its timing because it was the vehicle of a kind of reconciliation, of the EU countries pulling themselves back together after the rifts on Iraq, and that helped to ensure that it would be quite bold and coherent” (Q 126). Robert Cooper, Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs in the Council Secretariat, also believed that the Strategy had had “a political use in the particular situation of the EU in terms of bringing people together at a moment when they were very divided” (Q 246).
Strategy or Vision?

9. None of our witnesses thought that the document was a strategy in the traditional sense, since it did not contain plans for action, unlike, for example, the June 2008 French Defence White Paper. Robert Cooper was frank: “initially the term ‘strategy’ was not in the draft … because we did not think this was a strategy” (Q 257). He described it rather as a “conception of security” (Q 256). This description was echoed by Richard Wright, Director for Common Foreign and Security Policy in the External Relations Directorate-General of the Commission, who described the Strategy as “essentially a concept” (Q 196). The ESS was variously described to us by others as: “more of a doctrine or a concept” than what would normally be considered as a strategy (Dan Smith Q 23); and “a necessary crystallisation” of the 21st century security threats (Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations, Q 36).

10. Professor François Heisbourg (International Institute for Strategic Studies) thought it was “not a strategy; it is a vision. It analyses the world and then goes on to state its vision of the manner in which the EU could present itself within that world … but it is not a strategy in the sense that it says: here are the means towards the end and this is how we are going to deploy those means towards those ends” (Q 130). The then Minister for Europe, Jim Murphy MP, described it to us on 3 July as “a political declaration of intent about what Member States are willing to collectively enter into to support and protect their own and other populations … it is not a legal document so it will always rely on political will ...” (Q 375). The new Minister, the Rt Hon Caroline Flint, MP, said it was a “mission statement from which more detailed projects of work and collaborations should follow” and “a guiding tool that we can use to go forward” (Q 400).

11. The European Security Strategy represents the collective thinking of Member States on the challenges and security threats facing them at the beginning of the 21st century, as perceived in 2003. The ESS is not a strategy in the military sense of prescribing detailed actions and set timelines. However, it does helpfully define a common approach to the main security challenges and sets three important EU security objectives: addressing the threats, building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and working with other states and organisations to achieve “effective multilateralism”.

To change the document or not?

12. One of the main questions which arose during our inquiry was what should be done with the 2003 Strategy in the review. There was high praise for the clarity of the current document. For Dan Smith it was “well written and … a coherent document” (Q 7). For Professor Mary Kaldor (London School of Economics) it was “what the ESDP is about, and … it is pretty good”. “It should stand as a statement to which all the Member States have agreed …” (Q 89). Caroline Flint, MP, Minister for Europe, thought “it is quite amazing in terms of the EU to get something as concise but direct” (Q 398). Major-General Messervy-Whiting (Birmingham University) thought that, during the drafting process, the document had “retained some of its elegance

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5 Caroline Flint MP was appointed Minister for Europe as part of the Government reshuffle at the beginning of October 2008, replacing Jim Murphy MP.
and simplicities and succinctness”. He attributed this to Member States’ not being allowed to have an input at too early a stage (Q 49).

13. The author, Dr Solana, also thought it was a “non-bureaucratic document, written in a much clearer manner, not with paragraphs coming from different countries …” (Q 218). The fact that it was a straightforward document and was readable had helped different actors within Member States to discuss the issues (Q 242). He intended to continue to work on the review to produce a document that could be read easily. “We should add some new elements, where the document has gaps which are important”. However, he added that it had been agreed in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) to “change what is necessary and to add what is necessary, but not to change what is not necessary and leave it as it is as much as possible …” (Q 218).

14. Lieutenant-General Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff in the Council Secretariat, echoed this fear: “The one thing I am wary of is making it a prescription to cover absolutely everything … it has been described as a Christmas tree [on] which you hang every present …” (Q 307). Dr Giegerich (International Institute of Strategic Studies) also thought that it was “a good idea to maintain a focus [in the ESS] on … key threats rather than produce a laundry list of other issues, not least to preserve consensus”. The mandate given to Dr Solana had not spoken about a full revision of the document, and he thought it was unnecessary (Q 90).

15. Robert Cooper told us that he was not in favour of rewriting the document (Q 289). His guess was that there would be a document “which will in a kind of nuanced direction change one or two parts” (Q 250). Dan Smith, on the other hand, thought that the analytical section was interesting and important and many parts of it were valid, “but there is a case for re-writing now” because of what was absent from the document and changes in the world and the nature of armed conflict (Q 9). There was “still a need for clarity about how to play off these different issues, how to understand the relationships between these different kinds of threats, where to put the emphasis in terms of the importance of multilateralism”. He saw continuing worth in a renewed political declaration and thought it did not matter if it did not go into detail about action (Q 23). Professor Bailes, on the other hand, thought that one should not hope for too much from the review, nor should one “sink energies into it, particularly political energies or efforts for compromise, which are so much more needed on the real life agenda of the European Union at the moment” (Q 127).

16. The Minister for Europe, Caroline Flint MP told us that work was on track to complete the review of the European Security Strategy at the December European Council. The process would be similar to that in 2003, with the High Representative, Javier Solana, drafting the document in informal consultation with the Member States. It was expected that the review would conclude that the 2003 Strategy had “stood the test of time”, although it was important that it take into account factors such as climate change and the numerous European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions that have been deployed since 2003. However, she did not specify what the form the outcome of the review would take (Q 398).

17. One possible outcome of the review is that the European Council decides to amend the 2003 Strategy. Alternatively, the European Council could leave the Strategy untouched and adopt an outcome document, such as a Declaration, concluding the review, which would highlight developments since 2003 and other important factors.
18. The 2003 European Security Strategy is a clearly drafted and concise document. We attach importance to any revised Strategy not being significantly longer. In consultation with its EU partners, we believe that the Government should seek a limited number of changes to the 2003 European Security Strategy, in order to introduce or strengthen references to climate change, the links between security and development, energy security, human security and the responsibility to protect, and multilateral nuclear disarmament. Other issues, including implementation and operational lessons, could be covered in a separate document to be appended to the revised Strategy.

The Review

Concepts of threat and security

19. During our evidence sessions different concepts of threat and security emerged. These ranged from the traditional definition of hard security, or military defence, to broader concepts which have evolved as a result of globalisation, which often leads to challenges which need to be met with methods other than military force. We discuss these in detail in Chapter 3.

20. Defence against armed attack from a hostile power outside the state is the traditional definition of security. Despite concerns about the potential acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by states such as Iran, Europeans have recently become used to the absence of a major military threat from outside. This has been largely thanks to NATO, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War. However, the Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has reminded Europeans that military threats in its neighbourhood do still exist.

21. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has recently mentioned the review of the European Security Strategy in the context of NATO’s own review processes. These include the drafting of a declaration on the security of the alliance, to be adopted by the NATO summit in Strasburg/Kehl in April 2009, which should pave the way for a more fundamental assessment of NATO’s strategic approach and concept in the period 2010–2011. For the EU and NATO to really complement each other, he said, their strategy documents should also be convergent or even mirror each other. Echoing this point, Mr Andrew Mathewson of the Ministry of Defence said that ensuring maximum coherence between the European Security Strategy and any revision of the NATO strategic concept would be “very important”. He added that there was a minor issue of timing since the reviews were not taking place at the same time, but that it would be important to make sure that the documents adopted by both the EU and NATO were cross-referring and coherent in the way they described security challenges and responses (Q 155).

22. Professor Heisbourg focussed on what he believed was an essential point of a security strategy in a changed and globalised world. He believed that the EU should think “much more about defence and security … in a manner which does embrace the concerns of our citizens, that is homeland defence,

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6 All EU Member States are members of NATO with the exception of Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden.

7 Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the High-level seminar on relations between the EU and NATO, Paris, 7th July 2008.
homeland security, European and national defence.” The omission of these points from the ESS had, he thought, been a great weakness in the 2003 document (Q 137).

23. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner told us in Brussels that “the core analysis of the 2003 Security Strategy remains clearly valid, it is terrorism and non-proliferation. They are key threats to our security and … will remain so for a long time to come, unfortunately,” though she recognised that “the risks and threats to global security, and also the security of our own citizens, have evolved. What we see on the global scene is much broader …” (Q 165).

24. Dan Smith believed that the nature of war was changing with the emergence of non-state wars rather than inter-state wars. Some armed conflicts were also appearing where “political purposes intersect with pure criminality.” He wondered whether “some of the driving forces behind armed conflict in terms of a marginalisation of people which makes it possible to mobilise them in conflict, are now going to be mobilised … more in terms of gangs and crime rather than political movements and war … there is a shift happening in the nature of armed conflict worldwide” (Q 9).

25. Nick Witney (European Council on Foreign Relations) referred to the security threats that Europe should be concerned about as “not invasion but all these more amorphous threats from the dark side of globalisation” (Q 36). In recent years there had been an increasingly widespread understanding that defence issues needed to be seen as part of a much broader spectrum of security concerns. “Military power per se is not often, perhaps never, the answer to a particular situation and most crises and areas of instability need to be addressed with a variety of tools” (Q 39). He warned, however, of shifting the debate too far away from matters of hard power and military matters. Concentration on energy security, for example, was more a matter of the organisation of the internal gas market in Europe than something to be considered in conventional security terms. There was a danger in spreading the term security too far. Climate change, however, was one of the drivers of conflict and instability. Richard Wright, CFSP Director in Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s office, told us that, in the initial discussion with Member States, there had been a “general consensus” that the concepts in the original Security Strategy needed to be enlarged. He did not think there would be any disagreement on energy security, and probably food security, but it remained to be seen how far out the frontiers would be pushed (Q 196).

26. Dan Smith warned of the danger of spreading the net too widely. The strategy document should not become “a major academic disquisition on absolutely everything …” (Q 13). This view was supported by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner who thought that: “we should not develop a concept of security that is so wide that it embraces the whole of the EU’s external action” (Q 165). However, the definition of today’s threats and challenges had to be broader than it had been in 2003. There was also a clearer understanding that threats and risks could not be properly addressed if their underlying causes were not equally addressed (Q 166).

Human security

27. The term “human security” was raised in the evidence we took. The concept was strongly endorsed by Professor Kaldor for whom it was “an easy way to
make it clear to people that what Europe does, which is sometimes called the Petersberg\textsuperscript{8} tasks or contribution to crisis management, is very different from what a classic nation state does” (Q 89). “… Serious preventative efforts involving dialogue, co-operation, helping to strengthen the law, all the things that are involved in a typical human security approach” were needed for the “conflicts waiting to happen in the Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Chechnya …” (Q 103). Dr Giegerich (International Institute for Strategic Studies) agreed with the “general assessment of the usefulness and the great promise of human security as an underlying concept”. This provided a set of norms as well as operational implications. However, human security was a luxury; the human being would probably lose out against the national level if a state or government had to make a choice, although this was not the situation at present (Q 109).

28. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner in Brussels told us that she had personally always taken a human-centred approach “where the citizen is the main focus of concern—if not for the citizens, for whom do we make these policies?” (Q 165). Maciej Popowski, Director for Horizontal Issues in the Development Directorate-General of the Commission, spoke of the security risks and costs of non-achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) “because if we fail to achieve them collectively it might produce devastating results in terms of human security which I think will be the new focus of the revised Security Strategy” (Q 201).

29. Nick Witney’s understanding of the term “human security” was that “to get things right in the societies that you are possibly intervening in” it was necessary to “look at the grass roots and … address the problems of the individual human beings on the ground”. This was the lesson which was being re-learnt in Afghanistan where winning the hearts and minds of people, as well as work with the central government, was needed for a successful outcome (Q 46). Major-General Messervy-Whiting was not comfortable with the term “human security” but thought that “the EU, certainly in some of its smaller, more recent, good governance-type operations—security sector reform and other operations, mainly military in nature—is actually addressing those sorts of issues directly on the ground” (QQ 46, 47).

30. An important development since 2003 has been the adoption of the concept of the “responsibility to protect” by the UN reform summit in 2005. We discuss this in Chapter 3, paragraphs 93–97.

31. Concepts of security range from the traditional defence against armed attack from a hostile power, to more recent concepts, such as human security, which focuses on the individual. Both types of concept are relevant to European security and should be taken into account in the review. The August 2008 conflict in Georgia has, for example, reminded Europeans of the continuing existence of military threats while events in Afghanistan have shown the importance of human security. But we would caution against an approach which extends the concept of human security to almost any form of human

\textsuperscript{8} The so-called “Petersberg” crisis management tasks were formulated by the Western European Union in 1992 and subsequently incorporated into the EU Treaty as part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As stated in article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, these tasks include “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.
activity; and also against any attempt to establish a hierarchy between state security and human security.

The timing

32. We asked our witnesses about the timing of the ESS review and heard differing views. Professor Bailes thought this was not the best time for a review. Like the 2003 Strategy, any review carried out now was bound to be a creature of its time and reflect current concerns (see Chapter 3) (Q 126). It might be cautious because it was being undertaken before the anticipated changes from the Lisbon Treaty, combined with the uncertainty about what would happen to the Treaty after the Irish “No” vote; and because the results of the United States presidential elections would not be fully understood. December 2008 was not the right moment for the EU to “launch the big new idea, particularly on the Euro/Atlantic partnership” before the voice of the new United States President, or perhaps, even the new Russian President, had been fully heard (Q 137).

33. For Professor Bailes a further problem of timing was that the French had obtained agreement in the EU to a larger review of the EU’s future mission and scope to be carried out by a group of “wise persons”9 after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. It was not clear what would happen to that review but some nations might want to reserve “some of the meat” for a review taking place outside all the traditional institutions (Q 126).

34. Professor Heisbourg, on the other hand, had no difficulties with the timing because both US presidential candidates had “gone out of their way to demonstrate their multilateral bona fides” (Q 137). “It would be quite nice to have a thoughtful EU document coming out with ... a reasonable and civilised discussion of the relationship between the EU and the US/NATO which I think we can undertake now. We are no longer in 2003”. In addition, he thought, one might have to wait longer for the voice of the Russian President. He considered, though, that timing was bad in other respects because of the Irish referendum, but he did not see why the EU should not embark on the review. However, it should not be railroaded through if the scheduled time [of submission to the European Council in December 2008] proved too short. Both Professors Bailes and Heisbourg thought that, in general, regular review processes might usefully be built into the workings of the EU in future (QQ 129, 130). Dr Giegerich also thought that “one might have to think about how one institutionalises a review process for implementation” (Q 90).

35. We consider that developments in the past five years on the global scene and the events in Georgia in August 2008 make a review timely, while recognising that the December 2008 date for the presentation of the review is too early for the implications for transatlantic relations of the US election to have been absorbed and for the future of the Lisbon Treaty to have been resolved.

36. The ESS should in future be reviewed on a regular basis, normally every five years.

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9 In order to help the Union anticipate and meet challenges more effectively in the longer term (horizon 2020–2030), at its December 2007 meeting the European Council established an independent Reflection Group. The Group was invited to identify the key issues and developments which the Union is likely to face and to analyse how these might be addressed. It will not cover institutional issues nor the EU’s next financial framework, and shall present its report to the June 2010 European Council.
CHAPTER 2: THE STRATEGY’S PROFILE AND INFLUENCE

The Strategy’s influence on policy-making

37. The conclusions of the European Council of December 2007, which mandated the review of the Strategy, stated that “the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 has proved very useful. It provides the [European] Union with the relevant framework for its external policy ...”\(^\text{10}\).

38. Our witnesses were generally in agreement that the Strategy has been used as a point of reference in the European Institutions. Dr Solana, High Representative for CFSP said “the Strategy is a document that has been very useful” (Q 218). Similarly, for Dr Giegerich “the European Security Strategy is almost omnipresent. It is everywhere” (Q 94). A more nuanced view was expressed by Dan Smith of International Alert, who told us that the Strategy had provided some “useful mapping points and reference points for the EU institutions” (Q 1). However, Major-General Messervy-Whiting (Birmingham University) thought that decision-makers in the Council or the Political and Security Committee did not have the Strategy “in their left hand whilst they voted with their right” (Q 36).

39. Perhaps not surprisingly, within the European institutions, awareness of the Strategy is greatest in the parts of the Council and Commission dealing with security issues. References are not systematically made to the Strategy in documents which have a wider focus than just security or which cover external relations or development issues in general. Examples include the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), Commission development aid planning documents, and the Annual Policy Strategy, a strategic planning document of the Commission.

40. Dan Smith thought it possible that the Commission did not feel it had much ownership of the ESS document as it looked like a Council Secretariat document. This would be felt in the Commission’s work “where there has been resistance to the bringing in of security notions and this is also a political resistance which has been straightforwardly expressed and argued through in the European Parliament in the process of shaping the financial perspectives for the current period ...” (Q 28). However, the ESS had helped to guide the work of the parts of the Commission dealing with security and conflict prevention (Q 28).

41. Less attention has been paid to the Strategy in the EU Member States, including the UK (Dan Smith Q 1), although the situation varies considerably from country to country. According to Jim Murphy MP, the then Minister for Europe, the UK Government’s approach on the other hand was that “…this is a document that we will hope to influence to maximum effect rather than have it influence us, because we would only sign up to that with which we agree” (Q 391). The Government’s aim was to ensure that the revised European Security Strategy mirrored very strongly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) four strategic priorities:

- Counter-terrorism and weapons proliferation, and their causes;
- Prevent and resolve conflict;

\(^{10}\) European Council Presidency Conclusions, December 2007.
• Promote a low carbon, high growth, global economy
• Develop effective international institutions, above all the UN and EU

Jim Murphy believed that: “If we can do that, I think we will have achieved what we have sought to achieve”. The Government had been successful in translating its priorities into the 2003 European Security Strategy (Q 391). For Nick Witney of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the UK National Security Strategy, which is considerably larger in its ambit, was “surprisingly congruent” with the European Security Strategy, in particular in its analysis of the threats (Q 37).

42. This attitude contrasts with the approach taken by some of the other EU Member States, where the EU Strategy has had a notable impact on security thinking and strategic planning. In Germany the EU Strategy had been taken as the frame of reference in drafting the national security strategy published this year, and in Austria it had influenced the defence reform documents which were published between 2004 and 2005 (Giegerich, Q 96).

43. The European Security Strategy is used extensively and influences policy-making in the EU institutions, especially in the parts of the Council and Commission dealing with security issues. To build on this achievement, we would encourage the Council and Commission services to take steps to heighten awareness of the Strategy among staff dealing primarily with other policy areas, especially trade and development, justice and home affairs, energy and the environment. We believe that in future the Commission should make more use of the Strategy as a point of reference in proposals it puts forward, including in its Annual Policy Strategy and, where appropriate, Country Strategy Papers which the Commission drafts as part of its development cooperation policy.

44. The European Security Strategy represents a common European analysis and Member States should therefore use it as a point of reference although we recognise that it is likely to continue to have a highly varying degree of influence on policy-making in the Member States. We support the Government’s efforts to influence the outcome of the current review and encourage them to raise awareness of the Strategy within relevant Departments, including MOD, FCO, DFID and BERR, including through its incorporation into staff training modules.

Is there a need to increase public awareness of the Strategy?

45. We sought the views of our witnesses about the level of awareness of the European Security Strategy among the general public in the EU and whether more needed to be done to improve it. For Dr Giegerich, the British Government had failed to explain why certain security and defence activities were carried out in cooperation with its European partners under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This problem also applied to the European Security Strategy. He described the Government’s discourse as “rather defensive” and focused on why the ESDP did not undermine NATO, rather than aimed at explaining why it might be useful and helpful to British security policy (Q 97).

46. Several witnesses thought that, while the public would like to see the EU being active in the field of security, there was little awareness of what the EU
was doing in practice. There were few mechanisms by which the public was consulted or informed about these issues. But whereas Professor Heisbourg thought it not a good idea to try to generate public debate on a strategy document, Professor Bailes was of the view that an effort should be made to involve people indirectly by stimulating a debate and consulting non-state actors, such as non-governmental and civil society organisations (Q 154).

47. Jim Murphy, the then Europe Minister, accepted that the Government should do more to “popularise” the Strategy. This could not be done through a “well-crafted speech” but rather by placing emphasis on how the EU was delivering: “When the European Union is doing remarkable work—and it is remarkable work … in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Palestine and wherever else—we should do more to highlight it. We rightly are fantastically proud of our own forces and our own civilian commitment in these missions, but I think we should be a little more open about the fact that we are only actually able to bring democracy and stability to these countries, or minimise conflict, because we are part of a greater organisation, this great democratic force” (Q 391).

48. Mr Murphy recognised that one way to improve awareness of the Strategy among security and foreign policy practitioners, as well as the general population, was to engage civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in a dialogue on this topic. He mentioned that the Government recently organised eight seminars on its ‘Global Europe’ agenda, five or six of which involved British NGOs from a wide range of backgrounds. However, none of the seminars had dealt specifically with the European Security Strategy (QQ 394, 395).

49. Awareness of the ESS among the general publics in the EU is low and interest is likely to remain at that level unless a conscious effort is made to remedy this and to connect the Strategy to developments which affect citizens’ everyday lives. We believe that, once the review has been completed, the European institutions and the governments of Member States should make explaining its relevance an important part of their public diplomacy; and that HMG should do this in the UK. We also recommend that any future review of the Strategy should be preceded by a more systematic consultation of civil society institutions than has been the case on this occasion.
CHAPTER 3: CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SINCE 2003

The changing security environment since 2003

50. In this Chapter, we look specifically at some issues which are not, or not sufficiently, addressed in the Strategy, and which should be given particular attention in the context of the review. These include climate change, the link between development and security, energy security, the concept of the “responsibility to protect”, and multilateral nuclear disarmament.

51. The international environment has evolved since 2003. As set out in Chapter 1, the European Security Strategy was a creature of its time, and helped reconcile different views on Iraq. However, according to Professor Bailes the disadvantage was that the Strategy was heavily influenced by the USA’s new perception of threats. In her view the wider security environment had changed since 2003, including “a recrudescence of old East/West tensions … and new functional concerns about economic and financial stability, food supplies, energy, as well as climate change, continuing conflicts and so on”. She argued that this should push the review of the European Security Strategy towards a wider and more comprehensive treatment of security problems (Q 126).

52. Professor Heisbourg also took the view that the security environment had changed dramatically since 2003: “The world really is as different from what it was five years ago as it is between today and the years which immediately followed the end of the Soviet Union. We had ten or 15 years of the post Cold War era in which the west had its unipolar moment … the Solana document is still very much in the west unipolar moment mood”. For Professor Heisbourg, the current security environment was characterised by the rise of Asia on the one hand, and globalisation on the other, which he described as “the overriding, overwhelming feature of the international security landscape”. He also emphasised the importance of global terrorism (QQ 130–132, 140).

53. Our witnesses had contrasting views about the extent to which the European Security Strategy suffers from major gaps. The Government highlighted that although the impact of climate change, energy security, poverty and development on security are referred to in the European Security Strategy, they are not given enough prominence (pp 94, 95).

54. Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP told us that he preferred to leave the definition of challenges and threats untouched, but that there was a need to address some major gaps in the document. These included energy security; climate change, which “has to be tackled in much more detail”; and other challenges such as “the development of military capabilities in the world” (Q 218). Similarly, for Dan Smith, Secretary-General of International Alert, there are various absences, including climate change and the lack of attention to the problem of injustice and unfairness in the world (Q 9).

55. Professor Bailes was more critical, noting that the original document was “extremely weak” in spelling out exactly the broader set of climate, ecological, population and migratory issues, which have all become more complicated since 2003. “It is clear to me that if one were to have a really good revision of the Strategy and a more comprehensive approach it would
have to give far more space to those kinds of issues” (Q 149). For Dr Giegerich, the EU should continue to focus on the five key threats (terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime) identified in the Strategy (Q 89).

56. Jim Murphy MP, the then Europe Minister, added a further criticism that there was insufficient coherence between those who were working on the external and internal challenges of security. This needed to be addressed, although he acknowledged that there was an informal exchange of information between the two groups of senior officials (Q 359).

57. **The coherence between the EU’s internal and external security activities needs strengthening as coordination between the EU’s external policies and home affairs policies was identified as an area of weakness in evidence to the Committee. We believe this should be covered in the review of the Security Strategy.**

**Climate change and its implications for international security**

58. For Jim Murphy, the then Minister for Europe, climate change is the “major emergence” in terms of threats and challenges since 2003 (Q 376). He commented to the Committee in his letter of 26 May 2008 that the review of the Strategy should develop the treatment of climate change, taking into account its security dimension. This work should be informed by the existing work that is taking forward the joint report which Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and High Representative Solana submitted to the March 2008 European Council on the implications of climate change for international security (p 94).

59. The Government commented to the Committee in its letter (pp 94, 95) that the report “highlights the fact that climate change is a fundamental threat to our security”. The report argues that climate change will have a growing and significant impact on global security, multiplying existing threats and risks such as shortages of food and water, and exacerbating tensions and instability, particularly for states and regions that are already fragile and conflict-prone. The High Representative has been asked to submit recommendations on appropriate follow-up action to the March 2008 report by December 2008 at the same time as the review of the ESS. The Government would like to see the report lead to appropriate action being taken by the EU, including regional studies and deeper analysis of climate and security issues.

60. Gareth Thomas MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary-of-State of the Department for International Development (DFID) submitted written evidence (pp 125–128) to us stressing the strong links between climate change, development and security issues. He pointed out that climate change is already having, and will continue to have, significant physical impacts in developing countries, which will have “significant and detrimental effects on the human security of many millions of poor people”. Developing countries tend to have limited adaptive capacity, which exacerbates their vulnerability and the potential impact of climate change on human security.

61. As Gareth Thomas noted, the consequences of climate change may also increase the risk or severity of violent conflict, by influencing or exacerbating pre-existing social and political tensions, especially in fragile states or areas
already at risk of conflict. In particular, the consequences of climate change may contribute to:

- increased political and economic instability;
- increased migration and urbanisation;
- increased competition over resources such as water and land; and
- changes in the viability of livelihoods, e.g. pastoralists.

62. Gareth Thomas underlined that the link between climate change and conflict/insecurity was indirect: “Any conflict normally has multiple causes and drivers. It is the consequences of climate change that influence social, political and conflict dynamics …”. This understanding of climate change as interacting with several other factors was shared by Dan Smith: “in a situation where you have bad governance, a history of conflict, low levels of human security and low income, then the effect of climate change, interacting with those weaknesses in society and inequality are going to produce a higher risk of armed conflict than climate change may in a completely different circumstance” (Q 17).

63. Professor Bailes remarked that what EU policy has particularly lacked up to now was a consideration of “chains of consequence”, particularly how climate change feeds across into the fields of food security, population and migration (Q 149). The Oxford Research Group developed a similar theme regarding the interplay of environmental and socio-economic factors, stressing in particular the very long-term nature of the context out of which security risks and threats grow. They painted a picture of steadily growing global socio-economic divisions and inequalities, coupled with environmental degradation and especially climate change. If these continued to be inadequately addressed, they argued, the result would be an explosive mix of environmental pressures and endemic suffering (p 143).

64. Gareth Thomas underlined two additional points. First, governance and conflict management structures are key intervening variables. Thus the consequences of climate change may lead to increased conflict depending on the ability of people and institutions to adapt, manage change peacefully, and mediate competing needs, interests and visions of the future. Second, whilst climate change is likely to have an impact on migration flows, the exact dynamics of this migration are unclear. Movement within national borders is by far the most significant form of migration for the poorest. It is therefore important to consider the impact of potential migration flows on developing countries as well as on the EU.

65. The above two points were echoed in the evidence given by Dan Smith. Referring to the weak adaptive capacity of developing countries he said: “the general sense that climate change is going to break the back of a pretty weak camel is right”. However, he commented that while the analysis contained in the Solana-Ferrero-Waldner report was broadly correct, its conclusions and recommendations are relatively unambitious and should be revisited (Q 18). His main criticism was that the report lacked an emphasis on adaptation to climate change, especially for poor countries. According to Sir David King, formerly Chief Government Scientist, climate change is a greater threat than terrorism\(^\text{11}\). Under even the best scenario it would be three and a half

\(^{11}\text{Comments reported in The Independent, 8 March 2004.}\)
decades before mitigation really had an effect. In the meantime, people would be forced to adapt to climate change, such as by changing crop cycles and changing the way their houses were built, hopefully with help from their governments and the international community. In the worst case, they would adapt by migrating or fighting with each other over scarce resources. Therefore the EU should be focusing much more on helping developing countries adapt to climate change, including building institutions that could resolve conflicts peacefully (QQ 18–20).

66. This importance of adaptation was also stressed by Gareth Thomas (pp 126–127), who thought the recommendations of the Solana-Ferrero-Waldner report should be further strengthened. He called for climate change considerations to be integrated into the EU’s international development and humanitarian activities, including through a greater emphasis on disaster risk reduction. Gareth Thomas emphasised that there should be an increased focus on the need to promote and strengthen existing institutions to promote development and prosperity in the face of climate change in order to avoid future security threats. In addition he noted the importance of investment in new technologies and the EU pushing for an ambitious deal in the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) negotiations on climate change, both on mitigating the negative effects and on adaptation to current and future climate change.

67. There was general agreement among our witnesses that the European Security Strategy should place a greater emphasis on climate change as a challenge, but they did not agree as to whether this should be done by the inclusion of a simple cross-reference to the Solana-Ferrero-Waldner report and its successors, or a more detailed analysis. Gareth Thomas’ view was that the European Security Strategy’s analysis of the dynamics surrounding climate change and security could be a lot more sophisticated than it currently is, so as to move beyond a focus purely on competition over natural resources.

68. The climate change and energy package is a priority of the French EU Presidency of July–December 2008, on which the EU hopes to reach agreement by December 2008 12.

69. The most important development since 2003 is that the EU has become more aware of the current and potential effects of climate change. This is a crucial concern because developing countries will be among those hit hardest by the consequences of climate change but have the least ability to cope and adapt, thereby potentially impacting on competition for natural resources, conflicts and international security. We believe that the review should recognise this.

70. These security implications strengthen the case for the UK and the EU to play a leading role in addressing climate change, which is a fundamental challenge of our times. Its relevance as a threat multiplier and an exacerbating factor of human insecurity and conflict means it is one of the main issues which should be given significant attention at the December European Council.

12 The House of Lords Internal Market EU Sub-Committee has recently published a report on the EU’s renewable energy target, European Union Committee 27th Report (2007–08): The EU’s Target for Renewable Energy: 20% by 2020 (HL 175); and the House of Lords Environment and Agriculture EU Sub-Committee will shortly be publishing its report on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
71. Further analysis and research is required to identify with a greater degree of precision the exact implications of climate change for international and human security, including for conflict and migration dynamics. These are likely to vary considerably in different regions of the world, and we therefore strongly support the work currently underway by Dr Solana and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner on regional analysis which is the place for further development of these issues.

72. We are concerned that the EU has not yet paid enough attention to the importance of adaptation in developing countries. Without undermining the ambition of its mitigation objectives, the EU should place a greater emphasis on meeting this challenge, including by stepping up the budgetary resources available for this end. Technology transfer to these countries will also play an important role.

Development and security

73. The European Security Strategy recognised the link between security and development. Since its adoption in 2003, the mutual interdependence of security and development, as well as the challenges posed by fragile states, have been increasingly recognised by the EU and the United Nations. There was wide agreement among our witnesses that the European Security Strategy should contain a stronger emphasis on these links. This view was shared by the Government, which “believes that the review should also acknowledge more fully the link between development and security, and underline in this context the importance of the Millennium Development Goals...”. With regard to fragile states, the Government also saw the review of the European Security Strategy as an opportunity to improve the EU’s impact in conflict-affected countries by setting out clear priorities for EU work on stabilisation (p 95).

74. For Mr Popowski of the Directorate-General for Development in the Commission, this was the most important issue in the European Security Strategy. The Commission’s view is that “we need sustainable development in order for security to be sustainable” (Q 200). The Commission already took these links into account in the elaboration of country strategy papers (multiannual development plans) and through the implementation of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). This approach seeks to ensure that all policy areas, including security policy, of the EU do not undermine, and where possible support, development goals such as the MDGs.

75. Both Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Mr Popowski concluded that the EU needed to engage in a comprehensive approach to security (QQ 165, 200). Challenges such as energy security, pandemics, climate change and sharply increased food and oil prices had risen up the international agenda, many of which required a global response, including by developing countries. For Mr Popowski, “the original version of the European Security Strategy did not pay enough attention to the question of insecurity in developing countries because that is exactly where some of the threats may and will originate from. In our internal discussions we spoke about the security risk and security costs of non-achievement of the Millennium Development Goals because if we fail to achieve them
collectively it might produce devastating results in terms of human security ...” (Q 201).

76. Development and human security was crucial to addressing the root causes of current and imminent threats, which, according to Mr Popowski, lie “not so much in the rivalry between states and ideologies but in physical and psychological pressures on populations in developing countries. That can have very grave consequences when oppression and poverty are key factors, but also loss of dignity, for example, or deprivation of human rights. The EU policies should be definitely focused on that” (Q 207). Mr Popowski also underlined the importance of the statement in the European Security Strategy that distant threats, including those originating in developing countries, may be as much of a concern as those near at hand. He gave the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: “If things go wrong again in the Congo it can, and I’m sure it will, have a knock-on effect on Europe as well” (Popowski, Q 206).

77. The above themes were also taken up by the Quaker Council for European Affairs and the Oxford Research Group. For the Quaker Council, it was important to identify as security challenges the root causes of conflict, including “poverty, inequality, injustice, lack of education, alienation in a globalized world which offers little by way of chances to those who are already vulnerable and deprived. Addressing these underlying issues may do much more for security for people all over the world than some of the approaches highlighted in the strategy” (p 147).

78. The Oxford Research Group argued that long-term trends of global socio-economic divisions and environmental degradation were combining to create dangerous tensions, radicalisation and frustrated expectations. Their evidence outlined the contribution of the “brutal divisions of wealth and poverty” to various forms and consequences of insecurity and instability, such as crime, migration, and radical and extreme social movements, as experienced in Peru, Mexico, Nepal and China. Revolutions, riots and serious unrest due to high food prices and food shortages had occurred in Haiti, Egypt and elsewhere. The Oxford Research Group also pointed to the role of socio-economic divisions in the causation of terrorism and extremism: “While there are many reasons for the development of radical Islamist movements such as al-Qaeda, a very strong element is the perception of marginalisation” (p 142).

79. Echoing some of the points made by the Oxford Research Group and the Quaker Council, among others, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy states that there is a range of conditions which may create an environment in which individuals can become more easily radicalised. All of the conditions are challenges for development policy, and include:

- poor or autocratic governance;
- rapid but unmanaged modernisation;
- lack of political or economic prospects and of educational opportunities.

80. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy states that to counter these factors, in its external action “the EU must promote even more vigorously good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic

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prosperity, and engage in conflict resolution. We must also target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promote inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration where appropriate”.

81. The Quaker Council criticised the lack of emphasis in the European Security Strategy on the role of development policies and programmes, which were “barely mentioned; … conflict analysis should become an integrated part of development programming exercises and they should be regularly updated”. The Quaker Council called for all these and related issues to be included expressly in the European Security Strategy. The Quaker Council also called for Western countries to spend more on development assistance relative to their defence spending.

82. In a similar vein, Dan Smith said: “on the relationship between security somewhat classically understood and development somewhat classically understood I think the expression of that relationship in the European Security Strategy is quite inadequate”. However, while he believed that it is in the interests of the European Union that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) be achieved he cautioned against writing achievement of the MDGs as specific targets into a new European Security Strategy, as they functioned best when they are seen as aspirations: “I have a lot of reservations when they are made into bureaucratic objectives, wholly quantifiable and a tick-box approach is taken to them because that homogenising view of world development misses the distinctions and the differences between the different countries. I far prefer the trend in the development debate which is looking under the heading of the fragile states discourse … at the specific issues … which are different in Nepal from in Tanzania” (Q 17).

83. The increasing importance of the links between security and development should be taken into account in the review of the European Security Strategy. Achieving human security and resolving conflicts in developing countries make a direct contribution to the security of the EU and to addressing global challenges ranging from pandemics to migration and environmental degradation.

84. An important part of this agenda is tackling the root causes of conflict and radicalisation, including poverty, inequality, the perception of injustice and marginalisation, poor governance and human rights abuses. The development assistance of the EU should be conflict-sensitive and contribute to peace-building and conflict prevention in fragile states.

85. It is in the EU’s interests to help prevent violent conflict and security threats from developing. An emphasis on prevention can save lives and often only costs a fraction of the cost of international intervention once a crisis has developed. Greater attention and resources should be devoted to this objective.

Energy Security

86. In the 2003 European Security Strategy, growing dependence on energy imports and reliance on interconnected infrastructures in energy and transport, *inter alia*, are identified as European security challenges. Witnesses highlighted the growing salience of these challenges since 2003. Caroline Flint MP, Minister for Europe, told us that the 2003 Security Strategy was
right to highlight energy dependence as a “special concern” for Europe. Regardless of financial challenges across Europe it was something the EU had to keep focussed on because “it will always be a problem if we do not attend to it now” (Q 417).

87. In his written evidence, Commissioner for Energy Andris Piebalgs explained that the general approach outlined in the 2003 Strategy and the call for the EU to work with partners and be more “active, coherent and capable” had been integrated into the “Energy Policy for Europe” endorsed by the European Council in March 2007 (p 129). He noted that the Energy Policy for Europe was a strategy to achieve three objectives: security of supply, “climate protection” and competitiveness. It was based on the combination of action at European and Member States’ levels, solidarity between Member States and an effective international energy policy speaking with a common voice. The Energy Policy for Europe addresses energy security both in its short term and medium to long term dimensions. The Commissioner concluded that “the development of security and solidarity within Europe will enable the development of a strong common voice in external energy relations. Internal and external policy should not be seen as separate tracks” (p 129).

88. This theme was taken up by Caroline Flint, who said the Government wanted to see improved security supply for the EU and the achievement of a fully liberalised and complete internal market for energy, because “such a market would help to mitigate many of the energy security risks faced by the EU both in the short term and long term” (Q 417). The Commission’s third energy package, designed to create a fully-functioning internal market in gas and electricity, was a major step forward in this respect. The energy and climate change package, which the EU hopes to agree under the French presidency of the EU, was also important (Q 419).

89. The Minister stated that the EU’s negotiating mandate for the post-Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia had now been agreed (although talks started on 4 July they were suspended due to the recent conflict in Georgia). The EU had made clear that the new agreement should reflect the key principles of the Energy Charter Treaty and that this would involve discussions with Russia about security of supply. The EU aimed to create a more open and transparent market and to seek an agreement with Russia on how this could be backed up by legally-binding dispute resolution mechanisms (QQ 417–19).

90. According to Caroline Flint, what was lacking in the European Security Strategy was the recognition that the EU needed to be less reliant on a few sources of supply (Q 422). “I think there is unity [within the EU] on that” she said, but the question was how this could be put into practice, including in terms of countries’ commitments, relationships and contracts. “The fact that both the Strategy and the [EU second strategic] review on energy are identifying these issues … means we are creating a debate that nobody can really avoid” (Q 422).

91. Similar views to the witnesses above were expressed by Luis Simón Navarro of the University of London and James Rogers of Cambridge University in their written evidence. They pointed to the “important consequences” of increasing European energy dependency, especially on Russian energy supplies, which they saw as largely contributing to the reassertion of Russia’s power: “The combination of Russia’s rise and energy dependence results in a
myriad of economic and geopolitical challenges for [Europe] and, arguably, represent the most far-reaching change since the approval of the [Security Strategy] in 2003”. They concluded that a “bold and coherent” EU response was required, including solidarity among the Member States in their dealings with Russia; progress on a common energy policy; and greater diversification of energy sources (p 138).

92. **Energy security is an increasingly important challenge for the EU, and should be fully addressed in the review of the European Security Strategy.** Concerns have been heightened by the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas imports which we highlighted in our report in May 2008 on the EU and Russia. Greater diversification of energy sources and routes, as well as solidarity between the Member States in their external energy relationships, should be identified as key objectives of EU security policy.

The “Responsibility to Protect”

93. Another notable development is the adoption of the concept of the “responsibility to protect” by the UN reform summit in 2005. All 191 Member States of the United Nations (UN), including all EU Member States, committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”. This concept holds that states have a responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, crimes against humanity and other threats; and that if a state is unable or unwilling to do so, then the international community has the obligation to take action, including through the use of military force as a last resort and if appropriate.

94. There was a remarkable degree of consensus among our witnesses that the EU’s commitment to the “responsibility to protect” should figure in the revised Security Strategy. Jim Murphy MP, the then Minister for Europe, stated that the UK National Security Strategy acknowledged the importance of the responsibility to protect, and in his view, so should the European Security Strategy (Q 367). Other witnesses concurred with this view. For Professor François Heisbourg, the responsibility to protect “is tremendously important” and should definitely figure in the revised Strategy.

95. Jim Murphy also acknowledged that much remains to be done in terms of implementation of the concept, and that it is not “precise enough”. Therefore there was a need to build a common understanding across the international community on what the concept entailed. On a similar note, Dr Solana explained that the “responsibility to protect” was a “very dear idea for us, less dear for others. The problem we have had with other countries is they see everything through that potential prism that signifies military action …” (Q 223). He also mentioned that the “responsibility to protect” should be thought about in terms of climate change: “responsible sovereignty is terminology we have to begin to use and possibly link it with climate change” (Q 223).

96. On the implementation of the concept, Professor Bailes’ view was that when the EU does intervene in a crisis, its approach to peacebuilding and stabilisation should reflect ideas of human security. This means, in particular, creating an environment of respect for human rights and humanitarian law. However, she cautioned against linking the “responsibility to protect” to the EU’s military instruments: “we should seek human security through a coordinated strategy with a complete range of instruments”
This echoed Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s view that the EU could play a role in reducing the international tension around the “responsibility to protect” and working towards a more sophisticated, nuanced approach to applying it which does not limit the debate to whether or not to use military force (Q 169). However, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner also emphasised that in advance of a crisis developing, the EU should apply what she called a “responsibility to prevent”, where “the European Union can play a very strong role”. The EU should focus more on tackling the underlying root causes of conflict and insecurity. In this context she referred to the full panoply of instruments at the EU’s collective disposal, including policy dialogue, development co-operation, external assistance, trade policy instruments, social and economic policies, and co-operation with international partners and also with civil society (Q 169).

97. The “Responsibility to Protect”, as agreed at the UN summit in 2005, reflects a major shift in the international community’s thinking since the European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003 and it should be taken into account in the review of the European Security Strategy. We believe that the EU should be ready to play a leading role in attempts to put this concept into operation; and should endeavour to reduce the suspicion felt towards it by many developing countries. The review should also underline the fact that the concept refers to the use of force only as a last resort and should put more emphasis on its use as a preventive tool.

**Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament**

98. The Security Strategy identifies the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as a key threat, stating that it is “potentially the greatest threat to our security”. Our witnesses also identified this as a key threat (for example Jim Murphy MP, the then Minister for Europe p 94; Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner Q 165). Jim Murphy said that the nuclear threat had become “more acute” since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 (Q 364).

99. The Government want to use the European Security Strategy review to highlight priorities for future action in combating proliferation and in particular nuclear proliferation. They see the review as an opportunity to update the perception of threats, including on regions of concern and terrorists’ use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials; and to highlight emerging issues, such as the proliferation risks of the potential renaissance of civil nuclear technology (p 95).

100. One of the key pillars of international non-proliferation efforts is the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda. The main fora in which multilateral discussions take place are the Conference on Disarmament, based in Geneva, and the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which take place every five years, with the next one in 2010. Given the forthcoming change of administration in the United States, there is an opportunity for the US and the EU to forge a strong partnership to make progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament ahead of the 2010 Review Conference. There have been very important developments in the last few months on both sides of the Atlantic.
with regard to the need to revive the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda\textsuperscript{14}.

101. Jim Murphy said that he wanted to see the EU, including the EU Member States, playing a bigger role and devoting greater energy to the multilateral disarmament commitments that nuclear nations had signed up to (Q 364). The Government believe that the review of the European Security Strategy should reflect EU priorities for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (p 95).

102. Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, thought that there was an opportunity to make progress with the new US administration. The EU was cooperating with the teams of both candidates, Senators John McCain and Barack Obama. He expressed optimism on what could be achieved both on the reduction of the numbers of nuclear weapons and also on the question of nuclear posture: “That will put us in a much better position for dealing with Iran” (Q 227). However, how to deal with it at the EU level depended very much on how it was looked upon by France and the UK, the two Nuclear Weapons States as defined by the NPT. For Javier Solana, the EU should be a forum in which the issues pertaining to the 2010 Review Conference could be discussed (Q 228).

103. In the same vein, Robert Cooper of the Council Secretariat said that where the EU could “get its act together” it could have quite a lot of impact in the context of the NPT Review Conference, notably because the EU represented states ranging from Ireland to Britain and France. “Something that commands consensus in the European Union at the very least attracts a lot of attention from parts of the non-aligned movement, for example, and can become the focal point for a consensus. In that multilateral context the EU is not a negligible actor at all. On the whole, what either of the US potential presidents is going to do takes them much more in the European direction and ought to assist the process of creating the large consensus that is very important. All of those developments seem to me to be very welcome indeed” (Q 269).

104. The fundamental interest that the EU has in the revival of negotiations on multilateral nuclear disarmament should figure prominently in the review of the European Security Strategy. We believe that the EU will need to discuss in depth the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We strongly encourage the Government to work towards a consensus on a common EU approach. We recommend that the EU maintain an intensive dialogue with the US administration and the new US president so as to capitalise on the recent initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic in favour of significant progress on this issue.

\textsuperscript{14} These efforts are led by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn in America (Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008). The issue of nuclear disarmament was also taken up in the UK by three former Foreign Secretaries and a former Secretary General of NATO ("Start worrying and learn to ditch the bomb", letter to \textit{The Times} by Lord Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind MP, Lord Owen and Lord Robertson, 30 June 2008).
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT ON THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

105. As we have recorded in Chapter 1, the European Council asked the Secretariat to review the 2003 European Security Strategy and in particular its implementation. In evidence, the witnesses to the Committee emphasised that implementation and capability were the key tasks.

EU Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy

106. Several of our witnesses viewed the enlargement of the EU as an important factor for stability. Dan Smith thought that “the idea that EU enlargement, in a general sense an expansion of an EU zone of peace, is an important part of an overall security strategy ... that is also very valuable and worthwhile” (Q 9). The Europe Minister, Caroline Flint, MP, agreed that “enlargement is one of our most powerful tools in terms of democratic reform, opportunities for prosperity and trade, but also security ... in which ... trade and democracy play an important part ...” Enlargement increased stability and helped the EU to respond effectively to some of the challenges which it would face in the future. The review of the Strategy would reflect this (Q 414). The UK Government’s support for enlargement was reiterated by Lord Malloch-Brown, FCO Minister for the UN, Africa and Asia in the House of Lords15 “this Government’s commitment to enlargement remains known.” In his recent speech in Kiev, the Foreign Secretary also pointed out that “the prospect and reality of EU membership has been a force for stability, prosperity and democracy across Eastern Europe and it should remain so beyond”16. At the same time he stated the British Government’s position on the long-term goal for Ukraine “once Ukraine fulfils the criteria, it should be accepted as a full member, and we should help you get there ... the goal is a good one”.

107. For Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner the enlargement process was part of “effective multilateralism” (see paragraphs 117–120 below) and “a very important instrument per se to have a much better strategic objective on security matters” (Q 178). Patrick Child, Head of Cabinet in the Commission for External Relations, stressed “the importance of enlargement as one of the strategic objectives of the Union ...” In the context of the ENP (and in the wider world) the Stability

108. A major instrument in implementing Europe’s security is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). More recently the Union for the Mediterranean, developing the existing Barcelona Process, has additionally been launched. Both policies aim to associate the countries bordering the EU in the North, East and South with the EU, short of offering membership.

109. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner told us the Commission had been working on the ENP which had “an important component of strategy on security”. The Commission was also trying to do much more on the so-called frozen conflicts17. In the context of the ENP (and in the wider world) the Stability

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15 HL Deb 20 October 2008 Col 943
17 Conflicts which have not been resolved but where there are currently no active hostilities.
Instrument (SI)\textsuperscript{18} had enabled the EU to do quite important things quickly with only small amounts of money which made a contribution to resolving or preparing the ground for resolving matters. The Stability Instrument also helped to respond to crises—funds could be made rapidly available to stabilise conditions which were necessary for development. The advantage was that contracts could be taken on immediately which was not possible under normal development policy (Q 178).

110. Patrick Child considered that: “The strategic necessity for Europe of contributing to the security and stability in its neighbourhood in its larger sense, including those countries which have a clear membership perspective as well as the ones covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, is a very clear and present requirement” (Q 192). Richard Wright, Director for Policy Coordination in CFSP, added that all the Balkan countries had Stabilisation and Association Agreements which were “very important elements of building up a more secure environment in Europe.” The conclusion of an SAA for Serbia during the election period had certainly been an important political signal which seemed to have had some effect. There were positive developments going on in the area which were important to reaffirming security in Europe (Q 192).

111. Robert Cooper described the way in which different countries were treated under the ENP: “those who really want to move forward can move forward and get support in moving forward” (Q 286). More, for example, went to Morocco that to Algeria because the Moroccans were interested in the kind of development that the EU was trying to encourage.

112. Europe Minister Caroline Flint believed that the events in Georgia had raised a number of issues about the neighbourhood policies of the EU, particularly in the eastern part of Europe: “the review will have to take into account … issues around what has happened [in Georgia] and how this impacts on … our Eastern Neighbourhood Policy …” (Q 407). The events indicated that the EU should step up its support in the region, sending a “strong political message that we support European aspirations of the region” and strengthening the EU’s support for the long-term processes on which many countries in the area wanted to engage the EU (Q 413).

113. The substantial enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 came after the adoption of the 2003 Security Strategy which placed considerable emphasis on accession as an integral part of assuring the EU’s security within the European region. This consideration remains as valid now as it was then.

114. The potential for membership of the EU acts as a strong incentive to candidate countries to strengthen their democracy and the market economy. The EU’s enlargement process therefore contributes to European security by building areas of stability and good government on Europe’s borders. The continued enlargement of the EU should not be dependent upon entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

\textsuperscript{18} The Instrument for Stability was launched in September 2004 as one of six measures to replace the existing range of financial instruments for the delivery of external assistance with a simpler, more efficient framework. The aim of the Stability Instrument was to tackle crises and instability in third countries and address trans-border challenges including nuclear safety and non-proliferation, the fight against trafficking, organised crime and terrorism.
115. We welcome the British Government’s support for giving Ukraine an EU accession perspective.

116. Chapter 2 of the ESS recognises the European interest in countries on its borders being well-governed. We agree with this aim, a key tool in which is the European Neighbourhood Policy for nations who are not, or not yet, potential candidate members. The ENP plays an important role in constructing security and stability in the EU’s wider neighbourhood and sufficient resources should be allocated to enable it to be implemented effectively. Key subjects for action, both political and economic, will be the internal stability and economic well-being of the individual countries, migration and cooperation to combat terrorism.

**Effective multilateralism**

117. The EU has sought to advance its agenda of effective multilateralism since the Strategy was adopted in 2003, notably by supporting reform of the United Nations, and more recently the international financial institutions. However, the UN reform summit in 2005 only achieved meagre results and failed to reform the organisation comprehensively; the deadlock in the Doha Development Round of world trade negotiations this summer was also a setback. This is the backdrop against which the EU’s efforts to promote effective multilateralism since 2003 should be seen.

118. Dr Solana reminded us that the term “effective multilateralism” had been coined by the EU in the Security Strategy and was now widely used. He had found the term increasingly used internationally in Russia, China, ASEAN and America. It was important to coin terminology which was agreed with others. For the success of effective multilateralism the Doha round of trade talks and 2009 UN climate change conference in Copenhagen would be very significant (Q 223).

119. Whilst the term “effective multilateralism” is increasingly used, the definitions vary according to our witnesses. For Professor Kaldor, effective multilateralism was “moving towards an international order” (Q 116). Part of it was “strengthening that international rule of law, increasing our capacity for enforcement and that also means that sovereignty is a much more conditional concept than it ever was before.” Overall Dan Smith emphasised that ensuring the smooth functioning of the world system or ensuring its better functioning as a multilateral system of rule-based/law-based international relations could be probably fulfilled with very little extra cost—perhaps none extra—compared to what was being spent at the moment. “That does not mean that it is a low priority, in fact I think it is fundamental” (Q 22).

120. Effective multilateralism is a key pillar of the EU’s security strategy. In particular, the EU’s commitment to international law and a rules-based international system contributes to global peace and stability, and gives it influence and credibility as a reliable partner. The challenge now is to continue to build stronger international institutions, including the United Nations and the world’s financial and trade systems.
Working with partners

121. We found that the Commission and the Council Secretariat recognised the importance of working with other major players on security issues. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner acknowledged the importance of dialogue with third parties, such as China, Russia and the US, on issues such as desertification, diminishing water resources and climate change. “We alone will never be able to do things even if we try to go alone, even if we are the locomotive” (Q 172).

Working with major partners: the US

122. Professor Heisbourg believed that one of the weak points in the 2003 document had been that it hardly ever talked about the USA. “That was the fruit of circumstances back in 2003 … this was the opportunity to make up. So nobody was going to ask hard questions as to what the positioning of the EU and its members on the one hand, and of the United States on the other, vis-à-vis each other, should be in the future” (Q 130). Other witnesses thought that the new French policy towards NATO opened up the possibility of a better relationship with the US.

123. The then Europe Minister thought that there was a very strong opportunity for a better conversation about the relationship with the United States post-2003. The EU-US summit declaration in June 2008 had talked of “the transatlantic unity of purpose” which was the phrase used in the context of global threats and challenges and which would not have been in a declaration in 2003 (Q 385). Dr Solana told us that there had been contacts with both teams in the US presidential elections and their sympathy towards some of the EU’s ideas was very strong (Q 223).

124. Professor Bailes believed that there was now a chance to give positive signals towards the United States in terms of the direct EU/United States partnership and also on the EU/NATO relationship which had been too difficult to be discussed very much in the 2003 Strategy. The development in French policy had tipped the issue towards the positive side. She also proposed that “more NATO and more Europe” should be distinguished from “more rushing out into the world to do things, which has been very much the theme of the last five years and supported by this rather Westcentric top down approach of the EU strategy itself. We have fallen badly on our faces in some of those ventures but, perhaps more important … we have neglected many European issues … Europe is not going to find its right place in the world unless it clears up conditions of its own home space … [which] first of all involves the Euro/Atlantic relationship and secondly, the Euro/Asian relationship … which covers relations both with Russia and the Middle East.” “The improvements in EU/US relations over the last four years which have been considerable have come very much out of prudence, exhaustion, out of neither side really wanting a fight and both realising that they are, after all, among each other’s best partners” (Q 137).

125. Dr Solana believed that the recent French intention to reintegrate into the military command of NATO also had consequences for a much better relationship between the EU and NATO on transatlantic matters (Q 225). In particular the test of the relationship would be Afghanistan: “Whatever is done there … involves both the European Union and NATO, we both have a responsibility … If we do it properly that will allow us to go very far” (Q 241).
126. Professor Heisbourg told us that the Americans were “responding very positively to the new French approach which is to leverage the move towards NATO as a means of also developing EU defence and security policy and capabilities and getting the two to work in synergy” (Q 134). As far as the wider relationship between the EU and NATO was concerned, both at headquarters and operational levels, Mr Andrew Mathewson (Director, Policy on International Organisations at the MOD) said that modest but insufficient progress had been made. The fact that the French government now saw NATO and the EU as being complementary was a “great step forward”, but there were still serious problems. These problems were putting the success of the missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan at risk (Q 162).

127. The EU’s most important bilateral relationship is that with the USA. The inauguration of the new president in the US presents the EU with an opportunity to intensify the transatlantic dialogue on security strategy.

128. In the area of traditional defence, the ESS recognises that the United States has played a critical role in European security, in particular through NATO. We welcome the expressed willingness of the French President to work more closely with the NATO structures. The objectives of the EU and NATO are different but we commend efforts by both organisations to align their strategic concepts as far as possible. Consideration should now be given to developing areas of cooperation with NATO, particularly as the majority of EU states belong to NATO.

Working with new partners: Russia and China

129. Most of our evidence, with the exception of that of the new Europe Minister, Caroline Flint, MP, was received prior to August 2008, and therefore does not take into account the outbreak of hostilities in Georgia during that month. These events refocused attention in a dramatic way on the potential threat posed by Russia to what it considers its “near abroad”, that is countries which were formerly part of the Soviet Union. As we pointed out in our recent major report on the EU and Russia, since the enlargement of the EU to 25 and then 27, these countries now form a common neighbourhood between the EU and Russia. The armed conflict and continuing tensions between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia are therefore of immediate concern to the EU and the West in general, and especially to the EU Member States who were formerly part of the Soviet Union or of the Warsaw Pact. This, among other factors such as dependence on Russian gas (which we discussed in Chapter 3) has led to a renewed emphasis on Russia in the EU’s security thinking.

130. Caroline Flint told us that Dr Solana would only start drafting the part of the Strategy review on Russia once Member States had examined the audit of EU Russia relations (launched after the Georgia conflict) and in the light of progress at the Geneva talks in October. The assessment of EU-Russia relations had probably been the part of the review that had been most scrutinised by Member States (Q 401). However, despite the views of individual Member States and their relations with Russia, the EU had united with one voice in their reaction to the events in Georgia, following President...
Sarkozy’s efforts and the agreement of 1 September in the European Council (Q 406).

131. Caroline Flint believed that the EU had shown that “our Russian colleagues” had “overstepped the mark and were not behaving … in line with their responsibilities and also agreements that they had signed up to” but Member States had also taken a number of steps to avoid Russia’s becoming isolated. This was not an easy task but the EU’s response had demonstrated that the EU had acted “on a very difficult and sensitive issue … appropriately but also decisively as well”. “Russia is an important country, it is an important partner on a lot of different international platforms …” (QQ 406, 416). The first Russian participation in an ESDP operation with the contribution of helicopters was planned for Chad which was good (Q 293). While the UK’s position was to recognise that sovereign states should be able to seek to join NATO, it should also be appreciated that insecurities might exist on the Russian side. The EU should explore how to work in partnership with Russia, reassuring her that NATO should not be seen as a threat (Q 402).

132. Robert Cooper considered that the international situation had changed in the last five years. China had become a much more prominent player and a potential partner; though the Chinese had not rushed forward eagerly “you find in areas like Darfur and Burma a different Chinese response now from five years ago. That is a bit of the landscape which has changed most prominently” (Q 292).

133. Recent events in Georgia have underlined the importance of Russia for European security. We believe that the document to be adopted by the December European Council should refer to the challenge that Russia presents both as a partner and a source of risk and instability.

134. Russia’s future actions will depend partly on the response of the EU and its partners, and the rest of the world. The actions of the EU in sending an observer mission to Georgia and appointing a Special Representative over the summer of 2008 showed that the EU can act quickly when the political will to act is there. A continuing firm stance on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity will be needed, together with dialogue and sensitivity to Russia’s genuine concerns. The review of the European Security Strategy should address these issues.

Working with others: international and regional organisations

135. We raised the question of relations with other organisations with our witnesses, and noted that the EU is now working with the OSCE in Georgia. The importance of working with the UN and regional organisations was raised by Kees Klompenhouwer. In Bosnia and Kosovo the EU was following on UN work and the EU was co-operating with the UN in Congo. He thought that co-operation with the African Union (AU) could be looked at in the context of training for missions (Q 33).

136. Lieutenant-General Leakey spoke of operational co-ordination with the external agencies of the UN in Chad. The UN, and the Commission, had

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20 On 5 November 2008, Javier Solana and the Russian Ambassador signed an agreement between the EU and the Russian Federation on Russian participation in the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation, involving 4 helicopters and 120 soldiers.
joined him on the initial reconnoitring missions, daily conferences had been held jointly and coherence had been good (Q 306). Having worked with NATO as well as the EU he believed that the two organisations were “not in competition but complemented each other. There are places where NATO cannot go, will not be acceptable … and the EU has a role to play” (Q 332).

137. The importance of regional organisations was stressed by Maciej Popowski. The EU was very focussed on the African Union (AU) as a comprehensive organisation which had continental ambitions and was a key partner for the EU on Africa. The EU had already assisted the AU in managing peace operations like the one in Darfur under the Africa Peace Facility. This had been the first genuine attempt at mounting and conducting an African operation with very important support from the EU. A joint EU-Africa Strategy had been adopted and the EU also offered assistance in capacity building especially on security policy. Other important organisations for the EU were ECOWAS and SADC in Africa, and Pacific and the Caribbean fora, although the relationship was not at the same level of intensity as that with the AU (Q 216).

138. In his comments to us Dr Solana also confirmed the importance of co-operation with the AU (Q 223) as did the Europe Minister. For Jim Murphy, the 2007 EU-Africa Strategy avoided most of the pitfalls of previous European African document which gave the impression that the Europeans had decided what would happen.

139. In Brussels we were also told of the contribution of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as partners in the EU’s work on the ground. Mr Cooper cited Kosovo where, in preparation for the police rule of law operation there had been very extensive contact with the NGOs who knew that sector very well (QQ 292, 293).

140. **Regional institutions are also essential in helping to maintain peace and stability,** and the **EU should continue to work closely with organisations where Member States have membership, such as NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In addition, the EU should continue to build the relationship with the African Union, ASEAN and others, helping to build up the capacity of African peace and security institutions, including the early warning, dispute resolution and peacekeeping capacities of African regional and sub-regional organisations.**
CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION: IS THE EU MORE ACTIVE, CAPABLE AND COHERENT?

141. This Chapter focuses on Section 3 of the ESS which calls on the EU to be more active, more capable and more coherent.

Implementation

142. Dr Giegerich of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, thought that: “Looking at implementation is in fact much more important than tinkering with the text as such” (Q 90). The EU should consider whether to create sub-strategies to help with implementation, for example on crisis management (Q 94). Professor Kaldor (London School of Economics) told us that there should be “much more emphasis on implementation …” and “a greater commitment on the part of Member States” (QQ 89, 91). Implementation was not only about resources, though they were required, but how they were applied and used (Q 100).

143. Maciej Popowski, (Director in the Development Directorate-General in Brussels) agreed that “the problem lies in the implementation … There is room for improvement” (Q 202). He thought that action plans could be the way forward: “we cannot write [the operational dimension] into the paper because it would blow up the whole intellectual construction” but, since the Security Strategy lacked an operational dimension, action plans could show how the EU could implement and mainstream security considerations into different policies (Q 210). Furthermore “We need to have a framework but also some policy instruments on how to implement what we have agreed upon at a strategic level” (Q 212).

144. Dan Smith believed that the ESS “should be somehow reflected in the papers which the Commission draws up for its relations with and its activities and support for other countries outside the EU [the Country Strategy Papers]” as well as in the Commission’s Annual Policy Strategy (Q 27).

145. Javier Solana also told us about action plans for implementation which had been added since 2003, and cited the plan on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as an example. He also highlighted the need to develop co-operation between the civilian and the military sides of the EU’s action and co-ordination in natural crises (Q 218). Richard Wright at the Commission also thought that the question which would be discussed this time was the extent to which the final strategy should have implementation plans attached to it (Q 196).

146. Implementation of the Security Strategy is a key area on which the EU should focus its efforts. This could be achieved through the adoption of action plans or sub-strategies to take implementation forward. These action plans or sub-strategies should be linked to the overall approach to security set out in the Strategy, rather than incorporated into the existing document.

More Active

147. The EU has increased its activity under the Common Foreign and Security Policy considerably since 2003. In all, the EU has sent 21 ESDP missions into the field since 2003, ranging geographically from Africa to the Middle
East, from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Asia. The missions vary in size and purpose. Some have been military missions (such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), some civilian (such as Kosovo), and some combining military and civilian (Civ-mil) operations (such as Darfur). In some instances there has been a lead nation (France for the Congo), in some the EU is taking over operations from the UN (Kosovo), some are peacekeeping (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM), some are confidence building measures (the Rafah border crossing inspection mission in Gaza). Most recently the EU has been active in sending a peacekeeping mission to Georgia to monitor the ceasefire and Russian disengagement. These missions are consistent with the ESS’s assertion in the section on “Addressing the Threats” that: “In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand” and “the first line of defence will often be abroad”.

148. Dan Smith thought that the EU had been more active and the ESDP missions represented good forward steps. “The European Security Strategy may not have caused that but it is part of that direction of the evolution of policy and approaches ...” (Q 25). Nick Witney (European Council on Foreign Relations) however, thought that the ESDP fell short in all three areas—active, capable and coherent (Q 66).

More capable

149. We heard from a number of witnesses that the EU’s capabilities needed improvement. Specific areas were drawn to our attention, such as the shortage of civilian and military personnel—force generation—and helicopters. There were also the perennial problems of inadequate defence expenditure. These are discussed below.

150. Dan Smith thought that there was still a long way to go on capability (Q 25). Robert Cooper echoed this thought but believed that the EU was sufficiently active. In Brussels the organisation had been improved in the five year period since 2003 and was more capable of handling the very large deployment in Kosovo than five years previously (Q 288). While he was not in favour of rewriting the Strategy document he was in favour of “trying to take some clearer steps in the direction that we want to go, particularly on the capability front” (QQ 289, 290).

151. Lieutenant-General Leakey told us that it was a constant challenge to manage the gap between the political objectives, the situation on the ground and the means put at the disposal of the mission. In conducting military operations he thought that: “We have been capable and we have also been lucky.” The operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had not been demanding but had been well done, as had the first Congo mission which had been more demanding. The EUFOR operation in Bosnia had been done very well. The next Congo operation had been lucky as it had not been seriously tested and there had been problems where countries had placed national caveats, or restrictions, on the use of their troops. In Chad there had been many problems with finding personnel for operations (force generation.) On the plus side, the arrival of mission contingents from small and new Member States had expanded capability and they had performed well on operations (QQ 305, 306).
Helicopters, policemen and other shortages

152. We heard of concerns within the EU institutions that the EU’s capacity to act effectively on missions abroad is reaching its limit, though it had much improved since the Strategy was launched in 2003. Concerns focus mainly on the ability of the EU to raise sufficient civilian and military personnel, and the shortage of helicopters.

153. Robert Cooper had “one particular personal fetish in the area of capabilities … whenever we try and do anything there are several things we find we have not got, and one is helicopters, which everybody is now working on very hard …” (Q 263). Dr Giegerich also referred to the availability of helicopters: “… in Europe there exist about 1,700 transport helicopters. That is a large number. They might not be the right type, they might need to be upgraded, they might need changes but the key question here is how do we not just talk about getting more but how do we get more of what is already available into actual operations?” (Q 109). The importance of working with Russia was also illustrated by Robert Cooper who pointed out that the first Russian participation in an ESDP operation with the contribution of helicopters was planned for Chad (Q 293).

154. According to Robert Cooper: “The other thing we always find is in very short supply is policemen and, indeed, more general civilian capabilities”. He thought this was partly because policemen were never intended to be deployed abroad and suggested that, to remedy the situation, Member States, who had responsibility for police, might consider whether there might not be merit in having national programmes for deploying civilians abroad. It would be useful if police forces recognised that serving in a mission abroad ought to be regarded as career enhancing and to equip people for promotion, rather than the opposite, which tended to happen. The need was now a regular feature of life and “we need to organise ourselves for it better …” (QQ 263–266). Kees Klompenhouwer, Director of ESDP Civilian Operations, also thought “We want to get good people, not just people who are available” (Q 341).

155. Major-General Messervy-Whiting believed that some countries did have deployable police and legal assets, “particularly … those with a gendarmerie type of force and overseas territories or dominions still as opposed to the British police model.” He understood that “even in the British police forces there are designated forces which do have pools of officers who are available and in some cases on standby to go overseas, not least of which are in relation to our own remaining dependent territories” (Q 74). He agreed that recently retired police officers had a range of expertise which could be used overseas (Q 71). Nick Witney advocated the idea of a civilian reserve corps for the EU (Q 70).

156. Mr Popowski echoed these concerns: Member States and the European Defence Agency were working on the Capacity Development Plan. “We are trying to redefine our strategic interests in the Security Strategy but it has to be implemented and for that we need the capabilities, both military and civilian, and that is still the weak part … when it comes to an operation there is always the same conclusion, we are lacking helicopters and policemen … Every time we were planning an operation we always faced the same difficulties. It has to be addressed, but I do not think we need to go into details of capability development in the Security Strategy” (Q 215).
157. Dr Giegerich stressed the difficulties in recruiting judges and prosecutors for some of the missions: “if someone is a judge who is to deploy in a few months from now, he has to stop hearing cases today, and we are still a month away from actual use in these operations ... That is a strain on national systems that is considerable, and it gets worse if there are then delays in these missions and these people do not get to go. There is also a professional problem for them. The incentive structure for them to go on these operations needs to be rethought” (Q 124).

158. Nick Witney commented that a considerable amount of work had been done defining what capabilities were needed. As with NATO, the question was what constituted deployable, available and effective expeditionary forces. There was a surfeit of analysis about what should be done and the deficiencies, for example helicopters. The important thing was to arrive at “a point of critical mass of impatience for people to say let us actually seriously tackle this and see if we can do something about it”. He felt that more should be done on the humanitarian side, perhaps with a common fund and pre-stocked materials. In this context he also thought the EU considers the use of ships which could reach their destinations rapidly (Q 76). One of the problems linked to the shortage of personnel was, for Nick Witney, that the EU operations tended to be “emergency room stuff”. He also commented that “support might be hypothetically available, but on the day it is far too often not” (Q 66).

159. Kees Klompenhouwer expressed his concern that: “it is as if we are reaching a sort of capacity limit with the missions that we now have, particularly since I have a very big mission in Kosovo, EULEX, and we are doubling or significantly increasing in Afghanistan. We may have to significantly increase our presence in the Palestine Territories if the process goes well ... building the capabilities of the Palestinian police is a key element of the whole two state solution.” He thought that “we will have to be stronger on delivery, which means not only an effort on our side in planning these missions but also an effort on the side of the Member States who have to supply the scarce personnel ...” He hoped that the next step or the next version of the ESS would help in addressing these issues (Q 308).

160. Mr Klompenhouwer also pointed to the difficulties Member States faced in internal organisation when the call went out for personnel: “the weak part is the organisation in the Member States because a request comes in at the ministry of foreign affairs and then they have to mobilise other ministries. There is a need for a co-ordinated mechanism at the national level and nowadays in most Member States this has been established” (Q 335). Finland and Sweden had developed a national strategy.

161. Lieutenant-General Leakey expressed concern about the fall in levels of defence expenditure across the EU. However this was presented, “it means less available capability by and large.” The evidence, he thought, could be seen when the EU tried to raise personnel for operations (QQ 312–315). Different Member States fell into categories of why they could not participate in operations. Some states had the capability to participate but were unwilling to do so; some were willing to contribute but were not able to for various reasons.

162. Kees Klompenhouwer pointed to problems arising from discrepancies in the pay of personnel on missions (QQ 349–351). The Commission contracted experts. On the other hand operational personnel were seconded by Member
States and their salary was paid by the States, supplemented by an EU per diem. The result was that in Afghanistan the latter group received less pay than the former. They would also have been paid more if engaged on NATO operations. A further difficulty would be experienced in Kosovo where it would be very advantageous to transfer police personnel experienced in the terrain from the UN operation (UNMIK) to the EU mission (EULEX). “However, because of the system, those who accept the move from UNMIK employment to EU employment under EULEX will also face a decrease in their revenue because of the tight budgetary rules”. This was the contrary of the image that the EU had as a big spender.

163. Professor Kaldor commented that “We have in Europe 1.8 million people under arms and only about ten per cent are capable of being deployed into crisis zones” (Q 93). Dr Giegerich said that the EU had on paper a pool of some 12,000 civilian personnel for civilian crisis management missions. “When the EU led the mission in Kosovo the planning team put out a call for 1,375 vacancies. They got 1,200 applications from seconded personnel out of this pool of 12,000, less than one application per position, which already demonstrates that this issue of availability is a civilian and a military issue”. There was clearly not enough usable capability in either civilian or military areas. Though the military tended to take the headlines, the civilian side was absolutely crucial (Q 109).

164. Professor Heisbourg (International Institute of Strategic Studies) thought that the European goal of collectively providing 60,000 soldiers within a period of months for a duration of a year or more in demanding circumstances had disappeared. Instead the EU had moved to the battle group concept. “The 1,500 guys … small groups of soldiers, moving very quickly, acting decisively and then going home … but if we are facing a major contingency which threatens our livelihood and our security such as a major war driven by [for example] … Iran’s nuclear ambition, the convergence of the numerous conflicts in the Middle East if we have a major contingency in or around the Persian Gulf, surely a few battle groups will not be an adequate response, and it is quite important for us, if we are thinking strategically and not simply about describing visions, to come back to the 60,000 figure, which is quite realistic” (Q 140).

Lessons learned

165. Lieutenant-General Leakey thought that the operation of missions could be assisted by an overarching document on lessons learned. Separate lessons learned processes existed on both the military and civilian sides. For example, following a recent very demanding operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the military had rewritten some seven of its overarching concepts of how it carried out operations (Q 344). He added, however, that there had been difficulties in trying to get the lessons agreed frankly between Member States (Q 346).

166. Major-General Messervy-Whiting thought that the update of the ESS would have to take account of lessons learnt from operations on the ground. He was not sure, however, to what extent there would be anything particularly useful going back into the Strategy from the EU’s existing lessons learnt process. So far they tended to be fairly obvious points. “Most of the messages about the need for better co-ordination, the need for a better capacity for advanced planning, the need for Member States to act where there is an agreement to
act more quickly are already tagged in the Strategy”. He described a two-level lessons learnt process: “the top-level process which is signed up to by all the Member States politically, which tends to be fairly bland, because no-one wants to admit that everything has not gone correctly, and there is the practitioners’ lessons learnt list”. The military concept document did get amended and lessons were fed back from the practitioner’s point of view (QQ 60, 65).

167. In Nick Witney’s view, the EU was very bad at learning lessons, though they might have a process. This was actually a criticism of the Member States. “Operations take place, they are finished and no-one wants to trawl over what went wrong and everybody wants to declare a success and move on to the next one. It seems to me absolutely scandalous that it is only in recent months that anybody has taken any notice at all of the shortage of support helicopters, which has been the Achilles heel of every crisis management operation in the last decade—one could replicate that: lack of communications, lack of decent surveillance capabilities. If there were a decent lessons learnt process all of these would have been highlighted in some fashion years ago, but somehow that sort of retrospective judgement never arrives at the point of visibility, of people doing things about it”. There was a tendency towards corporate amnesia, in response to which “the ESDP needs to become more systematic and more professional in its approach to the operations it runs” (QQ 61, 65).

168. We are concerned that the EU still suffers from major shortfalls of key military and civilian capabilities, made available by the Member States, although there has been an improvement since the first mission was launched in 2003. The EU’s capacity to take on new crisis management operations on missions abroad will soon reach its limit if more resources are not allocated. Concerns focus mainly on the lack of civilian and military personnel and assets, with a particular gap being the shortage of helicopters. Work should continue in the European Defence Agency on the development of European capabilities, in full coordination with NATO.

169. EU civilian crisis management capacity, comprising, for example, rule-of-law experts, judges or policemen, can make an essential contribution to preventing and resolving conflicts and strengthening democracy and respect for human rights. Member States, whose responsibility it is to provide personnel for missions, should consider developing or strengthening their national programmes for deploying civilians abroad particularly in the areas of policing and justice. These should be high quality serving or recently retired personnel, rather than be those who are simply available. For serving personnel this should considered being a career enhancing, developmental period of service.

170. The establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in 2007 has helped to improve coherence in the planning and conduct of missions. Work on improving civilian crisis management should be continued as part of the implementation of the ESS.

171. Member States should consider how to make the pay received by seconded personnel more equitable in comparison with the pay of UN and NATO personnel operating in the same theatre. We welcome the
existence of the system of sharing common costs of EU missions with defence implications (Athena mechanism).

172. Member States should be encouraged to address the capability shortfalls which have been identified by the EU. Member States should also be urged not to impose national caveats, or conditions, on the deployment of troops to ensure that they can fulfil their commitment to the EU and operate under agreed rules of engagement.

173. The world-wide search for helicopters which are suitable for use during EU missions, for example for lift, should continue and contributions from non-EU countries should be welcomed, on a no-cost to the EU basis if possible. The contribution of Russian helicopters for Chad is welcome.

174. We welcome the fact that the EU has a “lessons learned” process to take stock of the outcome of EU missions but believe that it can be improved. There would be merit in compiling an overarching document with lessons for the future based on the EU’s past experience of missions. Member States should be encouraged to be as frank as possible about mistakes and failures as well as successes for improvements to be made.

More coherent

175. A number of witnesses raised the question of coherence in the EU’s actions and often linked it to discussion of the provisions of Lisbon Treaty whose fate is currently in suspense. The Lisbon Treaty would create the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported by a new European External Action Service. It also contains provisions on the strengthening of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).21

176. Two issues were raised: coherence in practical co-operation and co-ordination between the various EU institutions and, importantly, the need for an overall coherent policy to guide those institutions. In general, our witnesses had seen some improvement in both, but considered that further improvement was needed in order to make the EU more effective.

177. As far as the review itself was concerned, Dr Solana told us that “the Commission has demanded that I co-operate with the Commission and we are doing that.” He had given some information to the European Parliament, a policy he would try to maintain although he did not think it would be a good idea to have big debates in the European Parliament to get the Strategy approved (Q 218).

178. Dr Solana told us that the phrase in the Security Strategy which called on the EU to be more “active, capable and coherent” related also to the Lisbon Treaty, even if it had not at that time been conceived. He did not doubt that it would be easier to fulfil this call if the Treaty were to be ratified and implemented (Q 231). With the Treaty, co-operation among institutions would be much better. When dealing with fragile states, for example, development, security elements, economic policy and trade should all be packaged together (Q 233).

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In the Lisbon Treaty “structured co-operation” is about capabilities … if you want to belong you have to contribute” (Q 225).

179. Robert Cooper (Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs in the Council Secretariat) thought that: “The big challenge is coherence and that is connected to the [Lisbon] Treaty on the one hand, and it is also connected to a bit more. I ask myself sometimes if all of our activity really fits into a kind of coherent political objective or not” (Q 288). It was a “day-to-day struggle to ensure that one has a viable political strategy surrounding all of the things that you do” (Q 291). Again, the Lisbon Treaty would have been helpful in the way Europe handled its relations with other states such as China and Russia because it made much clearer who is in charge of putting forward proposals with one person clearly in charge (Q 296).

180. Professor Heisbourg (International Institute of Strategic Studies) spoke of the importance of the EU’s knowing what it was trying to do. The “headline goals” (goals to be achieved for crisis management capability) adopted as a result of the St Malo agreements between the UK and France and on the European scale at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 had disappeared, and “the biggest strategic sin one can commit is to forget what one is trying to do” (QQ 140, 141). He pointed out that, although the threat of global terrorism was well known at the time the ESS was drafted, it “hardly says anything about homeland security and defence of the Union” (Q 130).

181. Dr Giegerich, on the other hand, did not think that the Lisbon Treaty would make the problems of coherence go away. “It is actually very ambiguous in terms of the institutional set-up, of responsibilities between individuals with overlapping competencies and very strong positions” (Q 106). Professor Bailes thought that, if one looked at interventions abroad more in terms of self-interest, and said what changes were wanted from Europe’s point of view, it would be seen that those changes could only in a small part, if at all, be achieved by the use of European military force. “We should be moving towards more intervention in the world but less military intervention, considering how all the other very considerable resources of the EU—the economic/financial influence, the development aid, the technology—are going to be deployed to change situations abroad in the way that is good both for people there and for ourselves” (Q 139).

182. Dan Smith thought that the “big division [lay] between … the Council of Ministers and the European Commission where you do not just get inter-departmental rivalry, you get something deeper and bigger than that—the gulf has been a bigger one to cross.” It was impressive that in the last two years he had seen increasingly conscious efforts to cross the divide, partly with the idea of the External Action Service. As and when this was created, he did not see that it need be done “with the same sort of separated institutional structure internally that the Member States are used to” (QQ 26, 30).

183. Mr Smith thought that there had been in the Commission’s work “resistance to the bringing in of security notions and this is also a political resistance which has been straightforwardly expressed and argued through in the European Parliament in the process of shaping the financial perspectives for the current period.” However, the ESS helped to guide the work of the parts of the Commission dealing with security and conflict prevention (Q 28).

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22 The Lisbon Treaty introduces a new provision allowing for a voluntary form of institutionalised cooperation between EU Member States called Permanent Structured Cooperation. Its exclusive focus is the development of the military capabilities of the Member States so as to improve the EU’s ability to undertake crisis management missions.
184. Professor Kaldor thought that a problem lay in involving the Commission in the planning of missions. The lack of coherence of the whole EU would be partly, but not completely, solved by the Lisbon Treaty. The implementation of the European Action Service would be very important. It should be different from the traditional diplomatic service. The EAS “should be monitoring … human rights and law and order … a forum of access of local people to the EU … much more a diplomacy between peoples or citizens” (Q 120).

185. Major-General Messervy-Whiting of Birmingham University thought that: “Even with the Lisbon Treaty, actually getting the various bits of the Brussels machinery to … work together efficiently, singing off the same hymn sheet, is the toughest nut of all, even though the Lisbon Treaty will give them the framework with which to do that” (Q 66). The strategy touched adequately on the mix of civilian and military capabilities but the most difficult problem was to get the military and the civilian, the Commission and the Council, and the other parts of the organisation working together efficiently (Q 76).

186. The question of coherence also encompasses the problem of when, where and why the EU should intervene in situations. Dr Giegerich raised the question of the lack of implementation in protecting human rights and “how one can allow gross violations to stand and not intervene … what is absent … is on the one hand criteria for intervention, which the European Security Strategy does not provide, the when, where and why. The ‘why’ it does provide but not in any specific sense” (Q 118).

187. Professor Kaldor thought the EU needed a legal framework for missions. There were “huge problems of the competencies of international humanitarian law, human rights law, the domestic laws of individual Member States, the rules of engagement, the laws of countries where you are operating”. The EU could develop with a group of lawyers a legal framework which guided the kind of activities that it was going to engage in, including criteria for “responsibility to protect” (Q 121).

188. The intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy makes coherence unavoidably harder to achieve and there is an unavoidable trade-off between coherence and capability: Member States acting independently would be more coherent but less capable. Dan Smith, Secretary-General of International Alert, pointed out that the EU was often held back by the Member States who had to reach a compromise between their different interests on complex and difficult issues. The higher the profile of the issue, the poorer EU coherence looked (Q 31).

189. Our witnesses agreed that part of “coherence” consisted of working with other organisations outside the EU: “... one of the aspects of coherence ... is not just a plea for an end of institutional turf warfare in Brussels, it is a plea for the Member States to work more closely together, it acknowledges the need to work effectively with partners in other multinational institutions and other centres of power ...” (Nick Witney, Q 77).

190. The establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in 2007 was considered to have assisted the coordination of operations in the

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23 The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) plans and conducts civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations. It works under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee to provide assistance and advice to the Secretary General/High Representative (currently Dr Javier Solana), the Presidency and the relevant EU Council bodies and to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian ESDP operations. The CPCC works in close cooperation with the European Commission. Source, http://consilium.europa.eu
field. Lieutenant-General Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff in the Council Secretariat, believed that coherence had improved over the past five years: “we are getting the idea but there is a long, long way to go” (Q 306). On arriving in Brussels he had found “compartments of people doing their own thing, turf wars and egos … in Brussels in the last 16 months it has changed out of all recognition … the CPCC has been set up and we have people working collaboratively”. When he had visited Chad the Commission had gone with him and joint missions were now running (Q 333).

191. Kees Klompenhouwer, Director of Civilian ESDP Operations, thought that the organisation of civilian missions was also improving. “We are going from improvising as we go along to organising what we are doing by the establishment of the CPCC which is able to conduct operations and support operations in the field. We can still improve on planning … The key to this is civ-civ co-operation … between the civilian sides. Civ-mil is relatively unproblematic …” The methodology used was similar but “one challenge is working with the Commission, which is very jealous of its prerogatives” (Q 334). At the working level however people realised that when missions did not work due to internal differences, everyone’s reputations were affected—Member States, Commission and Council. While respecting the competences of others, everyone had an interest in seeking improvements in systems for bureaucratic management, financial controls, procurement rules and framework contracts.

192. Nick Witney told us: “When we conduct military operations run from one of seven possible alternative locations across Europe and civil operations run from an entirely different place within Brussels, you find at the very heart of direction of interventions complete separation between civil and military.” The Lisbon Treaty seemed to address the problem of trying to ensure that the combined efforts of Member States marched more coherently in step in aid and trade policies and not just in the military and diplomatic sides fields (Q 66).

193. Dan Smith felt however that there was still a long way to go on capability, in particular “in the institutions … there is still more to do. There is a lot of stovepipe thinking.” Attention particularly needed to be given to detail (QQ 25–27). “However, while the EU remains … an alliance—albeit a very close one—of sovereign states, there is always going to be a difference between what the EU is capable of doing and what a single state of that population and wealth would be capable of doing” (Q 34).

194. For the former Europe Minister, Jim Murphy, political will and co-operation were required: “We can achieve an awful lot more by co-operating with other European nations that we could ever do by ourselves. That is the important part of the Strategy that in the past I do not think we have made enough of and, hopefully, if we can agree a comprehensive Strategy, it is a very strong case for Europe in and of itself to be a world player” (Q 375).

195. The question of coherence will need to be addressed seriously with or without the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty if the effectiveness of the EU’s actions in the security field is not to fall far short of its aspirations.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 1: The Security Strategy

The 2003 Strategy

196. The European Security Strategy represents the collective thinking of Member States on the challenges and security threats facing them at the beginning of the 21st century, as perceived in 2003. The ESS is not a strategy in the military sense of prescribing detailed actions and set timelines. However, it does helpfully define a common approach to the main security challenges and sets three important EU security objectives: addressing the threats, building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and working with other states and organisations to achieve “effective multilateralism” (paragraph 11).

197. The 2003 European Security Strategy is a clearly drafted and concise document. We attach importance to any revised Strategy not being significantly longer. In consultation with its EU partners, we believe that the Government should seek a limited number of changes to the 2003 European Security Strategy, in order to introduce or strengthen references to climate change, the links between security and development, energy security, human security and the “responsibility to protect”, and multilateral nuclear disarmament. Other issues, including implementation and operational lessons, could be covered in a separate document to be appended to the revised Strategy (paragraph 18).

198. Concepts of security range from the traditional defence against armed attack from a hostile power, to more recent concepts, such as human security, which focuses on the individual. Both types of concept are relevant to European security and should be taken into account in the review. The August 2008 conflict in Georgia has, for example, reminded Europeans of the continuing existence of military threats while events in Afghanistan have shown the importance of human security. But we would caution against an approach which extends the concept of human security to almost any form of human activity; and also against any attempt to establish a hierarchy between state security and human security (paragraph 31).

199. We consider that developments in the past five years on the global scene and the events in Georgia in August 2008 make a review timely, while recognising that the December 2008 date for the presentation of the review is too early for the implications for transatlantic relations of the US election to have been absorbed and for the future of the Lisbon Treaty to have been resolved (paragraph 35).

200. The ESS should in future be reviewed on a regular basis, normally every five years (paragraph 36).

Chapter 2: The Strategy’s Profile and Influence

The Strategy’s influence on policy-making

201. The European Security Strategy is used extensively and influences policy-making in the EU institutions, especially in the parts of the Council and Commission dealing with security issues. To build on this achievement, we
would encourage the Council and Commission services to take steps to heighten awareness of the Strategy among staff dealing primarily with other policy areas, especially trade and development, justice and home affairs, energy and the environment. We believe that in future the Commission should make more use of the Strategy as a point of reference in proposals it puts forward, including in its Annual Policy Strategy and, where appropriate, Country Strategy Papers which the Commission drafts as part of its development cooperation policy (paragraph 43).

202. The European Security Strategy represents a common European analysis and Member States should therefore use it as a point of reference although we recognise that it is likely to continue to have a highly varying degree of influence on policy-making in the Member States. We support the Government’s efforts to influence the outcome of the current review and encourage them to raise awareness of the Strategy within relevant Departments, including MOD, FCO, DFID and BERR, including through its incorporation into staff training modules (paragraph 44).

Is there a need to increase public awareness of the Strategy?

203. Awareness of the ESS among the general publics in the EU is low and interest is likely to remain at that level unless a conscious effort is made to remedy this and to connect the Strategy to developments which affect citizens’ everyday lives. We believe that, once the review has been completed, the European institutions and the governments of Member States should make explaining its relevance an important part of their public diplomacy; and that HMG should do this in the UK. We also recommend that any future review of the Strategy should be preceded by a more systematic consultation of civil society institutions than has been the case on this occasion (paragraph 49).

Chapter 3: Changes in the Security Environment Since 2003

The changing security environment since 2003

204. The coherence between the EU’s internal and external security activities needs strengthening as coordination between the EU’s external policies and home affairs policies was identified as an area of weakness in evidence to the Committee. We believe this should be covered in the review of the Security Strategy (paragraph 57).

Climate change and its implications for international security

205. The most important development since 2003 is that the EU has become more aware of the current and potential effects of climate change. This is a crucial concern because developing countries will be among those hit hardest by the consequences of climate change but have the least ability to cope and adapt, thereby potentially impacting on competition for natural resources, conflicts and international security. We believe that the review should recognise this (paragraph 69).

206. These security implications strengthen the case for the UK and the EU to play a leading role in addressing climate change, which is a fundamental challenge of our times. Its relevance as a threat multiplier and an exacerbating factor of human insecurity and conflict means it is one of the
main issues which should be given significant attention at the December European Council (paragraph 70).

207. Further analysis and research is required to identify with a greater degree of precision the exact implications of climate change for international and human security, including for conflict and migration dynamics. These are likely to vary considerably in different regions of the world, and we therefore strongly support the work currently underway by Dr Solana and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner on regional analysis which is the place for further development of these issues (paragraph 71).

208. We are concerned that the EU has not yet paid enough attention to the importance of adaptation in developing countries. Without undermining the ambition of its mitigation objectives, the EU should place a greater emphasis on meeting this challenge, including by stepping up the budgetary resources available for this end. Technology transfer to these countries will also play an important role (paragraph 72).

Development and security

209. The increasing importance of the links between security and development should be taken into account in the review of the European Security Strategy. Achieving human security and resolving conflicts in developing countries make a direct contribution to the security of the EU and to addressing global challenges ranging from pandemics to migration and environmental degradation (paragraph 83).

210. An important part of this agenda is tackling the root causes of conflict and radicalisation, including poverty, inequality, the perception of injustice and marginalisation, poor governance and human rights abuses. The development assistance of the EU should be conflict-sensitive and contribute to peace-building and conflict prevention in fragile states (paragraph 84).

211. It is in the EU’s interests to help prevent violent conflict and security threats from developing. An emphasis on prevention can save lives and often only costs a fraction of the cost of international intervention once a crisis has developed. Greater attention and resources should be devoted to this objective (paragraph 85).

Energy Security

212. Energy Security is an increasingly important challenge for the EU, and should be fully addressed in the review of the European Security Strategy. Concerns have been heightened by the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas imports which we highlighted in our report in May 2008 on the EU and Russia. Greater diversification of energy sources and routes, as well as solidarity between the Member States in their external energy relationships, should be identified as key objectives of EU security policy (paragraph 92).

The “Responsibility to Protect”

213. The “Responsibility to Protect”, as agreed at the UN summit in 2005, reflects a major shift in the international community’s thinking since the European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003 and it should be taken into account in the review of the European Security Strategy. We believe that the EU should be ready to play a leading role in attempts to put this concept into operation; and should endeavour to reduce the suspicion felt towards it by
many developing countries. The review should also underline the fact that the concept refers to the use of force only as a last resort and should put more emphasis on its use as a preventive tool (paragraph 97).

**Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament**

214. The fundamental interest that the EU has in the revival of negotiations on multilateral nuclear disarmament should figure prominently in the review of the European Security Strategy. We believe that the EU will need to discuss in depth the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We strongly encourage the Government to work towards a consensus on a common EU approach. We recommend that the EU maintain an intensive dialogue with the US administration and the new US president so as to capitalise on the recent initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic in favour of significant progress on this issue (paragraph 104).

**Chapter 4: The Impact on the Strategic Objectives**

**EU Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy**

215. The substantial enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 came after the adoption of the 2003 Security Strategy which placed considerable emphasis on accession as an integral part of assuring the EU’s security within the European region. This consideration remains as valid now as it was then (paragraph 113).

216. The potential for membership of the EU acts as a strong incentive to candidate countries to strengthen their democracy and the market economy. The EU’s enlargement process therefore contributes to European security by building areas of stability and good government on Europe’s borders. The continued enlargement of the EU should not be dependent upon entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (paragraph 114).

217. We welcome the British Government’s support for giving Ukraine an EU accession perspective (paragraph 115).

218. Chapter 2 of the ESS recognises the European interest in countries on its borders being well-governed. We agree with this aim, a key tool in which is the European Neighbourhood Policy for nations who are not, or not yet, potential candidate members. The ENP plays an important role in constructing security and stability in the EU’s wider neighbourhood and sufficient resources should be allocated to enable it to be implemented effectively. Key subjects for action, both political and economic, will be the internal stability and economic well-being of the individual countries, migration and cooperation to combat terrorism (paragraph 116).

**Effective multilateralism**

219. Effective multilateralism is a key pillar of the EU’s security strategy. In particular, the EU’s commitment to international law and a rules-based international system contributes to global peace and stability, and gives it influence and credibility as a reliable partner. The challenge now is to continue to build stronger international institutions, including the United Nations and the world’s financial and trade systems (paragraph 120).
Working with partners: the US

220. The EU’s most important bilateral relationship is that with the USA. The inauguration of the new president in the US presents the EU with an opportunity to intensify the transatlantic dialogue on security strategy (paragraph 127).

221. In the area of traditional defence, the ESS recognises that the United States has played a critical role in European security, in particular through NATO. We welcome the expressed willingness of the French President to work more closely with the NATO structures. The objectives of the EU and NATO are different but we commend efforts by both organisations to align their strategic concepts as far as possible. Consideration should now be given to developing areas of cooperation with NATO, particularly as the majority of EU states belong to NATO (paragraph 128).

Working with new partners: Russia and China

222. Recent events in Georgia have underlined the importance of Russia for European security. We believe that the document to be adopted by the December European Council should refer to the challenge that Russia presents both as a partner and a source of risk and instability (paragraph 133).

223. Russia’s future actions will depend partly on the response of the EU and its partners, and the rest of the world. The actions of the EU in sending an observer mission to Georgia and appointing a Special Representative over the summer of 2008 showed that the EU can act quickly when the political will to act is there. A continuing firm stance on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity will be needed, together with dialogue and sensitivity to Russia’s genuine concerns. The review of the European Security Strategy should address these issues (paragraph 134).

Working with other: international and regional organisations

224. Regional institutions are also essential in helping to maintain peace and stability, and the EU should continue to work closely with organisations where Member States have membership, such as NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In addition, the EU should continue to build the relationship with the African Union, ASEAN and others, helping to build up the capacity of African peace and security institutions, including the early warning, dispute resolution and peacekeeping capacities of African regional and sub-regional organisations (paragraph 140).

Chapter 5: Implementation: Is the EU More Active, Capable and Coherent?

Implementation

225. Implementation of the Security Strategy is a key area on which the EU should focus its efforts. This could be achieved through the adoption of action plans or sub-strategies to take implementation forward. These action plans or sub-strategies should be linked to the overall approach to security set out in the Strategy, rather than incorporated into the existing document (paragraph 146).
More Capable

226. We are concerned that the EU still suffers from major shortfalls of key military and civilian capabilities, made available by the Member States, although there has been an improvement since the first mission was launched in 2003. The EU’s capacity to take on new crisis management operations on missions abroad will soon reach its limit if more resources are not allocated. Concerns focus mainly on the lack of civilian and military personnel and assets, with a particular gap being the shortage of helicopters. Work should continue in the European Defence Agency on the development of European capabilities, in full coordination with NATO (paragraph 168).

227. EU civilian crisis management capacity, comprising, for example, rule-of-law experts, judges or policemen, can make an essential contribution to preventing and resolving conflicts and strengthening democracy and respect for human rights. Member States, whose responsibility it is to provide personnel for missions, should consider developing or strengthening their national programmes for deploying civilians abroad particularly in the areas of policing and justice. These should be high quality serving or recently retired personnel, rather than those who are simply available. For serving personnel this should considered being a career enhancing, developmental period of service (paragraph 169).

228. The establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in 2007 has helped to improve coherence in the planning and conduct of missions. Work on improving civilian crisis management should be continued as part of the implementation of the ESS (paragraph 170).

229. Member States should consider how to make the pay received by seconded personnel more equitable in comparison with the pay of UN and NATO personnel operating in the same theatre. We welcome the existence of the system of sharing common costs of EU missions with defence implications (Athena mechanism) (paragraph 171).

230. Member States should be encouraged to address the capability shortfalls which have been identified by the EU. Member States should also be urged not to impose national caveats, or conditions, on the deployment of troops to ensure that they can fulfil their commitment to the EU and operate under agreed rules of engagement (paragraph 172).

231. The world-wide search for helicopters which are suitable for use during EU missions, for example for lift, should continue and contributions from non-EU countries should be welcomed, on a no-cost to the EU basis if possible. The contribution of Russian helicopters for Chad is welcome (paragraph 173).

232. We welcome the fact that the EU has a “lessons learned” process to take stock of the outcome of EU missions but believe that it can be improved. There would be merit in compiling an overarching document with lessons for the future based on the EU’s past experience of missions. Member States should be encouraged to be as frank as possible about mistakes and failures as well as successes for improvements to be made (paragraph 174).

More coherent

233. The question of coherence will need to be addressed seriously with or without the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty if the effectiveness of the EU’s actions in the security field is not to fall far short of its aspirations (paragraph 195).
APPENDIX 1: SUB-COMMITTEE C (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY)

The Members of the Sub-Committee which conducted this Inquiry were:-

- Lord Anderson of Swansea
- Lord Boyce
- Lord Chidgey
- Lord Crickhowell
- Lord Hamilton of Epsom
- Lord Hannay of Chiswick
- Lord Jones
- Lord Roper (Chairman)
- Lord Selkirk of Douglas
- Lord Swinfen
- Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
- Lord Truscott

Declaration of Interests

Lord Boyce

- Non-executive Director, WS Atkins plc
- Non-executive Director, VT Group plc

Lord Hannay of Chiswick

- Chair, United Nations Association UK
- Member, Advisory Board, Centre for European Reform
- Member, Advisory Board, European Foreign Affairs Review

Lord Roper (Chairman)

- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Royal United Services Institute
- Royal Institute of International Affairs

Lord Truscott

- Former Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Whitehall
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

The following witnesses gave evidence. Those marked ** gave both oral and written evidence; those marked * gave oral evidence only; those without asterisk gave written evidence only.

* Professor Alyson Bailes, University of Iceland
  Mr Michael Emerson, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
  Centre for European Reform (CER)

* Patrick Child, Head of Cabinet of the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, DG RELEX

* Mr Paul Clairet, Adviser, European Commission Development Directorate-General

* Mr Robert Cooper, Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU

* Mr Richard Crowder, Policy Unit, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU
  Department for International Development

* Ms Daniela Dicorrado-Andreoni, Head of Sector, Peacekeeping and Security Unit, European Commission Development Directorate-General

* Mrs Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, DG RELEX

** Rt Hon Caroline Flint, MP, Minister for Europe

* Foreign and Commonwealth Office

* Dr Bastian Giegerich, International Institute for Strategic Studies

* Professor François Heisbourg, International Institute for Strategic Studies

* Professor Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics

* Mr Kees Klompenhouwer, Director of Civilian ESDP Operations, European Council Secretariat
  Mr Helmut Kuhne, MEP

* Lieutenant-General David Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU

* Major-General (Retd) Messervy-Whiting CBE, Birmingham University, formerly Dr Solana’s head of design team for the EU’s military structures, then the first Chief of Staff of the new EU Military Staff

* Ministry of Defence

** Rt Hon Jim Murphy MP, former Minister for Europe

  Mr Luis Simón Navarro, University of London

  Mr Timothy Othieno, Overseas Development Institute

  Oxford Research Group

  Mr Andris Piebalgs, Commissioner for Energy, European Commission
* Mr Maciej Popowski, EU Development Policy: Horizontal Issues, Directorate-General Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States
  Quaker Council for European Affairs
  Mr James Rogers, University of Cambridge
* Mr Dan Smith OBE, Secretary-General of International Alert, London
* Dr Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the EU
* Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations
* Mr Richard Wright, Director for Policy Coordination in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, EU Directorate-General Foreign Affairs
APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

The foreign policy, defence and development Sub-Committee (Sub-Committee C) of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union has decided to undertake an inquiry into “The European Security Strategy”. The Sub-Committee is chaired by Lord Roper.

Since the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy in 2003, the international environment has evolved and issues such as climate change and energy security have taken on greater prominence. New threats are appearing on the horizon, including electronic attacks and non-military espionage. Risks such as pandemics, financial turbulence, water shortages and food crises are becoming more important and necessitate a European and international response. The EU has enlarged to 27 Member States, bringing it closer geographically to regions of instability, such as in the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Furthermore, thinking on these issues within the EU has evolved. The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr Javier Solana, and his counterpart in the Commission, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, recently presented a joint report to the March 2008 European Council in which they drew attention to the impact of climate change on international security. This report and any follow-up work, which are expected to lead to the adoption of a document by the December European Council, will be examined as part of this inquiry. Another example is energy security, which has become a priority for the EU in recent years.

In the light of these challenges, the Sub-Committee has decided to review the usefulness of the European Security Strategy and the extent to which it informs policy-making in the European Institutions and in the EU Member States. In the context of the planned review of the Strategy under the French presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008, the Committee will assess the extent to which the Strategy provides a useful conceptual framework for addressing the threats and risks faced by the EU in the 21st century. It will also assess whether the recommendations for action contained in the Strategy need to be adapted and how they can be more effectively implemented.

In the framework of this inquiry, the Sub-Committee will consider written evidence. The Sub-Committee would therefore welcome submissions on the following questions:

1. To what extent has the European Security Strategy provided a useful tool for addressing the security challenges faced by the EU? To what extent does it inform policy-making in the European Institutions and in the EU Member States? Have the EU Strategy for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other similar EU strategies served as tools for the implementation of the European Security Strategy?

2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy? Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the threats and risks facing the EU? Is there a need for the Strategy to pay greater attention to evaluating and analysing the EU’s sources of vulnerability and dependence, such as on energy supplies?

3. Should the Strategy place a greater emphasis on drivers of insecurity, such as challenges to the rules-based international system, climate change, competition for energy, poverty, inequality and poor
governance? Does the Strategy sufficiently take into account the interrelationship between security and development?

(4) How successful has the Strategy been in promoting security in the EU’s neighbourhood?

(5) Does the Strategy make appropriate recommendations on the action the EU should take to address the security challenges it faces? Is there a good balance between short-term and long-term priorities for action?

(6) In what ways could the Strategy be better implemented? Has the promotion of stability taken precedence over the promotion of democracy and good governance in the EU’s neighbourhood?

(7) To what extent have the EU’s Strategic Partnerships and political dialogue with third countries and organisations, including the UN and NATO, contributed to achieving the aims of the Strategy? Has the Strategy contributed to shaping EU policy and thinking in relation to the United States and other important partners such as Russia, China, India and Africa?

(8) Is there a need to review the Strategy and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically?

(9) Are there any other issues which should be brought to the Sub-Committee’s attention as part of this inquiry?
### APPENDIX 4: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BERR</td>
<td>Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civ-mil</td>
<td>Civilian and Military operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>Stability Instrument</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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APPENDIX 5: EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 2003

A Secure Europe in a Better World

Introduction
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

I. The security environment: global challenges and key threats

Global Challenges
The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence—and so vulnerability—on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.
In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world’s population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Competition for natural resources—notably water—which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key Threats

Large scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.
Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

State Failure: Bad governance—corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability—and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan—where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together—terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force—we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

II. Strategic objectives

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the Threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.
• It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

• The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world wide: their activities in central or south east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence—up to and including the Cold War—was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected—as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi faceted situations.

**Building Security in our Neighbourhood**

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.
The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution—which Europe has long supported—is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.
Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.

It is a condition of a rule based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

**III. Policy implications for Europe**

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

**More active** in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.
The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

**More Capable.** A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway—notably the establishment of a defence agency—take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

**More Coherent.** The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.
Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

**Working with partners.** There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

**Conclusion**

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.
APPENDIX 6: RECENT REPORTS

Recent Reports from the EU Select Committee


Priorities of the European Union: evidence from the Minister for Europe and the Ambassador of Slovenia (11th Report, Session 2007–08, HL Paper 73)


Priorities of the European Union: evidence from the Ambassador of France and the Minister of Europe (24th Report, Session 2007–08, HL Paper 155)

Evidence from the Minister for Europe on the June European Council (28th Report, Session 2007–08, HL Paper 176)

Session 2007–2008 Reports prepared by Sub-Committee C

Current Developments in European Foreign Policy: the EU and Africa (4th Report, HL Paper 32)

Current Developments in European Defence Policy (8th Report, HL Paper 59)

Current Developments in European Foreign Policy (12th Report, HL Paper 75)

The European Union and Russia (14th Report, HL Paper 98)

Current Developments in European Foreign Policy: Burma (16th Report, HL Paper 118)

Current Developments in European Defence Policy (20th Report, HL Paper 145)

Current Developments in European Foreign Policy (25th Report, HL Paper 169)

Session 2006–2007 Reports prepared by Sub-Committee C

Current Developments in European Defence Policy (1st Report, HL Paper 17)

Current Developments in European Foreign Policy (16th Report, HL Paper 76)

The EU and the Middle East Peace Process (26th Report, HL Paper 132)

Current Developments in European Foreign Policy: Kosovo (32nd Report, HL Paper 154)

Current Developments in European Defence Policy (34th Report, HL Paper 161)

Current Developments in European Foreign Policy (38th Report, HL Paper 183)
Minutes of Evidence

TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
(SUB-COMMITTEE C)

THURSDAY 22 MAY 2008

Present

Anderson of Swansea, L
Crickhowell, L
Hamilton of Epsom, L
Hannay of Chiswick, L

Roper, L (Chairman)
Symons of Vernham Dean, B
Truscott, L

Examination of Witness

Witness: Mr Dan Smith OBE, Secretary-General of International Alert, London, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: Good morning Mr Smith. Thank you very much indeed for coming to meet the Committee this morning. We are just starting an inquiry into the European Security Strategy which is due to be reviewed and perhaps revised in the second half of this year. We thought as a Committee it would be useful to take evidence both from people who have concerns about the issues which it treats as well as people who have direct knowledge of the way in which the EU operates in this area. We really want to begin by assessing how far the existing Strategy has worked and as well as that look forward to see what a new European Security Strategy might do and how it can be improved. I would like to begin by asking you what you see as the purpose of the existing European Security Strategy and to what extent it has proved a useful tool for addressing the security challenges faced by the European Union and its Member States.

Mr Smith: Thank you very much for the invitation to present some views and some ideas today. I think you have to begin by thinking about the political role of the European Security Strategy and the period in which it was first started and promulgated. It was an attempt to be a politically unifying document between different views and conceptions about security, about the security threats. Actually quite a big shift in security thinking was happening—in my view it is still happening—and the Security Strategy was in part designed by the Office of Javier Solana to cut a path through some of that confusion. Because of the tensions between the different conceptions of security and especially because of different views about how much emphasis should be put on the terrorism threat and how much should be put on other threats, I think that the document, although it is well written, is not as clearly a clarion call for a new conception of security as maybe some of its architects wanted it to be. I think that it did prove useful at the outset in offering some degree of cohesion, some degree of coherence in balancing between these different ideas of security. I also think it has provided some useful mapping points and reference points for the EU institutions, maybe less so for the Member States who have actually paid it less attention. As quick bits of evidence to support that idea I think that in the number of ESDP missions—including the ones that were already under way at the time the Strategy was finalised, there have been 20—there has not actually been a notable acceleration compared to 2003 in the numbers started each year (with the exception of 2005 when I think seven were started), but there has been momentum in those ESDP missions. The European Security Strategy might not have caused that but it explains it, it provides a background to it, it provides a reference point for it. I think also that you can see the influence of the Security Strategy in the work that the special envoy on the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Roeland van de Geer has done and the contribution he has made—which has been quite widely praised—towards trying to get some sort of agreements between the government and the different fighting groups in Eastern Congo. I would say it is a political utility with a political purpose to it, with some usefulness in relation to the EU institutions, much less in relation to the Member States.

Q2 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Mr Smith, can you say how you define the parameters of this? Probably when you and I were brought up we thought of security almost purely in military terms, now it is defined almost beyond what it can contain. Where do you think are the limits of security and are they adequately addressed in the document?

Mr Smith: I think of the two concepts of security that I was referring to, one is the more traditional one, not purely military any more but very distinctly state-based, based on the idea of national interest and reflected in the academic discourse and often in political discourse by what is often called realist analysis or, when people are being pejorative, realpolitik. On the other side, beginning I suppose in the early to mid 1990s, there has been a different strand which has gone by the name most commonly of human security, which argues that it is not the security...
of the state which is the main objective, it is the security of individuals and communities which is the main objective. When this was being used to expand the notion of security to include explosive remnants of war which in a village area will stop the farming going on after the war is over, I think this is very useful. When the notion is expanded to include the idea of the security sector—the police, the prison service and so on—it remains a very useful notion. Sometimes I hear the notion of human security being expanded so far that you are only secure if you feel happy. I heard one major spokesperson for human security ideas say that human security is knowing what will happen tomorrow. Surely one’s response is, “Well, that’s not life, is it?” I think there are some conceptions of it which have pushed the outer limits beyond what is feasible.

Q3 Lord Anderson of Swansea: It can be defined out of existence.
Mr Smith: Exactly.

Q4 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Where do you draw the line?
Mr Smith: I think I draw the line more or less pragmatically at the operation of the state security sector and then, in a different way, those factors which can lead to violent conflict. I would therefore include poverty, the environment, good governance under the heading of security concerns. I would want to make sure that the security strategy was consistent with policies leading towards development, environmental responsibility and good governance. I would not necessarily put that policy into the hands of the state security sector.

Q5 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Following on from Lord Anderson’s point, it strikes me that this thing has been set up by a committee and everybody has thrown their bit of interest into it—I do not think the EU committees are any different to any others on that—and you end up with something trying to do almost everything. There does not seem to be a single problem facing the world that is not included here in the parameters of this. Is it not trying to do too much?
Mr Smith: I think there is bound to be a constant iterative process, moving back and forth in this argument to try to find the right balance point. I think since before the end of the Cold War one found NATO looking at new security threats, thinking about movement of people (that was one of the first that came up) and looking at those threats which came from the south which were not threats from state actors but state threats arising out of the conditions in parts of Africa, for example. To exclude those from the conception of security is to exclude way too much, but obviously there is the risk on the other side that you go too far and you include absolutely everything. Then you are talking about the business of government rather than a component of government. I would love if there were a neat answer, if somebody could come and say, “Here it is; here are the parameters”. I think instead what there will be consistently is a debate in which people are trying to find more or less the right balance point, but it is always going to be slightly unstable and new issues and new problems will come up. I think it would be a mistake either to go to the outer limits of possibility, defining everything as human security, or to say that because it is possible to go to the outer limits then by contrast I prefer to stick with the core of military defence against threats from other states. There has to be a mid-point somewhere in there but I do not think in arguing it out there is a scientific way to do it.

Q6 Chairman: Is it primarily the external—external either to the state or in this case to the Union—that we are considering?
Mr Smith: I would say primarily it is but these issues have reflections, as we have seen, echoes—very violent ones—within the Union and within the states. I think we also have to think about the way in which national policies can inadvertently contribute to those external issues.

Q7 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I have two questions about your knowledge of the origins of the Strategy. What I had always heard—perhaps you can confirm this—was that it was in fact virtually untouched by the Member States; it was produced by Javier Solana and Robert Cooper and miraculously went through a process that only lasted three or four weeks and emerged as the Union’s Strategy in a much more coherent way than had often been the case in the past and was therefore not the construct of a committee. The second question I would like to ask you is to what extent you feel that the experience in the Balkans in the 1990s and Kosovo was one of the main motivating forces behind the definition of the strategy and one of the experiences that, as it were, informed it, similarly of course bringing in the question of human security which was very prominent in the Kosovo crisis.
Mr Smith: On your first point, a draft of the Strategy went to the June meeting of the Council of Ministers where it was noted and, subject to correction on actually looking at the communiqués and so on, encouraged further work. What I have understood is that that went away into this small team that produced it and wrote it. It is well written and it is a coherent document. It is trying to square a number of circles but that is the reality they were dealing with. My anecdotal understanding is that there was really very little change in it once the second version was produced. As to the background, I have always thought that the Balkans and Kosovo lay in the background but I have also thought that what drove forward the recognition
Q8 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Was there also in the background a wish to give a riposte to the US Strategy at a time when Europe and the US were diverging in terms of analysis of a number of key problems? Mr Smith: There were certainly a lot of people—observers active in politics—who wanted the Strategy to be a riposte to the US and you can indeed look into it and find things which are such, but you can also look into it and find other things which seem like they are concessions, they are alongside the US positions and are compatible with them. Steering that course is what the strategy was trying to do. At a time when it felt as if the Atlantic was getting wider and those divisions were then being replicated in Europe rather destructively, it was an attempt to put those divisions back a little bit into place, not to completely obscure the differences but to get them back to manageable proportions again. I think there was a general view that what had happened in the first half of 2003 was not viable long term.

Q9 Lord Truscott: Mr Smith, do you agree with the analysis of the global challenges and specific threats as set out in the first part of the European Security Strategy? How would you rank energy dependency as a security threat? Mr Smith: I think there is a lot of great interest and value in the analytical parts of the security strategy. It puts the emphasis on threats not being from states but arising out of phenomena or syndromes or processes—or whatever you want to call them—in international politics, some which are specific to regions and some which are to do with the nature of the world system. I think that its emphasis on a multi-faceted threat, a rather complicated threat is right, and the idea that one has a multi-faceted response using a lot of different instruments of government is also appropriate. It is right that in a globalising world distance is not as important as it used to be in assessing security threats. The idea that EU enlargement, in a general sense an expansion of an EU zone of peace, is an important part of an overall security strategy—I think that is also very valuable and worthwhile. I find various absences; perhaps some of these are based on retrospectively looking back with five years of additional knowledge, but climate change is a glaring absence. The lack of attention to the problem of injustice and unfairness in the world is also important because the perception and understanding of that is a major aggravating feature of a great many of the conflicts which give rise to some of the direct threats which we are concerned about. The focus on terrorism as a thing in itself is incomplete. I think one has to look at what terrorism grows out of as well as the specific terrorist threat. There is also a big thing which I would like to introduce into the discussion. It does not surprise me at all that it was missing in the European Security Strategy. I think though that it hints in this direction: that there is a major change going on in the nature of violent conflicts that are challenging the world system and major players within it. The notion of inter-state war of course is still real but it is much less important in the post-Second World War and especially the post-Cold War period. We are now seeing, as the Human Security Project has reported, a decline in the number of intra-state wars, but we are beginning to see, identify and understand what are being referred to as non-state wars. Beyond that I think it is necessary also to pay increasing attention to that zone where what we have thought of as armed conflicts having political purposes intersect with pure criminality. What I wonder is whether some of the driving forces behind armed conflict in terms of a marginalisation of people which makes it possible to mobilise them in conflict are now going to be mobilised in things that we would understand more in terms of gangs and crime rather than political movements and war. I think there is a shift happening in the nature of armed conflict worldwide. It is part of a development in the world system; it is part of the development in world economics but also in world politics which is putting increasing sanctions against those who use violence for political purposes. Those sanctions are still not powerful enough; there is still too much political violence. I think I am almost arguing that violence or violent conflict is a sort of homogenous fluid which, if it cannot get an outlet through political causes, we are going to see it happening in ways that we understand as being more social. To go back to your question, I think that the analytical section is interesting, important, many parts of it are valid, but there is a case for re-writing now.

Q10 Lord Truscott: You did not answer the point about energy dependency. One of my views is that the major security threat facing all of us in the 21st century will be the competition for natural resources: water, food and energy. How would you rank energy? Mr Smith: I think that energy issues may carry a dimension of risk that is different from what we have been talking about in the last decade, perhaps, when we have been discussing security issues. An awful lot of discussion of global security issues is really based on the risks for the poor in the world and the risks to all of us that arise from neglecting the condition and the
sition of the poor. In terms of climate change you can argue quite clearly that the greatest negative effect of climate change will be felt by the poorest of the poor living in low income, badly governed states. Energy dependency or energy issues will hit those people and those societies as well but they may also, if we are not careful, hit European, developed OECD countries as well. I would not say this is something that I was thinking will happen in five to 10 years’ time, but untreated and unregarded, perhaps in the middle of this century we would be seeing tensions and issues arising between the rich countries in a way that we have perhaps not seen in the last many years.

Q11 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I was very interested with your diagnosis of these internal conflicts and criminality. I have a lot of sympathy and find it very interesting, but what do we actually do about it? Let us take an extreme example of this, Afghan warlords who, let us face it, are about as criminal as they come, but the drugs trade gives them a fantastic cash flow which really enables them to buy almost any military hardware they want. Is there anything other than a military solution from the point of view of the West when dealing with these people? I cannot see that sanctions would have any effect on them at all.

Mr Smith: I think the military or the policing solution is obviously an important part of it. I think that providing alternative livelihoods for those who are doing the farming is also part of it.

Q12 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: That is not easy though.

Mr Smith: No, it is not easy, but good governance in Afghanistan—as in other countries where the issue arises—is also a part of it. The problem in some ways lies in ourselves in western societies, whether or not we can manage to find a solution. As long as there is a market for the poppies they will be grown. Also, at the other end and looking at how we manage those issues internally in our own societies—I do not want to get into a discussion of what I, as an ordinarily ill-informed citizen, think would be a reasonable drug policy in the UK—you are right, you have to have that hard-headed policing and military core to this but if you were not taking any other actions then it would be treating symptoms without getting even close to treating the causes. The two must different kinds of approach must go hand in hand.

Q13 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Do I understand you to say that the report fails or inadequately deals with the inter-relationship between various heads—terrorism, organised crime—and could the same, for example, be applied to migration flows and demography? Do you think the report addresses the problem of world population—the division between the developing and developed world in terms of population—adequately?

Mr Smith: My preference is to treat the question of migration with great care because it is such an emotive term. When my organisation looked at the question of climate change and its potential effect in causing migration one of the things we thought was necessary to make clear is that an awful lot of the migration we are talking about is not from the south to the north, it is not from the poor world to the rich, it is within the poor world. It is from areas which, in scenarios of climate change, absolutely cannot cope with the impact of climate change to areas which can barely cope, then putting increased pressure on those areas. I do think that there is a series of inter-relating or inter-locking issues which form the background to the specific security threats that are faced and are addressed, and that the European Security Strategy document was not clear enough about those inter-relationships. At the same time I hasten to add that I do not think that a strategy document like this should become a major academic disquisition on absolutely everything. It has to keep political clarity and therefore I would not expect it to go into the analytical depth that one would like in some contexts.

Q14 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Clearly one factor in migration is the very pressure of population.

Mr Smith: Yes.

Q15 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Has that been addressed adequately?

Mr Smith: No.

Q16 Lord Crickhowell: Just following up on the point raised by Lord Hamilton, clearly Afghanistan is uniquely difficult as a situation but recent history in, say, Colombia does suggest that policing good governance is a way of dealing with some of these issues in some parts of the world. I am actually in the middle of planning a visit to Colombia which I do not think I would have been doing five years ago. While Afghanistan may be uniquely difficult, there are parts of the world where, if these things are tackled seriously and in the right way, great progress can be made.

Mr Smith: I think maybe one would have said maybe 15 or 20 years ago that Colombia was uniquely difficult and it is still extremely difficult. You are talking about a background of essentially permanent violent conflict ever since independence and indeed before it. This war itself goes back at least 40 years and its roots can be found in the previous war in La Violencia in Colombia. The intersection with cocaine has given FARC and the other groups enormous resources and enormous power and at times they have completely out-numbered and out-powered the Colombian army. In recent years the Colombian government—with a number of different initiatives...
heading first in one direction, sometimes correcting course, some initiatives which did not work out, did not go right—does seem to be making progress. I think the problem about this is that the pace of progress in these circumstances is always at a snail’s pace. Sometimes maybe there is an impatience amongst policy makers to achieve a solution within what is actually an unrealistically short timeframe. When a conflict goes back decades and centuries one should not expect two or three years or the lifetime of a government to solve it.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I would like to remind Lord Crickhowell that Colombia still has one of the highest homicide rates in the world.

Lord Crickhowell: Yes but the fact is in the major cities you can now visit probably in greater safety than you can visit in parts of London. Enormous progress has been made and it is now a growing tourist country as a result.

Q17 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: We have really begun to cover this ground in the previous questions and answers, but looking at the Strategy do you think it sufficiently and clearly enough emphasises the main drivers of insecurity, challenges to the rules-based international system, climate change (you have already said it does not and is in a way reflected in the fact that the Commission and the Council Secretariat actually produced note for the March Council on that aspect), competition for energy resources (Lord Truscott asked you about that), water resources, poverty, inequality and poor governance. I suppose we should add now food security or anyway we should think a bit about it. To what extent do you think that the Strategy as drafted in 2003 identifies these drivers sufficiently? Are there any that are missing from it? Does the Strategy take sufficient account of the inter-relationship between what you might call classical security issues and classical development issues which are now recognised as being part of a wider security nexus in, for example, the High-Level Panel’s report to the Secretary General in 2004? Arising out of that do you think that the Security Strategy should have specifically said that achieving the Millennium Development Goals was a desirable objective for the European Union?

Mr Smith: To take the first part of the question addressing the drivers and insecurities, I think the European Security Strategy makes a reasonable start on that. As I think I have already said, I see some major absences there. The one footnote I would add to that—to nuance it in a way—is that one needs to be careful that the analysis does not re-visit the same issue simply under different names, for example poverty and food insecurity or indeed climate change and food insecurity. I am not arguing that food insecurity is unimportant; I think it is critical. Food insecurity is a major transmission mechanism from some of these underlying social or climatic or economic drivers, through food insecurity and livelihood insecurity which can lead then to people moving—migration—and thus in that particular chain of cause and effect increase the risk for armed conflict. Exactly how to reflect this network of issues in a document I think requires some careful thought. Where International Alert went to, as we were analysing this, was to attempt to stay away from simple chains of cause and effect and rather to talk about the interaction of different elements. Thus, in a situation where you have bad governance, a history of conflict, low levels of human security and low income, then the effect of climate change, interacting with those weaknesses in society and inequality are going to produce a higher risk of armed conflict than climate change may in a completely different circumstance. Take two low lying countries, one rich and one poor: why do we worry so much about Bangladesh in the context of climate change but really think that the Dutch will handle things? It is the interaction between the social realities and the natural phenomena that produces risk. Carefully addressed, introducing that element, would be a real strengthening of the European Security Strategy because those specific threats which are then being talked about and which need to be addressed, whether it is with military preparations or with policing or specific programmes, are being put into a background and a context that makes sense. On the relationship between security somewhat classically understood and development somewhat classically understood I think the expression of that relationship in the European Security Strategy is quite inadequate. I refer to the previous part of the answer just now to say what I think there ought to be. I do think that it is in the interests of the European Union that the Millennium Development Goals be achieved but I would caution against writing achievement of the Millennium Development Goals as specific targets into a new European Security Strategy. The reason for this is that I feel that the Millennium Development Goals actually function best when they are seen as aspirations and I have a lot of reservations when they are made into bureaucratic objectives, wholly quantifiable and a tick-box approach is taken to them, because that homogenising view of world development misses the distinctions and the differences between the different countries. I far prefer the trend in the development debate which is looking—under the heading of the fragile states discourse—looking at the specific issues which are arising which are different in Nepal from in Tanzania, which are different in Liberia from in Indonesia. I prefer an approach therefore which takes us towards the specifics rather than one which is happy resting at the generalities.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I would follow that very much; it is a theme which in a debate in the House of Lords recently on the Millennium Development
Goals it came out very clearly. Presumably in a document which is necessarily a general document you have to found your contribution to dealing with specifics into some general principles and that is where this comes in. I think your reply is very helpful.

Q18 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Had the Strategy been evolved 10 years ago probably there would hardly have been a mention of climate change. If one projects 10 years hence the likelihood is that climate change will be even higher up the agenda. As you have already mentioned, it is fundamental to a whole series of threats to human development, be it population movements, be it natural disasters, conflict over water, general environmental matters. Lord Hannay has already mentioned the report of the Council and Commission which I think was presented in March of this year. In your judgment is there currently a sufficient emphasis on climate change as a driver and factor in change? Does that report in its own analysis adequately tackle the subject in its recommendations? Mr Smith: As I said when talking initially about the European Security Strategy, it is good to begin with understanding the political moment. At the beginning of 2007 I think it was almost an eccentric position to be talking about the connection between climate change and security. When the UK Government used its chairmanship of the UN Security Council to convene a debate on that in the spring of last year there was really quite a lot of critical comment by other states, including ones to which HMG would normally feel pretty close. The case that there is a connection between the consequences of climate change and security issues I would say at that point, in April/May last year, was not broadly understood. This is around the time we were beginning to take up the issue as well. I got onto a number of radio and television programmes on the basis that here was somebody saying something completely different that we have not really heard before. During 2007 the debate shifted enormously, first of all because the fourth assessment report from the IPCC—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—came out and secondly because a lot of people were interested in it. The Nobel Peace Prize Committee gave the award to Al Gore and to the IPCC itself which at least pushed people into talking about the connection. Now we come round to the early part of 2008 and this is beginning to be a mainstream view. It is nonetheless still at a fairly early stage of really working out what that connection is. The effects of climate change are being felt now. On a lot of the problem areas the analysis in the report is right. I found a couple where I found it rather hard to trace causality but those were minor objections and I would not go into them. The general sense that climate change is going to break the back of a pretty weak camel I think is right. I think then, however, that the conclusions and the recommendations which came out of the report are relatively unambitious. There is a slight sense that the authors of this report were sort of going through the motions, not really sure what actually can be done about this but needing to put down a few paragraphs at the end under the heading of recommendations. I would very much hope that those recommendations would get revisited. As the former Chief Scientist of the Government, Sir David King, has said, it is going to be three and a half decades under even the best scenario before mitigation really changes things around. In the meantime, especially for poor countries, there has to be a huge amount of emphasis on adaptation. People will adapt to climate change; they will adapt in some cases by changing crop cycles, by changing the way their houses are built. Let us hope that that is done with support from governments and the international community. In the worst case they will be adapting by running, by moving away, by fighting with each other over scarce resources. There will be an adaptation to climate change but some of that process of adaptation can be counter-productive and what we want is to encourage a form of adaptation and models and systems for it which are conducive towards peaceful social relations rather than towards violence.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: Is it fair to say that global warming is broadly preferable to global freezing.

Q19 Chairman: So there is benign adaptation and malign adaptation and what we need to look for are the ways of encouraging the former. Mr Smith: That is right. I think that in a lot of circumstances the malign adaptation will occur because the benign has not been planned, prepared and implemented properly.

Q20 Lord Crickhowell: You have moved onto the point I was going to raise with you. Having spent a large part of the last year on the Joint Committee and then debating the Climate Change Bill, having taken considerable interest in the challenge made by Nigel Lawson in his recent book, while I do not agree with the main thrust I think he makes some very serious points which have to be taken seriously, not least on this whole question of adaptation. Earlier you referred to Bangladesh and Holland and the difference in approach. Would it not be right that up to now the European approach has perhaps had most of its emphasis on emissions trading and controlling CO2 emissions and so on and not enough on the priority which we have to give to adaptation? You observed quite rightly that it is going to be a very long time before we find a solution, a fact that Al Gore almost totally ignores incidentally in his report, he does not talk about solutions. It is going to take time and ought there not to be much more emphasis on adaptation?
Mr Smith: That is absolutely my position. There should be much more emphasis on adaptation not because mitigation is unimportant but, as we have said, it will take time, even in the best scenario, before it has its effect. Adaptation has been the poor relation within the climate change debate and the emphasis when there has been reference to adaptation, because it gets sparked by major events, is looking at things like the Burma cyclone now and adaptation is understood as being readiness for disaster. It is not just sudden onset changes or sudden shocks that we have to worry about; it is also the slow onset change. Year by year things move, just slightly, and you barely notice. That also needs to be prepared for. Adaptation to help people in that context is also part of it.

Q21 Lord Crickhowell: Particularly as some of these great shocks probably have nothing to do with global warming.

Mr Smith: Maybe, maybe not.

Lord Crickhowell: Everyone now takes a natural disaster and blames global warming. There is very little evidence that they do necessarily arise from global warming. The point you make I think is a very important one.

Q22 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Moving onto the strategic objectives that were set out in the European Security Strategy, it sets out three strategic objectives for the EU: address the threats which have been identified; build security in the EU’s neighbourhood; and work towards an international order based on effective multilateralism. In your view, were those the right strategic objectives? Are they still the right strategic objectives? If so, what should be the balance of priorities between them, if any? Or should the priorities be found within each of the three?

Mr Smith: I think one can do a certain amount of re-organising of objectives and how they are expressed which would maybe make things look a little more elegant but which does not have a real substantive effect. For personal preference I would say that to address the threats would be bullet point one and point two would be to address the source of the threats. That task of addressing the source of the threats I think can be looked at within the EU neighbourhood, among fragile states and in the international system. That would be an intellectual scheme which I would lay out but I do not think I would get to very different places in terms of substance when compared to the Security Strategy. I think that in terms of the priorities I would say that these tasks within the EU, in the neighbourhood, among fragile states and in the international system are tasks of equal importance but that does not mean that each task is as expensive or as resource heavy to carry out. It would be from that direction that I would go into the argument. Ensuring the smooth functioning of the world system, or ensuring its better functioning, as a multi-lateral system of rule-based/law-based international relations could be probably fulfilled with very little extra cost—perhaps none extra—compared to what is being spent at the moment. That does not mean that it is a low priority, in fact I think it is fundamental. One thing perhaps that should be said in the European Security Strategy is a statement of values which explains why a law-based system is absolutely fundamental. In terms of use of resources I think that ESDP missions should and will continue. I think there could possibly be a slightly greater pace in them; on average in the last three or four years they have been doing two new ones a year. I think as experience is gained it may be possible to go up to more. I would assume that the need for ESDP missions within the European Union neighbourhood would be tailing off over a period of time and therefore there would be opportunities for shifting those kinds of resources to the wider international sphere and fragile states. The kind of work that has been done in the DRC, for example; there are other places where it is worthwhile to ramp that up a bit.

Q23 Lord Truscott: Following on from what you have just said, do you think the European Security Strategy does make the right recommendations for action both in the short term and long term?

Mr Smith: To be honest, except in very broad terms and then in one or two specifics, I do not see very much by way of recommendation for action and I am not sure that that is a problem. It could over-burden a single document to try to go all the way from the general statements of values, through the principles, through the major mechanisms and instruments and analysis of threats through to action. I think it is true that Mr Solana actually resisted attempts to turn this into an operational document, preferring to keep it as a political declaration. It is more of a doctrine or a concept—as some of our continental colleagues would say—rather than what we would normally think of as a strategy. I am not quite sure, to be honest, what my own opinion is as to whether it is therefore a real gap in the Strategy that it does not see it all the way through to action. I think one can argue the benefits either way, but I think it was a legitimate position or a legitimate decision to say, “Let’s leave it as a political declaratory document” because there was a need for that at the time. I think in 2008 there is still a need for clarity about how to play off these different issues, how to understand the relationships between these different kinds of threats, where to put the emphasis in terms of the importance of multi-lateralism, the law-based approach. At least I would be open to the idea that there is continuing worth in a renewed political declaration and it does not matter if it does not go into details of action.
Q24 Chairman: The Strategy which may come out at the end of this year should be broadly of the same sort of nature as the one before, although the issues that we have already discussed might well have to be reviewed and revised and put into some of the wider context you have discussed.

Mr Smith: I think it is right; I think that is what makes sense.

Q25 Chairman: The Strategy does call on the European Union to be “more active, more capable and more coherent”. How far do you feel the European Union has responded to this call and what more can be done in practice?

Mr Smith: I think “more active”, yes, for sure. The ESDP missions, the role of Roeland van de Geer, these are good steps forward and things have been done which are worthy of praise. As I said earlier the European Security Strategy may not have caused that but it is part of that direction of the evolution of policy and approaches and it helps explain and justify those sorts of things. The second one was “more capable”. I feel there is still a long way to go with that. I think there is still a long way to go with that as one looks through all components of the EU. In the institutions I think that there is still more to do. There is a lot of stovepipe thinking. I have had precisely the experience of sitting in an office talking to somebody about conflict and the way this was holding back things which the EU wants to achieve and being told, “Ah yes, but you are talking about conflict; I do development” and so I had to go to another office in another building in order to be able to talk about conflict. The High-Level Panel—but also everybody and their second cousin—have been pointing out the close relationship between development and peace issues and it seems to me to be strange when one finds systems or institutions still structured according to these separate stovepipes. I think that the capability question still needs to be addressed more. A lot of the problem here is that it needs to be addressed in detail; these are issues of the detail of how different people with different professional experience work on issues as those issues expand and are redefined. Very often that sort of detail is way below the radar scanner as far as the political leaders or even the senior civil servants are concerned. That is really extremely important. As to coherence, I think that in the past couple of years there was the famous incoherence of Commission and Council actually at war in the courts with each other, but I think that more recently in fact the coherence of actions is improving. There are an awful lot of forums in which staff from the Commission and staff from the Council of Ministers get together and hammer out joint positions. It is much less of a challenge for them now to develop a common position and I think the climate change paper that we have been referring to is to some extent an example of that. I can also think of other examples, one case in point would be looking at how it has worked in DRC where I see the nature of the work is moving forward pretty coherently.

Q26 Chairman: We are spending a great deal of time at the moment of course considering the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union Reform Treaty. Do you feel there are provisions in that which ought to help in terms of achieving these objectives?

Mr Smith: I cannot comment; it is not my bedtime reading. What I do think is that the Treaty offers the opportunity to address some of these issues and as the External Action Service is put together I do not see that it needs to be put together with the same sort of separated institutional structure internally that the Member States are used to. I would like to see that issue up on the table and being talked about.

Q27 Lord Crickhowell: I would like to probe rather further how the Strategy has been and is being implemented. Right at the start of this discussion you talked about it providing useful mapping points for EU institutions. Bispoc and Anderson, in their recent analysis which has been given to us, say that “it serves as a reference framework for day to day policy making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment”. They say that “it has been omnipresent in EU discourse in many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the CFSP and its military dimension”. They go on to the ESS and the European Security and Defence College training and various aspects. Yet when I pick up—as we happen to have it before us this morning—the Commission’s Annual Policy Statement for 2009 and I go through it and I read it from cover to cover, I cannot find a single reference to it. What I really want to discover is how far it is being implemented. It is great to have a strategy that is having an impact and it does seem to be in certain aspects, but I do find it slightly curious that there is not even the smallest mention of it in the Commission’s Annual Policy Strategy.

Mr Smith: With respect I think that that quotation you read out was slightly overheated. It is having an impact; it is there in the background of thinking. It is a handy thing to refer to in documents from time to time in order to explain why a decision or an action is being taken. The question which you ask about that Strategy document could also be asked about the country strategy papers. Surely if one has a European Security Strategy which is addressing this broad range of problems, threats and issues, it should be somehow reflected in the papers which the Commission draws up for its relations with and its activities and support for other countries outside the EU. As far as I can see, having seen some early drafts—I am not quite sure whether I should have, but anyway I have—it is not
referred to. It seems to me that the gap which you point to is replicable. I think this is a case where there is a horrible word that one uses a lot and finds sometimes devoid of meaning, but it is mainstreaming. Something like the European Security Strategy or indeed a climate change policy or many other kinds of policy should be having their impact and having an identifiable impact which one can point to in these different areas. Even if it got into all the documents, would it actually be really being implemented on the ground? That is an open question, but surely it should first of all be in all the documents.

Q28 Chairman: Going back to something you said in response to an earlier question, is the problem that it looks very much as a Council Secretariat document and the Commission does not feel they have much ownership of it and therefore perhaps in the document and the Commission’s work strategy it is less likely to feature than perhaps in documents which are Council led?

Mr Smith: I think that is very possible and I think it is also particularly possible that this will be felt within the area of the European Commission’s work which, to use Lord Hannay’s term, is the pretty much traditional development work. That is where there has been resistance to the bringing in of security notions and this is also a political resistance which has been straightforwardly expressed and argued through in the European Parliament in the process of shaping the financial perspectives for the current period. I think that that is right. Being the property of the Council to begin with probably made that whole process of adoption more efficient and quick, but may have then hindered the absorption of those ideas into the EU institutions, particularly into some parts of the Commission. I would say by contrast that those parts that I know within the Commission dealing with security and conflict prevention are pretty much awake to this and it is a real thing for them that influences and helps guide their work.

Q29 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: On this issue of the perceived gap between the promulgation of a strategy and its reflection through into individual policy papers, actions and so on, I wonder if you could take a heroic attempt to compare how that takes place between a national presidential directive in the United States and their practice in foreign policy, how it takes place in this country where the Foreign Office now publishes a strategy, and this European one? How would you rank those three in terms of the connection between the generalities of the strategy and the practical delivery of policies?

Mr Smith: You are asking me not only to be heroic but to make some unfair comparisons in this. The changes which you see in US national security doctrine from one administration to another, while they may be the stuff of politics and are being fought out on the hustings and so on and so forth, actually result in relatively small changes. There are changes in policy but not fundamental changes in approach. The task of absorption then is perhaps somewhat less. What you certainly do see in the US—as I think you see in pretty much every national governing structure—is that depending on how dynamically and forcefully the institutions are led, that is going to have an awful lot of impact on the absorption. For example, when you have a strong leader in the Pentagon as, whatever his other merits or demerits may have been (and I do not want to go there), Donald Rumsfeld was a strong leader in the Pentagon, then he saw to it that the ideas which he saw as being central to US national security needs and strategic thinking were absorbed as they needed to be. People were shifted around and moved. One of the advantages in the US system is the number of political appointments which are made within the government institutions. I think in the case of the UK, if I take one of the specific issues which we have been talking about, the relationship between development and peace, over the past three or four years I have seen quite considerable movement in the way in which traditional diplomats are thinking about these issues and the way in which people within DFID in traditional development are thinking about these issues. I am always impatient that it pushes further. I think that the perspectives, without trying to stroke you too much, outlined in the High-Level Panel report seem to be approximately the place where this needs to go. I am impatient that they should be taken up further, but I cannot deny and do not want to deny the very visible progress that there has been in that debate moving forward.

Q30 Chairman: In London?

Mr Smith: Yes, in London. In the case of the EU I think this big division between the two institutions—between the Council of Ministers and the European Commission where you do not just get inter-departmental rivalry, you get something deeper and bigger than that—the gulf has been a bigger one to cross. What I think is impressive that I have seen in the last couple of years are increasingly conscious efforts being made to cross that gulf, partly with the idea of the External Action Service in mind, the understanding that many people are going to be working in a quite different institutional context and they have been trying to prepare themselves for that. I think you get inter-departmental rivalry within the Commission, if you like; you get something else between the Commission and the Council of Ministers which of course also reflects that they are recruited in very different ways as well.
Q31 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Mr Smith, you speak of increasingly conscious efforts within the European Union to bridge the gulf. You have spoken also of a greater coherence in EU policy. I would like to examine with you how this is reflected in EU policies to other actors on the world stage. Clearly the EU has a series of strategic partners; each of those partners has fairly similar interests in terms of climate change and other matters and the impact on their own external policies be it countries or international organisations, the UN (you have already mentioned) and Lord Hannay’s High-Level Panel and NATO. To what extent in your judgment has this increasing internal cohesion within the EU impacted on its strategic relationships with other countries and on those with other international organisations? I recall that the US Security Strategy appeared at about the same time as the earlier EU one; presumably there will not be a new US Strategy until the new administration is in place, but do you know about the inter-relationships between the planners and others within the EU and within the National Security Council, the State and the Department of Defense? How much effort is there made to align where possible the security objectives of US and the EU?  

Mr Smith: I think if you were trying to do that now, that sort of alignment, it would be an extremely puzzling task to try to take on. I think you have to call the result of the November election, put all of your money on that horse and hope that the thing comes in. The document like the National Security Strategy that was announced in the US in 2002 is really a very political document and the drafting of that is led from a very high level and done with very close aides working on it and trusted advisers and so on. So it would be the group which is most closely around the leaders of the national security team of whichever is the new administration who would be the key people to be relating to there. In terms of the first question it is very important to make a distinction between coherence within the EU institutions and coherence that also includes the EU Member States. What often holds the EU back from being a coherent actor is not positions or policies which are being taken within the Commission or any dispute that there might or might not be between the Commission and the Council of Ministers; it is that the Member States, which are all sovereign states with their own interests and their own policies, have got to cobble together some kind of a compromise, or come to a great understanding with deep vision and profound foresight for moving forward on very, very complex and difficult issues. My hunch is that if you look at the more high profile issues you will tend to have a pretty poor estimate of EU coherence and if you look at the less high profile issues your assessment of EU coherence would become a little bit rosier. In various contexts in countries where we are working we would certainly see the European Commission delegation as being part of a pretty coherent group of western donor governments that is primarily the EU Member States plus, for example, Norway and Switzerland (one or two which are close to EU on a lot of policies and issues). I think we would see quite considerable coherence there and we would see that as helping in the relationship between those players and, for example, the US and/or the UN. The way in which this plays out will be different in different places and to some extent it all also depends on personalities. However, when these things are below the level of concern that is going to get the headlines in the European newspapers and the questions in Parliament and the real active, engaged interest from the foreign minister or the prime minister, it is actually then sometimes a lot easier to identify coherent actions going ahead. There are these two levels and I am not saying that one is more important than the other; I am simply suggesting that they are different and that in the more high profile cases you get more varied interests coming into play and it is therefore necessarily harder to achieve coherence. On some of the more low profile questions people and institutions are very often more pragmatic and therefore you get more coherence.

Q32 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Certainly on the low profile ones you have mentioned, presumably the fact of the External Action Service can only help in improving implementation on the ground.  

Mr Smith: Yes, that would be my assessment as well; it can only help.

Q33 Chairman: The Brussels development of the External Action Service would mean that you would not have separate desk officers in the Council and in the Commission working on these sorts of issues.  

Mr Smith: That is right. I do think it is true that coherence begins at home and the EU’s coherence with other actors therefore begins in internal coherence.

Q34 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could I take up a completely different issue which is the public perception of these security strategies in the United States, in Europe and indeed nationally here at home, but particularly between the first two of those? In the United States the national security doctrine is a pretty high profile document which gets debated at every political level, it gets debated around the country, arouses enormous press interest and so on. The European Security Strategy, if you went out into the streets and asked people if they had heard about it they would all say they had not. If you asked a lot of people in government if they had heard about it most of them would say they had not. How on earth are we to set about shifting the situation so that a document like the European Security Strategy—which is to be revisited...
at the end of this year—becomes something that people discuss seriously, not just between people like us here and you in your NGO activities who obviously take it seriously and know a great deal about it? How do we move that debate out so that people have some understanding of it? The Council actually produced an excellent European Security Strategy in booklet form; I have never seen anyone who has it except me.  
Mr Smith: I presume the vast difference arises because everyone understands that the USA is an important actor in world affairs and that case is much less easy to make about the EU for, amongst others, some of the reasons that we have been talking about this morning. I think that in a way the answer to your question is that as the process of thinking through the Security Strategy and linking that to the formation of the External Action Service begins to produce an EU which is more often than it has been in the past a significant actor on key world issues, then the importance of that will rise. However, while the EU remains, as I am more or less presuming it will for the rest of my conscious period on this planet, an alliance—albeit a very close one—of sovereign states, there is always going to be a difference between what the EU is capable of doing and what a single state of that population and wealth would be capable of doing. People will react to that accordingly. It may be that in the context of the External Action Service, with the movement forward of the European Security Strategy, it becomes a slightly larger circle of people who know what that Security Strategy is but I doubt that if you ask a random person on the street they will quickly tell you and will have an opinion about it because I do not think the EU will ever be a European equivalent of the United States of America.

Q35 Chairman: Mr Smith, thank you very much indeed for coming and answering our questions this morning. As I said at the beginning, you are our first witness and this is the very beginning of our thinking about this issue. It has been very helpful to have you and cover the whole ground so comprehensively. We are really very grateful.

Mr Smith: Thank you very much for the opportunity.
THURSDAY 5 JUNE 2008

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Major-General Messervy-Whiting CBE, Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations, examined.

Q36 Chairman: Major-General Messervy-Whiting and Mr Witney, we are very pleased to see you this morning as part of the inquiry which we are carrying out on the future development of the European Security Strategy of the European Union. Both of you of course have had significant practical experience with this area of the Union’s work but you are now free, working in other places, to be able perhaps to speak to us more frankly about these matters than might have been the case on earlier occasions. Can I begin and ask you what do you see as the nature and the purpose of the European Security Strategy and to what extent has it served as a useful tool for addressing the security challenges which have been faced by the European Union since it was prepared and agreed? To what extent do you feel it really informs policy-making in the institutions and indeed in the Member States? Perhaps I will ask Major-General Messervy-Whiting to start and then, Mr Witney, we will switch around.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Thank you, My Lord Chairman. If the Committee’s attention has not already been drawn to it might I mention the publication which has been published by the Swiss (Zurich) Technical Institute, ETH, as the result of a Chatham House conference in March 2006, which is available on the internet. This was called Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy and contained really the results of the workshop that was co-sponsored by Chatham House and by GCSP in Geneva, amongst others. Professor Anne Deighton was the leading light and the editor for that and what really came out of that workshop, of which I was a member, was that it was very much accepted that it was a rough guide for future action, it was not perhaps a strategy document in the true military sense. Solana himself, when speaking yesterday, opening the plenary session of the European Parliament, spoke at length on the European Security Strategy and his view of his remit from the European Council. He referred to it very much as it has proved useful, it has served us well, it is a short readable document that reflects our values and reflects our principles rather than a more fully fleshed-out strategy. Certainly looking back at the period up until 2006 and this particular Chatham House workshop, when the participants were asked if decision-makers around the table in the Council or indeed in the Political Security Committee in the European Union had the strategy in their left hand whilst they voted with their right, the answer was very much that they did not think that happened, that it was more a document that informed the decision-making process. That would be my view on nature and purpose; to what extent does it inform policy-making, it informs it quite well in European institutions. A number of them are now seized of the issue to try and do something to bring it up to date. Whether it is as widely used in the EU Member States I would have my doubts.

Mr Witney: My Lord Chairman, my views are really very similar to General Whiting’s. I guess the purpose of the document was essentially to get the Member States onto the same page in relation to their attitude towards security issues, which was particularly necessary at the end of 2003 when the document was born. Yes, you could argue about whether it is really a strategy or a conceptual framework or what it actually is but it seems to me a necessary crystallisation of the understanding that moving into the 21st century the security threats that Europe should be concerned about were not invasion but all these more amorphous threats from the dark side of globalisation, if one can express it that way, and that the way to deal with them was to get out there and deal with them, that you could not and should not afford just to sit at home and have these things happen to you. How far it has been used—I know that during my time in Brussels we seemed to have identical copies of this little blue book. Mine is substantially dog-eared, I found it very useful on occasion, but as Graham said my sense is that it was absorbed more within the Brussels ring road—where after all it was proposed—than out in the capitals of Europe.

Q37 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I have a copy of the little blue book too but could I ask the two witnesses this morning, who have got extensive experience of
course of living and working in our national framework and also some knowledge of how the United States organises security strategies and so on, do you think that this document differs markedly from documents you came across in your professional life in London and which you came across in your contacts with Washington? If so, how does it differ or is it broadly similar. Secondly, does either of those two actors, the United Kingdom or the United States, hold their strategic document in their left hand as they take decisions with their right, or is the situation more or less the same as the one you have described in Brussels?

Mr Witney: I suppose my immediate sense of how it differs is that it is blessedly short, very lucid and readable, which cannot be said for most security strategies. Because the EU is not a nation state we find less in here about its policies and it is closer to a statement of principles whereas the US national security strategy will tend to be more specific. Interestingly, I thought the recently produced British national security strategy, although considerably longer in its ambit, was surprisingly congruent with this five year old document, certainly in its analysis of the threats.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I wonder if the US national security strategy is perhaps more widely used within Washington because it reads across to a certain extent to budgetary issues, which I do not think this does—perhaps it should. I note that it followed hard on the heels of the US strategy and that our own Foreign Office’s first strategy followed hard on the heels of the EU.

Q38 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Is there any point in it at all unless it actually changes things on the ground? The reaction of most European nations to Afghanistan, which I think threatens the whole of Western Europe if it reverts to being a terrorist state, is appalling, but really the performance of German and French troops has been pretty weak and defence budgets have been cut across Western Europe. What is the point of all of this if things are changing for the worse on the ground?

Mr Witney: I agree that to the extent that there is anything wrong with this, it is not the words so much as whether people are doing it or not and across Europe I am not sure that I would exempt any national capital. Across Europe people are not actually following the prescriptions of more active, more capable and more coherent.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I would perhaps just emphasise that like many things in the European Union this is about starting a long term process of construction rather than achieving immediate results in the short term.

Q39 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could we turn now to that phrase that you used, Mr Witney, about providing a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the threats and risks facing the EU. Does the strategy achieve that? Are there any threats or challenges or risks that are not covered by the present strategy and which could now fall within the ambit of the review that is ongoing at the moment and which has triggered our own consideration of this matter. Already, of course, Solana and the Commission put a paper to the March European Council on climate change which suggested that that was an area that came within the ambit of a broad security policy, but there are other things like electronic attacks, non-military espionage, maritime piracy, natural disasters and then a whole range of what I call poverty eradication, pandemic disease, food security and so on. Could you perhaps comment, both of you, on the extent to which these now need to be brought within a broader view?

Mr Witney: There is no doubt that in recent years there has become an increasingly widespread understanding that defence issues need to be seen as part of a much broader spectrum of security concerns, which cover many of the sorts of issues that you have just listed, and that military power per se is not often, perhaps never, the answer to a particular situation and most crises and areas of instability need to be addressed with a variety of tools. It is interesting that this document does in fact mention quite a few of the subjects you have mentioned—there is even, I noticed, a reference to piracy which has become topical in the last week or so—though it does not have very much to say about them. Whilst it is important and right that people are increasingly concerned about the multi-headed nature of most of the situations of instability and crisis management that the EU might need to involve itself in, there can be a danger of this tending to shift the debate too far away from matters of hard power and military matters. It is too easy to move from saying that the military is seldom a solution to anything by itself to an attitude of mind which is that you do not actually need the military at all. I myself, for example, am slightly sceptical about today’s rather vogue concentration on energy security which I think falls pretty loosely under the ambit of what I understand by defence and security affairs, it seems to me in fact more a matter of the organisation of the internal gas market in Europe than something that needs to be considered in conventional security terms. I see that danger if one is too sophisticated and moves too far into spreading the term security, but on the other hand it is absolutely right that things like climate change do play a key role in contributing as drivers of conflict and instability.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I tend to agree with Nick. There are tags to most of the things in there and, of the ones the Committee listed in its
question, I do not think there is anything about non-military espionage, that is about the only one I could not find a coat-hook to. It is interesting that yesterday, whilst saying that most of the threats were still the right ones as they were in 2003, Solana picked out in particular climate change and its effect on international security, ditto illegal immigration and information security. Actually, the strategy does mention global warming under global challenges and talks about turbulence and migratory movements, and it does mention illegal immigration under the key threats in relation to organised crime, but clearly these are issues that Solana will probably feel he needs to tackle in any update of the strategy. The other thing I noted recently is that the French are just about to update their defence white book after about 15 years and President Sarkozy is going to announce the main findings on 17 June, just before the European Council on 18 and 19 June and just before France takes over the Presidency of the European Union. What Le Figaro trailed as likely headlines from that were obviously terrorism, but the dangers generally coming out of Asia and specific mention about cyber-terrorism and climatic change.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Solana quotes 17 ESDP operations so far and the vast majority have been civil rather than military in nature, but actually in terms of the planning effort, the machinery and the institutional side the military were very much first off the ground under the ESDP and the civilian side, without being derogatory, were very much playing catch-up. The first mission mounted was a police mission but the planning for that was very much done quietly and informally with a great deal of assistance from the military staff because they were up and running and the police planning staff were not. The non-military crisis management structures had very much been looking at the military way of doing things to try and develop how to do things.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: France provided the framework nation, absolutely, but a large number of Member States and non-Member States took part in that operation. It was small in nature.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: At about the time this security strategy came out was it not also the time when we had the Macedonia operation where although it was trumpeted by the European Union their role was pretty minimal; at the beginning it was a NATO-led operation. My point is, is there a temptation, because of the weight within the European Union, to over-stress the civilian as opposed to the military dimensions?

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Just to follow up on that, because I very much agree with what you said about the risk that if you say too much about what I call the Millennium Development Goal end of the spectrum, you do risk giving the impression that it could all be done with soft power. Do you not feel that the European Union and its Member States should be looking at the soft power/hard power issue as a long continuum basically in which you cannot predict in advance how far along that continuum you will have to go in dealing with a particular risk or threat. It is not a question of alternatives, of either soft power or hard power, it is a question of having a realistic and credible continuum up which to move.

Mr Witney: Yes, I do agree with that and I think that for an organisation whose self-image is its particular value—added in combining the different tools of hard and soft power, the European Union is remarkably ill-equipped to do that.

Q40 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Just to follow up on that, because I very much agree with what you said about the risk that if you say too much about what I call the Millennium Development Goal end of the spectrum, you do risk giving the impression that it could all be done with soft power. Do you not feel that the European Union and its Member States should be looking at the soft power/hard power issue as a long continuum basically in which you cannot predict in advance how far along that continuum you will have to go in dealing with a particular risk or threat. It is not a question of alternatives, of either soft power or hard power, it is a question of having a realistic and credible continuum up which to move.

Mr Witney: Yes, I do agree with that and I think that for an organisation whose self-image is its particular value—added in combining the different tools of hard and soft power, the European Union is remarkably ill-equipped to do that.

Q41 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Just as there are differences in the weight given to soft and hard power in individual countries—at the one end I guess one would have Canada and Norway emphasising soft power and ourselves probably on the other side. Is there a danger that there would be a differentiation from the European Union side because the military end of the spectrum has been as yet undeveloped within the European Union, and is there therefore a temptation to look mainly at the soft power end? Perhaps part of our role is to put a little more weight on the military and hard power side in the formulation of the new policy.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Solana quotes 17 ESDP operations so far and the vast majority have been civil rather than military in nature, but actually in terms of the planning effort, the machinery and the institutional side the military were very much first off the ground under the ESDP and the civilian side, without being derogatory, were very much playing catch-up. The first mission mounted was a police mission but the planning for that was very much done quietly and informally with a great deal of assistance from the military staff because they were up and running and the police planning staff were not. The non-military crisis management structures had very much been looking at the military way of doing things to try and develop how to do things.

Q42 Lord Anderson of Swansea: At about the time this security strategy came out was it not also the time when we had the Macedonia operation where although it was trumpeted by the European Union their role was pretty minimal; at the beginning it was a NATO-led operation. My point is, is there a temptation, because of the weight within the European Union, to over-stress the civilian as opposed to the military dimensions?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I would say from what I saw when I was there, which was up until 2003, that that was not the case. To what extent that might have changed I defer to Nick, but certainly by the time the strategy was agreed there had been two military operations, one was using Berlin Plus and NATO assets and capabilities—the Macedonia one—the second one was Artemis in the Bunia region of the Democratic Republic of Congo which was very much a so-called autonomous military operation without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, so they had done one of each.

Q43 Lord Anderson of Swansea: But that was essentially French, was it not?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: France provided the framework nation, absolutely, but a large number of Member States and non-Member States took part in that operation. It was small in nature.
Lord of Swansea: We had a general in Macedonia for what people were saying was essentially a brigadier scale operation—that is the EU was trumpeting this as a great operation, but it was pretty small.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: It was modest in size but the operation commander was a four star general, was DSACEUR, the German Admiral at that stage. Feist, based in Mons and the force commander on the ground was a two star. It was a modest operation.

Lord Jones: Following on from Lord Hannay and Lord Anderson’s immediate question should the strategy place greater emphasis on human security to balance the current focus on state security and does the strategy sufficiently address the complexities of the European security environment and inter-linkages between different types of security threats and risks?

Mr Witney: It is a bit unfair to the strategy to say that it is focused on state security; it seems to me actually that it recognises that most situations of instability and conflict are to do with regional conflicts and the failure of states. There is quite a clear pair of statements about the importance of governance, ensuring that the rule of law works, that there is not excessive corruption, that there is accountability. The understanding of the importance of human rights comes through to me pretty clearly from this so my sense is that allowing for the fact that this is very much a summary, headline document, very much compressed in its terms, it is entirely sensitive to the fact that what you mean by development and concern for human rights is something that has to go absolutely hand in hand with efforts to improve harder security, as we learn every day in Afghanistan or anywhere that Europeans are engaged, no matter what flag they are engaged under.

Lord Jones: Could you explain how you perceive human security; could you put that out a little bit?

Mr Witney: I have had one or two conversations with collaborators of Professor Kaldor and my understanding is that it is very much focused on an understanding that you are not going to get things right in the societies that you are possibly intervening in, unless you look at the grass roots and do address the problems of the individual human beings on the ground. As I said, it seems to me that this is exactly the sort of lesson that we are relearning again in Afghanistan, that you can do what you like with the central government but unless you win the hearts and minds of people on the ground and show them substantive development and show them real security, you are not actually going to have a successful outcome to what you are trying to do.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I agree with Nick. I am not comfortable with the term “human security” because I do not really understand it.

Lord Jones: I was hoping you could explain it to me.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I run fellowship courses on democracy, the rule of law and security at Birmingham University and I think I know what she is getting at. The EU, certainly in some of its smaller, more recent, good governance-type operations—security sector reform and other operations, mainly military in nature—is actually addressing those sorts of issues directly on the ground.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I agree with the difficulty of defining what you mean by this catchphrase “human security” but the most obvious case where it has been defined and has become an international norm but has not yet been properly implemented is the responsibility to protect, which is of course specifically directed towards human security and overriding state security in certain circumstances where genocide or war crimes or gross abuses of humanitarian law took place. The responsibility to protect was of course agreed in 2005, after the European Security Strategy was promulgated, and presumably one of the ways in which the strategy may need to be updated is to indicate how the European Union intends to move ahead with implementing its responsibilities of its 27 Member States in the United Nations under the rubric of responsibility to protect; that is about human security.

Chairman: We did have evidence from Dan Smith last week and we are going to hear Mary Kaldor next week, so we will have from them a good deal about human security. Can I ask Lord Anderson if he would like to come in.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: Gentlemen, when you mentioned the thin blue book my mind raced to Maoist themes and I had a picture of the Brussels bureaucrats waving a little blue book, but I guess the danger is that because it is thin it is merely a statement of principles, broadly consensual; is there a danger of just having a sort of Cook’s tour of problems, challenges, threats, without going beneath those to the implementation—I took down your phrase, if I can repeat it, “get out there and deal with them” on terrorism, looking at the causes and what one can do there. Is that next stage, the implementation and the understanding of the causes, in your judgment beyond the remit of what such a strategy should contain?
Mr Witney: There is a great deal of material that should be developed underneath the chapeau of this strategy. For example, it is probably time that a more coherent doctrine of stabilisation was developed with Europe. We all talk again in headline terms about the need for the “comprehensive approach” and we do not necessarily know exactly what we mean by that.

Q49 Lord Anderson of Swansea: But that is under the chapeau, not contained within the document itself.

Mr Witney: Yes, I think that is right. Of course, the neighbourhood policy moves on and in due course the EU should develop more explicit and coherent regional strategies. I find it striking that five of the 20 EU operations so far have been in Congo—and why not, if ever there was a country that needed external help . . . But it is pretty opaque to me what the EU thinks its strategy towards the Congo is apart from popping into the Eastern Provinces or backing the UN over the short period of an election or putting a few drops in the ocean of policing and security sector reform. This does not actually look to me like a strategy towards Congo. There is plenty that can be done and should be done underneath the chapeau of this strategy to fill out the sub-strategies or policies, but the document itself I am rather attached to.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: There might be real practical difficulties in trying to get something more complicated through the EU system successfully in a short space of time. The way the European Security Strategy was worked through the EU Council system was in my view, standing back from it and not having been involved directly, quite masterful in as much as EU Member States were not allowed to get at it at too early a stage and therefore it retained some of its elegance and simplicities and succinctness before it hit the drafting wall. As a former military adviser to the United Nations Secretary General said recently at RUSI, “The important thing to do is know who not to call at UN headquarters in New York if you want to do something in practical terms as a commander in the field” and that applies a little bit to that as well. There is a whole raft of things underneath that; terrorism was mentioned and there is a whole JHA construct which does terrorism, gives effect to what happens, without necessarily needing to go back into here to give more detail.

Q50 Lord Swinfen: From where is the intelligence obtained that shows you that there is a security threat developing and what the causes of that threat are? As far as I understand the EU itself does not have an intelligence service of any kind.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: It does not, and I do not think there is any serious ambition by anybody that it should. What it does have is quite an efficient intelligence-handling machinery, both on the military side inside the military staff in Brussels and on the non-military side inside the situation centre in Brussels and they work very closely together. What Member States are signed up to do is provide intelligence product to the European Union and the military side of it is handled in one way and the non-military side of it is handled in another way, but then they come together. The EU is receiving sensitive classified intelligence which is releasable to the Member States from, I think, each and every Member State. What happens then is that there is a synthesis—in my time there it started off being called a hotspots thing, but it then became a global overview which was presented to the Political and Security Committee, looked at and updated, in my time on a monthly basis. That was the document that gave rise if you like to what we would call threat analysis and eventually to risk assessment if the EU decided to do something in the field.

Q51 Lord Swinfen: Is updating on a monthly basis satisfactory or should it be more often?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: What we are talking about being updated on a monthly basis, and I may be out of date here, was the end product of all these considerations. The actual intelligence was flowing in 24 hours a day on an as and when needed basis.

Q52 Chairman: And OSINT would generate material for the Member States on a more regular basis than monthly.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Yes, there would be intelligence summaries which would be periodic and there would be specific intelligence reports if there was a specific intelligence event that needed reporting.

Q53 Lord Swinfen: Although the Member States are passing intelligence to this organisation, is the organisation passing intelligence back to the individual Member States?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Absolutely. That is one of the fundamental conditions of all the memoranda of understanding between the EU bodies and the intelligence services of the Member States; that everybody gets all product back from what the EU produces.

Q54 Lord Swinfen: Have there been any instances of a Member State withholding intelligence because it thought it was to its political or other advantage?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I cannot answer that but certainly Member States would not release everything that they had to the European Union, they would be making decisions as to what was releasable to the 27 Member States and certainly countries like the United Kingdom and France.
would not be releasing everything they had, some of it would not be releasable to the 27.

Q55 Lord Chidgey: On this point, My Lord Chairman, of paying greater attention to the causes and sources of security threats, which we have been chuntering on about quite happily, can I just use an example here which is rather puzzling me in a way? One of the key threats set out in the overview of the ESS is the proliferation of WMDs. There is a fact sheet from the European Union, a pro forma of what the EU should set out to do in terms of facing up to the threat of WMDs—this was in 2004. I first of all feel it is probably a bit ambitious for the structures within the EU that we are talking about to actually tackle the issue of rogue states or whatever using WMDs as an international threat, but that is my view and I would like to hear from the witnesses as to what has been achieved in the last four years with regard specifically to the ESS being able to address and progress the ambitions that are set out here in dealing with this as a key threat to the EU.

Mr Witney: Proliferation is a difficult subject to deal with on an essentially inter-governmental basis, where, as Graham has just described, the intelligence is contributed by Member States according to what they feel comfortable contributing. In the area of proliferation of course intelligence is critically important and I imagine that it is rather difficult for Member States to provide their best assessments and consequently rather difficult for the EU collectively to form particularly up to date or incisive views on the proliferation threat. The obvious area where the EU has been engaged is with Iran and the not definitively successful, if I can express it that way, dialogue that Mr Solana has been having with the Iranians.

Q56 Lord Chidgey: Was that not the initiative of Germany, France and the UK?

Mr Witney: They are the particular partners in that enterprise but it now has the weight of the EU behind it. Of course it seems that Iran carries on enriching uranium, which is scarcely a measure of success, but on the other hand they have not been bombed, which I suppose is another measure of the success of the policy, a more positive measure. It is an intractable problem, proliferation, but I do not think the EU is particularly well-placed to deal with it except at second hand by trying, as per the strategy, to see what it can do to enforce the broader sense of the rules-governed world and the rule of law and deal with instabilities and regional conflict where they arise.

Lord Chidgey: Particularly on WMD there is a set of actions that have been set forth as a framework for the EU WMD strategy 2004. I was just interested to know whether there is some assessment of the progress that has been made with the actions that were set out there in 2004 at the US/EU summit in Dublin in 2004.

Chairman: Lord Chidgey, this is probably something we could pursue more usefully when we are in Brussels with EU officials. General Whiting would have left the organisation by the time that went through and Mr Witney’s responsibilities in EDA were not directly related to it; it might be easier to take this up there.

Lord Chidgey: Just one final small point. I would just like to make a distinction between the work that was done by our Foreign Secretary in Teheran with our colleagues in Germany and France as an initiative to try and make some progress with the Iranians. I do not think we really should see the ESS absorbing that as part of its achievement, because it was not. I happened to be in Teheran at the time when Jack Straw arrived and one has to be careful about what one assumes has been achieved when it has not been achieved and then recognise what has to be done.

Q57 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Returning to the question of sharing intelligence, is it not true that the nations contributing the intelligence have to basically work to the lowest common denominator in that you have to think of the roughest and most unreliable member of the EU, as to what they will do with that intelligence, before you contribute it. You say that this intelligence is sensitive; I just wonder how sensitive it is at all. I suspect that sensitive information is switched between the intelligence communities in each country, probably on a bipartisan basis, so the real intelligence is not actually going through the EU at all.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Certainly during my time as a practitioner it was much easier working with 15 than I suspect it is for my successors working with 27.

Q58 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I would imagine that is so.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Having said that, there was and is a multi-layering to it, so there were things for example that Member States would agree to release to key decision-makers within the EU machinery that might not necessarily go out in a report to the 27 to inform their negotiations or the actions they were taking, demarches they were making, in overseas countries. There was and is, therefore, a sort of layering system which the UK as well as other countries, as well as France, were actively involved in setting up.

Mr Witney: Perhaps I could just add a footnote. It is also worth recording that intelligence and particularly secret intelligence of the kind you are referring to is only a means to an end and the end is to have a decently robust assessment which can be shared, particularly the business of sending it out
again, using it to inform 27 Member States. Many of the new Member States have not traditionally been particularly closely interested or involved with distant parts of the world, so I do not know how well informed the Poles were on Chad before they took part in the Chad operation. To provide assessments with the necessary degree of robustness to inform that sort of debate—open source intelligence is increasingly widely used actually.

**Chairman:** We did have a meeting when we were in Brussels on the last occasion with Mr Shapcott and we had a very interesting discussion with him, really coming to the conclusion that you really do need to have among Member States common analysis if you are going to get common reactions, and you will not have common action unless you have common reaction, so this is all the preparation of the process for decision-making. I have the feeling that OSINT has been a rather useful development over recent years.

**Lord Anderson of Swansea:** I would share that.

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** Does that not beg the question of common politics and a common policy over different issues of foreign policy? It was not entirely straightforward sharing intelligence even at 15.

**Lord Hamilton of Epsom:** It certainly was not.

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** This sounds, if I may say, terrific in theory, but for those of us who have had to practise it and control to a degree the intelligence passing, even between close allies, I cannot help agreeing with a lot of the analysis that Lord Hamilton made, that actually this becomes so bland in what one is prepared to share in the end that the effort involved sometimes does not seem worth the candle. That is a very bleak view, but it is one borne of experience.

**Lord Hannay of Chiswick:** In contrast to that I just want to pick up what Mr Witney said, which I believe to be correct, that a higher and higher proportion of the input to making analyses and risk assessments is open source now and that is, of course, entirely available and depends only on the resources that Brussels has to absorb it, to analyse it and work it, so I do think that is a pretty important point. The other one which you also commented on is if you wish to get common action out of 27 countries on a matter on which an understanding of the underlying threat is absolutely critical, then of course withholding intelligence is one way to not get it.

**Chairman:** We ought to revert to questioning mode.

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** My Lord Chairman, there is the opportunity for an internal discussion amongst members of the Committee about this. I always see Lord Hannay’s brilliant breadth of knowledge; military intelligence however is a very different matter from human intelligence.

**Chairman:** With respect to the Committee, our witnesses are only with us for another 45 minutes and we can have these discussions on another occasion, so if we can revert to the questioning mode it would be useful.

**Q59 Lord Jones:** Looking at General Whiting’s distinguished CV, in the context of the strategy and following on Lord Hamilton’s references to intelligence, how do you establish a rating in terms of human intelligence as opposed to signal, which is the most valuable have you found?

**Major-General Messervy-Whiting:** In general they each have their particular merits depending on the situation that you are trying to address; in some cases human intelligence might be more valuable and more available, in other cases where it is difficult to penetrate a particular area or target technical intelligence might be more useful than human intelligence. I would agree with the thrust of the comments made that open source intelligence is becoming more and more interesting.

**Q60 Lord Chidgey:** This is bringing us back to the growth if you like, the development, of the ESS. For the record, thinking now in terms of the ESS being adopted in 2003, at a time when the European Security Defence Policy was only just getting off the ground, could the witnesses tell us do they think the strategy should be revised to take into account specifically the experience gained since then and the types of crisis management operations that the EU has conducted in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Africa, in the Middle East and in Asia? I realise we have already talked about the fact that there were operations in those various theatres but I am specifically interested in the lessons that can be learned, the developments that can be made in the strategy updating, modernising and recognising the fact that it is 27 nations not 15 and so on.

**Major-General Messervy-Whiting:** The update will have to take account of lessons learnt from operations on the ground. The EU does have a lessons learnt process in the same way as NATO has a lessons learnt process from operations and, I believe, so does the UN. To what extent there is going to be anything particularly useful that will go back into the strategy from that I am not sure, because from what I have seen of the lessons learnt so far they tend to be things that are pretty obvious and I do not think there have been any big surprises to practitioners there. Most of the messages about the need for better co-ordination, the need for a better capacity for advanced planning, the need for Member States to act where there is an agreement to act more quickly are already tagged in the strategy.

**Q61 Lord Chidgey:** Is there anything specific? You have mentioned that there is a process, General, obviously as one would expect, of reviewing what has happened, but again we are talking about a five-year
timescale and quite a lot of investment in materials, human resources and so forth in these various actions by the EU. We are looking for something robust that has come from this to almost underline the importance and effectiveness of the strategy and I am rather hoping to have that confirmed so we can say, yes, this is really working so well. It is all a bit down-key at the moment.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Quietly optimistic perhaps rather than down-key. I do not think there have been any huge surprises, is what I was trying to say. There are lots of specific things that have come out in terms of the operations with recourse to maintain our assets and capabilities; there is a general feeling now both within the European Union and within NATO that Berlin Plus perhaps is a bit old, a bit archaic for what needs to be done between the two organisations and can actually be a bit of a hindrance in working with organisations nowadays and there is a need to move on beyond Berlin Plus. In each and every (however many it is) completed operations to date—there are things like that that come out of it, but I am not sure how much of that needs to be folded back into a document that might remain that size.

Mr Witney: In terms of encapsulating the lessons of five years of operational experience for the EU, plus many other crisis management operations under other flags, there is a case for the more self-conscious formulation of a doctrine of stabilisation and how you deal with crises, failing states and so on, but I am not sure that that would belong in this document. If I might just pick up the point about lessons learnt in my view the EU is very bad at learning lessons—perhaps rather than down-key, I do not think there have been any huge surprises, is what I was trying to say. There are lots of specific things that have come out in terms of the operations with recourse to maintain our assets and capabilities; there is a general feeling now both within the European Union and within NATO that Berlin Plus perhaps is a bit old, a bit archaic for what needs to be done between the two organisations and can actually be a bit of a hindrance in working with organisations nowadays and there is a need to move on beyond Berlin Plus. In each and every (however many it is) completed operations to date—there are things like that that come out of it, but I am not sure how much of that needs to be folded back into a document that might remain that size.

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starvation, but that actually gets almost nobody anywhere. All that is actually useful is to say we had a challenge in Chad, this is how we handled it and this is where we got it incredibly wrong and we should learn some lessons from it. Is there really anything useful beyond that that we can do?

Mr Witney: I do feel that the tendency towards corporate amnesia is one of several ways actually in which the ESDP needs to become more systematic and more professional in its approach to the operations it runs.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Just briefly, as Nick hinted there tends to be a two-level lessons learnt process, as indeed with NATO. That is, there is the top-level process which is signed up to by all the Member States politically, which tends to be fairly bland, because no one wants to admit that everything has not gone correctly, and there is the practitioners lessons-learnt list which is more akin to what you were saying about the British Army and learning over time. For each and every step in a deployment process there is an underpinning, what the EU calls a military concept document; those do get amended and lessons are fed back from the practitioner point of view with those.

Q66 Lord Swinfen: The European Security Strategy calls on the EU to be “more active, more capable and more coherent”. What in fact does this mean in practice and how could the improvements be made? Will the Lisbon Treaty lead to greater coherence between the nations or not?

Mr Witney: Yes, that is indeed the heart of it, these three words active, capable and coherent and at the moment there is no doubt that the ESDP endeavour is falling short on all three heads. Part of activity, as I read this document, was to be prepared to get in there early and so far the record has been that we are not; we arrive really very late in the day, it is all emergency room stuff rather than preventative medicine on the whole, and the time it takes simply to set up operations, to get people to put their hands up and say “Yes, we will contribute” is often embarrassingly protracted. Twenty operations is quite a lot but it is a reverse Berlin Plus arrangement so that the EU can lend its civil capabilities to NATO. The famous catalogues talk of 5000 policemen and there are about 1500 earmarked for Kosovo and a couple of hundred finding their way slowly into Afghanistan, maybe a couple of hundred more, which in practice drains the reservoir. So support might be hypothetically available, but on the day it is far too often not. In terms of coherence, when we conduct military operations run from one of seven possible alternative locations across Europe and civil operations run from an entirely different place within Brussels you find at the very heart of direction of interventions complete separation between civil and military, so we are not very coherent in that way. Of course there is then the fundamental problem that you mentioned at the end there, that the Lisbon Treaty does seem to address—which is to try to ensure that it is not just the combined efforts of Member States in terms of the military and the diplomatic side but also that the aid and trade policies march more coherently in step, which is something that, God willing, the Lisbon Treaty will improve.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Briefly, the Chatham House workshop in March 2006 did try to look at the 15 ESDP deployments to date and fit them into the boxes of more active, more capable and more coherent, and it was able to produce one to illustrate each of those boxes. Whether that actually means that a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention is a great deal nearer than it was in 2003 I am not so sure, but that is all part of the long term construction anyway and is unlikely to show short term gains. The most difficult bit is the “more coherent” bit, that is the toughest nut; even with the Lisbon Treaty, actually getting the various bits of the Brussels machinery to in their heart of hearts work together efficiently, singing off the same hymn sheet, is the toughest nut of all, even though the Lisbon Treaty will give them the framework with which to do that.

Q67 Lord Swinfen: Do you have a timescale for long term?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: If one is talking about changing mindset and strategic culture it is going to be something that will have to draw on training and education of young people, whether they are bureaucrats or—

Q68 Lord Swinfen: Are you talking about a generation?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I am talking about a generation.

Q69 Lord Swinfen: At least.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I would hope to see some results at the end of a generation.

Q70 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could I just take up this point about the civilian capability which you have referred to as also being a fairly shallow pond. Presumably the problem is that in order to be able to deploy civilian capability in Afghanistan or in Chad
or wherever it may be countries have to have a surplus over what they need to conduct their national responsibilities in policing, judges, civil servants or whatever it is, but that is not something that they naturally have, unlike the military who by definition have a deployable surplus, even if it is not a very big one. Unless Member States are prepared to recognise that the pond will remain shallow presumably and per contrary they do recognise it, the pond could be quite considerable but then they would have to carry excess capability on their books.

Mr Witney: There is a third way, which is the idea of a civilian reserve corps, as indeed the Prime Minister advocated in his recent speech in America in the context of the UN. But it could be more easily and effectively done closer to home in an EU context.

Q71 Lord Anderson of Swansea: There could be a fourth way in terms of the recently retired, because police officers who have recently retired have a range of expertise which can be used overseas.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: Absolutely.

Chairman: We will be looking at the papers later on about a letter from the minister talking about a proposal to double the size of the EU police mission in Afghanistan, and at the moment it only is half the strength it should be, let alone what it is going to be when it is doubled, so it does demonstrate very clearly the real difficulty of deploying in that sort of area. Lord Swinfen.

Lord Swinfen: Just as a matter of interest what countries in the EU currently have a surplus of deployable military personnel?

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Presumably all the people who have battle groups.

Lord Swinfen: But they are normally doing other jobs.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Our battle groups are.

Q72 Chairman: Can we ask our witnesses to answer, please?

Mr Witney: If I may, I think there are some countries which probably do have a surplus of deployable military capability—the Spanish, for example, have Armed Forces well into six figures and have an explicit cap of 3,000 on the numbers that they are prepared to deploy at any time.

Q73 Lord Swinfen: Are they well-trained?

Mr Witney: That is absolutely the issue, is it not? We have nearly two million men and women in uniform in Europe and yet by the Member States’ own calculations only some 30 per cent of land forces are trained or equipped to act outside national territory, 70 per cent of land forces are not fit for deployment outside national territory which does raise the question of what on earth they are for. Across Europe we just have not restructured away from the Cold War to meet the sort of activities that we are all saying we should be preparing to meet.

Q74 Lord Swinfen: Is it not really just pie in the sky then?

Mr Witney: One just has to plug away at pointing out the difference between what people say they are going to do and what they actually then do when the next annual set of decisions comes up as to how they are going to spend their defence budgets.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: On the non-military side some countries do have deployable police and legal assets—I am thinking particularly of those with a gendarmerie type of force and overseas territories or dominions still as opposed to the British police model. As I understand it, even in the British police forces there are designated forces which do have pools of officers who are available and in some cases on standby to go overseas, not least of which are in relation to our own remaining dependent territories.

Q75 Lord Selkirk of Douglas: I wish to ask a question about capabilities. You have in large measure answered the first aspect of it which I wish to raise, which is whether there is the right mix of civilian and military capabilities at disposal and the necessary flexibility to apply them. The second aspect related to capabilities is whether the strategy should contain stronger or more precise references to such capabilities, or whether you feel a level of generality is preferable, and the third aspect is whether the EU has adequate capabilities to deal with large scale natural disasters and emergencies outside the EU as in the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and whether such capabilities should be strengthened.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: If I may take the last one first—and it leads on from our previous discussion—I am not sure that the EU certainly in the short term would wish to do more than contribute to the international effort to deal with such large scale natural disasters. The EU in that sort of situation would always want to do something in support of the United Nations or, if a regional organisation was taking the lead, ASEAN or whoever in support of ASEAN, as indeed it did in the Aceh monitoring mission on disarmament and demobilisation. In those sorts of situations it is going to have to be an international effort to which the EU contributes in the best way that it can, and the best way might be diplomatic or financial or reconstruction and not necessarily an ESDP operation.

Q76 Chairman: On the earlier questions do you think it would be useful for there to be rather more explicit reference to capabilities in the revision of the strategy?
Major-General Messervy-Whiting: In terms of the mix of civilian and military capabilities the strategy touches on that quite adequately at the moment, but it certainly would do no harm. I referred to it as being the toughest nut to crack to get the military and the civilian, the Commission and the Council, and all the various bits working together efficiently. It would do no harm to really pound the fist on that particular point.

Mr Witney: In the area of capabilities in the five years since this document was produced there has been quite a lot of work one level down at, if you like, defining what capabilities are needed, and the story is in fact identical with the story that you hear in the other side of Brussels at NATO about what it is that constitutes deployable, available and effective expeditionary forces. Roughly speaking I would say there is no shortage of analysis, in fact there is a surplus of analysis, an almost interminable analysis about what should be done and the deficiencies. I quoted the example of helicopters before—the arrival at a point of critical mass of impatience for people to say let us actually seriously tackle this and see if we can do something about it. I have an instinctive feeling, without being an expert on the subject at all, that we ought to be doing more on the humanitarian side. I do not know whether it would be useful or helpful for the EU to common-fund and pre-stock materials. I was quite interested at one stage in the concept of fast ships—it always seems to me a bit ridiculous that our naval inventories contain things that can only move at 25 to 30 knots when technology allows you to move things over transoceanic distances at twice that speed if you pay for it—it is rather a specific point but it is something that I feel would be worth some attention in the EU.

Q77 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Gentlemen, at the level of the analysis of threats there would probably be a reasonable consensus among the planners in the Kremlin and in Washington if one were writing just a general document on global threats; the problem I guess is implementation in part but also when the EU strategy cannot be done within the confines of the EU it surely will need to be or should be co-ordinated with what the planners in Washington are saying and equally with what the planners in NATO are saying and, to a lesser extent, what the planners in the Kremlin are saying. We know for example on the helicopter case you cited that we are now in discussion with the Russians about surplus helicopters in Ukraine and so on. My question is to what extent in the formulation of this new strategy there should be, in your judgment, increased co-ordination between people in other areas? If one looks at circles the closest circle would be Washington and NATO and even more widely afield in terms of the planners in the Kremlin and elsewhere, those countries which have strategic partnerships with the EU.

Mr Witney: That is exactly right and as I read this document it is one of the aspects of coherence—the coherent word is not just a plea for an end of institutional turf warfare in Brussels, it is a plea for the Member States to work more closely together, it acknowledges the need to work more effectively with partners in other multinational institutions and other centres of power as you describe. Dialogue with NATO has its well-known problems at the moment but probably one of the successes of the ESDP in the last five years has been increasingly close and productive involvement with the UN. An area where the EU needs to beef up its dialogue very substantially is its direct dialogue with Washington—that will come—and the Kremlin.

Q78 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: What you have both said about this document which is now being reviewed puts a lot of emphasis on the fact that it is short and clear and readable and that indeed it is more a kind of public policy statement than it is a guide to individual policy-making in individual crises. Does it not therefore seem a little odd—but perhaps you could comment on this—that it has so low a public profile, that nobody seems to know about its existence and that the institutions of the European Union do not seem to have taken much trouble to popularise it or to socialise it—to use that ghastly NGO phrase—and yet that is surely what it ought to be ideal for. Would you have any suggestions, if you agree that that is a weakness, about how a reviewed strategy could be better promulgated?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: A lot of this comes down to the extent to which Member States are willing to push an EU product and that will vary between Member States. I really do not have a feel, for example, as to what extent this is known to the average citizen in France but I would not suspect it is a topic of discussion in the local bistro in Marseilles, but I am not sure that it should be however. This is an area where the Lisbon Treaty hopefully—if and when ratified—should be helpful because at the moment there is a Commission representative in London with outposts in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, and the poor chap’s job is to try and sell this but it is not actually at the top of his priority list, I think fishing at the moment is at the top of his today’s priority list, but when that becomes the European Union External Action Service representative in London, maybe issues from Pillar 2 will be nearer the top of the list than the Pillar 1 issues that are there.

Q79 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: You do not think that the Member State governments have any responsibility there at all?
Major-General Messervy-Whiting: I do actually but it would be nice if the EU representative in each capital, if this were to happen, would be able to occasionally remind officials in foreign offices that this was there and needed a bit more visibility perhaps.

Mr Witney: The advantage of the bureaucratic coup that was effected in order to produce this document in the first place is that you get something which is such a good document; the disadvantage is that nobody takes ownership of it and ESDP is nothing if it is not the possession of the Member States, it is an inter-governmental exercise. My beef about this is that you have got a great document which people do not actually follow, because vast swathes of European opinion do not believe it, they do not think we should be being more active, they do not think that the frontline against terrorism is on the Hindu Kush, they think terrorism is best combated from underneath the duvet. There is a whole process that never happened with this in terms of taking this out to national parliaments, to opinion-formers, to try to make the case for more active, coherent and capable European policies. In some ways, therefore, I regret that it looks as though the revision is going to be an inside-the-Brussels-ring-road stitch-up again, but at least there will be a document which is new and I very much hope that in 2009 governments will find their voice to advocate it and present it. It should be debated in all national parliaments it seems to me; the last one was debated by the Finns and that was about it.

Chairman: Particularly in view of Mr Solana’s meeting with the Parliament yesterday.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: He opened the plenary session at three o’clock yesterday afternoon and this—or at least common foreign and security policy, including the European Security and Defence policy—was top of the agenda. Two European Parliament rapporteurs had produced reports which were considered by the plenary session essentially relating to the European Security Strategy. Solana, as I understand it, is not only going to talk about this and take the temperature with heads of state and government next week, on 18/19 June, but is also under remit to discuss where he has got with it in the informal foreign ministers’ meeting this autumn, I think in September. I believe there will be this time a much greater transparency process with not only Member States but also with Parliament and that process has started.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: That might partially solve the ownership and policy problem which Lord Hannay mentioned.

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: It might do but I think Member States feel that they own something if it has been tabled as a document in one of the formations of the European Council and is looked at by ambassadors and is looked at by ministers and is signed up to as a Council document. That gives Member States a real feeling of ownership and I am not sure that this document will necessarily go down that route. One reason why there was this sleight of hand with this document—a precedent within the EU—was the production of their crisis management procedures, which started off as an in-house secretariat document as to how the internal machinery in the EU Council should deal with a crisis. It was not meant to be a comprehensive bible, it was meant to be a guideline, a thing you referred to—have we ticked all the boxes in addressing this crisis. But Member States insisted on taking ownership of that and to an extent it was a good thing that they did, but it led to an interminable drafting process and something that ended up being a great number of pages long as opposed to a practitioner’s guide.

Chairman: At least you have seen that in one of the parliaments or Member States a certain amount of attention is being paid to it. Lord Hamilton has a final question.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: The normal culture of Brussels is transparency which obviously poses problems for intelligence as you have mentioned, and you have talked of the bureaucratic coup in the formulation of the last document. To what extent in your judgment should the European Parliament be involved, what are the processes available for an input from the parliamentarians in Brussels?

Chairman: Is this not the dilemma: you either have the classic definition of a camel as a horse developed by a committee—which is what I suspect you would have if it were developed in a more normal Council process—or you have something elegant designed by a very limited number of people, but which other people do not share ownership of. How do we solve that problem?

Mr Witney: I am not even sure, My Lord Chairman, that having it worked on for four months through the Brussels committee process would help. It is not what happens within the Brussels ring road that matters at all in this case, it is whether in 27 national capitals the people who take the key decisions about how defence budgets are spent and foreign policies set believe this sufficiently to have it influence the way they implement their national policies.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Can I move slightly away from this document and the realities on the ground and go back to hard power. What it really comes down to, it seems to me, is that these are national decisions taken by individual governments within the EU and that really depends on the political will to actually risk the lives of your troops. What I want to know is whether anything is really going to
change. There is this great pacifist tradition or anti-military tradition in Germany, for instance, where there seem to be quite large numbers of troops who could be deployed although things have changed there a bit. I remember in the late Eighties or early-Nineties an admiral called Velascom (?) who was the chief of defence staff came over, and I remember him saying quite specifically that there could be no question of Germans being deployed to the Balkans because the history of Germany in the Balkans was so absolutely horrific that it would be completely unacceptable. The Germans now are in the Balkans, so things are changing in some areas a bit. It seems to be going rather backwards with the French, they used to very gung-ho about charging off into places and doing things but they seem to be more reluctant now to risk the lives of their troops. I can never quite understand what the French Foreign Legion is doing—they are always painted as being extraordinarily gung-ho, dying to get into action all the time, so where are all of them? What is going to happen with other European countries? What I wanted your personal opinion on is where is all this going, are we seeing a Europe that is going to get increasingly pacifist, more and more reluctant to risk the lives of their troops, or do you see any signs that it might go in another direction?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: The real hard-power decisions will always be taken by Member States and national parliaments—I hope they are, as an old soldier. Having said that, I would be slightly more upbeat; I do not think the EU is going backwards on the European Security and Defence Policy although the French perhaps have a particular problem at the moment in terms of restructuring resources and over-commitment in the same sort of way as we British have. I do see the EU doing more and more of these operations along these lines, provided the troops are there to do them. At the end of the day if we are in Afghanistan and others are in Iraq and those sorts of commitments stay, there is not going to be an awful lot that we the Brits are going to be able to contribute.

Q85 Chairman: Can I ask Mr Witney if he would like to comment before calling Lord Selkirk.

Mr Witney: It is a little hard to predict really. The latest enlargement of the Union has probably been helpful; the Poles are thoroughly determined to establish this and the Estonians are surprisingly stepping forward in a positive role. As for the French, they have their money problems but the 2006 intervention in Congo would not have happened without the French making it happen and Chad would not have happened without the French making it happen. Even the Germans have actually come a long way and they have over 10,000 troops deployed at the moment. That is only a relatively small proportion of their very large Armed Forces and there are lots of caveats but how it goes—I just come back to this thing of whether publics can be convinced that this is the sort of thing that they want to be behind, whether they feel a sense of pride at their guys going out there and doing these jobs or whether, as for example I am afraid is the case with Afghanistan, far too many European publics think that this is some ghastly American global war on terror mistake that Europeans are now being leant on to bail the Americans out of. I do not share that view, but that is how a lot of people in Europe see Afghanistan. At the end of the day it is all to do with how these things are perceived politically, whether the political will is there.

Q86 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Do you think that would change if there was a terrorist outrage in a German city, killing very large numbers of civilians walking along the street?

Mr Witney: I do not know Germany well enough.

Q87 Lord Selkirk of Douglas: Can I ask the General a question: why do you perceive the French to be totally over-committed as far as providing military resources is concerned?

Major-General Messervy-Whiting: It is not so much over-committed in the same way as we the Brits are but, as Nick mentioned, they have got resource problems at the moment, budgetary problems perhaps even worse than ours.

Chairman: Gentlemen, can I thank you both very much indeed for coming and talking to us. It has been a further important part of our education on this subject and we are taking more evidence next week and the week after—we are seeing Francois Heisbourg the week after next, just after the French White Paper has been published, so it will perhaps be an appropriate moment to raise some of these points with him, and then we will be going to Brussels where we will obviously be seeing some of your successors. Could I thank you very much indeed, we have very much appreciated your coming and the evidence that you have given to us.
THURSDAY 12 JUNE 2008

Present

Anderson of Swansea, L
Chidgey, L
Crickhowell, L
Hamilton of Epsom, L
Hannay of Chiswick, L

Roper, L (Chairman)
Selkirk of Douglas, L
Truscott, L

Lord Hylton

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Professor Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics, and Dr Bastian Giegerich, International Institute for Strategic Studies, examined.

Q88 Chairman: Professor Kaldor and Dr Giegerich, we are very pleased to see you. As you know, the European Union is in the process of reviewing the European Security Strategy and Dr Solana is going to produce a further version of it. He is going to speak about it at the European Council next week and then bring his document forward at a meeting in December. We thought it would be interesting and important to have a relatively short inquiry, taking some evidence here in London and also going and talking to people in Brussels, and then try to produce a report which could be of value, which we can feed into the discussions. I do not know whether either of you would like to make a short opening statement, otherwise we will move straight to questions.

Professor Kaldor: I am happy to do either. I can make my opening statement in the form of an answer to a question.

Professor Kaldor: Actually, I think the strategy is pretty good and I think it should stand as a statement to which all the Member States have agreed to. Of course, if we were writing it today, we might put more emphasis on climate change, for example, but I think the strategy is about addressing the traditional domain of security. By that I do not mean external threats; what I mean is situations of violence, various forms of violence. I think that is what the ESDP is about, and I think it is pretty good. What I would like to see is much more emphasis on implementation and I also think it will be very important in a way to find a way to popularise it, because I think that the European Security Strategy is different from a national security strategy. The European Union is a different kind of animal from a state in the making. It is not a state in the making, nor is it a classic intergovernmental organisation. It is a new kind of regional institution and I think it has a responsibility to make a real contribution to global security. That is really what the European Security Strategy is saying. The job of the European Union is to contribute to global security, and that is different from a classic national security strategy. I use the term—and I know that question is coming—“human security” because I think it is an easy way to make it clear to people that what Europe does, which is sometimes called the Petersberg tasks or contribution to crisis management, is very different from what a classic nation state does. I think that would be rather popular because it would make it clear to people that Europe is not a new militarised super-state in the making but rather it is an attempt to strengthen the multilateral system in which we live.

Q89 Chairman: In that case, what I suggest is we will probably ask a question initially as to one or the other, and the other witness, if he or she wishes to add anything, obviously is free to do so. Can I start by asking you, Professor Kaldor, the first question: do you feel that the strategy provides a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the global challenges, threats and risks facing the European Union? Are there some things that you feel are missing from the existing strategy which ought to be included in the revised version?

Professor Kaldor: Actually, I think the strategy is pretty good and I think it should stand as a statement to which all the Member States have agreed to. Of course, if we were writing it today, we might put more emphasis on climate change, for example, but I think the strategy is about addressing the traditional domain of security. By that I do not mean external threats; what I mean is situations of violence, various forms of violence. I think that is what the ESDP is about, and I think it is pretty good. What I would like to see is much more emphasis on implementation and I also think it will be very important in a way to find a way to popularise it, because I think that the European Security Strategy is different from a national security strategy. The European Union is a different kind of animal from a state in the making. It is not a state in the making, nor is it a classic intergovernmental organisation. It is a new kind of regional institution and I think it has a responsibility to make a real contribution to global security. That is really what the European Security Strategy is saying. The job of the European Union is to contribute to global security, and that is different from a classic national security strategy. I use the term—and I know that question is coming—“human security” because I think it is an easy way to make it clear to people that what Europe does, which is sometimes called the Petersberg tasks or contribution to crisis management, is very different from what a classic nation state does. I think that would be rather popular because it would make it clear to people that Europe is not a new militarised super-state in the making but rather it is an attempt to strengthen the multilateral system in which we live.

Q90 Chairman: Dr Giegerich, do you have anything to say in response to that question?

Dr Giegerich: Thank you, Chairman. In essence, I agree with the assessment Professor Kaldor has just laid out. The most important aspect of the threat assessment that the ESS presents is that it describes a continuum of connected threats that one cannot deal with in isolation. That not only represents a consensual position but also one that remains valid. It is therefore a good idea to maintain a focus on these key threats that are pointed out rather than produce a laundry list of other issues, not least to preserve consensus. I would also agree with the point about implementation, which is also reflected in the mandate which was given to Javier Solana. If you look at the text, it very clearly speaks about a review of the implementation and perhaps complementary elements but it does not speak of a full revision of the document, and I think that is indeed unnecessary. Looking at implementation is in fact much more important than tinkering with the text as such. We also have to realise that the ESS, the European Security Strategy actually lays out or puts forward a
fairly ambitious agenda—maybe we will look at that later—and one might have to think about how one institutionalises a review process for implementation. I assume that is something we will touch on later.

**Q91 Lord Anderson of Swansea:** Congratulations to you both. You appear to have answered all our questions in your first two replies! Can I go back to basics and ask you both what you think is the real purpose of such an assessment, and to whom it should be directed? Is it just to the bureaucrats who, rather like “The buck stops here”, should have on their desk the strategy? In your judgement, how flexible should it be? What should be the means of adapting, modifying, it in response to changes in the external environment?

**Professor Kaldor:** I think it is very clear for whom, which is for the Member States and European civil society. I think quite a lot is happening in a bureaucratic sense. It is amazing when you look at the ESDP how many questions there are, how far the ESDP has developed over the last five years, but there is not a big amount of commitment on the part of Member States. I think also there is not at all a public commitment. What happens is that the ESDP is really not visible, and it is not presented in a way that is popular, even though people do have deep concerns about what is happening in the Congo, what is happening in Aceh, about natural disasters. I feel all of that is terribly important. When you say how it could be adapted, I am not sure. Neither of us really think the actual text needs much adaptation. What is needed is a greater commitment on the part of Member States. What I do think is needed—again, repeating what I have said—is a greater popularisation and a greater emphasis on making more visible, making more coherent, increasing public support for what the ESDP does.

**Q92 Lord Anderson of Swansea:** In your judgement, can it ever be popular in the sense that relatively small commitments to important but distant parts of the world are never going to be popular?

**Professor Kaldor:** I am not completely sure about that, for two reasons. One is that these distant parts of the world do affect us here.

**Q93 Lord Anderson of Swansea:** Indeed. You have convinced us but how do you get through to a wider audience?

**Professor Kaldor:** I actually think this is a lot more serious. It is not just a tiny commitment. That is really the basic problem of the ESDP: it is that I think in the world today we face a really serious security gap. There are a whole series of new types of threats which are asymmetric, which involve terrorism, which involve fragile states, which are very different from what we are accustomed to thinking of as security, yet most of our security capabilities are organised around meeting an external threat. We have in Europe 1.8 million people under arms and only about 10 per cent are capable of being deployed into crisis zones. I think with climate change, with the kind of pressures we are going to see over the next few years—and I am now jumping questions, I am afraid—that is going to express itself not in a new kind of cold war or a new kind of competition, arms races between nation states. It is going to express itself in more of the kind of Darfur, even Afghanistan/Iraq, on-the-ground type crisis, and we simply do not have the capabilities to meet that. So I think it is much bigger than people realise.
well. I do not see a solution to that, other than a continued attempt at explaining why these operations, these problems, have a direct and larger impact than is commonly perceived. That is actually a challenge for political leadership that we can witness across Europe.

Q95 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Professor Kaldor made the point about asymmetric warfare, which clearly is the threat. People may not recognise it but our problem today is not that our country is going to be invaded but that somebody is going to blow us to smithereens on the streets of our cities. When—and I think it is a question of when—this happens, and you have very serious death tolls, is this going to change this equation? I totally accept your view that at the moment we do not feel threatened, we do not feel there is a problem, but surely we are going to take a different view if there is a serious outrage in some European city which kills a very large number of people.

Dr Giegerich: Yes, and it is a sad thing in a way that one has to learn from experiences like that but clearly there will be an impact, but I think on a larger scale perhaps it is just difficult to see how even these key threats that are mentioned in the European Security Strategy amount to anything that we would refer to as a strategic or existential threat. Not to be too cynical, a successful terrorist attack every couple of years in a European country is not threatening the existence of our societies. I am not saying that is an acceptable price to be paid. I am not saying that at all and I do not want to be misunderstood on that point, but it does not amount to an existential threat. I would argue, now. Of course, you could point to the link between two things that are mentioned in the European Security Strategy, namely terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is referred to as more or less the ultimate nightmare in the strategy, and I think that is probably a situation where you would have both capability and intent for massive destruction and the killing of as many people as possible, which is the only scenario in those that underpin this problem, I think.

Professor Kaldor: I would just say I am not sure that I do think it is not necessarily an existential threat, but my emphasis would be the same probably, that it is all about the means you use in dealing with this. That is why it is so serious actually, because I do think that we face a lot of problems—we are going to discuss them—fragile states, regional conflicts, all getting entangled and interrelated with each other, and I do think they have serious consequences for us and we have to take them seriously. I would like again to emphasise that I think using the term “human security”, which means protecting individuals on the ground and using the instruments of law rather than the classic instruments of war is terribly important in this respect, both to help people understand what it is all about and to make it clear what the European Union policy is. Essentially, I think what needs to happen is, as it were, to turn the inside of our societies outwards, which has always been the European Union method. The European Union has been a brilliant peace project after the Second World War, the methods of integration, the ways of stopping societies going to war with each other. What makes European Union external policy different from a classic foreign policy is precisely that it is extending those methods outwards, trying to extend the zone of peace, if you like. That is exactly what is meant by a human security strategy, and I feel if we could get the story right, we would have a better chance of mobilising people to support it and to make a greater commitment to implementation.

Q96 Chairman: Could I ask one supplementary to Dr Giegerich, who said that in Brussels, wherever you went in the European institutions, the strategy was very present. You also in terms of your earlier research visited Berlin, Vienna, and you also had discussions with people in London. In which, if any, of those three countries did you feel there was much consciousness of the security strategy among the people you talked to who were dealing with its content?

Dr Giegerich: Clearly, in Germany, for example, it is a visible document if you look at national government security policy documents. If you look at the German White Book from 2006, for example, you will see a threat assessment that essentially follows the logic of the European Security Strategy and there is also explicit reference to these documents. In that discourse it is very present. If you look at the draft national security strategy that the Christian Democratic party in Parliament published in Germany about a month ago you will see exactly the same. In my conversations with the people who drafted it they were very open in their acknowledgement, as in “This is exactly what we’re trying to do. We accept the European Security Strategy as the reference point. It is a frame of reference and therefore it structures what we do now on the national level.” In that setting it is clearly very visible. I would say in Austria one can also see that if one looks at their defence reform documents, for example, which came out between 2004 and 2005. I think however there is then still a disconnect between that level, the policymaker level, and what one might refer to as the security policy establishment and public opinion, the public at large, where clearly there is a much lower perception also in those countries of its content and its importance.

Q97 Chairman: What about as an external observer of London?
Dr Giegerich: I was trying to avoid that! My general comment on that would be that it is not just the European Security Strategy but a lot of things that are related to the ESDP. In London in my conversations the problem that I always see—and it has been for years now, over time—is that the government here has failed to engage in a discourse that explains why these things are necessary, why they are beneficial, why there is utility in doing them on the European level. The discourse here to me seems to be rather defensive, as in “Why does it not undermine NATO?”; all the things that it is not, rather than explaining why these things might be useful and helpful to British security policy. I think that also goes for the European Security Strategy.

Q98 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I just wanted to follow up on what you said and ask you whether you felt that the European Union had a role to play in this review of the European Security Strategy and in its ongoing policy formulation in trying to identify ways of moving forward with the concept of responsibility to protect, which is at the moment just words on paper, and which the whole international community, not just the EU, have signal failed to find practical means of giving effect to, in Darfur, for example, and certainly, in my opinion, some of the ministers in the EU set off down the wrong road. Mr Kouchner in particular, in the context of Cyclone Nargis, trying to suggest straight away that this was a case of responsibility to protect, which I do not actually think it really was. That is not to say the issue of responsibility to protect does not arise in Burma, but not in the Irrawaddy Delta two days after a massive cyclone. Could you say whether you think the European Union could play a role or that its reviewed security strategy could identify ways in which the international community could be made more capable of giving effect to what it signed up to in 2005?

Professor Kaldor: For me, that is what it is all about. I use the term “human security” rather than responsibility to protect because I think it is a bit broader. I think what responsibility to protect did not do in the original UN resolution was to think about how you would implement it. Human security is all about the protection of individuals and the communities that they live in rather than the protection of states. It seems to me that is the big problem that we face, whether we are talking about states’ responsibility in their own societies or the need for the international community, and I think actually the European Union has a historic role to play because the European Union is a large regional bloc. It could make a real contribution to the United Nations’ ability to carry out human security or responsibility to protect. So I think it is incredibly important, and is one of the reasons why I am so keen on using this term. I think it is somewhat broader than responsibility to protect because it covers natural disasters, multiple sources of insecurity, but it has that same emphasis on the issue of human rights violations. It is about protection and respect for human rights and the spread of international law. I think there has been a tendency all the way along to hope the US will take the lead. Maybe the US after Obama will take the lead but I think the European Union does have a responsibility to set the agenda and to strengthen the capability of the United Nations to carry out this kind of operation.

Q99 Lord Chidgey: We have covered so much ground already, I just want to make sure I can focus on the issues that I wanted to raise without asking you to repeat what you have already said. I think I have understood this correctly. Both our witnesses have acknowledged that the European Security Strategy has prioritised countering terrorism and proliferation, and rightly so, and the concerns that they have expressed of the lack of implementation so far in the strategy. I would like to ask them to spend a little time concentrating on the issue of whether the strategy should pay greater attention to the causes and sources of security threats in addition to the focus we have at the present time on the symptoms. When I say that, I am thinking in terms of not just asymmetric threats but the threats that exist because of global shortages of water supply and food, as well as radicalisation of people through religion or whatever, the extent to which some nation states are trying to expand their territory and the effect that has on us. How can we see the strategy being used to pay greater attention to the subliminal, almost, future causes of security threats, not just to the European Union but also globally.

Professor Kaldor: I suppose—and this again might anticipate future answers, but it seems to me two things. One is that not all of the causes of insecurity, whether you are talking about poverty, food insecurity, or climate change, can be covered under ESDP. A lot of it will be the responsibility of the European Commission, in that the European Commission provides aid, or indeed the European Council pressing for better agreements on climate change. The kinds of things that are specified in the European Security Strategy, which are weak states, regional conflicts, terrorism, I still think should be the focus of the security strategy. I think the point is that, if you take the underlying causes, say migration, say food insecurity, say land erosion, these are not necessarily going to lead to violent conflict. Whether or not they lead to violent conflict depends on the extent to which there are institutions capable of managing these threats in a co-operative way. We saw with the tsunami that it, interestingly enough, had opposite effects. It actually provided the
conditions under which a peace agreement was reached in Aceh, and it also temporarily contributed to an easing of the situation in Sri Lanka. So it is not necessary that these causes, so-called, of insecurity lead to violence. It is all a matter of whether states can manage violence, whether there is a rule of law, whether there is trust in institutions, and it seems to me that is what the ESDP has to focus on and will become all the more important. That is not to say I do not think those issues are important but I just do not think the ESDP can cover everything. Other bits of the European Union have the responsibility to cover those other things.

Q100 Lord Chidgey: You, I thought, made a very interesting point regarding the European Union, the European Commission, and aid, a very powerful tool in encouraging stability, I think. Is it not the case that the jury is certainly out on how effective aid has been in the past decade in trying to improve security in the overall sense of states that are at risk, and risk in regard to our interests?

Professor Kaldor: Thank you for that question, because my argument, and the argument that we make in the various reports that we have provided to Javier Solana, is that implementation and capabilities is not just about more resources, even though that is required. It is about how they are applied and how they are used. What we have developed in our work is a set of principles of human security which are about how you implement human security. They are about the importance of human rights in what you do, they are about the importance ofestablishing the legitimacy of local institutions, which is absolutely key, because one of the problems I think with aid efforts is that they often displace local institutions, and that actually means they are less sustainable in the long run. It is about what we call bottom up, which means really involving local people in consultations about how aid should be provided, where, and what strategy should be developed. It is about involving neighbouring states, because very often these problems cross over borders. It is also about coherence, involving other institutions. This is what we found, for example, when we did a couple of studies on the impact of European aid for the tsunami. There was enough aid. The problem was how it was implemented. So when we talk about implementation, I think what you are doing with the human security approach is operating in a very different way from a traditional top-down, state-ist approach.

Dr Giegerich: Can I just add a few thoughts? When we talk about the sources and drivers of security and insecurity, there is actually a very important point there because the strategy at the moment creates the impression that this is merely context to these five real issues. I said initially that is a good focus, but I just want to point out that a bit more attention to these drivers would actually strengthen the logic of preventive action that the European Security Strategy is built on. It would also help European leaders to think through how to organise a coherent and comprehensive response to these problems. While it is certainly true that the ESDP cannot deal with everything, I think it is also true that it is still part of the answer and therefore I think it needs to address these issues. Some that I think are worth pointing out: climate change has already been mentioned and that is certainly a big driver but also things like exclusion in various forms. I would include global inequalities here, but also issues like multi-polarity, the rise of new power centres, on which the security strategy is rather silent. It mentions them, and that is all really. The question of, for example, how China will manage to balance continued economic growth, internal stability and increasing international activity. I think it would be good for European leaders to think about these issues of rising power centres and multi-polarity. There are certainly a few issues that are worth fleshing out in a little more depth than they are currently in the strategy.

Q101 Lord Crickhowell: Lord Chidgey asked a rather wider question than I thought he was going to ask in the area I want to pursue, but I am going to raise question four on the list you have been given and then make a further comment about it. To what extent is energy dependence, notably on Russia for gas and the Middle East for oil, a source of European vulnerability? Do these issues need to be better addressed in the European Security Strategy and, if so, how? Having asked that question, I am going to refer to a piece of evidence that was given to the Committee last week by Mr Witney, when he observed: “I myself, for example, am slightly sceptical about today’s rather vague concentration on energy security which I think falls pretty loosely under the ambit of what I understand by defence and security affairs, it seems to me in fact more a matter of the organisation of the internal gas market in Europe than something that needs to be considered in conventional security terms. I see that danger if one is too sophisticated and moves too far into spreading the term security, but on the other hand it is absolutely right that things like climate change do play a key role in contributing as drivers of conflict and instability.” I have taken up another question, the climate change issue, but it seems to me quite an important issue here. I understand what was being said earlier, particularly about human security, about fragile states, about Darfur and Afghanistan. What I am finding a little difficult as we come into this inquiry is the connection between these other issues, like energy issues, at the moment and the European...
security strategy. Are we not getting into danger in stretching the whole thing so wide when we have to look at the more specific threats that may arise? I am trying to get the connection between the two things.

**Professor Kaldor:** I think there is a connection actually, and I think what is very often left out of the discussion of climate change and energy security is a third element which I think is terribly important, which is known in the jargon as “resource curse”. I think there is a huge problem of countries which are dependent on oil revenues being vulnerable to huge instability. If you ask me what the problem about Russia is, or the problem about Saudi Arabia, they can sustain as long as the oil revenues keep flowing, but because they have so many oil revenues, they do not need taxation, they do not have a social contract with their citizens, and these are states that are very vulnerable to conflict. This is exactly what the problem was with Iraq, and it is something the Americans did not anticipate. Actually, Saddam Hussein, far from leading a strong powerful state, (I think he and George Bush had a joint interest in us all thinking that), was actually leading a rather weak state because it was a state built on oil revenues. When sanctions happened, when the war with Iran happened, those oil revenues were steadily falling and it was a state on the verge of collapse. What the Americans did was just give it a final jolt, and what you have is what I would call a contemporary oil war. It has all the characteristics of local instability, weak state, weak law and order, fuelled by all kinds of criminal smuggling. It illustrates different ways in which oil can fund war — and there are lots of ways: you can smuggle, blow up pipelines, take people hostage, and Iraq is typical of that. Chechnya, surprisingly enough, was typical of that. Angola was typical of that. This is one of the most serious causes of conflict in the world, and it is not what we classically think of as energy security. It is not worrying about threats to us by people who are going to withdraw energy. It is about the threats that local instability can cause to the supply of energy and that local instability can cause generally. I think that is a very serious issue that we need to worry about. If we are worried about our vulnerability to Russia and the Middle East, it is not so much that Russia is going to stop the oil flowing; it is that in a situation where oil revenues fall for one reason or another, there is likely to be internal instability. Imagine what would happen in Saudi Arabia if you could not sustain that government with oil revenues.

**Q102 Lord Crickhowell:** I think, in a way, you have answered my question. You are in effect saying that the question as far as the European Security Strategy is not about the dependence of Europe on Russia for gas and on the Middle East for oil. That is not the issue; that is an energy policy issue, which is separately addressed. What you are looking at is something different, which is the effect in states of energy issues in a much more specific security and human affairs way.

**Professor Kaldor:** Exactly.

**Lord Crickhowell:** Thank you very much. I will come back to it on the later question of climate change.

**Q103 Lord Truscott:** Professor Kaldor, I agree with you that the real issue is not really OPEC or Russia turning off the tap, because that is not in their commercial interests. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Europe gets 25 per cent of its gas from the Russian Federation. Alexei Miller, head of Gazprom, in the last couple of days has said the price of oil could go up to $250 a barrel. If it does hit $250, that will be a real security issue, I think, in terms of security of energy supply for the West, and for the EU. Looking at the European Security Strategy, whatever way you look at energy security, even if you look at it in purely human security terms, and given what you said about what may threaten it may be internal developments rather than external developments, how do think we can address energy security? What sort of strategy could we adopt to mitigate any perceived or real threats that we may experience from Russia or anywhere else?

**Professor Kaldor:** Of course, one is just having alternative energy policies which make you less dependent on oil and gas, which is the solution to all three problems: energy security, resource curse and climate change. Secondly, the problems that I alluded to, how do you deal with the problems of oil-dependent states and the risk of instability, I think there is a lot you can do there. One issue that is terribly important is transparency. We have Revenue Watch based in our office and they do a lot of work on how to make sure that oil companies publish the money they give to governments so the public can question them. Oil transparency is a key issue. I think a lot more could be done to encourage oil companies, international organisations, nation states, to adopt co-operative efforts. The Caucasus is a very good example of this. There are conflicts waiting to happen in the Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Chechnya, and there you need to be making serious preventative efforts involving dialogue, cooperation, helping to strengthen the law — all the things that are involved in a typical human security approach.

**Q104 Lord Truscott:** May I ask a final supplementary? Do you think those issues are addressed well enough in the European Security Strategy as it stands or do you think it could be further developed?
Professor Kaldor: I think it could be further developed. I was going to say when Dr Giegerich was saying about prevention, again, a lot of this is about coherence because you must not forget that there is a conflict prevention bit of the European Commission. There is a stability instrument within the European Commission, and the European Commission is also addressing many of these issues. The real focus of the ESDP is on law and order and on dealing with outright crises, responsibility to protect. That is what I see the ESDP as doing but in a rather broader way than responsibility to protect, emphasising law and order, but it needs to work much more closely with the Commission on reconciliation, dialogue, using aid in a way that helps bring communities together.

Dr Giegerich: I have finally found something I can almost disagree with! The first point I would like to make is on energy, rather, on the strategy as such, and on the European Security Strategy as such, I think it is actually more than just the ESDP, so therefore one might need a slightly bigger focus here as well. I also want to try to make a more direct link to what is commonly understood under the term of energy security. If the European Security Strategy is about these things like freedom from fear and from want, then one has to look at these things as well, because there is a statistical relationship between wealth and energy consumption, which is very clear, in the sense that the higher the GDP per capita, the higher is energy consumption per capita, and energy in a way fuels growth. So that is an issue that one has to address. It is very important to be precise about what it means. If you look at energy security in the way that you alluded to, then it would imply access to raw materials, capacity for refinement, security and protection of transportation and distribution infrastructure, and all these things. The question is, do we want that in the security strategy as such? There I would be very cautious and point to a parallel discussion that NATO is having at the moment about prevention, dialogue, making aid in a way that helps bring communities together.

Q105 Lord Hanning of Chiswick: Surely some of the problems of coherence that you referred to, the Commission doing one thing and the ESDP doing another, are those that are addressed by the Lisbon Treaty and the reforms there. Presumably, if the Lisbon Treaty survives the attentions of the Irish electorate today, that will be improved. Can you comment on that? Listening to your reply, Professor Kaldor, and thinking about these matters, I am wondering whether it is quite correct if we are not lurching from one problème du jour to another problème du jour, the first one being energy security and security of supply and the next one being the risks for countries with large energy resources, oil resources and so on, because is it not the case—and you mentioned Angola. The point about Angola that differentiated it from Mozambique was that it had the diamonds and the oil which enabled the civil strife to go on much longer. In Mozambique you did not have either diamonds or oil or any other natural resource, and therefore eventually the insurrection collapsed into the arms of the international community. So it is not right surely to say that oil caused the civil war. There was civil war in both countries, helped greatly by the South Africans, but the duration of it was enormously aided by natural resources. Given that we cannot actually do anything about the fact that natural resources are located in particular countries, it surely is a little bit unwise, is it not, to suggest that this is a problem we should address directly? It is surely another of those factors which we should take into account when trying to strengthen governance in countries which could be facing difficult problems further down the road.

Professor Kaldor: On the Lisbon Treaty, yes, that will begin to address it, but I also think—and this is why I am so keen on the term “human security”—that having a shared narrative, feeling that everybody is on the same song sheet... I was very impressed, I remember, when I was looking at the UN effort in Sierra Leone that the departing Special Representative in his departing note said, “What really matters is conceptual coherence.” Institutional coherence is very difficult to achieve always, because you create new institutional mechanisms and that becomes yet another source of competition. What you really need is conceptual coherence, everyone agreeing on what the mission is. That is one of the reasons I am so keen on human security. On the other issue I completely agree with you. I am not suggesting that oil is a cause of conflict. What I am suggesting is that countries that are rich in oil revenues are more vulnerable to conflict and have longer conflicts, as you suggest. What I also think that means—and Paul Collier, for example, has pointed this out—is that countries that are heavily dependent on revenues of primary commodities are more vulnerable to conflict, so that in your conflict prevention strategy it is very
important to give a focus to those countries, so issues of transparency of revenue, all those kinds of issues need to be addressed as part of the conflict prevention issue. One last point on critical infrastructures. We did a big study on oil and conflict, and one of the things we found was that one of the problems that has happened in the past is that in the past oil companies focused on protecting their enclaves. The enclaves were attacked and they started to use all kinds of unsavoury methods to protect them; they got involved with paramilitary groups for example. This typically happened to BP in Colombia, Exxon in Aceh, Shell in Nigeria, and it was only when they started a much more outward strategy of cooperation and dialogue with local people, that they began to achieve security. Actually, BP in Colombia is a fascinating example where they were really very successful in adopting basically a human security strategy in place of their traditional approach of protecting enclaves; the person who wrote the essay called it “Beyond the perimeter fence.”

**Q106 Chairman:** Dr Giegerich, perhaps on the Lisbon part.

**Dr Giegerich:** In one sense, it would be at this point in time necessary to keep the discussion there separated from the European Security Strategy. We will see what happens today but if we expect Javier Solana to present a report by December 2008, I would assume that would be a draft document, which, if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified by 2009, could then be adapted to take account of the changes that the Lisbon Treaty would make in terms of the institutional set-up and things like the External Action Service and so on and so forth. I think, however, that the Lisbon Treaty will not make these problems of coherence go away. It is actually very ambiguous in terms of the institutional set-up, of responsibilities between individuals with overlapping competencies and very strong positions. I do not think it will go away. If you allow me one more comment on what Professor Kaldor has just said, because I think that is an excellent point about how energy companies sometimes have addressed these problems. If one goes around the globe, one can pick out examples where these companies succeeded in making the local population stakeholders in this whole enterprise, thereby undercutting support for whoever it was that was attacking the infrastructure. I think there is actually a very useful model there. I am not saying it is destined to succeed but those might be important lessons that one might have to learn.

**Q107 Lord Anderson of Swansea:** Sierra Leone, a comment: all the good work in terms of human development was only possible because of a hard power intervention by the UK, and there was a danger in your joint presentation of ignoring the underpinning by hard power necessary in Sierra Leone. My problem is that of definition, that there is a case for doing a few things and doing them well. The definition of security 10 or 15 years ago would probably mean purely military. Now we are extending it. Human security is a much more amorphous concept. Where do you see the limits? What is outside your definition of security?

**Professor Kaldor:** I very much take the view that human security is a hard policy. There is a debate between, on the one hand, UNDP, who have tended to use human security to mean development, and it was a way of getting the development people on the security bandwagon after the end of the Cold War, I would argue, and the Canadian version, where human security really means responsibility to protect. I am much closer to the Canadian version but I do think what is good about the UNDP version is the way it emphasises the multiple and interrelated sources of insecurity. Human rights is not just about civil liberties and political liberties. It is about economic and social rights as well. It is about both freedom from fear and freedom from want. I think it is that interrelationship I would like, so I would like to keep the hard component.

**Q108 Lord Anderson of Swansea:** But what is it not?

**Professor Kaldor:** What I am trying to say all along is that we need a policy to deal with the hard issues and I see ESDP as dealing with the hard issues. I see it as dealing with people’s personal security in their situations, I see it as dealing with law and order, I see it as dealing with the relationship between organised crime and political violence, and while I think issues of human development are absolutely critical as drivers and so on, I think that is the job of other bits of the European Union, working very closely together with the ESDP.

**Q109 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:** Can I just come in on hard power? In terms of military, if you just take one component, which is helicopters, these are enormously relevant to almost anything that you are trying to do. The Americans made an enormous impact on the tsunami because they had a carrier in the area which was bristling with helicopters and could go straight in to aid the people who were there. I do not think there really is a difference between hard power and soft power because at the end of the day you need the capabilities that hard power brings with them to pull off soft power.

**Professor Kaldor:** I agree, and I would emphasise that in dealing with these issues you need a combination of military and civil capabilities. You need policemen, you need civilians, you may be able to do things, as they did in Aceh and as they are doing in Kosovo, with purely civilian missions. You need them working together. Where you have the military
operating, I think they are operating in very different ways from traditional war fighting ways. They are operating in support of civil authority, which is what they did in Northern Ireland. I think where the ESDP needs to go is strengthening the civilian side, bringing the military and the civil closer together, doing more joint training—we just did a pilot project for the EU Crisis Management Centre on joint training for military and civilians going to Kosovo, which was really interesting—more joint exercises, and on the technology side I think there is a lot to be done in terms of dual-use technology both in the field of communications and transportation.

Dr Giegerich: Can I add a few things? I agree with the general assessment of the usefulness and the great promise of human security as an underlying concept, which to me would be one that not only provides a set of norms but one that has operational implications, which is Professor Kaldor’s argument. However, I would also—I am trying to be a bit provocative—say that human security in a way is a luxury. If we think about the referent object of that security approach, it is the individual, the human being. If a state—and we are not in that situation right now but if you stay with me for a moment—or a government were to be in the position to have to make a choice between those different levels, I would think that with those different levels of analysis and those different levels of referent objects of what security is about, the human being would probably lose out against the national level. We are not in that situation right now but I just want to point out that we can talk about human security in this way because of the context that we are in at the moment. On the hard power issue and the complexities, we can clearly see that the military is part of the answer but it works in a way that complements a lot of civilian things, and clearly the solution to problems like Afghanistan is not going to be exclusively military. We can see that every day but what we need to realise is that we are actually asking quite a lot of the military in terms of the scope of tasks that they have to carry out within one operation, beginning from training, mentoring, to diplomacy with village elders, up to killing the enemy, of which there are still a few around. If one talks about hard power versus soft power, the challenge is to fuse these two in a productive way. On the helicopter issue and the question of availability of these assets, I do not think have the precise numbers in my head now but in Europe there exist about 1,700 transport helicopters. That is a large number. They might not be the right type, they might need to be upgraded, they might need changes but the key question here is how do we not just talk about getting more but how do we get more of what is already available into actual operations? How do we actually make them usable rather than just have them on paper? Here is the real question of capabilities. That, by the way, goes for the civilian side just as much. Just to give you an example, the EU has a pool on paper of some 12,000 civilian personnel for civilian crisis management missions. When the EU led the mission in Kosovo the planning team put out a call for 1,375 vacancies. They got 1,200 applications from seconded personnel out of this pool of 12,000, less than one application per position, which already demonstrates that this is issue of availability is a civilian and a military issue. I do not think it makes sense to separate the discussion there. One has to make sure that it operationalises both aspects and does so in a joined up way.

Chairman: Lord Selkirk, we seem to have dealt with the question you were going to ask on human security. We will go on to the question from Lord Chidgey.

Q110 Lord Selkirk of Douglas: Could I ask a supplementary question? You have talked about conflict prevention. This may be a fringe issue but to what extent do you envisage that future conflicts could be on the subject of water, for example, dams, diversion of river courses, one country being so lacking in water that it could find itself in conflict with a neighbouring country? Is this more of a Middle East and African problem, or do you see it as one in which the European Union could be involved in some capacity, and has this been taken into account?

Professor Kaldor: I am not a water specialist but from everything I have read, it is definitely an African and an Asian problem, and it is going to be a huge problem with the melting of glaciers in the Himalayas. Again, my answer would be, whether one is talking about the Middle East or Africa, that there needs to be serious attention paid to the issue of the availability of water but for the ESDP, the issue is how to solve the Middle East conflict actually, how to solve the conflicts, how to strengthen the rule of law and states’ capacity to deal with conflicts in Africa.

Q111 Chairman: I am a little anxious that we are not getting really quite through the scope of the whole of our agenda. Dr Giegerich, do you wish to add anything?

Dr Giegerich: If you allow me two or three sentences on water, I think we can see that already happening but, interestingly, involving sub-national actors, including, for example, in Sudan, and I would also point to Kenya as a potential problem. There are projections that the water supply in Israel might drop by some 60 per cent in the not too distant future, with obvious consequences. The south Caucasus is also vulnerable in that regard, so I do think it has implications. I am not a specialist in this either, and I do not have the exact data to hand but it is certainly an issue that in my organisation we have started to look into because it is definitely concerning us.
Q112 Lord Chidgey: Moving on now to state fragility, we have talked around this subject already but, as a case in point, a test case, in a way, I would like to spend some minutes on Afghanistan. Formerly we were asking you if in countries like Afghanistan organised crime and drugs trade are linked to the internal conflict and state fragility, which in turn are involved around extremism and terrorism. The real heart of the question is: does the ESS adequately address the interdependent nature of the problems faced by fragile states? If not, in what ways should it be modified? The background to that, of course, is today’s meeting in Paris, where of course President Karzai is putting in a bid in for a huge amount of additional aid, something like $18.2 billion over five years from 67 governments, and the IMF is now reckoning that economic activity generated by aid in Afghanistan represents something like two-thirds of the country’s gross domestic product. I do not say that is a bad thing but it clearly skews terrifically the development of a stable society and economy in Afghanistan. Against that background, I would be very interested to hear what the ESS and the ESDP could actually be doing better to try and get away from this scenario.

Professor Kaldor: I am really glad you asked about Afghanistan, because it enables me to talk a little bit more about the problem, which is this: that the ESS is a very different approach from, say, the war on terror. The war on terror is much more in a classic way, are all in the police and are making our security very weak, rather than the Taliban?” So I think there is a huge contradiction there. This is a big problem for the Europeans, and it is one of the reasons why we need to be more explicit about our commitment to the European Security Strategy, though I recognise that is a big problem but I think it is very important, because Afghanistan is a terrible mess actually.

Q113 Lord Chidgey: That brings me back to my opening question: if the European Security Strategy does not adequately address this interdependent nature, and you have explained the complexity of it, how could it be modified to better address it?

Professor Kaldor: Actually, I am saying the piece of paper does address it but what I am really saying is I do not think there is a sufficient political commitment on the part of the Member States or on the part of the public to this. Nobody has really thought through what that means in political terms. Actually, to go on with my list, another case is regional. You cannot solve Afghanistan or Iraq without a different kind of strategy towards the neighbouring states. It means that the ESS has to be integrated. We have talked a lot about the relationship between the ESS and drivers of insecurity on the economic side but it also needs to be related to a broader foreign policy approach. That is not necessarily about the ESS; it is more about common foreign security policy in general and how strong it is and how much Member States are willing to sign up to these principles.

Dr Giegerich: Let me just add to that briefly. One thing where one could do with a little more precision or engagement really in the strategy is, I think, the connection not just between these different threats but how they relate to our efforts to deal with them. I mean in particular the effects that, for example, terrorism, organised crime, whether it is in Afghanistan or Kosovo, have on the missions that we send there, whether they are civilian or mixed civil and military or military. They obviously have a rather stark effect in undermining the effectiveness of what we are trying to do, and I do not think that aspect is explored at all at the moment in the security strategy, although I agree that the security strategy does talk about the connections between these different threats as such, but it does not talk about what these connections do to our attempts to address crisis situations. I think that would be a useful aspect to spend some time on.

Q114 Lord Crickhowell: We began to talk earlier about the extent to which the European Security Strategy addresses the issue of climate change and some of the drivers of insecurity. We now have a Solana mission saying we should spend more time thinking about climate change and address it and so on. Again, if I get the right connections, I spent a lot of time debating climate change legislation as it was going through Parliament, and Europe has a strong
position on addressing climate change—not everyone agrees but broadly there is a strong climate change policy. I quite see down the road that the failure to deal with climate change is going to throw up some crisis situations around the world, but in the meantime there is a tendency to think that every single environmental event is something to do with climate change, when probably most of them have absolutely nothing to do with climate change at the present time. Every storm that occurs almost anywhere around the world is blamed on climate change. My worry about all this is that we can have a strong policy on climate change but I am trying to get the connection between an active security policy, which should be surely addressing the problem areas as they emerge, the volatile situations, and how we get in to be effective in dealing with them. I have this worry that if we have this broad “Let’s look at energy issues or let’s look at climate change issues,” we are going to be drawn away or I do not see how we actually get to be keeping the focus on the issues that are actually those of security policy. Am I wrong in being worried about these connections?

Professor Kaldor: No. I agree with you very much. It seems to me that what is absolutely key is strengthening state capacities. That means not just state capacities; it means strengthening legitimacy, and that means building the relationship between the state and society, it means involving citizens in decisions, it means establishing the rule of law, establishing justice institutions that people trust; all of those things are absolutely crucial both to managing climate change, energy security, and what we classically think of as security issues. That is where the ESDP’s focus is.

Chairman: Can we perhaps leave the question of commenting on the document or would you like to cover that as well?

Lord Crickhowell: I did raise it. I asked the question, I think, in my first remark.

Q115 Chairman: Do you have anything to add, Dr Giegerich?

Dr Giegerich: On climate change? I am also sympathetic to the point about conceptual stretching of what is security, but I think climate change will function as a multiplier of stresses on governance on national and international levels. It will increase vulnerabilities of countries, which would then have knock-on effects in terms of migration but also potentially on conflict. The key is to try and mitigate these effects, not just act when it is happening. Going back to the point I mentioned earlier about prevention, I think it is not just dealing with the symptoms but trying to engage earlier on. Therefore I would agree with the analysis in the paper submitted by Javier Solana in March, I think. In fact, the security implications of climate change studied so far are not very well understood and I think it is a useful area to think about. It seems to me to be a rather crucial driver of security in the future.

Q116 Chairman: In the security strategy the final section talks about the need to build an international order based on effective multilateralism. I wonder whether you could say something and to us about what you understand by the phrase “effective multilateralism”.

Professor Kaldor: I suppose what I understand by the phrase is two things. I do understand it as moving towards an international order. What we have seen over the last 50 years is a coming together of international humanitarian or human rights law and what people call a humanitarian regime, where we have built to the International Criminal Court, we have human rights groups, we have much more possibility for people in vulnerable societies to be able to appeal to the multilateral regime. So part of what I mean by effective multilateralism is strengthening that international rule of law, increasing our capacity for enforcement, and that also means that sovereignty is a much more conditional concept than it ever was before. States are sovereign if they respect the human rights of their countries. It is not as absolutist as it used to be. It means moving towards a system of multilateralism in which states are partners. I think it also means much greater coherence. We have so many different international organisations, international NGOs, and I think that is a huge problem in all the places that I have looked at. There is an enormous problem of swarming of all these different agencies, overlapping, failing to do things, doing things in the wrong way, and a lack of coherence which is actually quite catastrophic in some places. Those are the two things I mean by effective multilateralism.

Dr Giegerich: I just want to add that I think the irony about effective multilateralism—there are two actually—one in the security strategy is it becomes a means and an end at the same time, and I think there is a problem with that. The second point is that effective multilateralism, in the way it used to be understood in times before the European Security Strategy, was multilateralism that required leadership by a certain group, a smaller group within a larger multilateral context. That is actually an idea that we should not forget, both in the intra-EU context, in terms of when it comes to the implementation of these issues in the strategy, but also in the larger international context. Effective multilateralism usually requires leadership, which then leads to a rebalancing of these questions of legitimacy and the effectiveness of what we are doing. I think that is something that got lost in the way that it is used in the security strategy.
Q117 Lord Crickhowell: All this talk about human rights and effective multilateralism—how can we actually claim there is anything in terms of effective multilateralism, when we have a total failure to act in almost all situations in Africa and in Burma, for example? If the situation is really bad, and people are being slaughtered in their thousands and tortured and brutalised, actually nothing at all gets done. It is only in minor places where the aid agencies and so on can come in, but if there really is brutality going on in the world, there is a total failure now to be able to do anything about it, so how can one possibly talk about effective multilateralism?

Professor Kaldor: I do not think there is a total failure. There are terrible examples where we have failed utterly, whether you are talking about Rwanda or Burma or Zimbabwe, but I think there are huge efforts, and it is very interesting. I do not know if you have seen the Human Security Report but there has been a decline in the number of conflicts in the world, there has been a decline in the number of people killed in conflicts, and if you look at the details as to why that is, it is a learning experience on the part of multilateral organisations. I think there are lots of weaknesses, which I would like to say something about, but actually the United Nations family plus the EU plus other organisations have learned a lot about how to negotiate ceasefires, how to sustain ceasefires, and there is an enormous amount that has been going on in the last decade and a half which has lessened some of these terrible tragedies. I am not saying they have avoided it. What I do think is true—and this is where I come back again to human security—is that the emphasis has always been on stability, and that has been true in military and in economic terms. The UN has got much better at stopping conflicts. It has got much better at stabilising currencies and preventing runaway inflation, but what it is not so good at is the everyday insecurity that people in many conflict zones, even after ceasefires, face: the insecurity of organised crime, violence against women, high levels of unemployment, which, by the way, are linked to organised crime because there are not legal ways of making a living. Those are things that we are much less good at addressing. I think at the heart of many of them is strengthening the rule of law and law and order, and putting much more emphasis on public security. What the UN is good at is peacekeeping, which means separating sides, but it is not so good at dealing with these human rights issues, which go on over a long period. That is where a huge effort still needs to be made.

Q118 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I have certain doubts about the effect of multilateralism but surely—perhaps you would comment on this—effective multilateralism as an objective is a great deal better than ineffective multilateralism, and that in its turn is probably better than no multilateralism at all, i.e. the law of the jungle and each looking after his own interests at the expense of others. If that is the case, surely you have to think of ways of making effective multilateralism more effective, not of deconstructing it. We are looking, after all, at a review of this strategy and the question is, does the third leg, effective multilateralism, stand and, if so, should the European Union be showing the way that it can put more achievement into that, get more implementation of it, not junking it?

Dr Giegerich: I think, first of all, there is a hierarchy of objectives that one should not lose track of, which is, in my view, effective multilateralism as a means of increased security rather than an end in itself, but that is my personal view. I absolutely agree there is no reason to disaggregate this concept too much, but I think there is a tendency within the EU, because of the way the EU works, based consensus and repeated interaction and all of that, to favour—and that is part of effective multilateralism—to be very inclusive. Sometimes that inclusiveness undermines effectiveness. That is the kind of balance I was alluding to earlier that one might have to rethink, and I think making effective multilateralism as understood in the security strategy into an end in itself is going to make that more complicated. That was my earlier point. There are two other things. We mentioned the lack of implementation in protecting human rights and how one can allow gross violations to stand and not intervene. Obviously, on one level the answer is that just because one fails in one case does not mean that one cannot succeed in another. It is not total failure, but I think what is absent, and which might help in this regard, if we were there, is on the one hand criteria for intervention, which the European Security Strategy does not provide, the when, where and why. The “why” it does provide but not in any specific sense. The second aspect that would need to go hand-in-hand with it is a clear definition of the level of ambition; in other words, what is available, how often, for how long, and for what kind of missions in order to deal with this. The European Security Strategy is absolutely silent on that point. It mentions civilian and military means, and that is it. A level of ambition and precise guidance, perhaps based on human security or a concept that might provide the framework, that is what would be needed to improve the situation and actually get better results than we have seen in the past.

Q119 Lord Crickhowell: That takes us rather neatly into the implementation of the strategy. When the European Security Strategy was adopted the European Security and Defence Policy was only just getting off the ground. Do you think the strategy...
should be revised to take into account the experience gained since then of the type of crisis management operations that have been conducted in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East and Asia? What are the lessons and how should they be learned?

Professor Kaldor: We actually did a study of several of the missions that the ESDP has undertaken and I would say two things really. First of all, actually it is quite impressive. There have been some 20 missions and they have operated in a different way, really interesting ways. Perhaps the most interesting were the two missions in Congo, which really involved consultation with the local population and were really seen as neutral and impartial but they were too short. Aceh was also interesting. A lot of good experience has been gained. The problem with all of them has been first of all that they have often been too short—that was especially the case in Congo—and secondly, which is linked to their being too short, there has been a lack of coherence either with other bits of the European Union or, especially importantly in my view, at the political level. I was mentioning that in the case of Afghanistan but in the case of Congo it was because there was a mismatch between what German public opinion wanted and what was needed in the Congo. In the case of Israel and Palestine, this is really fascinating and it would take me a long time to explain but actually the EU has done some very interesting things on the ground. The ESDP mission there was to help the civilian police, which was the only security agency keeping law and order and there was also a mission to keep open the Rafah crossing. These were really human security tasks but they were at total odds with Quartet policy. When the embargo happened, the civil police were the first to be hit. Instead you had the Quartet policy. When the embargo happened, the security tasks but they were at total odds with

Q120 Lord Crickhowell: In organisational terms, the vast majority were civilian in nature but had to involve military planning because the organisational side just was not there among the civilian participants. Have some lessons been learned there about the organisation, the co-operation of the military and civil sides?

Professor Kaldor: There is a military civil headquarters in the Council that operates on both and I think it has been relatively good. The problem is more involving the Commission in the planning. That is the problem. It is the problem of lack of coherence of the whole of the EU, which will be partly solved by the Lisbon Treaty—I agree with Lord Hannay about that—but not completely. One other point about implementation, because I can see we are running out of time, is the European Action Service. I think that is going to be very important and I think we need to think about it as different from the traditional diplomatic service. I think the European Action Service should be monitoring these issues, monitoring human rights, and law and order. It should be a forum of access of local people to the EU. Instead of diplomacy between states, it should be much more a diplomacy between peoples or citizens. I think that would be very important to emphasise in any report.

Chairman: Can I perhaps say we will send you a copy of our report on the European Union and the Middle East, which we produced last year, which discussed some of the points to which you have just referred. Depending on what happens today in Dublin, we will be looking at the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, including the Action Service. We might well write to you and ask for some written evidence on that.

Q121 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Just building on Lord Crickhowell’s question on implementation, clearly, the EU has several advantages over NATO in terms of the range of tools in its toolbox: aid, trade, closer links with the voluntary sector and so on, which we saw, for example, in Bosnia when the European Union took over from the NATO mission. The question really then is that of balance. Certainly the military side of the European Union has been developed, battle group concept and so on. In your judgement is there currently the right balance within the European Union between those military tools which are available and the civilian force?

Professor Kaldor: No, there is not, and I am sure Dr Giegerich has a lot to say about that. There is not enough on the civilian side, as he has already said. There needs to be a greater commitment, and I am glad the Prime Minister made that an explicit point in the national security strategy. There needs to be a greater commitment to policemen, for example, legal experts, gender. No, it does not have the right balance. There is one thing I wanted to add, which was in relation to the question about criteria. I think another capability the EU needs is a legal framework for this kind of operation. That was one of the things that we proposed in the Barcelona Report. There are huge problems of the competencies of international humanitarian law, human rights law, the domestic laws of individual Member States, the rules of engagement, the laws of countries where you are operating.
Q122 Lord Anderson of Swansea: That goes well beyond the capability of the European Union.

Professor Kaldor: The European Union could develop with a group of lawyers a legal framework which guides the kind of activities that it is going to engage in—I think that would be incredibly helpful—including criteria for responsibility to protect, for example.

Chairman: Some of which did appear in the earlier documents before the declaration of 2005.

Q123 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I think both of you in answering the questions have identified that the ESS was a pretty good effort in 2003, that it has proved a useful framework for national politicians, civil servants and the military in framing their national strategies but that there is a complete disconnect with the general public, who (a) do not know that it exists and (b) are in many of their attitudes towards these issues actually cutting across the direction of the ESS in the sense that they are not in many European countries, particularly enamoured of the use of hard power at all, although hard power is a part of the European Security Strategy. Other witnesses we have had have identified this gap, the gap of public perception and knowledge and also the gap of public support, which is far more important, of course, than the other two because without public support governments are not going to provide the resources or the political will to do some of the things that are set out in the strategy. Could you very rapidly, at the end of this session, if you agree with that analysis, say how you think it can be remedied?

If we assume that there is going to be a revised version of the European Security Strategy issued roundabout the December European Council, what should the European Union and its Member States and civil society be doing to ensure that this gap is filled, that there is a proper debate about these issues, and that, in so far as this is possible, you can begin to get more of a consensus behind the objectives set out?

Q124 Chairman: I am sorry. I did not give Dr Giegerich an opportunity to reply to the last question.

Dr Giegerich: Let me say a few words on the last point and then move on to this one, and I will do it quickly so we have some time left. I think the biggest lesson for me, perhaps in a cynical way, from the experience so far in the EU missions is that whenever we talk about a European capability for anything, we are talking about national building blocks to that European capability, and that is a problem we sometimes tend to forget. That flags up the issue of political will to address these issues, to create the capabilities that are needed. I would agree that the EU is clearly more advanced in this field than in the attempt to create a joined up and comprehensive capacity. I think that in fact is the great promise of the ESDP. It is its biggest selling point, in my view, the possibility that it does create this comprehensive capacity. I am not too worried about institutional competition in this regard because I think it is up to governments to look towards the EU and or NATO as tools to implement their policies, so one should look at who has a comparative advantage in what situation and then decide which framework to use, rather than spend time on debating hierarchies and so on. On the capabilities question, very quickly, yes, there is clearly not enough of it, I would argue in both areas, civilian and military, in terms of usable capability—that is an important qualification. It is a bit unfortunate that the military aspect sometimes almost steal the headlines. It is just the more headline-grabbing aspect of it but I think the civilian side is absolutely crucial. To throw out another example, it is very difficult to find the judges and prosecutors for some of these missions, because it means if someone is a judge who is to deploy in a few months from now, he has to stop hearing cases today, and we are still a month away from actual use in these operations. That is just to point out one example. That is a strain on national systems that is considerable, and it gets worse if there are then delays in these missions and these people do not get to go. There is also a professional problem for them. The incentive structure for them to go on these operations needs to be rethought. In that sense we are still in very early days, I would argue. If you look—again, we do not have time to go into the detail—at the report on the civilian headline goal for 2008, you will see that not all needs that have already appeared on these operations have been anticipated, so there is actually quite a bit of scope for improvement there. Coming to Lord Hannay’s question about the disconnect, this is an aside but I think it would actually be quite interesting to do a defence Euro barometer, a coherent polling on these issues, which I do not think has been done in the last five or six years, a specific thing to get a better sense of where the public actually stands. I would argue that clearly Parliamentary activity on these issues is very important, not just because it gives civil society an opportunity to engage with these issues, but also in general to raise awareness. While these things will all be helpful, one cannot find a way round the basic problem that large parts of the population are not in their daily lives worried by the things that this document is about and therefore politicians—I do not need to tell you this—will always find that a difficult case to make and also one that obviously competes with a lot more pressing ones. I do not think that is an excuse; I am just walking around your question, in a way, pointing out the difficulties of bridging that gap, because I do not think it can be done in the short run. I think it needs sustained, coherent explanation of why these things
matter to people here, whether it is because of crime, drugs or whatever the issue is that resonates. I think it needs coherent effort and I do not think we have seen that quite yet.

Professor Kaldor: I would just like to say I agree, we need both military and civil. I do think we should emphasise that the European Union has actually pioneered civilian crisis management and has made an important contribution in that respect. On the gap between the public and the lack of visibility, again, I would like to stress human security. First of all, what Euro barometers there are show that foreign and security policy are the most popular parts of the European Union, so making it more visible for those people who support the European Union could help the European Union. Secondly there is—and I think it is probably a good thing—within countries like Germany and Italy a great deal of opposition to the militarisation, what they see as the militarisation of the European Union or the defence component, but I think in those same countries there is a lot of support for the idea of human security understood as both military and civilian capabilities contributing to UN—there is a lot of support for the United Nations—contributing to crisis zones. I do not agree actually that European populations do not care because large parts of our population come from South Asia, from Muslim parts of the world, from Africa. We have a growing diaspora in Europe who have people back home who really care about what happens in those regions and will make a real impact on domestic politics. I just had to submit a paper to the French White Paper Commission and they want to go for strengthening a Europe de la défense. Why not strengthen a Europe de la sécurité humaine? That would bring on board a lot of countries and a lot of publics that are sceptical and worried about what they see could be a militarised superpower but at the same time who really want Europe to contribute to global security.

Q125 Chairman: Professor Kaldor, Professor Giegerich, thank you very much indeed. We really have appreciated the evidence both of you have given this morning. We could obviously have gone on a great deal longer on these very important points. Thank you again. If you think there are any things that you feel we ought to know and you wanted to send as anything else in writing, we would obviously be very happy to include it in our report. Thank you very much indeed.

Professor Kaldor: Thank you for inviting us.
Dr Giegerich: Thank you.
THURSDAY 19 JUNE 2008

Present

Anderson of Swansea, L.
Boyce, L.
Crickhowell, L.
Hamilton of Epsom, L.
Hannay of Chiswick, L.

Jones, L.
Roper, L. (Chairman)
Selkirk of Douglas, L.
Truscott, L.

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Professor François Heisbourg, International Institute for Strategic Studies; and Professor Alyson Bailes, University of Iceland, (via video conference), gave evidence.

Q126 Chairman: Professor Bailes and Professor Heisbourg, we are very grateful to both of you for being with the Committee today. We are carrying out an inquiry, as you know, on the European Security Strategy and a review which is taking place, and we have some questions which we would like to put to you, but I think, Professor Bailes, you would like to make an opening statement?

Professor Bailes: A very short one, thank you. I wanted to say that I found a tendency, especially among academics, to read the original Security Strategy out of context as if it had been handed down on tablets of stone. Of course it is a creature of its time, and any review carried out now is bound to be likewise. The first Strategy was quite fortunate in its timing because it was the vehicle of a kind of reconciliation, of the EU countries pulling themselves back together after the rifts on Iraq, and that helped to ensure that it would be quite bold and coherent; people would be on their best behaviour and not mess up the drafting too much, so to speak, but the downside was that the Strategy was heavily influenced by the USA’s new threats perception. It had to more or less take that as the starting point even if it then tempered it by reintroducing a concern about conflict as a bad thing, and, of course, offering some significantly different policy prescriptions. Now, if you look at the macro-environment today for reviewing the Strategy we do have more security concerns, perhaps a recrudescence of old East/West tensions, if I can use that as shorthand, and then new functional concerns about economic and financial stability, food supplies, energy, as well as climate change, continuing conflicts and so on. In logic that should push a review towards a wider and more comprehensive treatment of security problems. The hints I have, though, are that rather on the contrary there may be elements of caution in the approach of the Council machinery to this in Brussels which would lead them to play safe by focusing more on implementation in fields that clearly belong to external policies, CFSP and ESDP. It is partly that this review is being undertaken by the Council before the anticipated changes from the Lisbon Treaty, which would have blended in the Commission’s external roles and services and allowed a truly joint assessment: and, of course, the huge uncertainty now about what will happen to the Lisbon Treaty will be another feature pushing towards prudence. I think the upshot is that the drafters of the review will be very cautious about commenting on Pillar I matters, broader economic issues, energy and so forth in any kind of policy-relevant detail. We should also remember that the timing is wrong in the sense of absorbing the results of the United States presidential elections—by the time of the December European Council I think the full results of that will not be fully understood—and, finally, we should not forget that France itself, which will be holding the Presidency, got agreement in the EU to a larger review of the Union’s future mission and scope which was supposed to be carried out by a group of wise persons after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. It is not clear now, of course, what will happen to that either, but it might be that nations including France would want to reserve some of the meat, so to speak, for a review taking place outside all the traditional institutions of that other type. Thank you.

Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Bailes. Do any of my colleagues have any questions?

Q127 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I would very much like to come back on that. We seem to be completely locked into the whole idea that there should be a very view. Many of the people who have given evidence to us say that the existing Strategy is extremely clear, it reached agreement, but the real problem is implementation. Nobody seems to have considered that it might be a good idea not to review the Strategy at all, but merely to try and implement the one we already have.

Professor Bailes: Well, the Union is a bit like that; once somebody has had a good idea and it is adopted the trains have to run according to the timetable. Of course, one could not have foreseen the present problems over the Lisbon Treaty, but on the whole I would agree that it is not the best time to review, and I think my advice would be not to hope too much
from the review and, in particular, not to sink energies into it, particularly political energies or efforts for compromise, which are so much more needed on the real life agenda of the European Union at the moment.

Q128 Lord Anderson of Swansea: You make a powerful case for saying that the timing is wrong, wrong in terms of the United States’ election, wrong in terms of Lisbon and the wider review. The review does not have to take place by the end of the year: what the Council decides can be undecided. Is it your view that there should be some postponement of a review?

Professor Bailes: I think what might be more sensible is to see this as part of a longer term process, a string of beads, if you like. There are some components of updating especially the analysis in the Strategy or the ESDP implications, where sensible things could be said in December. I think the best thing would be to see that as a step along the road and expect that important further discussions would need to take place, especially next year.

Q129 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Well, the last review took place five years ago. Are you suggesting on your string of beads that there should be if not a continuous revolution, a continuous review, because clearly much has changed over that five years. Who can predict what will change over the next five?

Professor Bailes: I think this is a rather intriguing idea because, of course, any organisation with complex aims should have some kind of regular review process annually, as, for example, the board of an organisation would make such a review annually, and if you think about it there is not really institutional provision for that in the EU at the moment because Council and Commission have their separate planning units who think the big thoughts; it is not normally part of the Council schedule to sit back and have this kind of wider review. I suppose the Gymnich-type meetings of foreign ministers are the ones that come closest but one cannot expect the functional issues to be looked at really deeply, and I think it might be an interesting thing to ponder on whether this capacity for a well intellectually-supported rolling review would be something to build into the workings of the Union in future.

Q130 Chairman: Professor Heisbourg, do you have any comments on Professor Bailes’ opening remarks?

Professor Heisbourg: Absolutely. First, I would like to say “Hallo” to Alyson; I missed you in Reykjavik last week so we have an opportunity to make that up now! On the European Security Strategy, a few remarks. First, it is not a Security Strategy. I do not know whether you have heard the authors of the document, those who wrote it, but my understanding is that they did not intend to call it a European Security Strategy: that that subtitle came up as an afterthought. Because, indeed, it is not a strategy; it is a vision. It analyses the world and then goes on to state its vision of the manner in which the EU could present itself within that world, notably with the well-known concept of effective multilateralism, but it is not a strategy in the sense that it says: here are the means towards the end and this is how we are going to deploy those means towards those ends. I think it was an abus de langage to have called it a “Security Strategy”. Maybe it is a good time to start doing one. Secondly, on its own terms, and this is, indeed, a consequence of it not being a Security Strategy, the document was very weak on two key points. One was that it hardly ever talks about the United States of America. That was the fruit of the circumstances back in 2003. What Alyson Bailes just said about the mood of the times, this was the opportunity to make up. So nobody was going to ask hard questions as to what the positioning of the EU and its members on the one hand, and of the United States on the other, vis-à-vis each other, should be in the future. The second shortcoming is that although the threat of global terrorism was well known at the time—yes, it was drafted before Madrid and before London but 9/11 certainly had been there before and we had all had to face terrorist attempts previously to the document being drafted—it hardly says anything about homeland security and defence of the Union, which one would normally assume to be a major element or one strategy. Look at the American Security Strategy, look at the French Security Strategy, which has just come out, or, indeed, look at your own National Security Strategy document, which just came out also. Lastly, and this point is very much a third way in favour of, indeed, revisiting the whole thing, the European Security Strategy document was possibly the last major document of the post Cold War era. The post Cold War era is over. Asia has risen and is continuing to rise: globalisation, a globalisation which is not driven by the United States in particular or by the West in general, new structures and is the overriding, overwhelming feature of the international security landscape. You do not get any sense of that if you look at Solana’s otherwise excellent document. It was quite good as a vision at the time it was written but that was five years ago, and in five years a lot has happened. As for review processes, I completely agree. In the French case the notion is we are going to review our Security Strategy every four years, and I think that is reasonably sensible.

Q131 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Professor Heisbourg, do you accept Professor Bailes’ prospect that a review may lead to a rather weaker document
than we now have, and may go backwards rather than forwards?  
Professor Heisbourg: I do not know; you will not know until you try. Maybe there is so much disagreement between EU members as to what the world is like and what we should do about it, but somehow I would be surprised. Is there very much in the United Kingdom National Security Strategy document or in the French National strategy document which other Member States would strenuously disagree with, in terms of those elements of possible commonality at the European level? I am not sure. Whether it is possible to go very far in a real Security Strategy we do not know, but I think it is worth testing. In any case the 2003 vision we have is really overtaken by events. It fulfilled its role at the time when it was done: it no longer fulfils any identifiable purpose today. Just compare it to your National Security document or the French National Security document, and I think you will see the differences.

Q132 Chairman: Yours is certainly longer!  
Professor Heisbourg: But ours also has the bells and the whistles because it goes into the programmes and into the organisation, it fulfils a broader purpose, than the National Security Statement. The world really is as different from what it was five years ago as it is between today and the years which immediately followed the end of the Soviet Union. We had 10 or 15 years of the post Cold War era in which the west had its unipolar moment. That unipolar moment is over; the Solana document is still very much in the west unipolar moment mood.

Q133 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Another difference making it a child of its time, and I think Professor Bailes has argued also on this, is that it was done almost as a riposte to America. Since that time Europe has changed its leadership; we have Chancellor Merkel; President Sarkozy aiming full to rejoin NATO has a more balanced view, if I may say so, of the United States; the United States, under whatever President, is likely to take a more multilateral approach; Europe has far more tools at its disposal, so do you think we can draft a document with a more mature Europe, one not looking over its shoulder at the relationship with the United States? What should be the view of the US taken in the new document?  
Professor Heisbourg: If I apply the French approach, and it is one which may be extrapolated I think in the broader European context, the basic French approach today is to say “more NATO, more Europe”. That form of words is not used in the French White Paper but I think those four words summarise quite well the thrust of what we are trying to do. Now, that may be a mistaken proposition: that is, “more NATO” may not lead to “more Europe”, or the two may be incompatible, but the French are determined to try and see whether that proposition stands. The Americans certainly seem to be responding quite positively to this new French approach --

Q134 Lord Anderson of Swansea: It is a bilateral relationship!  
Professor Heisbourg: Not simply in terms of the bilateral relationship, which, of course, has improved, between France and the United States, but in the broader United States/European framework the Americans are essentially saying: “The more ESDP the better, the more NATO the better”. Now, it may be easier for the Americans to say than for you here in London, because for the Americans, as far as ESDP is concerned, it is essentially a political and a rhetorical issue; it is not one in which they pour money, resources, et cetera—they do that in NATO but they do not do that in the ESDP, for fairly obvious reasons—so they are responding very positively to this new French approach which is to leverage the move towards NATO as a means of also developing EU defence and security policy and capabilities and getting the two to work in synergy, and you do not hear the Americans any more using the sort of language they used 10 years ago when the British and the French launched a St Malo process and we had Mrs Albright coming out with all guns blazing—you remember the three Ds: Decoupling, Duplicating and Discriminating. Now the Americans rather seem to be saying “the more the better”, and that indeed seems to be quite sensible because, after all, the EU’s members and the EU as such constantly duplicate what the Americans are doing. I never heard the Americans complain about the British or the French buying main battle tanks on the pre-text of the Americans already having some. Well, it is the same with planning and command capabilities. The Americans used to complain about the Europeans wanting to acquire those because they already had them and NATO already had them. Now the language is “the more the better”; it is no longer the sour grapes approach of some years ago. I very much hope that this will also be the view taken in this country because what you decide to do in the field of defence and security policy is key to whatever can happen in the European Union, and, to speak very bluntly, there are two serious countries in this field in the European Union and that is Britain and France.

Q135 Chairman: You once described them as the two extrovert countries in Europe, I think.  
Professor Heisbourg: Indeed.

Q136 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I want to revisit a couple of points that have come up so far, and first about the timing not being particularly good. Surely

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**2003 European Security Strategy**

The review of the 2003 European Security Strategy: Evidence

**19 June 2008**

Professor François Heisbourg and Professor Alyson Bailes
the answer is that the timing is never particularly good to do something like this, and if you want to step back to get further ahead you have to accept that there will be some negative factors around. I do not know if either of you can comment but it seems to me that the timing and the idea of revisiting this Strategy probably about every five years is the right one. The second point is that the timing in regard to the United States would seem to me, but I would like you to comment on this, rather good. It is no bad thing, surely, that the incoming President of the United States should have some idea of the direction in security issues that the Europeans would wish to go and what effort they are prepared to put into it. Of course, a Strategy cannot be a fait accompli or anything like that, but it seems to me it ought not necessarily to be unwelcome to the incoming President of the United States to know that.

Q137 Chairman: Professor Bailes, could I ask you first to comment on that, and make any other remarks you have on what we have just been saying? Professor Bailes: Thank you. I think these last points are sound ones, and there is another sense in which I would not want the development of the EU’s actual activities in the world to go on for too long without a higher level strategic review. There have been enormous changes in the ESDP since 2003; there have been a much wider range of missions, and many of us have felt that, because the original Strategy did not give terribly clear prescriptions, a lot of what has happened has been improvised. It is not particularly clear what the principles and priorities are that lead us to go into one particular mission and not another. That is just one small example, and I think you could find examples in other fields of external policy where it is time to stop just doing things and sit down and think for a moment. I do not at all disagree with that. I also agree with the second point and with what François was saying just before, that there is now a chance to give positive signals both towards the United States in terms of the direct EU/United States partnership and also on the EU/NATO relationship, which was too difficult to be talked about very much in the first Strategy. It is not exactly a bed of roses now but I think the development in French policy has very much tipped that issue towards the positive side, and, indeed, I would take François’ argument on this one stage further. If we say “more NATO and more Europe”, I would also support “more NATO and more Europe” as distinct from more rushing out into the world to do things, which has been very much the theme of the last five years and supported by this rather West-centric top-down approach of the EU strategy itself. We have fallen badly on our faces in some of those ventures but, perhaps more important, I think we have neglected many European issues. We cannot pretend that the dossier of enlargement, for instance, is in terribly good state at the moment; and EU/Russia relations are, frankly, a mess, although there may be some faint hope now of getting them better on track. I do not mean this at all in contradiction to what François was stressing about the rise of Asia, the multipolar world, but it is rather the very common sense remark that Europe is not going to find its right place in the world unless it clears up conditions in its own home space, and its home space, first of all, involves the Euro/Atlantic relationship and, secondly, the Eurasian relationship, if I can put it that way, which covers relations both with Russia and the Middle East. Finally, although I hope a review of the Strategy and any new statement will give proper weight to that last set of points I have been talking about, I think it is not the moment to launch the big new idea, particularly on the Euro/Atlantic partnership. We cannot guess what packaging a new United States President will use for positive ideas, even if we hope that the ideas will be positive and we have some idea what they are. The fact is that the improvements in EU/US relations over the last four years which have been considerable have come very much out of prudence, exhaustion, out of neither side really wanting a fight and both realising that they are, after all, among each other’s best partners. It has not taken place in the framework of a new big idea to relaunch this relationship for the post Cold War period, and I still think that December 2008, before we have fully heard the voice of the new United States President, or perhaps, even, the new Russian President, is not the right moment for the EU to wager everything on some hastily prepared new concept.

Professor Heisbourg: I cannot refrain from reacting to the comment about hearing the voice of the Russian President—we may have to wait rather long to hear it! Seriously: the issue of timing does not bother me in terms of the relationship with the US. Both American candidates have gone out of their way to demonstrate their multilateral bona fides. There have been some very remarkable pieces by McCain and Lieberman, more in the Asian press actually than in the European press, on this score, and yes, I think it would be quite nice to have a thoughtful EU document coming out with, indeed, a reasonable and civilised discussion of the relationship between the EU and the US/NATO which I think we can undertake now. We are no longer in 2003.

Professor Bailes: Agreed.

Professor Heisbourg: Of course, timing in other respects is atrocious because of the Irish referendum which obviously forces people to worry about other stuff and so on, but I agree with David Hannay that timing is never good, and I really do not see why we should not embark on this venture. It may be more difficult; it may take more time than one would want. That is, if one sees that six months is not enough then
and therefore, like it or not, we are going to be drawn into distant conflicts, some of which, like Afghanistan, will be highly relevant to our streets and some of which, like Congo, are irrelevant but we are there for almost moral purposes.

Professor Heisbourg: Indeed. First, on Afghanistan, I entirely agree, and what bothers me is that European assets have not been marshalled in a coherent manner. That is we did the usual thing, using the military as an armed component for external purposes, but we never came up with an integrated strategy which would have included the sort of point which you mention. On marshalling the assets, for example, the Commission in Brussels, here the Irish “No” is a bit of a tragedy because the Lisbon Treaty would have made it considerably easier to bring together the assets of the Commission and of the Council and of the Member States, bringing together the civilian and the military means of operation. As for the Congo, I was very much in favour of the war in Kosovo so I do not have any hang-ups about some of the things we did, I do have hang-ups about some of the things we did not do like Rwanda. Because of the way the world has changed, that is we no longer write the rule book is only beginning to sink in. R2P, second part of our illusion, but the first part of what was not an illusion at the time but was the ability to write the rule book is only beginning to sink in. R2P.
Responsibility to Protect, was possibly the crowning point of what the West was able to push through the multilateral system, and our battle now is to make sure that R2P can exist; we are not going to be in a position to go beyond it.

Q139 Chairman: Professor Bailes, have you any further comment on Lord Anderson’s last question? Professor Bailes: The only thing I would like to say is that I think François is absolutely right and paradoxically, if we looked at interventions abroad more in terms of self-interest, if we scrape away a little bit more of the traditional peace-keeping veneer and say what changes we want from Europe’s point of view, we would immediately see that those changes can only in a small part, if at all, be provoked by the use of European military force. In other words, we should be moving towards more intervention in the world but less military intervention, considering how all the other very considerable resources of the EU—the economic/financial influence, the development aid, the technology—are going to be deployed to change situations abroad in the way that is good both for people there and for ourselves.

Q140 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. Professor Heisbourg, how do you think the French Presidency will take forward the work on reviewing the European Security Strategy, and we have already had some comment on this but how far is the work of your own Commission and the new French White Book on defence and security relevant to the review of the Strategy? Professor Heisbourg: The second one is easier to answer than the first. I was not and am not involved—and I am very grateful for that I would add—in the minutiae of the preparation of the EU Presidency. We were entrusted in the commission of the White Paper to project ourselves 15 to 20 years ahead, which has its own difficulties, but we were spared from having to prepare the timetable for the six months of the French EU Presidency, so I will ask for a pass on the first part of your question. On the second part, yes, there are a number of links, both in terms of the analysis and in terms of prescriptions. In terms of the analysis much of what I said would lead you to the conclusion that the European Security Strategy paper should, indeed, be rewritten with a view to factoring in the two major strategic upsets which have heralded the end of the post Cold War era. One, of course—possibly not the most important one but in symbolic terms it certainly was very important—is 9/11, the power of non State actors with an ability to wreak mass destruction in countries which had thought themselves to be rather invulnerable to major grief during what we will probably see in the future as the golden years of the brief post Cold War era. The second thing which has happened which is of greater moment and, indeed, helps to explain the first one, is indeed globalisation, and what I have called in one of your newspapers this morning the “dewesternisation” of globalisation. That is, the dynamo of globalisation is no longer western, it is no longer American; it is truly global, and Asia in economic terms and in terms of strategic importance, is now very much at the pivot of that system, so since we have projected ourselves 15/10 years ahead we go into rather more detail on those issues, and some of that analysis I have no doubt could quite readily be recycled, and I use the word in a positive sense obviously, into a European endeavour, because that analysis is hardly country specific. There are a few items which are French specific but most of them are not. We also should not lose sight of some of the good ideas we may have had in the past, and the European Union at the same time. Alyson reminded us of the historical circumstances under which the European Security Strategy document was drafted in 2003 on the heels of the Iraq crisis, at the beginning of the war, actually, since the first drafting took place at the time, but something else happened at the same time and that concerned the headline goals adopted as a result of St Malo, and on the European scale at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. Those headline goals, which were very largely the fruit of British and French thinking went, to speak American, AWOL. They disappeared. They evaporated. And in particular the suggestion that the Europeans should be able collectively—drawing, of course, on the resources of the Member States—if it was thought necessary to have a European operation, to project 60,000 soldiers within a period of a number of months for a duration of a year or more in demanding circumstances. That has completely disappeared to the benefit of what I would call the rationalisation of the success of our operation in the Congo in 2003, and that is the battle group concept, the “1500 guys”. Now, the French and the Brits are very good at this sort of stuff, small groups of soldiers, moving very quickly, acting decisively and then going home—you did it in Sierra Leone, we did it in the Congo, we are very good at that—but if we are facing a major contingency which threatens our livelihood and our security such as a major war driven by, I do not know, Iran’s nuclear ambition, the convergence of the numerous conflicts in the Middle East if we have a major contingency in or around the Persian Gulf, surely a few battle groups will not be an adequate response, and it is quite important for us, if we are thinking strategically and not simply about describing visions, to come back to the 60,000 figure, which is quite realistic. The French national commitment is 30,000, and it is fleshed in in rather more detail than our previous commitments have been, and historically the Brits have certainly...
demonstrated they could send more than 30,000 chaps out on a muscular foreign intervention. So the notion that the EU should, as a body, be able to martial 60,000 soldiers and the relevant air and naval assets does not strike me as being unrealistic or out of sync with our even admittedly rather lethargic defence spending.

Q141 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: It sounds as if you agree with our previous witnesses that much of the existing Strategy document has been ignored by the nation states. If we rewrite it, why will they not ignore the next one as well?

Professor Heisbourg: That is a very good question and I do not know if there is a good answer to that, but still, I would prefer for us to have a commitment which is well crafted, well drafted, and makes sense, to which the attention of people can be drawn, that one should be able to bring in the shame factor, but, of course, in the case of the Solana document the shame factor could hardly operate because it is not a strategy; it is a vision. What is there to implement? One could accuse Romania or France or Sweden of not fulfilling the commitment to deliver effective multilateralism. That is rather vague and unprovable --

Professor Bailes: Yes.

Professor Heisbourg: As I say it is a vision, not a strategy. There is nothing in there which commits people, something which you can put in their face and say: “Hey, you said 60,000 and you are not delivering”, which is why I made the little point about the headline goal. The Brits went into Iraq, the French did the opposite, and the two of us together lost sight of what we had decided to do in the previous years. The number of meetings which took place between ‘99 and 2002, the force generating meetings, the European capabilities, exercises, etcetera—we were rather serious, along with some of our partners, to fulfil the headline goal, and then we just lost sight of it, and, as you know, the biggest strategic sin one can commit is to forget what one is trying to do.

Q142 Lord Truscott: You mentioned the battle groups and also Rwanda and the role of battle groups going in and being very good at short-term operations, but that raised a question with me about the question of political will, because if political will is lacking then really the ESS is pretty meaningless, is it not, and we see that really with NATO’s operations in Afghanistan, where you have the Germans unwilling to commit troops to the areas where they are most likely come into contact with the Taliban. If there is not political will to have a meaningful Security Strategy, then really drawing up pieces of paper is a waste of time, is it not?

Professor Heisbourg: No. I know it is a popular sport to beat up on the Germans in Afghanistan, including in my own country—as you know, we are not quite so timid about the use of force—and I would like to do a bit of a plaidoyer for the Germans. When we collectively decided on 12 September 2001 in the Security Council in the framework of a unanimous vote, and people can forget that, to authorise the military operations against those who had been harbouring and helping and abetting those who had committed the atrocities of 9/11, what happened? Two things. One was that there was a military operation under the operational control of CENTCOM in the United States with the coalition of the willing and the able. The rules of engagement of that force were quite muscular, as was absolutely appropriate; the name of that game was clear, and there was no cavilling about it. Those who felt able to accept those rules of engagement went in and in the Rumsfeldian vision of the world—which I would add is not inaccurate in that case, that is, “the mission determines the coalition”—that went quite well. Secondly, we had a decision in early 2002 at the Bonn meeting to have a broad approach to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Kabul having fallen, Kandahar having fallen, the Taliban having been chased out, the major effort was to take a multilateral, civilian approach to Afghanistan with oodles of money and a lot of involvement from all sorts of people and heavy involvement from the UN being planned. But I think pretty much for the same reason as the one which led the European Union in 2003 to do the European Security Strategy as a manner of trying to save the wounds of the Iraq crisis—when NATO in 2003 started wanting to take over the Afghan show when nobody really wanted to have a fight about it—we, the French, had made ourselves so unpopular with our positioning on Iraq—rejecting the new American and NATO approach in Afghanistan would have been one fight too many. The Americans were in favour because they saw in greater NATO involvement the ability to spare resources for the “more important thing” which was, in their view, going on in Iraq, and NATO, of course, found here another way of proving its relevance and its raison d’être. This was very good for M de Hoop Scheffer. So we decided, instead of having a major multilateral effort with the UN at its pivot and with major involvement by the regional powers like Iran, Russia, China, India and so on, that we were going to do this all on our own, all 47,000 NATO troops which were eventually deployed in the country, and we took over most of the operations of Operation Enduring Freedom. I was against this. I considered it made more sense to have a NATO operation in Kabul with soft rules of engagement as an anchor for the broader multilateral venture in Afghanistan on the one hand, and to have the
muscular Al-Qaeda chasing operations along the borders of Pakistan under American operational control. The French Special Forces were very happy to operate in that American run, very high intensity environment. Well, that show was eventually wound down in favour of NATO taking over, and now we have NATO saying “Ah, but we are not really able to do it”, et cetera, et cetera. I think we really made a big, big mistake. And our German friends? When they went into Afghanistan it was part of a stabilisation operation; it was not part of a muscular rules-of-engagement type operation. Their Bundestag, their Parliament, had not sent their forces under that brief. Yes, it is very irritating to have caveats, but then we all have our caveats. I remember the British caveat in Kosovo when General Wesley Clark wanted to tell General Michael Jackson he had to go to Pristina to head off the Russians first and Michael Jackson answered if I recall well that (a) he was taking orders from 10 Downing Street and (b) he was not starting a Third World war with Russia. Yes, we all have our caveats; we do not like it when the rules of the game somehow change. If there is criticism to be levelled at the Germans it is that they accepted to go along with the change of plan in Afghanistan in 2003–04, and that is the area at which I would dig at them, rather than, “Ah, well they do not want to do the brave sorts of things the Brits and the Canadians are doing”. It was not part of the contract.

Q143 Chairman: Professor Bailes, I would like us to get back to some of the questions on the European Security Strategy but obviously, if you have any comments, please make them now. Professor Bailes: Thank you. I will try to be very brief. I think it is a little unfair in a way to complain about the Strategy not directly guiding national actions. It would not have been practical to have a document as succinct as just 13 pages, and as comprehensive as it is, indeed it should have been more so, yet at the same time being specific enough to be cited, as it were, in national decisions. It is in that way not at all comparable to the United States National Security Strategy that had been produced a while before which was an administrative programme for a single nation state fully under the control of the people who wrote the Strategy. In fact, any instructions in the Strategy are primarily directed to the collective institutions of the Union and the way that collective assets are used, collective policies managed. And even from that point of view we should bear in mind that the Strategy, and, I am sure, any successor to it, are political documents which under the EU system of governance cannot have a nature that creates new law in member countries and cannot have a nature that releases new funds, either in member countries or at the centre. So if we are going to be fair in looking at the impact on national policy we should look at it more in terms of a general inspiration, and I think the Strategy did inspire countries to try to be on their better behaviour, at least for a couple of years afterwards, and perhaps that was one reason why the Germans were willing to do as much in Afghanistan as they did; that is one reason, as François has quite clearly hinted, why France did not stir up any major debates in NATO afterwards. So if you look at that wider effect on national behaviour, some kind of effect is there, it was positive, and I think it will be the trick—but it will be much harder now—to try to get a similar broad inspirational force flowing from any revised concept of the Union.

Lord Boyce: Alyson answered a question about whether greater emphasis should be placed on terrorism, given what has happened within the years 2004 and 2005 within the US, but I think you have answered that question already, Professor, and I do not want to labour the question unless you have anything else to add? You mentioned how much has changed in the five years since 2003, particularly in Europe, but, as I say, I think you have probably already covered that.

Q144 Chairman: Professor Bailes? Professor Bailes: I agree with what has been said. If anything, the 2003 document spent too many pages on terrorism in relation to other things. I think what François has said about, as it were, the internal security agenda of the Europeans is very compelling and it is a fact that that agenda was not covered in full. The Strategy spent a lot of words, for instance, on WMD events involving terrorism: it did not really talk about the more general concerns of Europeans, law and order on the streets, community relations, employment, economic/ financial instability, security of infrastructure, for example, so, if anything, terrorism rather enjoyed its day at the expense of those other things. That said, I think the line taken on it in that Strategy was sensible: the line taken in the detailed sub-Strategy that followed was sensible, and, as we know, the real problems are not there at that level in the formulation of policy: the real problems at European level are in the difficulty of co-ordinating the different instruments. Co-ordination between the Second and Third Pillar is still a huge problem, including such booby-trapped questions as what is the role of military force in handling that agenda, on which I think France and Britain would lean one way and many others would lean another when it comes to internal security. And then of course, when you move out to the nation states, despite the horrific terrorist events that have happened since 2003, we still face a fundamental difference of experience of these problems and a fundamental difference, therefore, in the priority that different Member States...
will accord to them and the amount of sacrifices they are prepared to make for them.

Professor Heisbourg: Very briefly, the Solana document talks a lot about terrorism but, indeed, it does not draw the conclusions one would normally have expected it to draw in terms of the efforts to be made within the European Union. This was supposed to be a European Security Strategy; it was not supposed to be a European external security strategy, or only an external security strategy. Now, of course, the medium is the message and the medium here was Javier Solana and his people whose job within the European Union is to worry about common, foreign and security policy, security being a sub-set of foreign policy not something different from foreign policy, and that I think is one of the real problems of the European Union, that it does tend to deal with security and defence as a sub-set of foreign policy, but they are not a sub-set. Indeed, one could rather turn the proposition around to the point made by Lord Anderson a few minutes ago about Afghanistan: how do you tie together what one is doing in terms of preventing terrorism within our countries and what we are doing to prevent terrorism outside of our countries? That is the integration of a strategy, and it is not a foreign policy; it is a security policy. A foreign or defence policy in that respect is actually a sub-set of security policy. Another point is that here in Britain you have been accustomed, because of the troubles in Ireland, to having domestic contingencies as one of the major tasks of your Armed Forces. You had in Ulster for a period of about 30 years somewhere between, and I speak under your collective control, somewhere between 10 and 15,000 soldiers, which is not an inconsiderable number, so the notion that in your planning you will make a space in your military policy for homeland contingency is one you are completely familiar with. This is not the case for most of the European countries, and one of the innovations in the French paper which has just come out is to earmark 10,000 military personnel in order to deal with domestic contingencies, be they, and this is another important point, of a terrorist nature, a major terrorist act, or of an unintentional nature, because one of the characteristics of the age of globalisation is that unintentional events, initially of local or minor import, can very rapidly become a global and major concern. When we had the SARS epidemic in 2003, at the time of the Iraq invasion, a new virus crops up unexpectedly in a remote part of China and within the next three months you are on the verge of a global crisis. For those of us who travelled at the time, in Singapore, for example, the defence forces were mobilised in order to try to ensure a reasonably free flow of people through their airport and, if they had not been able to do that, Singapore would have shut down. We all have been making preparations for the interhuman transmission of bird ‘flu in our countries. Those sort of contingencies have become not prime force dimensioners but at least second level force dimensioners; certainly not third or fourth level. They become quite important, and that is also part of the new age.

Q145 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: You mentioned, Professor Heisbourg, the question of Responsibility to Protect, which is a doctrine which was only endorsed by the United Nations after the 2003 Security Strategy was promulgated and which, up until now, has remained really words on paper with great difficulty in articulating it or, to use an appalling phrase, operationalising it, and that has been most recently demonstrated in the case of Burma and the cyclone. I think you were saying that, although this was perhaps the last phase of an earlier era, that is to say, the one in which the West set the agenda, it is nevertheless something which needs to be taken seriously.

Professor Heisbourg: True.

Q146 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My question really is this. Do you think the review of the Security Strategy should get involved in how the European Union should articulate its response to Responsibility to Protect and in particular, if you agree with this, how can it turn it from being a purely military concept into a multifaceted concept that starts at the diplomatic end of the spectrum and only works along it to the military as a very last resort? Could you comment on bit on that, because it is an area we are looking at?

Professor Heisbourg: The short answer to your first question is yes, it should definitely be in there. “R2P” is tremendously important. I certainly do not want to have given the impression earlier that I was considering that it was unimportant; it is extremely important. My point simply was that we are going to have great trouble delivering on what we have committed ourselves to, and we should not fool ourselves about any possibilities of having a broad interpretation or a broad mandate in terms of R2P. What happened in Burma last month gave some quite clear indications as to what the response of most of the world would be if we really tried to have a broad interpretation of R2P. That is the first point. If we do talk about it in the European Security Strategy I would make three recommendations. The first would be to acknowledge that there are narrow limits to what the European Union and other industrialised countries can do in terms of long-lasting military provisions, for example, Britain and France. Britain made a major effort in the war in Iraq, Operation Telic and subsequent operations, and you are one of the prime movers in Afghanistan. That has been achieved by essentially removing you
from every other theatre. You are no longer a presence in the ESDP operations, a meaningful presence: you are no longer a meaningful presence in UN operations. That is the reality. The French? Well, we have, in a way, the opposite problem. We are currently present in eight different operations involving more than one thousand soldiers on foreign interventions. That is too many; we cannot sustain that rate; some are of questionable value. No, we are going to have to be more selective and, indeed, the word “selectivity” is used on a number of occasions in the White Paper and is buttressed by two things: one is the definition of guidelines for foreign operations—not procustian guidelines, nothing is cast in bronze, but still guidelines which a political leader will have to respond to if he wants to send a French military operation to Greenland or to Patagonia—and the second one is to have Parliamentary authorisation of operations lasting more than four months, to put them to a vote, which presumably would introduce a bit more viscosity and to make it more difficult to run off on every peace-keeping errand around. Secondly, if one accepts we are going to have to be more selective, then we are going to have to introduce a much more deliberate interface between the EU’s military—as well as civilian, but here for the moment I am essentially on the military—assets and the broader UN or ad hoc force providers from countries whose competitive advantage is in the number of boots they can put on the ground. I talked about one of the operations in the Congo which was Artemis; the other operation in the Congo was an election organisation operation where the Europeans formed the core set of a much larger UN operation. So the Kosovo model, if I can put it that way—and it was a model, I am not criticising what we did in Kosovo, although criticism may be due, or in Bosnia—we are going to have to move away from those models to something rather different, and here I think the harbingers really are these two operations in the Congo, one with the French in the lead and the other with the Germans, by the way, having been in the lead, and the second one was just as successful in its own terms as the first one. Lastly, the multifaceted nature of R2P—and here we go back to the Lisbon Treaty—gives some prospect of the European Union being able to pull together in doctrinal, in organisational terms, the vast array of very different assets that it has at its disposal under various institutional incarnations, and, indeed, the ability to project an integrated package of civilian and non civilian capabilities adapted to whatever contingency we are dealing with is something which the EU has really to work on very hard. That is where the vision should become a strategy. There are some pointers on that European score in the French Defence White Paper, but only pointers. There is a lot more work to be done there.

**Professor Bailes:** I profited from a good discussion on this with experts in Brussels a couple of weeks ago at the European Policy Centre, and what we did there was to think through the three parts of the Strategy document which are diagnosis, desiderata and directions for action. It was rightly suggested that in the diagnosis, the way the original Strategy was drawn up used a kind of human security analysis. Pointing out that social and economic problems, problems of human rights and welfare are directly linked with security, and that security problems can only be solved if you address that linkage, is pure human security thinking: and I think to introduce the concept specifically at the level of analysis would do no harm; in fact, it would bring intellectual coherence. When it comes to desiderata, I think it would be strange if the EU could not go as far as the UN’s 2005 Summit document in its formulation of the Responsibility to Protect—after all, all the European countries agreed there: and as a sort of sub-desideratum, I think it would be right also that when the EU does intervene, the manner and the micro-composition of what it does should reflect ideas of human security. Indeed, the micro-prescriptions of the famous Barcelona report of Professor Kaldor are realistic and useful prescriptions and point to some of the present weaknesses, for instance, in the EU’s civil military co-ordination. It is when it comes to directions for action that I would be more cautious, and I agree here with the point that Lord Hannay himself originally made, that we should seek human security through a co-ordinated strategy with a complete range of instruments. Very often the ESDP instrument is not the right one; and conversely it would be quite unrealistic but also wrong in principle to say that human security is the only goal of the ESDP or the only use of military resources. First, they could serve the human security of our own populations here at home, which is, by the way, an association of words you do not often hear except perhaps in northern Europe where human security is called “societal security”; and François has already talked about several different ways in which military or security resources could be deployed here. I also want to say that there could be other self-interested but legitimate reasons for ESDP operations, for instance, rescue of citizens, support for border controls, guarding sea lanes and so forth. So in a nutshell what I am saying is yes, use the concept in many ways, but do not link it tightly or too tightly to ESDP as such, because that is in a sense the link that is least useful and sustainable in practical but perhaps even in theoretical terms.

**Lord Crickhowell:** I am going to ask my first question to Professor Bailes, if I may. Does the issue of energy security need to be better addressed in the European Security Strategy, and if so how? I want to
hang on to that question which seems to be emerging as a pretty central question. You, Professor, right at the start, said that the European Council was likely to be cautious about extending into these broader areas, and Professor Heisbourg asked the question what defence and security is all about? It seems to me we are in danger of spreading into economic and infrastructure management areas which are not necessarily anything to do strictly with the European Security Strategy or vision. Indeed last week Professor Mary Kaldor, agreeing with that, said that the real energy issue was not the threat that we might be cut off from energy in Europe but that the energy producing states were themselves very vulnerable from what she described as resource scares; at the moment when their resources fall away they will be unstable states, and that was the real risk. Can you elaborate on this connection? What should be really part of the security issue, and what is actually something quite different?

Professor Bailes: I agree with every point that you have made there. Energy security was very underplayed in the original Strategy; it is staring us in the face today; it is, indeed, a complex issue and it hurts many people in the world other than ourselves. I myself am certainly preoccupied by this kind of North Sea disease of not only over-reliance on energy income but misuse of energy income that may be facing many of the prominent producers at the moment, not excluding Russia. I am also extremely concerned about the impact on the developing world, China, India, Brazil, whatever. At the analytical stage it is a cliché to stress how important these other major consumers are, but when you get to policy you do not usually find the corresponding section or chapter which is carefully devoted to what leverage does the EU have on them? What political institutional business or other solutions should the EU use in order to steer everyone’s reactions in the right direction? Having said all that, the point I made right at the beginning and which you referred back to is perhaps a much more petty and bureaucratic point than some of the noble Lords are allowing for. What I am saying is, if you look at the institution in Brussels that has been asked to draft this, at this point in time and the nature of the officials and the attitudes of the officials drafting it, they are not in the Commission, they are not the energy managers, they are not the people who will be pondering on the latest G8 decisions on this whole nexus: they are people who deal with CFSP, ESDP and whether those instruments are relevant to this particular set of challenges. Again, I would say, let’s not overestimate the importance of military assets or traditional assets in the security sense to this particular agenda; if we over-securitise it and over-militarise it in that way, we may fall into exactly the same pitfalls we did when we overmilitarised and oversecuritised terrorism and WMD back in 2003. So, in short, I would love to see the European Council make progress on these issues already in December, but coming back to my petty bureaucratic perspective, I do not think it is under the agenda item saying “Review of the European Security Strategy” that they are going to reach those political compromises and take those new initiatives they need to take.

Q148 Lord Crickhowell: I do not think it is a petty bureaucratic point at all. From the start I thought it was a very central essential point, if we are going to address security strategy, who should be doing it and how, and who should be addressing as their central objectives these important issues concerning energy and other matters?

Professor Heisbourg: Exactly. On the two points, because there are now two of them, first, on energy as such, I am old enough to remember when petrol rationing tickets were issued in France briefly after the Suez debacle in the early months of 1957. Threats to the provision of energy are definitely not new, they are a permanent recurring feature ever since the world economy has functioned at a global level, that is ever since the 16th century. When the 30 Years War was dependent on the transfer of silver and gold from the Andes to the Spanish armies here in Europe—it was not energy, or rather it was energy of a particular sort—that is what kept the war going, so we have five centuries of experience in this field! So we should not pretend it is a new issue and that we are all of a sudden rediscovering energy and energy security. Secondly, we should not use the word “security” in a lazy manner. Energy security, and I speak under the control of Admiral Boyce here, when we had the Pasteran shooting Silkworm missiles and laying mines in the Persian Gulf against the oil tankers which were at sea the West sent in a naval force. I hasten to add it was the first military operation in which some of those ships were operating under some sort of European command.

Professor Bailes: Yes, Western European Union.

Professor Heisbourg: Could it happen again? Yes, of course. That is energy security in the sense that I use the word “security” tacked on to the word “defence”. That is not the same as dealing with the general issue of whether the amount of oil being pumped is going to diminish because of this or that. On the question of who should be drafting, that is a very interesting question. The threat analysis, the “analysis of the world” part, is very much in Solana’s shop. The Bob Cooper of this world do it supremely well. For this you do not need to go to the Commission and you
would not want to go to the Commission. But if you are starting to flesh it out in terms of devising a strategy then you are probably going to want to pull in a wise man’s group in, I dare say a White Paper type approach. We do it at the national level and there is no particular reason why it should not be doable at the European level but, once again, Solana is about foreign and security policy, not about national defence or homeland security. It is not his job.

Professor Bailes: Yes.

Professor Heisbourg: As for the Commission, the Commission has assets and muscle, it has the ability to run things, it knows how to run stuff, but it does not know culturally, historically, organisationally, how to produce a strategy; and documents which are called Strategy such as the Commission’s Russia Strategy or China Strategy, because such documents exist, they are not strategies either. They are a catalogue of measures reflecting what different parts of the EU bureaucracy could do with China or Russia, and they are fine as they go but they are not about strategy, or else the word really does lose all meaning. So I would strongly advise, and John has heard this before in a different context, a Harmel-type approach, that is, you pull together a group of 20 people, you give them eight or nine months to work on it, and they come up with it.

Q149 Lord Jones: May I thank you, Professor Bailes, for your paper. I very much appreciated your reference to foreign ministers seeking to retrieve a unity. To what extent does the European Security Strategy address the issue of climate change and other drivers of insecurity, such as poverty, inequality, and poor governance?

Professor Bailes: The original strategy, so to speak, did its best on those issues. It tried to bring them into the picture of causation. There is a very important sentence in it where it has been talking about terrorism and the linkage with conflict, crime and so on, and it says that the roots of these problems also exist in our own society, and I think that was an important realisation for which there was no parallel, for example, in the United States documents at the time. These are common problems of humanity; they are ones we share; they are also ones to which we have contributed. That said, the original document was extremely weak in spelling out exactly what this set of broader, climatic, ecological, population, if you like, migratory problems were at the time: all those problems have become more complicated since; and it is clear to me that if one were to have a really good revision of the Strategy and a more comprehensive approach it would have to give far more space to those kinds of issues. What EU policy on this has particularly lacked up to now is a sober consideration of chains of consequence, if I can use that expression, particularly how a climate change feeds across into a food change, into a population change, into a migration change. A common factor on all those issues would be, for instance, the value of land, of cultivable and habitable land, and we see in the newspapers that Saudi Arabia is buying up large tracts of land on other continents. These are extraordinary changes in patterns of resource use and co-operation, which will be quite a stretch for a new strategy document to capture and deal with adequately. But, broadly speaking, I would like to see the EU think harder about those topics, whether it is in the context of the strategy exercise, whether in the context of a continuing dialogue on connections between security and development or, indeed, security, development and disarmament, for which the time is now very ripe. Just to throw in one other little angle that has not come up yet but may do so, namely the role of regional integration and organisation in other parts of the world: if you are looking for approaches to climate change or to any other of these more human factors in security which carry the spirit of multilateralism in other words, they are not zero sum, they are more than the sum of their parts, but on the other hand are really adjusted to local circumstances and in a legitimate way reflect local interests. I do not see anything much other than regional organisations which are going to achieve that. I think this theme of the EU thinking about its relationship to and support of such organisations was a theme that should have been brought out in the original Strategy and, hopefully, would be more brought out now.

Professor Heisbourg: Very quickly, it is tempting to try to build a world in which we have simple causations, one big event in a simple setting, leading to a fairly simple policy response, pretty much what we had during the Cold War. Climate change is not the functional equivalent of the Soviet Union, if I can put it that way.

Professor Bailes: Absolutely.

Professor Heisbourg: The real difficulty for us in the age of globalisation is to try to understand the connectivities between interacting causations. Let me take something as straightforwardly monocausal as the 2004 Tsunami. There is nothing more monocausal than that—earthquake under the surface of the earth provokes the phenomenon that we know and we have ever since the earth has existed. Nothing new, nothing complex. Yet what was important was not simply that it happened; what made it what it was was the patterns of urbanisation, what made it what it was was the pattern of deforestation, possibly the changes in sea level—I do not know—or you take Katrina. Simple causation, a hurricane. Well, what caused the causation and what made it bad? The nature of the urbanisation, the nature of the organisations which were dealing with
these sorts of contingencies, and so on. The real difficulty for us at the security policy level is to try to understand how the various challenges which we are facing are going to be interacting, and because the interactions are complex, because they are not straightforward, that is why we run this risk of constant strategic upsets. I mentioned SARS earlier on. Where did SARS come from? It took us as a short number of months, not years, to find out it came originally from a certain type of existence in a certain part of China between men and animals, et cetera, and at the other end, of course, what made it important was the phenomenon of globalisation with air transport, communications, with Toronto all of a sudden on the front line of a contingency which had originated in the backwoods of Guangdong province in China, and the conclusion you draw from that is not that you should not be interested in climate change per se or, indeed, in deforestation or in pollution or in patterns of urbanisation or in changing demographic evolution and so on. Of course you have to be, but from a security and defence standpoint what you are going to try to do is see what the connectivities are between these various issues and how they could lead under certain circumstances to the emergence of an actual threat, be it intentional or unintentional. Once again, I emphasise that. You talk about Katrina. The Americans had to send in their 82nd Airborne, like in Normandy in June 1944, and if somebody tells you that is not security—well, it certainly is. So let the IPCC work on climate change, but we have to be aware that what people in our neck of the woods really should be doing is to try to understand how these various phenomena can interact, generating a change in security circumstances. It is not simply looking at a mono cause with a mono effect.

Q150 Lord Crickhowell: I understand that those who are looking at security issues are looking at what the possible threats may be and emerge, but I come back to the organisation and European management issue. In fact, Europe is extremely active on climate change; it is one of its most active and some might argue most successful areas of intervention, though not all agree, but at least it is making a very strong attempt, and an international attempt which is spreading out from its efforts in Europe to the global world outside. I, again, find it quite difficult to know how, with all that activity going on, it effectively connects with the security thinking that you are saying should be addressed. Is there a connection and, if not, how is it to be made?

Professor Heisbourg: Just in one sentence, today the connection is not made in any deliberate manner in a European context. Should researchers be tasked with reflecting on the connections globally and regionally? The answer is yes. Can the European Union afford to do so? The answer is yes, too. These sorts of studies are not expensive but if you do not do them you are not going to get the product. Putting on a national hat for a moment, the French Defence White Paper, what is it that we put at the pivot of the national security? Is it what we call in French “connaissance et anticipation”, what I have translated as “knowledge-based security”—big words but what do they mean. That is, a premium on actually acquiring, processing and delivering knowledge of exactly the sort that you are talking about. That is at the premium; that is what makes our new Security Strategy basically different from the post Cold War strategy that we evolved in 1994, which served us quite well, which was dealing with the absence of the Soviet Union, a single American super power, and the West’s ability to call the shots, in every sense of that phrase, building on our ability to project professional military forces as the military component of that strategy. It is a very different world now.

Q151 Lord Selkirk of Douglas: May I ask Professor Bailes a question about the Strategy? Namely, should the Strategy contain stronger references to working with and building up the capacity, legitimacy and credibility of the international system, including the United Nations, as well as regional organisations such as the African Union?

Professor Bailes: This is a line of thought which I have already supported and which I think needs to be further developed as part of EU policy, and also perhaps a little bit more superficially of the EU’s profile. When we are within the EU we are perhaps more conscious of its fragmentation and the elements of national difference or incoherence that remain. From the outside it looks like the most interesting experiment yet in a collective approach to world problems, and there are many people working in institutions around the world, successful and unsuccessful institutions, who are looking to be inspired and helped by the EU. Interestingly enough, even in countries that do not seem to share our values very much, like China and sometimes Russia, often imitation is the sincerest form of flattery when they construct organisations like the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. By all means let’s retain this as a theme but I think if a revision of the Strategy is going to bring anything very new it has to be more than pious talk; it has to be capable of being operationalised. It is all very well for the EU to say it supports the UN but then not be able to swing the 2005 Summit in a direction that would have reflected our common disarmament aspirations, for example. If we are not going to be able to do that because of the limits of European influence in the UN, let’s not pretend we are going to. So I am in favour of an approach on this issue that is at the same time
idealistic and realistic, and I think also this may be an area where research and intellectual input into EU policy may have something to offer because there are a lot of academics around Europe and the world who are trying to conduct studies looking precisely at multilateralism as a force in the world today, just looking at the comparative experiences of regional organisations and their strengths and weaknesses. I think at the moment there is not a particular point in the Brussels machinery where one can input those ideas and have those debates because what tends to happen is that, let’s say, ASEAN is dealt with by a desk which is a long way away from the China desk; UN matters are very fragmented and dealt with by probably a 100 different desks in the EU. So I am afraid it is rather a vague answer but perhaps, to sum it up, if we are going to get from this prima facie idealised role of the EU in supporting multilateralism to specific moves that we should take, specific do’s and don’ts, we still have some missing mass in the middle and need a really good analysis to guide us. **Chairman:** Professor Heisbourg, can we go on to the next question, but Professor Bailes’ answer will be very useful to us when we go to Brussels next week.

**Q152 Lord Crickhowell:** Turning to implementation, the Strategy calls on the EU to be more active, capable and coherent, but perhaps for the time being we will have to wait and see whether the Lisbon Treaty will improve the coherence of EU external action because that is all rather on hold, for the reasons we know. But are there any other thoughts? We have already heard Lord Hamilton’s question about the fact that individual states are not perhaps taking much notice of the Strategy, or the vision, and not acting on it. Have you anything to add to what has already been said about implementation and making it more effective?

**Professor Heisbourg:** I would tend to focus, for reasons I will explain, on a couple of simple, understandable objectives, and here I take the short view, not the long one, the short-term perspective serving the long view, and notably using in the French case the opportunity of the EU Presidency and direction. The first thing is to reinstate the 60,000 headline goal. That is the tool which (a) sets you a goal towards which one is supposed to work and (b) it provides you with the catalogue which permits you to use the shame factor. So you have committed yourself to this, what have you done? It actually worked quite well at the very initial stages but, once again, this was a collateral victim of the Iraq crisis, and the Iraq crisis really created a very large cemetery of lost opportunities and initiatives. So, reinstate that one; it should not be a big political deal to do so since it would only require recalling that which we had already committed ourselves to, except that one would want to tag on to that a couple of force generation conferences and meetings and start changing people who would need to be shamed. The second thing, and this is very much Anglo/French, is the force planning capability of the EU. Now that the Americans no longer have any theological objection to it I think it would make a lot of sense to start to get moving on that one. Is it complex materially? Organisationally? No, it is not complicated materially. Is it difficult politically? Presumably yes, because we have been at loggerheads on this one for a number of years but, once again, circumstances have changed. The world has changed, the Americans have changed, the French have changed, and, indeed, others can change too. Thirdly, the only official hat I wear is White Paper/Commission; anything else comes from an analyst sticking off his mouth; so as far as renovation of the European Security Strategy is concerned I personally consider that there is no particular reason to want to rush it. That is, if you want to spend eight or 10 months to do it, you spend eight or 10 months to do it, and, as for the crafting of it, I simply re-state what I said earlier on, the Strategy part, the doing part, if I can put it that way, should not flow from Solana’s shop; it should be a broader-based endeavour, and the Wise Man’s approach would be the one I recommend. The last recommendation, but further down the road, is that it may be useful to start looking at what an EU defence capability’s White Paper could look like. This is not something urgent but if one restores a serious headline goal, if one has an effective European Security Strategy, then moving on towards the defence capabilities in the White Paper mode may be something one can do.

**Q153 Chairman:** Professor Bailes?

**Professor Bailes:** I would just like to add something at this practical level that François has stuck to, and I do agree with everything he says: that purely within the Second Pillar, and without getting into problems of competence, there is a lot more that can be done for civil-military cohesion in policy-making, in preventive work and on the ground. I think the group of people in authority in Brussels at the moment are grasping this and it needs to be pushed forward in parallel with the kind of military coherence which François is talking about if those assets are going to be used really well. If I could be just a little bit more general or ambitious—and jumping here over the issue of perhaps using the Lisbon Treaty reforms, which is, of course, perhaps the most crucial thing for coherence and external action—I think it could be interesting to bring into the intergovernmental discussion of strategy the question of how we work with private business actors, who are a very important force on all these new issues for ill and also potentially for good—and we are supposed to be the home of the free business model! Similarly with the role of NGOs, charities, citizens’ organisations and the empowerment of individuals to deal with their own
security, which is very much an issue here at home even without looking abroad: and, finally, the issue of the impact of new technologies on security, which has been pushed a long way in recent Commission studies, and European money has been directed to develop certain areas of technology seen as important for solving problems. The other side of that, however, which is possible misuse of new technology has been missed out somewhat by everybody, and perhaps should come more into the main strategic discussion.

Q154 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: This seems to be the week in which we all beat our breasts and tear our hair about the disconnect between European institutions and the electorate following the Irish referendum, and tidal waves of rhetoric are pouring into the press at the moment on this subject, but just taking this to the specifics we are talking about now all the opinion polling seems to show that there is quite widespread support for the generalities of the European Security Strategy, of a European Union that is reasonably active in this whole field, but at the same time there does not seem to be any understanding whatsoever of what that means in practice and it does not seem to be connected up. Could either of you suggest, first of all, if there is a new version of the Security Strategy in the next few months, how it could be socialised, to use that ghastly phrase, how it could be set out better and talked out with a wider range of people, including our own electorate? Because it is surely a weakness at the moment that this is a construct purely produced and owned by the elite?

Professor Bailes: I agree very much with the spirit of this question and also with the remark that there is no transmission line within the academy; let’s not waste more resources against my own interest I would say we have plenty of academic involvement; let’s not waste more resources on that. What I think could be the key to this is a point I made on the last question and that is, if we take a jump forward to saying that good non-state actors, European and foreign, are going to be part of the implementation and thus the ownership of a good new European Strategy, it becomes much easier to think of ways which may be fuzzy, flexible, new ways of getting all those constituencies and not just academics involved in the preliminary debate on the Strategy, and find ways to allow them to give evidence, as it were, in the different ways in which those different kinds of non-state actors might find most natural.

Professor Heisbourg: I do not think there is a serious chance of engaging with public opinion at large on these issues unless you give pride of place to the homeland security dimension. If it is not relevant in a fairly obvious way to the man in the street you are not going to engage the man in the street. You may engage this or that set of NGOs, this or that set of academics, but you are not going to engage the man in the street. If you take security issues, in my own country at least, I would argue that people were very well socialised, because there was a lot of media attention and the two fed into each other, when there was a decision to go ahead with the European arrest warrant, for example. This is something people understood, and which as relevant to them at the time the decision was made, but generating great public interest in a general Strategy document? Honestly, I do not see it. Let’s not try too hard to do something which is probably not achievable. Secondly, you very rightly emphasise that these were general expressions of support in the opinion polls and as soon as issues become specific things tend to change very easily. Opinion polls do not yield different results in Ireland, for example, in general terms on these issues, but I am not sure that deployment of the substantial number of Irish soldiers in the framework of a European force under an Irish general in Chad has been conclusive to a Yes vote in Ireland. If I look at the electoral material used by the No camp, this was a not an invisible part. The only part I saw was that which was visible on television; that included slogans about not being engaged in military commitments, so the specifics of the Irish tend to yield a different result from the generalities of the opinion polls vis-à-vis the same people.

Chairman: Can I thank both of you very much indeed for what has been a very rich session for us. We have gained an enormous amount and drawn upon the collective wisdom of a few people who, in different places, have played very active parts in the development of these ideas over a long time, as we have heard this morning. Thank you both very much.
THURSDAY 26 JUNE 2008

Present
Anderson of Swansea, L
Boyce, L
Chidgey, L
Crickhowell, L
Hamilton of Epsom, L

Hannay of Chiswick, L
Jones, L
Roper, L (Chairman)
Selkirk of Douglas, L

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr ANDREW MATHEWSON, Director, Policy on International Organisations, Mr BOB REGAN, Director, International Relations Group, Defence Equipment & Support and Mr IAN HALL, Head of Research Collaboration, Ministry of Defence gave evidence.

Q155 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Does the European Security Strategy’s assessment of strategic threats need revising or updating and to what extent does it mirror the analysis and recommendations of the UK’s National Security Strategy and NATO’s strategic planning documents?

Mr Mathewson: I know the Minister for Europe wrote to Lord Grenfell on the 26 May setting out the government’s position on the further work on the European Security Strategy so I would hesitate to elaborate too much on that but broadly we think the strategy is good and probably needs to be taken on rather than revised. There are factors now which did not feature as prominently in 2003 as they might have done if it was written today, like the security implications of climate change or development and inequality. We would like to see it taken forward, taken on and built upon. It is broadly consistent with the UK Security Strategy and we would expect to make it more coherent as the work progresses. Certainly we do see that ensuring maximum coherence with the European Security Strategy and any revision of the NATO strategic concept will be very important. There is a slight phasing issue since this work has not been done at the same time but we will certainly want to make sure that both are cross-referencing and coherent in the way they describe the security challenges we face and our responses.

Q156 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: That echoes what has been said to us by many of the witnesses who have appeared in front of us. They rather admire the existing document. It is pretty concise, relatively short and very clear and the real problem is that nobody has bothered, amongst the Member States, to enact it so implication is the big problem. It, therefore, raises the question whether we should actually do anything to revise this document which will tie up an awful lot of time. People are worrying about what should be added and what should not. A lot of compromises have to be made. It was even suggested that if we ended up with a new document it might be rather weaker than the one we already have. Would you agree with that?

Mr Mathewson: That is always the risk. It is often better to build on what we have. There are issues which might be difficult to find consensus on if the document were reopened at this time and that is a factor which will come into consideration in NATO’s strategic concept as well. I think it reads very well. It is a coherent document which was clearly the result of a single author consulting rather than the committee drafting that you often see so it does come across as a very coherent document. I think you are probably right that there is a challenge about implementation but the prescription in there for what European countries need to do is fairly clear.

Q157 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Would you agree with me that it is an opportunity to remind Member States of how little they are doing in terms of the European Security Strategy in terms of the defence budget and getting their act together, and it would be a complete distraction from leaning on them to actually implement what they have already agreed?

Mr Mathewson: I certainly agree with you that the real challenge is implementation. The real challenge is getting countries to do what we would think of as an adequate level in terms of responding to the challenges both in terms of investment in defence and making sure that investment in defence delivers the right outcomes: modernising our forces and acquiring modern relevant capability. If work to take forward the Security Strategy can increase the incentives and pressure on countries to do more in this area, then it is worthwhile. From conversations with French interlocutors, that is certainly what they have in mind. They want to see a clearer focus on capabilities coming out of this rather than just a drafting exercise for its own sake. They will be looking at how to focus on the capability challenges and to that extent we have the same agenda as they do.

Q158 Lord Crickhowell: The strategy calls on the EU to be more capable, and we have the French security proposal for a renewed drive for the deployment of up to 60,000 troops to a distant
theatre for the duration of one year, a proposal strongly urged as being desirable by one of our witnesses last week. Does the UK government agree with this proposal and what is the government’s position on the French proposal for the establishment of a permanent military EU headquarters? Can I add on the 60,000 proposal, I know it is an old one and it is being revived, but when I heard it pressed last week I must say I thought then, and I thought even more as I heard very senior people at the top of the military both at present there and those previously there talking about overstretch and the huge demands on our own forces; and when I think of the reluctance of other European members to join fully in some of the combat situations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. I had a certain scepticism about the practicality of it. That was merely a personal reaction but what is the view in government circles?

Mr Mathewson: We think this a very reasonable aspiration albeit that it should be seen in the longer term. You clearly recognise that this is an earlier aspiration that was set out in the Helsinki headline goal and this is our planning objective. This is not a proposal for a force but is an aspiration that the EU nations acting together should eventually be able to deploy 60,000 men for a year at 60 days’ notice and we think that is a very reasonable aspiration. A group of countries as wealthy as Western European countries in the EU should be able to do that. I think we should separate that from the challenges we face now. It is clearly not practical, given what we are going through in Afghanistan and in Iraq, to think of us contributing to a European Union force of that scale in the foreseeable future. Certainly I would acknowledge your reservations and your concerns about the challenge we face now but with any luck we will not be in that situation forever and it is a reasonable aspiration, we think, that Europe as a whole should plan to be able to do this. This is a reasonable level of ambition for Europe to be able to take on in the longer term and recognising the other commitments. There is a point in there that this should not be seen as in addition to NATO’s level of ambition. We need to understand that NATO talks about its level of ambition in terms of two major operations and six smaller operations and the EU talks about 60,000 men for a year. When they are talking about European forces they are talking about the same pool of forces and we must not allow these to become competitive levels of ambitions. We certainly would consider that the 60,000 men for a year is a reasonable challenge for the European members to aim at delivering, whether in support of NATO or the European Union.

Q159 Lord Crickhowell: How can it be a reasonable aspiration when we have heard repeatedly of falling budgets throughout the European Community and the challenges we face which, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, are not going to go away quickly and may be with us for a very long time? Does it make much sense to be talking in these terms when actually this is not going to happen. We certainly cannot make a significant contribution to it in the foreseeable future. Mr Mathewson: No, and I think that is where we have to separate the use of this figure as a planning target from any consideration that we are planning to do this in the near term. It is reasonable to think that the European countries in the EU could undertake a mission of this size. We have, at the moment, 12,000 men in the field between Iraq and Afghanistan. In a world where we are not contributing at such a significant scale we nationally could contribute, conceptually I have to say, at about that scale to distant operations. We ought to be challenging the other European nations to be doing more to develop their capacity to contribute at that scale. I should stress this is not a near term objective. This is a longer planning aspiration and we ought to be challenging our partners to be able to contribute in the same way we could.

Q160 Lord Crickhowell: What about the permanent military EU headquarters? Mr Mathewson: We still see no requirement, and at the moment we do not think the French are proposing it. They are talking about improving the ability to plan and conduct operations but we have not heard them talk recently about a permanent EU operational headquarters. If they did, we would still oppose it on the grounds that if this permanent EU headquarters is to be competent to conduct the full range of operations it is a substantial facility and we have those in our national inventories at Northwood, Potsdam and we have it at SHAPE. We would still regard a permanent EU operational headquarters capable of mounting this size of operation as an unnecessary duplication of what we have. I do not think at the moment the French are pressing it. They are looking rather more modestly at what are the lessons from Chad or the Congo two years ago about the EU’s ability to plan operations.

Chairman: Some of us are seeing General Leakey next week and we will be able to pursue this issue with him.

Q161 Lord Boyce: I am relieved to hear what you say about another permanent headquarters and it seems very sensible of the government to take that line. I am sorry to drive Lord Crickhowell’s nail out of sight but you try to avoid the question by saying we have a “now” situation and in the future things will not be so bad. The fact is for months, if not for years, we have trying to persuade other European partners, albeit under the NATO umbrella, to contribute more forces to Afghanistan, and for those who have some
in Afghanistan to contribute them more to combat operations, but they are not minded to do so. We have hundreds of thousands of people so-called under arms in the European nations, well over a million, and we cannot even drive out 1,000 let alone 60,000. I think Lord Crickhowell’s point is absolutely right. For us this is a “now” problem but for the majority of the European nations I cannot see any sign of them ever having the will to commit forces overseas and certainly not to commit forces to combat operations, other than Denmark within Europe and France.

**Mr Mathewson:** I certainly would not argue with anything you said there and I think that is the value of the target. We ought to be challenging countries. In some cases the problem is they have not invested in the deployable capability. We have over many years invested in deployable capability and we can sustain brigades in the field in Afghanistan but it is not something that every European nation could do and we ought to be challenging them to develop that capability. There is the question of the politics and that will vary from time to time. As at the level of planning objectives, I repeat this is a reasonable objective to be setting for European nations to be able to do. Afghanistan is a very good case in point and the European nations ought to be able to contribute them more to combat operations to Afghanistan as in Chad or any other theatre. I do not think there is any realistic prospect in the near term of Europe putting 60,000 men in the field for a year at 60 days’ notice.

**Lord Boyce:** I hope that eventually if that aspiration is put into paper and institutionalised there will be some case for saying if the European nations sign up to this now why are you not prepared to do something about contributing the manpower even if we provide the transport.

**Q162 Lord Selkirk of Douglas:** Do you think there has been an improvement in the somewhat difficult relationship between the European Union and NATO at all levels including both headquarters and operations in the field? Do you see the lack of co-operation proving to be an obstacle to the implementation of the European Security Strategy?

**Mr Mathewson:** My answer is there has been not enough of an improvement. There is modest progress. The way the French government, and certainly in the recent White Paper, now talks about seeing NATO and the EU as complementary is a great step forward. That is exactly what we have been talking about for many years, seeing NATO and the EU as complementary. They have had a slightly different vision but it is very helpful that they are now talking about EU and NATO being complementary. We are very encouraged that one of the first events the French will undertake in their presidency is a seminar on EU/NATO relations. It is good to see France getting behind this agenda and making it clear that they support closer working. The relationship has not improved enough. There are still serious problems based around the well understood issues about differing membership of the two institutions and about the ability of the two, therefore, to transfer information across. I think the comfort we can draw from this is that on the ground, in Afghanistan and Kosovo, sensible planners will seek out their opposite numbers and work with them, but at the political level in Brussels there is still not good enough co-operation and it is a point which ministers make regularly. I know the Secretary of State made it at the recent NATO defence ministerial meeting a couple of weeks ago that the level of co-operation between the two is not adequate and it is putting these operations at risk. I would not say it is a risk to the implementation of the European Security Strategy but I would say it is a risk to the success of the missions in question.

**Q163 Lord Selkirk of Douglas:** Is there likely to be more co-operation about non-combat roles than there is about combat roles? Have you found there is a distinction? I am thinking in particular of the Germans committing some troops to Afghanistan but far away from the combat.

**Mr Mathewson:** I think that takes us into a different area. That takes us into the question of national political appetite for particular operations rather than the question of the institutional co-operation between the two. Certainly it is the case that when they are looking at the commitment of forces to operations like Afghanistan, different countries have a different political appetite based upon their public and parliaments views about the extent of risk they are prepared to take. It is the very point Lord Boyce was making earlier, that we do not have the same level of either physical commitment in terms of the numbers they are offering or in terms of the risk they are prepared to wear. We would certainly like to see better burden sharing in terms of numbers and risk sharing in terms of everyone being prepared to take on the same operations.
energy security, economic insecurity and the threat of scene is much broader including climate change, own citizens, have evolved. What we see on the global threats to global security, and also the security of our time, we also have to recognise that the risks and approach to promote peace and security. At the same emphasis on the role of multilateralism is the best to come, unfortunately. Therefore, the Strategy's security and, of course, will remain so for a long time non-proliferation. They are key threats to our Strategy remains clearly valid, it is terrorism and also the security of our development questions remaining. Of course, I have known Lord Hannay for many, many years, and others, Lord Anderson of Swansea. I am very happy to see you personally today. Of course, I have known Lord Hannay for many, many years, and others, Lord Anderson of Swansea. I am very happy to see you. Let me make two remarks at the beginning and then I will go directly to your question. You know that the European Commission has been associated fully with the task of re-examining the implementation of the European Security Strategy and particularly working on that now. The core analysis of the 2003 Security Strategy remains clearly valid, it is terrorism and non-proliferation. They are key threats to our security and, of course, will remain so for a long time to come, unfortunately. Therefore, the Strategy’s emphasis on the role of multilateralism is the best approach to promote peace and security. At the same time, we also have to recognise that the risks and threats to global security, and also the security of our own citizens, have evolved. What we see on the global scene is much broader including climate change, energy security, economic insecurity and the threat of diseases, as well as in the last few months questions of foodstuffs and food security. If you think of bird flu, for instance, it has suddenly become a global issue. Also, questions of migration have to be taken into account. This is more or less what I want to see the Commission doing. In addressing these issues, as well as terrorism and non-proliferation, we should take into account more and more the fact that external and internal EU policies are being blurred. That is very important. We have seen this in the last few years and are working more and more on both issues. For instance, I personally work a lot on questions of energy security. We are going out and working on that as a very horizontal question. I also would like to say what the UK calls “drivers” in your paper about security in an interdependent world, from our standpoint is highly important also. Personally, I have always been involved in questions of human security where the citizen is the main focus of concern—if not for the citizens, for whom do we make these policies? I have always had this human-centred approach. This is what lies at the heart of what we would like to contribute. While there is a need to develop our analysis of threats and risks beyond CFSP, we should not develop a concept of security that is so wide that it embraces the whole of the EU’s external action. This is a healthy debate and there are still the development questions remaining. Under the French Presidency, as you know, the questions will continue. Let me now go into your first question.

Q164 Chairman: Commissioner, it is extremely kind of you to have found some time to see us. As you know, our Committee is carrying out an inquiry about the review of the European Security Strategy and we were very interested to come and get the views in RELEX and of yourself and we are very grateful you have brought your colleagues. We have a certain number of questions which I think you have had some indication of which we would like to talk to you about. I know you have to leave after half an hour but it may be possible for us to continue with Patrick and your colleague.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Absolutely.

Q165 Chairman: When they do speak, if they could say who they are so that we have got it on the record. Can I begin with the first question? How far do you feel that the existing Strategy provides a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the challenges, threats and risks facing the Union? Should the Strategy pay greater attention to the underlying political and socio-economic sources of threats in addition to the obvious symptoms?

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Let me welcome you, first of all. It is a great pleasure to meet you. On one of the last occasions, unfortunately, I was not there, therefore I am more enchanted to see you personally today. Of course, I have known Lord Hannay for many, many years, and others, Lord Anderson of Swansea. I am very happy to see you. Let me make two remarks at the beginning and then I will go directly to your question. You know that the European Commission has been associated fully with the task of re-examining the implementation of the European Security Strategy and particularly working on that now. The core analysis of the 2003 Security Strategy remains clearly valid, it is terrorism and non-proliferation. They are key threats to our security and, of course, will remain so for a long time to come, unfortunately. Therefore, the Strategy’s emphasis on the role of multilateralism is the best approach to promote peace and security. At the same time, we also have to recognise that the risks and threats to global security, and also the security of our own citizens, have evolved. What we see on the global scene is much broader including climate change, energy security, economic insecurity and the threat of diseases, as well as in the last few months questions of foodstuffs and food security. If you think of bird flu, for instance, it has suddenly become a global issue. Also, questions of migration have to be taken into account. This is more or less what I want to see the Commission doing. In addressing these issues, as well as terrorism and non-proliferation, we should take into account more and more the fact that external and internal EU policies are being blurred. That is very important. We have seen this in the last few years and are working more and more on both issues. For instance, I personally work a lot on questions of energy security. We are going out and working on that as a very horizontal question. I also would like to say what the UK calls “drivers” in your paper about security in an interdependent world, from our standpoint is highly important also. Personally, I have always been involved in questions of human security where the citizen is the main focus of concern—if not for the citizens, for whom do we make these policies? I have always had this human-centred approach. This is what lies at the heart of what we would like to contribute. While there is a need to develop our analysis of threats and risks beyond CFSP, we should not develop a concept of security that is so wide that it embraces the whole of the EU’s external action. This is a healthy debate and there are still the development questions remaining. Under the French Presidency, as you know, the questions will continue. Let me now go into your first question.

Q166 Chairman: Thank you.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Let me say that we should remember the context in which the European Security Strategy in 2003 was submitted. This was particularly created by the Iraq War and there it was essential to create a structure around which EU foreign policy could coalesce, come together again. It was essential to develop the EU’s ESDP capacities also, both civilian and military. This was reflected in the Council’s wish to reinforce the EU’s capacities to act in international affairs. We have contributed to that with a Communication called Europe in the World. While this Strategy of 2003 did refer to the global challenges and also the relationship between security and development, as well as energy
dependence, it focused on the threats directly affecting CFSP and also on reinforcing the concept of multilateralism within the United Nations. The threats and challenges we face today cannot be fully addressed, we think, within the confines of this relatively narrow definition of security and, therefore, we think it has to be broader. There is also a clearer understanding that threats and risks cannot be properly addressed if their underlying causes are not equally addressed. This is something I adhere to very much personally. I think it is important we have both a more coherent and more efficient Strategy and, therefore, it is good to go for the implementation of the Strategy.

Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.

Q167 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: One of the things that has happened since 2003 is that the United Nations has endorsed the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect”, which was in the Outcomes Document of the summit of 2005, along with very much the analysis you have just given us, which is that security issues go much wider than just WMD proliferation and terrorism.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: I think so.

Q168 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: “Responsibility to Protect”, having been announced in 2005 and endorsed by everyone, including all 27 Members of the European Union, has remained a pretty dead letter since then, it has proved very difficult to implement.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Yes, that is true.

Q169 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Each time the subject comes up, first of all there is this almost exclusive concentration on the military dimension, which is the last point you would reach if all else fails, and also there has been a great unwillingness to do anything about it. What I wanted to ask you was whether you thought the review of the Security Strategy should factor in “Responsibility to Protect” but also perhaps promote the idea that the European Union could play a role in reducing the tension around this issue and trying to get a more sophisticated, nuanced approach to applying “Responsibility to Protect” which does not leave us every time confronting the simple question, “Do you or do you not use military force?”

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: You are absolutely right in your first analysis. In Burma/Myanmar, the French at least have mentioned this idea of “Responsibility to Protect”, but what do you do? It may be too late at that stage because you can only go in with a military force and you cannot do these things like that. We support the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” which was endorsed at the 2005 UN World Summit. I was there and I remember it very well. What we should try to do is go for a “Responsibility to Prevent” first. That means going in the direction that you have mentioned. It is one of the most essential parts. Here the European Union can play a very strong role. We have Peace building Commission, the Council of Human Rights and all these matters are very important. Indeed, our soft diplomacy, which I sometimes call smart diplomacy, as well as the smart instruments that we have are very important. As I said, there is always an underlying root cause and we have to consider this much more. We have a lot of instruments, be it policy dialogue, development co-operation, external assistance, trade policy instruments, which are sometimes very important, social and economic policies, and cooperation with international partners but also with civil society. Indeed, we, the Commission, apply all of these instruments. In all fairness, I must say that sometimes we do not have the budget for everything, we could do much more. As you know, I have clear budget lines and I am implementing the country programmes. I would like to do more because very often if we changed these we would have much less to think concerning the “Responsibility to Protect”.

That said I think of Zimbabwe, Burma/Myanmar, there are areas where you think you are impotent, you cannot do anything, and when you try to do things and politically it is not enough.

Q170 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Commissioner, you have said that you believe the essential Strategy of 2003 at its core remains valid and perhaps, therefore, the picture just needs a few brushstrokes and a little emphasis here or there.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Exactly.

Q171 Lord Anderson of Swansea: One of those presumably is climate change which has achieved a greater salience since that time, and also what I suspect Tony Blair would have called insecurity and the causes of insecurity, poverty and climate change. Would you like to say a little more about those areas where you think there needs to be greater emphasis, more brushstrokes?

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Together with Javier Solana I produced a special paper which looked at the multiplying threat.

Q172 Chairman: Our Committee has received it and is certainly including it very much in the study which we are undertaking.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Thank you very much. It is an important paper in that it shows what could happen if we do not do things immediately by mitigating or adapting ourselves. We speak about desertification, diminishing water resources, but we even go as far as saying there are going to be conflicts because clearly these are the most important human resources. What
is necessary, on the one hand, is an enhanced political dialogue with all the third parties. On climate change this is now the issue with all the important partners, whether it be China, now Russia (we might talk about the Russia Summit afterwards), or the United States of America or any of the other big players. We alone will never be able to do things even if we try to go alone, even if we are the locomotive. One of the underlying causes is certainly the question of poverty. The poverty stricken are always the people who are most affected and, therefore, we should take a fresh look at the development strategy and the development goals which are our guiding principles. Gordon Brown in particular mentions, as he did at the European Council, that there should be a new aim to really implement what is there, the 0.7 per cent, which not every country has reached.

Q173 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Far from that, most are failing.
Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Yes, but there are others who are not. There are a few, of course, you are right.

Q174 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Clearly climate change is also relevant to other key interests of the Union, such as migration. To what extent do you believe that the Union should give greater resources to help those countries most affected by climate change, otherwise if we do not go to them, they will come to us?
Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Personally, as I said before, in reality I think we would need a greater budget for all of these matters because if we want to avoid them then we have to prevent them, and preventing means working with them. That goes for migration as well as health questions. We try to tackle as much as we can but we have a certain limit and the limit is the financial limit that we have because we cannot offer more.

Q175 Lord Anderson of Swansea: What is the nature of the assistance that you would give to those countries threatened by climate change?
Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: We are giving assistance for all the underlying questions that are there already, but in the future we might target these things even more precisely. We are working on the questions of helping them with water, with food security, all of those most basic things that are necessary for a human being. That is why I say human security as such is very much at the centre of our thinking. Sometimes it is more on the educational front, because this is also important, sometimes more on the health front, sometimes both.

We are targeting the whole scope, but sometimes our programmes are not big enough in order to be able to do that. From the side of the recipient countries, I also need to see good governance because without good governance a lot could go in the wrong direction. I am speaking in general now of the world outside Sub-Saharan Africa where we have particularly difficult conditions and my colleague, Louis Michel, is working on that.

Q176 Chairman: Going back to the point you make about more resources, it has been examined that conflict prevention can be a very good investment.
Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: I think so.

Q177 Chairman: Spending money in this way spares us spending a great deal more money if things go wrong. This sort of cost-benefit analysis which, for example, Professor Paul Collier of Oxford has been working on for some time, suggests what a good return there is if this is used properly.
Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: I absolutely agree with that. I do not know his particular analysis but that is exactly what I feel. If it is properly used there is a big difference that can be made over a certain time. You need time because some of these are generational changes that we are doing.

Q178 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Can we move on to strategic objectives. What is the EU’s definition of effective multilateralism? What reference should be made to it if the Strategy was to be revised?
Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: First, we have been working on the enlargement process which is a very important instrument per se to have a much better strategic objective on security matters. We have also been working on the Neighbourhood Policy which has an important component of strategy on security. By the way, we are trying to do much more on frozen conflicts. Going further, we have developed a specific instrument which is the so-called Stability Instrument and Richard Wright is leading on this particularly in the CFSP area. I must say that sometimes with only small amounts of money, we can do quite important things. If you think of Aceh, if Aceh really was a great success I can boast that President Ahtisaari got great support from us, or in the Western Balkans. We use this Stability Instrument more and more on the one hand in the Middle East and, on the other hand, in the Caucasus, even in North Africa. We see that sometimes with smaller things that can be done quickly we can make a contribution sometimes to resolving or preparing the ground for resolving something. We are now extending our scope of partnerships very strongly to the global players, that is the US, Canada, Japan, but also China and India. This is very important. This Stability Instrument also helps respond to crises and it is rapidly available because we can use it for six months and then a further six months and can establish it very quickly in order to stabilise conditions that are necessary for development. We can go for contracts immediately which we cannot do
on normal development policy which, on the one hand, is good because of the financial control but, on the other hand, sometimes takes too much time and we cannot immediately show a difference. Here very often we can work within six to eight weeks. That is what we have tried to push in this new 2007–13 Financial Framework.

Q179 Chairman: I watch the time with concern, but I would like to pick up two things that you said there, and on this issue you might wish to go off the record. Frozen conflicts and relationships with Russia. I got the impression that at least over lunch in Siberia that there was some discussion about the possibility of the EU continuing to play a rather useful role in the Southern Caucasus and perhaps particularly in Georgia. Obviously, as we have been concerned about these matters we would be very interested if you did feel either on the record, or we could stop taking a note if you felt it was more appropriate, you could comment.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: I think it might be better to do it off the record.

Q180 Chairman: We would be grateful if you would spend a few moments bringing us up-to-date on some of the flavour of Khanty-Mansiysk.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: First of all, it was a well chosen site. Khanty-Mansiysk is a small town in Siberia that nobody would know, except for the future because it might be the Houston of Russia. (The answer was continued off the record)

Q181 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We have come to the end of your half an hour.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Thank you very much for that because I have a few other meetings this morning.

Q182 Chairman: What we feel is if we honour these sorts of things we are more likely to get a good response the next time we issue an invitation. Thank you very much. We do know from our previous experience with your colleagues that we always get very good answers from the whole of your team.

Mrs Ferrero-Waldner: Thank you very much for the efficient way you have handled this meeting because it was really to the point. Thank you very much. I will leave you with Patrick Child, who is my Head of Cabinet, and Richard Wright, who is the Director for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is a key area.

Q183 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Clearly there has been some success since 2003 in stabilising in the Balkans and movement in North Africa, the Maghreb, where the Commissioner has had a very strong personal interest. Where do you think the main changes are which require rewriting, updating in the ENP since 2003?

Mr Child: I do not expect the present revision of the Security Strategy to get very deeply into specific geographical relationships. However, maybe slightly separately from that discussion, in the spring the Commission presented its latest analysis of the implementation by the different partner countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. Here in particular we have recommended a group of four countries individually which we think have made most progress within the existing framework of the Neighbourhood Policy where we think upgraded relationships of one sort or another are justified. The four countries are, in the east, Ukraine and Moldova and, among the Mediterranean partners, Israel and Morocco. Now, as we work on the basis of the analysis in these annual reports that we presented a few months ago, we are looking more and more on a differentiated basis taking account of the different situations that might arise. We are also considering how we can further consolidate the give and take of the relationships with those countries in this new upgraded, strengthened context. The European Neighbourhood Policy is a relatively young policy which is still finding its feet to some extent. The finding of its feet is complicated by some of the other initiatives that we sometimes see. The Union for the Mediterranean, for example, started life as an initiative which was primarily outside the established EU context. In discussions over recent months, confirmed by the European Council Conclusions of a couple of weeks ago, we have now clearly anchored it within the Community policies and I think that is the right place for it to be. Similarly, as some Member States have looked to the south, that has created incentives and further interest from other Member States to think about whether there are new ideas for the eastern partners, and also in the discussion at the last European Council we were considering some ideas from Poland and Sweden for a new form of enhanced partnership with some of the eastern countries in the Neighbourhood Policy. The challenge for us is to make sure that this very welcome political momentum created by Member States is channelled in a way which is constructive and helps us to make progress on the agenda that we have with all the countries.

Q184 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Morocco has been massively rewarded comparatively as a result of its progress and the amount to Israel is pretty vestigial, is it not? If that were to be enhanced, would that complicate relations with Libya and other Maghreb countries?

Mr Child: The comparison between Morocco and Israel is a very good illustration of the need for a differentiated policy. We have a very different
relationship with Israel where we do not have significant financial assistance programmes because that is not necessary for Israel.

Q185 Lord Anderson of Swansea: It is technical cooperation.
Mr Child: Where there is political commitment to the relationship, the inclusion of Israel in some of the EU’s policies and agencies is a very promising area of mutual benefit, whereas in the relationship with Morocco the financial assistance component is also extremely important. That said there are many other important matters that we discuss with Morocco, and I just highlight the need to make progress on the readmission agreement that we have been preparing with Morocco in the context of the migration debate which the Commissioner mentioned as one of the issues of insecurity.

Q186 Chairman: Could I just ask you one question from what you have just said. There almost seem to be things going in opposite directions. On the one hand, I think quite rightly, positive conditionality does lead to differentiation, and should, but, on the other hand, both the upgrading of a process which some people have thought was moving rather quietly, the Barcelona process and the Union for the Mediterranean, suggests that one can have a homogenous process in one direction in the same way the Eastern Partnership suggests that one is treating the whole of a group the same. On the one hand, one seems to have moves from Member States wanting to have homogenous approaches to a sub-region or a part of the world and, on the other hand, the other approach of the Neighbourhood Policy, as it has been developed here, has been this differentiation and demonstrating positive conditionality and perhaps this is an incentive to other people to follow in the example of people who have improved already.
Mr Child: It is not necessary to make quite such a distinction between the two. There are things that make sense to discuss with the Mediterranean partners as a group, and many of those, I am sure, will be present at the summit which will be held in Paris in July to kick off the Union for the Mediterranean process, yet I think it is very important that we continue to work on a bilateral basis and on the basis of the action plans that we have with the countries covered by the Neighbourhood Policy on the specific issues which are relevant in our relations there. There is not a contradiction between the two, but it is important, as your question poses, my Lord Chairman, to keep the two elements present in the thinking.

Q187 Chairman: Can I just pursue one other problem. Again, looking at the document when you reviewed, let us take the examples of Algeria on the one hand and Belarus on the other. In one case the issues of stability and perhaps energy security play rather more part and would appear to lead our concerns, and in another one would see rather more attention to the promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights. Within our own approaches to our neighbours there even is a variation and a differentiation presumably because of our economic and other interests.
Mr Child: We have to treat all our partners on their merits and as we find them. Quite a lot of the EU’s energy is travelling across the territory of Belarus, so even if Belarus is not an energy producer like Algeria we need to have that as part of our discussions with them. It is true that the commitment and the level of interest in Algeria to full participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy has been influenced by their specific situation as a major energy supplier. This is something specific to that relationship which is not the case for the other partners that I mentioned. Libya is an energy producer but it has a different set of factors in the relationship and we are working there with a new agreement with Libya, Morocco and other North African countries.

Q188 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Back to the Union for the Mediterranean. President Sarkozy’s original, rather flamboyant concept was of a self-standing group. Now it has been modified substantially. Is the Commission content that the role of the Commission perhaps in terms of secondments to the Secretariat in terms of the other relationships on particular projects is now wholly acceptable?
Mr Child: Yes. You may have seen a communication which the Commission presented a few weeks before the recent European Council meeting where we, following the mandate that we received from the previous meeting of the European Council—

Q189 Lord Anderson of Swansea: The March meeting?
Mr Child: Yes. We set out our ideas for the modalities for the Union for the Mediterranean. We are very pleased that it is that basic formula, including the institutional aspects between the Secretariat and the Presidency, but also in terms of the first concrete projects that we think this Union for the Mediterranean could help to make progress with. Most of our ideas, if not all of them, have been very much taken up in the European Council Conclusions and we expect this communication to have a very strong influence on the statement which is presently being prepared for the Summit.

Q190 Lord Anderson of Swansea: So no remaining concerns?
Mr Child: We are happy with the way that things are going.

Q191 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The Commissioner mentioned enlargement, rightly in my view, as a key part of the European Security Strategy and I suppose it comes in the same context as the Neighbourhood Policy to some extent, it is our part of the world. To what extent is what is being said about the effects of the non-ratification so far of the Lisbon Treaty on enlargement really knocking away a large chunk of this Strategy? Surely a strategy that is going to be adopted in December is going to have to say very firmly, if it is to have any meaning, that enlargement continues and enlargement is an essential part of the European Union’s response to the security problems in its own region. Is there not a risk that this policy is coming apart in that respect?

Mr Child: I think it is very important that the Union sticks to its commitments in relation to enlargement, and that was the message which came from the European Council Conclusions of last week. The message on the Lisbon Treaty, although of course we have to take account of what has happened in Ireland, that there is a strong hope among large numbers of Member States that it will be possible to implement the Treaty, that the improvements in the functioning of the Union that that Treaty is intended to deliver will also help to strengthen and improve the way we go forward on enlargement. I am absolutely with you on the importance of enlargement as one of the strategic objectives of the Union and very much hope that the Treaty will be able to come into force and help us to consolidate that policy.

Q192 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Surely the requirement that for the European Union’s security you need to continue with a policy of enlargement exists whether or not Lisbon is ratified? The method of carrying it out would be affected by whether Lisbon is implemented or not, but not that it is a security requirement for the European Union, that is my point. After all, who knows, we may have to live without Lisbon, in which case that does not knock away enlargement as a security policy requirement or opportunity.

Mr Child: I agree with you. Our capacity to address this particular, very important security objective will be affected by the future of the Lisbon Treaty. I am not in a position today to assume that the Lisbon Treaty will not be ratified; on the contrary, I hope that it will be and we will get both things together. The strategic necessity for Europe of contributing to the security and stability in its neighbourhood in its larger sense, including those countries which have a clear membership perspective as well as the ones covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, is a very clear and present requirement whatever happens.

Mr Wright: To add one footnote. In the Balkans, all countries now have an SAA—Stabilisation and Association Agreement—as well as dialogues leading towards visa liberalisation. These are very important elements of building up a more secure environment in Europe. The conclusion of an SAA for Serbia during the election period certainly was an important political signal which does seem to have had some effect. Things are moving forward with these countries. It is going to take a long time, no doubt, but we are very much engaged. You are fully aware of what is going on in Kosovo and we are now advancing towards the full deployment of the ESDP civilian mission, the largest by far. In Bosnia next year there is the prospect, we do not know when, at some point, of the OHR giving way to a European Union structure. There are positive developments going on in our immediate environment that are important to reaffirming security in Europe.

Q193 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Can I be clear on what you said about the Lisbon Treaty, that you saw it being implemented by a number of countries and not by others. The British have said they are not prepared to implement, have they not?

Mr Child: I do not think I said that. The Commission is very hopeful that the Treaty will be ratified by all countries, and we are very happy that as many countries have ratified as they have, including the United Kingdom.

Q194 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The existing Strategy talks about the EU being more “active, capable and coherent”. What are the instruments at the disposal of the Commission in this area of the security threats and do they need to be strengthened? How far do Pillar 1 instruments contribute to stabilising and improving governance in fragile states, for example?

Mr Child: I will let Richard Wright comment as well. The Commissioner referred in her opening remarks to our document on Europe in the World.

Q195 Chairman: Which we read the report about.

Mr Child: Yes, indeed, which we discussed with you before. This very much underlines the increasing interplay between the internal and external policies. Some of the issues that the Commissioner mentioned are increasingly on the agenda in our discussions with strategic partners: energy, migration, transport, environment. They are things where, as our internal agenda progresses and as we make progress on our internal policies, so the impact on our external relationships becomes greater. It is in these areas first and foremost that I see us making a contribution to the thinking in the latter part of this year on how we
can complement the existing supporting Strategy to make it more our version drawing on our policies which we are managing to a greater extent internally and also when it comes to their external projections. The Commissioner’s example of discussions with the Russians in the last couple of days on energy is very relevant in this respect.

**Chairman:** We are under some pressure of time because we are meeting people from the Directorate-General Development at noon at UKRep. I would like to ask Lord Hamilton to ask the last question.

**Q196 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:** I have been asked to ask you about the extent to which the Commission has inputted into the review of the European Security Strategy. I think that has been answered because you have given us a paper and so forth. I would like to ask a totally different question. Everybody we have talked to have very much said that the existing European Security Strategy is short, pithy and easy to understand, the problem is implementation. I was slightly alarmed by your Commissioner because she seemed to have an extremely long shopping list of things she wanted to add in. Is not the effect of this that you then dilute the effectiveness of the existing Strategy, you open up a lot of areas for argument and discussion when really the problem with the Strategy today is it has not been implemented. I would be much happier to see much more emphasis being placed on the implementation of the Strategy rather than rewriting the Strategy.

**Mr Wright:** The mandate from the European Council is on implementation and we are charged to look at the implementation, how to improve the implementation, and identify elements to complete the strategy, so it is three parts of the same exercise. There is a general consensus from the first discussions we have had with Member States that the existing concept needs to be enlarged. Certainly I do not think there will be any disagreement on energy security, climate change, perhaps food security, but how far you push out the frontiers remains to be seen. As the Commissioner indicated, perhaps understandably from where we are coming from in the Commission, we would certainly like to go beyond that. You are right to point out that the existing Strategy is essentially a concept. A strategy would have implementation plans. There were three or four implementation fiches last time, but I do not think they had a big impact. A question that will be discussed this time is to what extent the final Strategy should have attached to it certain plans for implementation. If you look at the recent interesting French White Paper on Defence and Security, they have very clear ideas both on the military side to strengthen capabilities as well as on the civilian side. We will have to see what the mood amongst Member States finally will be on this. On the civilian side, we in the Commission are already doing things. We are helping to train police who will participate in future European missions; there is a dearth of police and in every mission that comes up we need this—police, prosecutors, judges, customs officials. There is a lot that can be done here to strengthen European capabilities. On your fundamental point, the implementation is crucial. From our side we are open to broadening, to have some clearly focused action plan. We should not necessarily duplicate what is already there; we have a plan on energy security, it is just a question of recalling it. There may be other areas where we want to give specific direction for implementation subsequently

**Q197 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:** Are we talking about targets there for capabilities, do you think?

**Mr Wright:** Or maybe just recalling things that we have agreed to that have not been implemented, like targets in terms of military capabilities, civilian capabilities, headline goals. We need to deliver. We have done 17 ESDP missions roughly since the beginning of 1999, most of them civilian, but there are two ongoing military ones. I do not think the demand for intervention by the European Union is going to diminish; on the contrary, I think it will increase.

**Q198 Chairman:** We have also got to do them better. If we look at the police mission in Afghanistan, which we are perhaps going to make some inquiries into, we are very concerned that we are not very good yet at knowing how to do that sort of thing.

**Mr Wright:** There were teething troubles at the start, I think everybody knows this. We are getting it together now but it is an extremely difficult environment in which to operate. There is a commitment now from the Council to further strengthening it, even up to doubling it, and Germany has indicated its readiness to deploy two times the number of police officials, which is very good from their side. I will not hide from you it is a challenge and it is also a challenge to get people to go there.

**Chairman:** Can we say thank you very much indeed. As you know, you are the part of the Commission which we feel we relate to and are always delighted that you are so ready to see us and help us with our inquiries. We will be unlikely to complete this before we come back after the summer recess but we hope it will be available before the final decisions are made in the December Council. Thank you very much indeed for your help this morning.
MONDAY 30 JUNE 2008

Present
Anderson of Swansea, L.
Hamilton of Epsom, L.
Hannay of Chiswick, L.
Roper, L. (Chairman)

Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Mr Maciej Popowski, DG Dev, Director of DEV A, Ms Daniela Dicorrado-Andreoni, Head of Sector, Peacekeeping and Security Unit, DEV2, and Mr Paul Clairet, Adviser to DEV A, Directorate-General Development, examined.

Q199 Chairman: Mr Popowski, can I apologise that we are a moment or two late in getting across. Trying to be in two places at once is not even possible for Members of the House of Lords. As you probably know, we are undertaking an inquiry into the European Security Strategy in the light of the decision earlier this year that it ought to be reviewed and its implementation examined before the European Council came to consider it in December. We were very anxious to discuss with people from the Development Directorate-General the issues which affect you in terms of the European Security Strategy. We have a number of questions which my colleagues and I would like to discuss with you. I do not know whether you have an opening statement you would like to make or whether you would like to introduce your colleagues who are with you so that we have a note about them on the record too.

Mr Popowski: Thank you very much. Yes, I would like to introduce my colleagues. Thank you very much for the invitation, first of all. It is interesting for us to exchange views with you. My name is Maciej Popowski, I am Director for horizontal matters at the Directorate-General for Development. I am accompanied by Mme Daniela Dicorrado-Andreoni, who is in charge of the security and development nexus, to put it in simple terms. Paul Clairet, is an adviser in the Directorate-General who is also dealing with issues of security.

Q200 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We will certainly want to come back to some of the issues which were initiated during the Portuguese Presidency and which we find of very great importance, particularly the case studies which you are now undertaking and the way forward you are working on fragile states because that element is clearly one of the important issues within the development of the Security Strategy. The original Strategy was developed by the Council and we wonder how far it really is an instrument for the Council or how far it is an instrument which influences the whole of the external actions of the Union, including those which come as direct responsibility of the Commission. In particular, given that your Directorate-General does carry out policy planning and draw up Country Strategy Papers, how far are they seen within the context of the wider Security Strategy?

Mr Popowski: We very much hope that the European Security Strategy is not only a Council instrument. The Commission was involved in the elaboration of the original ESS in 2003 and now we are closely associated with the process as mandated by the European Council last year. Indeed, if we want to be serious about an update of the European Security Strategy we need to follow a comprehensive approach to security which goes beyond the classical pillar structure of the European Union. We really cannot act as if we are living in different worlds. From our particular point of view, the Directorate-General for Development, the most important issue is the link between security and development which was captured in the original version, the 2003 Security Strategy, and I have been using that very extensively—that is the original—stating that development is a precondition for security. We would like to go a little further down the road and elaborate on the concept that we need sustainable development in order for security to be sustainable. Of course, security considerations are being taken into account when we elaborate Country Strategy Papers, for example. We do it in different ways. I can only quote one important policy of ours, which is the Policy Coherence for Development, a concept which was developed in 2006. The main rationale of the Policy Coherence for Development is to make sure whatever we do in different policy areas of the European Union, it does not undermine the development goals as defined, for example, by the United Nations in the MDGs. That applies to security as well. In view of recent developments, let us say between 2003 and today, the importance of the nexus of security and development has grown, everybody can see that, and we need to engage in a comprehensive approach to security, especially in Africa, which we have done in Congo/DRC or Guinea-Bissau and to a lesser extent in Darfur, but I am sure we are going to come back to the issue of Darfur.

Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.

Q201 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Does the European Security Strategy provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the global challenges, threats
and risks facing the EU? Should the Strategy pay greater attention to the underlying political and socio-economic sources of security threats in addition to the symptoms?

Mr Popowski: The ESS has recognised that a distant threat may be as much of a concern as those that are near at hand. Originally the Security Strategy looked at the threats as identified in 2003, but we are living in a rapidly changing world and the map of threats has changed as well. We have this cluster of fragile states, terrorism and regional conflicts, but back in 2003 we were not entirely aware of the imminent threats linked to climate change, food prices, oil prices. Migration was covered in the original version, but the questions of climate change, food prices and oil prices were not. That requires a new focus and we have to look at security in a much broader way. The original version of the European Security Strategy did not pay enough attention to the question of insecurity in developing countries because that is exactly where some of the threats may and will originate from. In our internal discussions we spoke about the security risk and security costs of non-achievement of the Millennium Development Goals because if we fail to achieve them collectively it might produce devastating results in terms of human security, which I think will be the new focus of the revised Security Strategy. That is the Commission’s point of view which was an input from the European Commission to the discussion adopted by the College of Commissioners some two weeks ago, and I am sure Mme Ferrero-Waldner touched upon that. That has to be mainstreamed in the discussion so that the more distant threats, but also those clearly linked to the poverty and development dimension, which means the use of human security, are discussed.

Q202 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: You talk about the map of the threats and things changing over these five years, but there is a slight risk, is there not, that if you revise it then things change again so it becomes irrelevant again. Surely you want a very broad document which covers everything. Everybody we speak to says how wonderful the existing one is. Is there a risk that if we add more and more things on to the next one it will mean more means less and it will be less effective? Surely the problem is implementation rather than what we put in the Strategy?

Mr Popowski: I fully agree. The problem lies in the implementation because the original Security Strategy, to which I am very attached because in my previous incarnation in the Council I did take part in the elaboration, has stood the test of time but it can be improved and there we have to differentiate between the analytical part which needs some fine-tuning and the implementation part which is a different issue. There is room for improvement. When we look at what we have done over the last few years, we can say that we have achieved a lot, not because we had a Security Strategy but because we were forced by circumstances. For example, the EU-led operations, ESDP operations, in Africa and elsewhere, perfectly fit the framework of the Strategy but in a way they were forced upon us by circumstances. If we continue this discussion we must look into the implementation issue more thoroughly than before.

Q203 Lord Anderson of Swansea: I imagine that the temptation for your Directorate is to include as much as possible of the development agenda within the European Security Strategy. Clearly there is quite a large part of the MDGs which are outside the immediate focus of security. Yes, the Maghreb is relevant and, yes, the Caucasus is relevant because their insecurity impacts on us directly as Europeans. It is less so in respect of, say, Congo or the Pacific Islands where there are resource interests and our interests are more marginal. How do you draw the line? Clearly some things have to be excluded which are within your own Directorate’s remit that are not directly relevant to the Strategy which affects security.

Mr Popowski: That is a good point but we need to draw a distinction between the development approach and the geographical approach. We know that the structure of the Commission is quite elaborate. I would say, and our DG is responsible for development and policies in our relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific States. We are not responsible for the Caucasus or Central Asia. From the development point of view some of these countries are developing countries, so if we talk about development considerations or the MDGs it is not only limited to Africa as far as the approach is concerned. If we speak about the Millennium Development Goals, these concern all the developing countries worldwide. We are not going to integrate our development policy fully into the new version of the European Security Strategy, but we would like to concentrate especially on the people-centred approach, human security, where the link with some development issues and Millennium Development Goals is very close.

Q204 Lord Anderson of Swansea: You would accept that Congo, for example, is relatively marginal to a European Security Strategy?

Mr Popowski: Congo is quite crucial to the security of the African Continent.

Q205 Lord Anderson of Swansea: On that basis you can enlarge it indefinitely. I suppose, have all of Africa within this Security Strategy.
Mr Popowski: We have a European consensus that Africa is quite crucial. We have our—

Q206 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Not on security.

Mr Popowski: Of course it is crucial from the security point of view. If things go wrong again in the Congo it can, and I sure it will, have a knock-on effect on Europe as well. That was why we decided to get engaged operationally in the Congo a few times. We have mounted two military operations and we are there with our policemen and military advisers in order to help the Congolese reform their security sector because we see it as a potential threat to the security of the Continent and if we want to be a responsible global actor we have to take that into account.

Q207 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: That leads rather helpfully, I think, into a question I would like to ask you. What you have been saying about the interconnections between development policy and security is of course common ground to all Member States because they all signed the Outcomes Document on the UN Summit of 2005 which actually said that, so bringing that more clearly into focus in the European Security Strategy should not be a major development. One thing that has arisen since 2003 is the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect” which has been subscribed to by all our Member States. What I wanted to ask you was whether you thought that the review of the Security Strategy and its implementation could or should identify this as an area where the European Union should be able to make a contribution? So far the “Responsibility to Protect” has remained a pretty dead letter, it has proved very difficult to implement. My question really is whether the European Union should be indicating that in the period ahead it would try to identify ways in which a much wider view of the “Responsibility to Protect”, which is, I think, closely connected to your reference to human security, should be taken.

Mr Popowski: Absolutely true. I fully agree with your assessment that we have not gone far as far as the implementation of the Council’s “Responsibility to Protect” is concerned. That was why we decided internally to concentrate in our thinking on the human security aspect, which is linked to the underlying assumptions of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” and the concepts which were the basis of the Secretary General’s report on *Freedom from War and Freedom from Fear*, for example, that are the root causes of many of the threats we are currently discussing. We see that the root causes of the current threats, the most imminent ones, lay not so much in the rivalry between states and ideologies but in physical and psychological pressures on populations in developing countries. That can have very grave consequences when oppression and poverty are key factors, but also loss of dignity, for example, or deprivation of human rights. The EU policies should be definitely focused on that. We have done some conceptual work on the issue of fragile states and our approach and assistance to fragile states. We have also addressed the issue of the security sector reform, which is linked to it, and a comprehensive approach to security. In the OECD it is being called a whole of government approach and we call it a comprehensive approach. Basically, if we want to establish governance in a fragile state and improve the living conditions of the population we need to be comprehensive, we cannot just go in, do something and pull out because the results would not be sustainable. That is very much our philosophy in continuing the discussion on the Security Strategy.

Q208 Chairman: Is there a risk of what is sometimes rather unkindly called stove piping, that if we are thinking about fragile states and the interaction between development, security and good governance, one really does need to have the ideal of the Union’s holistic approach and yet the institutions of the Union do not always ensure that that is as successful as it could be?

Mr Popowski: I am afraid we are not there yet. Of course there is stove piping. There are parallel chains of command and that is why you have to see quite a number of people in Brussels today and not a single one.

Q209 Chairman: That is what we are doing, which I am afraid is why we were late.

Mr Popowski: We do what we can. When it comes to objectives, we really converge. We have a complicated institutional set-up that we have to overcome sometimes in order to deliver the best results. Within the Commission, which is only one side of the story, we try to make best use of the Policy Coherence for Development in the sense that we are really coherent in what we do. That is the Commission’s concept, of course endorsed by the Council, but we cannot impose it on other players, Member States on the Council, but when it comes to improve objectives we are singing from the same hymn sheet. I do not know whether you would like to add something to this?

Ms Dicorrado-Andreoni: The split between the focus on the situations of fragility and the security and development matters, on the other hand, was a split that caused some discomfort even in the European Commission because it is difficult to draw a line. The Council Conclusions asked us to focus in a stove piped way on two areas which are connected and difficult to make a distinction between. What we tried to do was in the implementation of the Council
Conclusions to have an approach first of all on scrutiny of the situation focusing on country situations and we split the world quite artificially into countries which we would consider from a security and development nexus perspective and countries which we would consider under situations of fragility knowing that at the end of the day, and even during the process, we are keeping track of who is doing what on the other side. Even the decision on what country to choose for each of the two clusters was done in complementarity. We insisted on having South Africa under the security and development. Why South Africa? Because South Africa is not a real developing country, it has achieved security situations according to some standards but it has specific security issues and we wanted to know better how to go about it. Another implication of these two studies that we tried to gain out of this exercise was, as Mr Popowski said, to go for the comprehensive approach which for us is seen from the point of view of the EU-wide approach involving Member States, committing what each Member State is doing in “case studies” countries and how to pull together both what we do on this side and what is done on the side of Member States. If this belongs to the security and development nexus or a fragility of situation is quite irrelevant for the purpose of implementing the concept which is integrated into the Country Strategy Papers and the Regional Strategy Papers, a focus of attention which is fully integrated with everything that is done on trade, infrastructure, education, health, etc. I have to add that we do not only have these case studies on fragility, security development, we are not waiting for these studies to bring guidelines, guidance or action plans, we are putting into Regional Strategy Papers the very few focal sectors that we are requested to select. An important focal sector includes political dialogues, security issues, governance, so that the attention of our desks, delegations of Member States when we discuss about how to strategise with the regions or country is focused in terms of analysis and implementation on security, its wide-ranging implications. Today security is a word which is used so much, even to define stability. Either we go back to defining stability for what it is, but if we start talking about the European Security Strategy we have to take on board everything which has been indicated as security strategic objectives.

Q210 Chairman: Could I just follow that up. One possible outcome from the December discussions would be to have the Security Strategy with relatively small changes but, linked to that, a decision from the Council on the actions in which one ought to try and develop action plans in order that there can be more effective implementation of the Strategy in the future. Would that seem to you to be a wise approach?

Mr Popowski: We need to do something about implementation. We were very proud to adopt the Security Strategy in 2003 but it was not operational. In the discussions among experts and some of the authors of the original paper a clear conclusion that is emerging is we lack this operational dimension. Of course, we cannot write it into the paper because it would blow up the whole intellectual construction. Action plans, whatever we call them, could be a way out just to have an idea how we would like to implement and mainstream security considerations into different types of policies we are going to implement.

Q211 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Action plans would have the benefit of flexibility without any modification of the basic text.

Mr Popowski: I would say so, yes.

Q212 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Presumably they would need to have timelines as well, dates within which various elements should be implemented.

Mr Popowski: Preferably. I fully agree that we should not engage in that kind of exercise every three or five years whenever we see there are new threats emerging. We need to have a framework but also some policy instruments on how to implement what we have agreed upon at a strategic level.

Q213 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I think we are really talking about the same thing. Would you extend these action plans to cover Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, for instance?

Mr Popowski: When it comes to geographical coverage, I would say so. The Security Strategy must have a global outreach. No security threats emerge from the regions we are responsible for in the Commission, but we need to have the same strategic and comprehensive approach to them and take the security considerations as outlined by my colleague into our programming work.

Q214 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Clearly there are some problems which impact more directly on the interests of Europe. No doubt there will be a development policy in respect of Belize or Guyana, but things which go wrong there will not impact directly on our security interests. Do you accept that differentiation?

Mr Popowski: I am afraid it is natural. We cannot be present everywhere and cannot do everything, nobody can, and that is not going to change in effective multilateralism. We need to continue to work on the basis of a global network of interlocking institutions and that will remain the backbone of our approach to security. In terms of operational engagement, for example, we need to be selective.
Q215 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Clearly there is a corpus of experience since 2003 and the Union has learned not to crawl but not to run either, somewhere between the two. To what extent do you see a development of crisis management capabilities woven into the new document?

Mr Popowski: We have a separate track. In the whole process of capacity development the Member States and the European Defence Agency are working on the Capacity Development Plan. It has to be covered one way or another. That is a crucial point, of course. We are trying to redefine our strategic interests in the Security Strategy but it has to be covered and for that we need the capabilities, both military and civilian, and that is still the weak part. We talk about great projects, a Strategy, but when it comes to an operation there is always the same conclusion, we are lacking helicopters and policemen. It has never been any different. I went through that when I was working in the Council in the Political and Security Committee. Every time we were planning an operation we always faced the same difficulties. It has to be addressed, but I do not think we need to go into details of capability development in the Security Strategy. We have to maintain these parallel tracks.

Q216 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Following up your line that the European Union cannot do everything everywhere, presumably in the area you are responsible for, for instance in the Pacific, the primary institution which deals with security in the Pacific is the South Pacific Forum really with the fragile states there. Could you say something about what the European Union and the Commission does to co-operate with them? For example, in the Caribbean presumably there are other international organisations like the OAS and CARICOM which have greater capabilities. In Africa, of course, there is the African Union and all the sub-regional and regional organisations. Do you feel that the European Union and the Commission are making an effective contribution to these regional and sub-regional organisations? Could we be doing more, or should we be doing more?

Mr Popowski: We have the ambition to do more because we believe that the regional organisations play a crucial role. We see it in the context of effective multilateralism. You mentioned the African Union, which is the key partner for us on Africa and, as you know, we have adopted a joint EU-Africa Strategy. The African Union is a key partner to implement that. We are very focused on the African Union because it is a comprehensive organisation which has continental ambitions. We offer a lot in terms of capacity building, for example, especially when it comes to security policy. I will mention a genuine European instrument, the Africa Peace Facility, which was developed in order to help Africans manage peace support operations like the one in Sudan, in Darfur. That was the first African driven operation and, regardless of the outcome, it was the first genuine attempt at mounting and conducting an African operation with very important support from the European Union, mainly from the Africa Peace Facility which will continue under the tenth European Development Fund because it is being financed from the Fund. Other organisations are crucial as well: in Africa it is ECOWAS or SADC, and the fora in the Pacific or the Caribbean. I do not deal with them directly so I do not want to dwell on that, but perhaps we are not at the same level of intensity of relations as with the African Union but the African Union is a key partner in implementing our strategy.

Chairman: Mr Popowski, I do apologise first that we were late and, secondly, we are going to be called away. Can I just say we have very much appreciated having the opportunity to have this meeting. Can I just say something which I hope will not be misunderstood. One of the things which we all do agree on in the United Kingdom as far as the European Union is concerned, although we disagree about some other things, is we are all advocates of enlargement and it does give us particular pleasure to see people from the Member States now playing such an active part in the Commission and helping us work together to solve problems. I hope you will accept that. I am very pleased to see you here playing such an important part in DG DEV. Thank you very much indeed.
MONDAY 30 JUNE 2008

Examination of Witness
Witness: Dr Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the EU, examined.

Q217 Chairman: Secretary-General, we have to begin by giving you our warmest congratulations on yesterday evening. [Victory of Spain at the European Championship of football]. We share your personal pleasure.

Dr Solana: Thank you very much. I got several SMSs from London and I do not know what the significance of that is!

Q218 Chairman: Given we did not have a team we were very glad that the right team won! Secretary-General, we are, as usual, very grateful that you have found time to see us, particularly after you have had a busy time recently. As you know, we are doing a study on the way in which the European Security Strategy is going to be reviewed and the way it has been applied. We know that, unfortunately, because 10 days ago the European Council was rather busy dealing with one or two other problems you were not able to discuss it with them on that occasion as I am sure you would have liked to do. Nonetheless, we would be very grateful if we could raise one or two other issues today. I suppose the first question, if you would not mind, would be to ask how do you feel you will be able to take forward your work on reviewing the European Security Strategy and will the fact that you were not able to discuss it with the European Council 10 days ago hinder that in any way? What role do you expect from the French Presidency? Of course, we have read your speech to the European Parliament where you talked to them about it and this morning we were talking to people in the Commission. It is obviously very important that although this is an extremely important document which this time, as last time, you will lead, it is accepted and there is a sense of ownership throughout the whole of the European Union, including the Commission and the Parliament. We would be very interested to hear your views as to how you see the review being taken forward.

Dr Solana: Thank you very much for coming and for this opportunity to discuss these important issues. Let me start by saying that today is the last day of the Slovenian Presidency and tomorrow will be the first day of the French Presidency. But I will not have the certainty that I used to have before a new Presidency starts, to tell you the truth. That has nothing to do with France but more the outcome of the referendum in Ireland. I say that because, as you know, the analysis of the referendum is still being done, including the effect that some debates may have in the coming months. As you know, one of the issues that had not been discussed much in the campaign in Ireland was the question related to security. At this moment I do not know exactly what the repercussions of that debate in Ireland will be and the result of the referendum on the French Presidency. Next Monday I will be going to Paris and I will see President Sarkozy to try to fine tune how these issues are going to be tackled in the French Presidency. In any case, let us suppose that the rhythm will be the same. As you said in your introductory remarks, it was supposed to be discussed in the report given by me to the European Council but there was no time to do it and nobody wanted to enter into that on that day. As I said, next Monday I will be visiting the French. I will be there tomorrow but it will be symbolic with raising the flag and having dinner with the Government. Supposing that nothing changes, the idea is by the European Council of October, and as you can imagine the agenda of that meeting will be slightly different because the consequences of the Irish referendum will be discussed, there will be another report that I will have to make to the Council. What is it we intend to do? First, we think that the Strategy is a document that has been very useful. It is five years old and it is a document that is useful for the European Union. It is a non-bureaucratic document, written in a much clearer manner, not with paragraphs coming from different countries. It is a document that comes wrapped. That was not easy to do, as you can imagine. For those who know how we work you will know that it was very difficult to do it in that manner. I intend to continue doing it in that manner, to have a document that can be read easily. On the issues that have been agreed already, defining the challenges, defining the threats, et cetera, I would like to touch it as little as possible. We should add some new elements where the document has gaps which are important. One is energy, which was not dealt with in 2003 in the manner that we are dealing with it today, energy security for instance. The issue related to climate change has to be tackled in much more detail. From
2003 until today we have added some action plans which I think will be more important that can change the basic trend of the document. My idea, and that was agreed in the PSC, is to change what is necessary and to add what is necessary, but not to change what is not necessary and leave it as it is as much as possible, and try to work in the same manner as before. Apart from energy security and climate change, we have to look at other challenges that we have, for instance the development of military capabilities in the world, which is another thing that is difficult to touch upon but we have to mention it. The other thing that I would like to touch upon a little bit more is anti-terrorist capabilities. I have to convince our friends in France that is something that would be useful to develop more. There is no need to go into all of the details but make a call on the importance of capabilities militarily and also in general. The other thing I would like to develop more is the co-operation between civilian and military, and military and civilian. That is something which is necessary. We have done a lot but we have to underline that part and do more. That is one of the challenges that we have in front of us. Many of the Member States, the UK for instance, are doing a lot nationally and we have to see how we can handle that also in the EU. The other thing we have to look at is the question related to problems that are not manmade but nature made such as crises that may come from other sources and we have to see how we can co-ordinate better and give a line in that direction in the Security Strategy. One of the criticisms that can be made is that it is not quite a new strategy, it does not say exactly how to do it. We define the challenges but we say less about how to go about handling them. Some of this issue we will have to review. I think some difficulty may come with a possible debate on Russia. It is very difficult to tackle it well, to put it in written form. I sense we may have some differences of opinion inside the European Union on how to define and tackle Russia. That is a tricky point and we will have to see how we do that. Apart from that, I do not see any big difficulty. The Commission has demanded that I co-operate with the Commission and we are doing that. With the Parliament, I gave a little bit of information on that on the day you mentioned and I will try to maintain that. It is a document that has to be assumed by everybody. But the ownership is that of the European Council and the Member States will have to deal with security as the most important first category. It is good to have the Commission engaged and to inform the Parliament as much as we can, but I do not think we should have big debates in the Parliament to get it approved or something like that. That would not be a good idea.

Q219 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Can I ask how you envisage the documentation to be done on this because clearly there is much to say about capabilities, action plans and implementation, and presumably that should not be in the Strategy itself but in a separate document.

Dr Solana: What we have done so far on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is we have—

Q220 Chairman: A sub-strategy.

Dr Solana: --- another document that develops an action plan. The same has to be done for energy security and on other issues, for instance on climate change where we already have a document.

Q221 Chairman: A very good document.

Dr Solana: We have to keep updating that. If possible, we want to have it as action documents attached to keep the dimension of the document as it is. My fear, and you will know why I say this, is if we go through paragraph by paragraph we may have a paragraph from each country or something like that. If we want to do something which is significant I will try to avoid as far as possible countries putting in phrases that they want specifically.

Q222 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Can you gloss over Russia? Russia is going to be a bone of contention, is it not, it is going to divide rather than unite?

Dr Solana: The problem we will have with Russia is how to balance Russia as a strategic partner and Russia as a neighbour. That is the balance that has to be struck. We can debate and come to an agreement on that, but to put it in written form is very difficult. We are seeing that in just about every issue that comes to the table that is Russia related. Russia is an important actor in international affairs and at the same time we have the problem with the neighbourhood. Another problem that you will know of very well is the structural situation in Russia today. I came from Siberia on Thursday or Friday where we had the first formal meeting with President Medvedev and the day after we sensed some of the consequences or reactions, some positive but others not so positive. This is going to be a tricky point to handle. These are the issues that we have, plus how we deal with Georgia or Moldova, which is more of a neighbourhood problem.

Q223 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Thank you very much, Secretary-General, for that splendid overview. Just to say at the outset that I think most of us who have been looking at this for about two months now have enormous sympathy with your intention not to fundamentally change the 2003 document and certainly not to turn it into a kind of Christmas tree on which everybody hangs the thing that they most like and it becomes ridiculous. There is very strong support for that approach. On the other hand, listening to the various briefings we have had, it does
strike me that, whereas the 2003 document arrived at a particular conjuncture when relations with the United States were very bad and it was seen as a way somehow of restoring a more healthy attitude and showing the United States that we were not going to remain divided on every issue as we had been divided over Iraq, I am not sure that the same trick can be played a second time because the circumstances are rather different. As you say, there are other issues like what we, the EU, are going to do about Russia or China that have somehow got to be mentioned, although not obviously described in this document. Surely there has to be a stated intention by the 27 to do better than they have done in the past, to have a proper strategic partnership and not just a ragbag of every odd EU issue that happens to come up. It would be very interesting to us to hear how you think that circle can be squared. We are not suggesting you should put the strategy towards Russia into the document because then the question will be, “What about your strategy towards China, ASEAN” or whatever it is. Could I mention one point that I find very interesting, which is the concept of effective multilateralism which I am sure is going to be sustained and it must be one of the bedrocks of European foreign policy, but things have happened since 2003, for example the “Responsibility to Protect”, or rather it has been written down on paper but it has not happened, to be more exact, in Darfur or wherever you like to think about it, and we are seeing the agonies going on over Zimbabwe as another example of that. I wonder whether it would not be a useful thing to at least ensure that the European Union in the future addresses that in a bit of a less black and white way which has managed to create great tensions for the developing world without actually getting any protection for anyone, and to try to have an approach to that, because I think the Europeans probably have got something to say on that. They are not a military resort at any price group, quite the contrary, in fact it is very difficult to see them producing military resources somewhere in Africa or Asia at all. It would be good if that could be brought within the scope of the next period.

Dr Solana: I have taken note of three or four points. It is true that 2003 was a very specific moment in our common history, but this is over and we are going to have an election in the United States by the time the Strategy is approved. I am trying to see how much we can put ideas together that could be found in this document and also in a document from the United States that will be done at around the same time or a little bit after. We have been in touch with both teams and their sympathy towards some of these ideas is very strong. I do not know if there will be an administration in place by then which is able to discuss formally, but to have a sense of where things are going, a sense of direction, would be very good. Let me go to effective multilateralism for a moment. I was very surprised in 2003 that the words “effective multilateralism” were used by no-one but today, wherever you go, in Russia, in China, ASEAN, America, the world “multilateralism” comes up and always accompanied by “effective”, which is something we helped to coin. The type of terminology that we are able to coin is very important. If we could find that here, it would be very good. There is no doubt that documents of this type are going to be written in the coming period of time. In as much as we can find common language on important issues that would be very good. Climate change is a perfect example. This is the first problem to which a solution has been found by everybody. No single country can find a solution alone. It is a good moment to try to coin terminology and if necessary to be more specific on where we are heading with other countries. This has been done already with the United States. We will have a meeting before the end of July to look at these issues and the big questions on the agenda today and see how much we can cooperate together and use terminology together. I would not say with the new administration because we do not know what the new administration will be, but think-tanks, people we know are important in the building up of concepts, et cetera. On effective multilateralism, it is very, very important that we keep on talking about that. To my mind, we have two big challenges on that issue. One is Doha and the other is Copenhagen. They are not a year from now. Doha is tomorrow. It seems to me that a big effort has to be made, not only because it is beneficial to the economic situation to have trade agreements but because if we do not get that it will be very difficult to get Copenhagen. The countries with emerging economies, if we talk to them, the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, et cetera, they are waiting for more than a gesture; but a reality. I think it will be much easier to do it in Doha, for them to see or feel we are credible and we will engage, we are taking them seriously, than to engage them on climate change where the sacrifices, the problems, may be much more difficult to handle. If we do not get something on Doha it will be much more difficult to get them engaged on climate change. For us, climate change is fundamental in that we are the catalytic motor or engine of the climate change deal. We should not forget that Doha is a Development Round. This is the essence of Doha. So we cannot be ungenerous when we are talking about the Round. But due to the political situation and the crash in the economy the reflections of some countries, even Member States, are a little bit more conservative. I am worried about that. Whatever dynamics we may create, even in the writing of this document, it is very important that we believe in effective multilateralism. If the WTO fails, what is left on effective multilateralism? We have a
really important decision to be taken there. The third thing is our relations with others. In 2003 we said a lot about countries and institutions and from there we have had experiences which are a little bit deeper such as with the African Union. It is very important not only to say it but to construct more on African Union co-operation. Yesterday I was talking with the new President of the African Union, and after the meeting at Sharm El Sheik, we exchanged views and talked about it, and it is important that is reflected and is done. It has to be reflected in a much more important manner, ASEAN, the African Union and other groupings of countries, and at the same time we have to do it. We have challenges there which are very, very important. The last thing I would like to say is on “Responsibility to Protect”. This is a very dear idea for us, but not so dear for others. The problem we have had with other countries is that they see everything through that potential prism that signifies military action and you cannot discuss that with Egypt, for example, it is impossible. Responsible sovereignty is terminology we have to begin to use and possibly link it with climate change. You do things in your own countries that have repercussions outside, for instance through CO2. If you put the two things together, what you do in your country may be dangerous for others and what you do in your country influences others. If we have a responsibility to protect and responsible sovereignty in a package that may be easier together. Let us see how we can put that into the debate. Let us see if we can make some headway in that direction.

Q224 Lord Anderson of Swansea: No-one will be against effective multilateralism, even the incoming US administration, whoever it is. No-one will be against responsible sovereignty. No-one will be against capabilities, although people will not deliver on capabilities. No-one will be against the MDGs, although we note that the actual amount spent by most of our European partners has decreased over the past year. Do you not see a problem of moving from declarations to implementation? Do you realistically think that rallying around what is a grand concept is going to persuade any country which is currently falling behind on its military side or in terms of its aid contribution to alter its conduct one whit?

Dr Solana: I am an optimist, otherwise I would not be here.

Q225 Lord Anderson of Swansea: So am I!

Dr Solana: When I look back I find things that go in that direction, although you might say not in the rhythm required. When you see that we have already been engaged in more than 20 operations in the world. They may not be huge operations but to have the European Union acting in peacekeeping operations is helping. Some are military, some are civilian. We have been in Indonesia. It was a small operation that came after the tsunami but helped to get the bilateral agreement implemented, together with some ASEAN countries. Sometimes they are little things that can bring the added value. It is true that much more should have been done, but what has been done was not cheap. If the conversation took place a month or two months ago I would have been much clearer. I may have doubts today because I know some of the questions on the Treaty of Lisbon are on defence, which at the end is capability. We have structured co-operation. We know what it means, structured co-operation is about capabilities. In a way this is a good criterion, that if you want to belong you have to contribute. I do not know how this is going to be handled after the referendum. If that is kept in the Lisbon Treaty that is one step that is very important. On capabilities, I think some of the countries that are opting out now will opt in. Denmark, for instance. That is because a new climate has been created. Otherwise why would they want to change? With all the caveats, the economic crisis et cetera, we have seen the document by the French which is an interesting document because it goes in the direction of effectiveness. It is important also that France is moving into NATO which has consequences for a much better relationship between the two organisations on transatlantic matters. There are some things which are coming which go in that direction, not dramatically but slowly and clearly in the right direction.

Q226 Lord Anderson of Swansea: On climate change, do you think there will be agreement on specific measures to help developing countries respond to climate change? If so, what is the range of help which you think the Union can give?

Dr Solana: You ask me if I think it will be possible I say, yes, it is possible. Is it going to be easy? No, it is not going to be easy. It is going to be a very difficult agreement to make binding because with important countries like China or India it is very difficult to get binding objectives. But we have to continue fighting for that. In the European Union, which is leading the catalytic effort to get an agreement, we have to put things on the table which are important. Your Prime Minister has made some statements in the same direction. The objective has to be to make it binding but at the same we will probably have to be much more aggressive on amounts per capita. Maybe we can find an agreement. The United States have said very clearly, and President Bush told us very clearly the other day, that without engagement from China and India they will never sign. I do not think it is impossible but it is difficult and we will have to do a lot on technology transfer, be constructive on intellectual property laws and maybe touch on
something there. It will require a lot, but it is not impossible.

Q227 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could I just ask you a question about enlargement because I think the 2003 Security Strategy somewhat took enlargement for granted, which was reasonable enough because the European Union was about to increase its numbers and we had already begun to go down the road towards opening negotiations with Turkey, Macedonia and Croatia, and given certain undertakings at Thessaloniki to the other countries in the Balkans. It seems to me that everyone from one side of the political spectrum to the other accepts that the prospect of enlargement, which could one day come to include, let us say, the Ukraine as well, is something that is absolutely crucial to any European Security Strategy. A European Security Strategy which said, “The 27 Members of the European Union, that is the end, line drawn, no more”, would be an entirely different Security Strategy from the one that says there are a number of countries out there who will ultimately become members if they can accept the responsibilities of membership and conform to our criteria. Most of us would argue it is a better Security Strategy and that the other one saying, “27, that’s it”, is a disastrous European Security Strategy with all sorts of damaging implications, particularly in the Balkans but also with Turkey. At the moment, not only is the Turkish situation very fraught both for internal Turkish reasons and also because of the attitude of the incoming Presidency, but people are starting to throw around rather loosely talk about “No Lisbon, no further enlargement”, which strikes me as highly irresponsible because if we have to continue on the basis of Nice plus some pragmatic efforts in the direction pointed to by Lisbon we could certainly not say “no enlargement” without damaging the Security Strategy. I wondered if you could say how you thought you could get round that. On a final, quite different issue, can you factor in what is becoming quite a big element in the American election campaign, which is the move back towards multilateral nuclear disarmament and how Europe can fit into that.

Dr Solana: (The answer began off the record) On nuclear disarmament, that is a beautiful question and I think we have an opportunity here. We have an opportunity with the new administration. You know there are bipartisan efforts in that direction and we are co-operating with them. How do we deal with it? That will depend very much on how it is looked upon by the UK and France. If you help I think we can do a lot on that issue and create a climate which will be a catalyst for disarmament. I was in Geneva on Wednesday at the UN Conference on Disarmament. I was asked to speak by the Member States and I will give you a copy of my speech. It created a certain impact because nobody has revitalised the situation. Ban Ki Moon was there six months ago. We have an opportunity to do something along that line and I am very optimistic about McCain’s and Obama’s teams. I think it will be possible not only on the numbers but on the posture, and the two things have to be done. That will put us in a much better position for dealing with Iran.

Q228 Chairman: 2010?

Dr Solana: The Review Conference in 2010 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be quite an important event for non-proliferation.

Q229 Chairman: It is something which we have raised also in London.

Dr Solana: It would be good if you could help.

Q230 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Public statements by the British Government are pretty helpful so far, there have been two or three speeches now.

Dr Solana: There are two things. One is the principle, and I agree that you are moving in that direction very rapidly. The other is, is the European Union the place where we can talk about this? I think it should be. We need to create a positive climate and that is the other part on which you have to help a little bit.

Q231 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Going back to the Security Strategy, it calls on the EU to be more “active, capable and coherent”. To what extent do you think the EU has actually delivered on this commitment and should part of the Strategy be revised or strengthened? I think you have somewhat answered that in terms of thinking it should be pretty minimalist.

Dr Solana: That phrase in the text relates also to the Lisbon Treaty even if Lisbon Treaty was not yet conceived. If the Treaty were to be ratified and implemented there is no doubt that it would be easier to be done, no doubt about that.

Q232 Chairman: One of the important areas I would like to come on to is that threats and challenges increasingly are not coming from enemy states classically, but because of fragile states which implode and, therefore, create a lot of problems in a whole variety of ways for us, unstable states which spread. Here there are some questions because quite clearly if this is to be effective it needs the potential of the European Union to bring together instruments which are able to work in the security, governance and development areas and can work effectively together. Yet we all know for a number of reasons there is too often what might be called stove piping with things operating separately without sufficient co-ordination. As far as this business of stabilising
Dr Solana: The problem with Bosnia now is not because of the countries which are not in the European Union but who would like to maintain a broader international representative. If not, by now we could have appointed somebody from the European Union, double-hatting.

Q239 Chairman: I hope that we will not have to fall back on these other ways of doing it if the Treaty goes through but, nonetheless, as a Committee some time ago in responding to the document Europe in the World we tried to take up some of these points.

Dr Solana: It is very good that you keep pressing.

Q240 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The trickiest one of all to do without Lisbon, of course, would be Russia. That is the one where the lack of an overall European Union approach which factors in some of the foreign policy issues as well as all the economic policy issues is undoubtedly one of the things that enables the Russians to divide and rule, but of course it is much trickier because it is not an emergency situation like Afghanistan, Macedonia and so on.

Dr Solana: (The answer was given off the record)

Q241 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Can I just come back on the United States. I feel really that it does not make any difference who wins the presidential election, the Americans are going to cut back on their defence expenditure, they have got serious financial problems, they may undergo major economic recession, their foreign adventures have been mixed to disastrous, so we are going to have a post-Vietnam time, I think, when they are going to be rather drawing back and much more cautious about foreign adventures. How do you think the EU plays into all that? You must have been thinking about that.

Dr Solana: Yes, a lot, not only thinking but talking to them. I think the test for us is going to be Afghanistan. They may have differences on Iraq but in Afghanistan they have a bipartisan policy. Whatever is done there, it involves both the European Union and NATO, we both have a responsibility. That is something where we should give signals of maintaining engagement, helping to find a solution together which will be very, very important for our strategy. If we do it properly that will allow us to go very far.

Q242 Chairman: Secretary-General, we have taken a good deal of time but we have one last question if we might be allowed another couple of minutes. One of the things which we have learned in the last day is although perhaps in London, Paris, and I do not know about Madrid, but in the larger countries, because there are capacities for developing security strategies on their own maybe the Security Strategy does not play as large a role as it should, and there are
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a number of other Member States who do not necessarily have the inherent capacity to develop security strategies to get a broad overview. Here, as an educational function in creating an environment, we have got the impression that the Security Strategy already has played a rather important role and it would be interesting to hear from you whether you could confirm that.

Dr Solana: That is true. I do not want to exaggerate but I think the fact that it was a straightforward document and was readable has helped a lot for different actors within the Member States to talk about it. We have maintained the idea of seminar in different capitals which creates the dynamics for debate inside different countries and we are going to continue. We will have a seminar in Paris at the EU Institute. Others in Warsaw, and Rome. It is important to keep on discussing these matters without necessarily having a commitment to get conclusions. Everybody has their own conclusions but we do not write down conclusions or paragraphs. Ideas, yes. That is good because it mobilises the security community in different countries.

Chairman: I was at the seminar that was held in Warsaw at the end of last week and having been originally involved in the creation of the WEU Institute I am very proud of the way that Institute is playing an important part in the development of the European security culture collectively.

Q243 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I think you have answered my question, but just for completeness could I say that there is this astonishing contradiction between the fact that everyone who sees it agrees that the European Security Strategy is a good document that has been useful to a lot of people and so on, but if you go outside a very small charmed circle nobody has ever heard of it. At the same time, when Eurobaromenter goes round and asks people what they would most like to see the European Union providing them, security comes right at the top. Somehow or another in all the agonising after the Irish referendum, much of which is about the same question, the disconnect between the elites and the electorate, I do think we are going to have to come up with some kind of answer as to why it is we cannot do better at telling people about these security issues and what the European Union is trying to do about them.

Dr Solana: One thing that is much more delicate but we also have to tackle is national security.

Q244 Chairman: Yes.

Dr Solana: Not only external security but also—

Q245 Chairman: That is why the French White Book was very important and why, in a sense, we need to incorporate some of those ideas perhaps into the review of the Security Strategy. Secretary-General, as I think you know, our Sub-Committee really appreciates the time you are always prepared to give us. We hope that our reports are better because we have the chance to discuss these things with you.

Dr Solana: Thank you very much.

Chairman: We wish you well. Life has become a little more complicated because of events on the other side of the Irish Channel, but there are lots of tasks still ahead of you and we wish you well with what is going to be an interesting Presidency. We wish all those well who are involved in the task of making sure that we have an even better European Security Strategy in the next few months. Thank you.
MONDAY 30 JUNE 2008

Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Mr Robert Cooper, Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs, Council Secretariat, and Mr Richard Crowder, Policy Unit, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union, examined.

Q246 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for coming to see us. You know better than anybody else the subject of our discussion. As you know, we are doing an inquiry, you have seen where we have been and who we have been seeing. We have taken evidence in London from a range of people. We are seeing Mr Murphy later this week to get a view from the Government. This morning we met people from elsewhere and then the Commission, and now with you and the High Representative. You have seen the European Security Strategy in a whole variety of ways from its inception right the way through. How far has this sort of document proved useful in the development of the EU's external actions? Are there any lessons, as somebody who has seen the thing through the whole of one cycle, from those who as your neighbour are now involved in the review of the Strategy and a possible minor redrafting?

Mr Cooper: It had a particular use at the time that it happened, it had a political use in the particular situation of the EU in terms of bringing people together at a moment when they were very divided. Thereafter I was going to say it has depended partly on how different people have chosen to use it. For example, I believe in Sweden it was taken as a starting point, or maybe even the starting point, for their defence review as an overall picture of the kind of defence forces that they wanted. It is not enough for that so they must have elaborated the ideas quite a lot. That is an example I am aware of, but perhaps there are others as well.

Q247 Lord Anderson of Swansea: To what extent has work already been done on the redraft? There have been the various documents published from March onwards. Is there a preliminary draft available already, or redraft?

Mr Cooper: Richard may know better than I do. No, I do not think so. I do not know that we are really thinking in terms of redrafting anyway, it is more likely to be a document to supplement that.

Q248 Lord Anderson of Swansea: To supplement, so the original document will stand and there will be a sort of self-standing update?

Mr Cooper: Yes.

Q249 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Based on experience.

Mr Cooper: That is my guess, yes.

Q250 Chairman: There might be some phrases which could be tweaked, or do you think that it is a sacred text?

Mr Cooper: Once you start redrafting a bit of it you end up redrafting the whole thing. My guess is that there will be a self-standing document which will in a kind of nuanced direction change one or two parts.

Q251 Lord Anderson of Swansea: What will be the role of the French Presidency? Presumably they have their own ideas. The Council will be in the driving seat, but where will the French Presidency come in in this new stage?

Mr Cooper: It was a French proposal that this should happen and I am sure they will take a very strong interest in it. They are in the chair and that gives them not an enormous power but the possibility of steering things and this is one of the things they have wanted, so I assume they will make an important impact on it.

Q252 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Do you see any major, I will not say confrontations, difficulties arising from various priorities of the French that will not be acceptable to others?

Mr Cooper: No.

Q253 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Where are the major points of confrontation?

Mr Cooper: What I see in this is there is going to be a kind of tension between those who want to put everything that you can possibly think of into the document and those who think it is better that it should remain focused. I belong to the second category.

Q254 Chairman: Surprise, surprise!

Mr Cooper: I thought that one of the merits of the original document was that it dealt with areas that the European Union otherwise does not often deal with, the kind of hard security. The term “security” is very large and you can interpret it in many different ways. I think it is good for the EU to reserve a little
bit of time to think about these rather difficult areas and, therefore, too much dilution with a whole range of things which the Community deals with in other ways, trade protection, is—

Q255 Lord Anderson of Swansea: In your judgment, which are likely to be the most thorny issues? Mr Solana mentioned Russia where he thought there would be substantial differences arising presumably from the different commercial interests in gas and so on. What would be your list of areas which would prove the most difficult in the negotiation?

Mr Cooper: Well, apart from the one I have mentioned between the maximalists, the Christmas tree supporters, I am sure Javier is right that anybody who attempts to write down too much about a strategy to Russia, even if you tried to do that on a national basis, you would find there would be differences of views within the different Whitehall departments, some of whom saw Russia as an important partner and some of whom saw Russia as a very difficult country. Those differences are magnified when you have countries with very different experiences in dealing with Russia.

Q256 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Geography and history.

Mr Cooper: Exactly. For my part, what I personally hope for this, and in a way it is at an early stage, is that what happens in the coming semester will do some things which will make this document into something more like a strategy. What we have at the moment is a description of what you might call a conception of security. To make that into a strategy you would have to say something about how you were going to get there and there is probably some scope for doing that.

Q257 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Including a timetable?

Mr Cooper: Initially the term “strategy” was not in the draft which the High Representative proposed because we did not think this was a strategy. I do not know how far you go in the way of timetables, but personally I would be happy if we finished at the end of the year with a document that involved some commitments to doing something.

Q258 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I think you should be congratulated because there has been unanimity among all the people who have talked about this, which is becoming quite numerous, that the existing document is short, concise and totally comprehensible. There has been slightly less than unanimity on the fact that if you rewrite it, it will probably become longer and less comprehensible and if you are not very careful it will achieve nothing, it will be completely negative by extending it. Can I tease out with you, if we are going to talk about implementation, which I think is the main concern as to what has not happened and perhaps this needs to be written down, do you see this as an addendum to the Strategy?

Mr Cooper: Yes.

Q259 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Would you put capabilities in that?

Mr Cooper: Yes, certainly.

Q260 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: And timescales for implementation?

Mr Cooper: I think that is for discussion and negotiation.

Q261 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: It is something we could call for?

Mr Cooper: Yes. It is always good if you are going to make a commitment, the more precise you make it the more real it is and, therefore, putting in deadlines is a good thing.

Q262 Chairman: Would that be best in the Strategy or would it be a good idea if, together with the Strategy the Council adopted, a document instructing that by a certain date something of that sort should be developed?

Mr Cooper: Yes.

Q263 Chairman: Both ways are possible, are they not?

Mr Cooper: There are many different ways of doing that. It will depend. In the end when you try and draft these things they fall into a natural shape. It depends how much detail you want to go into in the different areas. I have one particular personal fetish in the area of capabilities and that is whenever we try and do anything there are several things we find we have not got, and one is helicopters, which everybody is now working on very hard, both in this part of Brussels and in the other part of Brussels and down at SHAPE as well. The other thing we always find is in very short supply is policemen and, indeed, more general civilian capabilities. That is partly because policemen were never designed to be deployed abroad. One of the things that I hope Member States will consider when they look back over the past five years is whether there might not be merit in having national programmes for deploying civilians abroad. That is something which has to be looked at on a country-by-country basis because everybody has different systems. Indeed, I think the UK has already taken steps in this direction and I believe Finland has done the same as well. If everybody thought this was a good idea there would be merit in everybody having a look at their national systems.
Q264 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: How would you do that? Would you dual-hat existing policemen and give them a liability to be deployed abroad?

Mr Cooper: Again, this is a national question because the police are all within national systems. For example, it would be useful if police forces recognised that serving in a mission abroad, which is often doing rather difficult things in a rather challenging environment, was something which ought to be regarded as career enhancing and to equip people for promotion, for example. At the moment the tendency is that if you go abroad when you are a policeman everyone is surprised when you come back and I do not think it necessarily does you that much good.

Q265 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Out of sight, out of mind.

Mr Cooper: Yes. Often the jobs that they are doing abroad are very challenging indeed and they take a lot of responsibility and that ought to be recognised.

Q266 Chairman: It is sometimes suggested that this can be done so well by people who have Gendarmerie or Cabinieri, but it is not only that sort of policemen who are needed and, therefore, in the UK and other places we really need to think rather hard about this difficult problem.

Mr Cooper: Exactly. We ought to recognise now that this is not something which is just an accident that has occurred once or twice, it is now a regular feature of life and we need to organise ourselves for it better than we do at the moment.

Q267 Chairman: It is something which we are pursuing obviously in the case of the Afghanistan situation.

Mr Cooper: Exactly.

Q268 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: If I understood you correctly, you are positing for the sake of this discussion a European Security Strategy which is not much changed, the actual core document, with some form of accompanying document which, as it were, updates and brings within the scope of it some of the things that have assumed greater prominence since 2003, like climate change or energy security and so on.

Mr Cooper: Climate change is the obvious one.

Q269 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: In that context it does strike me, and also that of effective multilateralism, that it will be very important that the European Union tries to find a way out of the difficulty in actually implementing and applying “Responsibility to Protect”, a way which tries to de-intoxicate that from the belief that it is a military intervention mechanism rather than a how to stop states failing mechanism, and only if they have totally failed an intervention mechanism. I do not know what you think, but it seems to me that since acceptance of “Responsibility to Protect” happened after 2003, it would be good if some references to that could be made. Of course, the other big issue for 2009 which may be quite difficult to accommodate but quite important is the whole business of multilateral nuclear disarmament and the input that a new American President now seems very likely to make to that and on which the Europeans certainly do not have a lead role to play, but unless they want to be dragged along behind it without making any effort at all it seems it is about time they started thinking about it in a more purposeful way.

Mr Cooper: I do not know how one should describe our role but it is not negligible because where the European Union has been able to get its act together in the context of NPT Review Conferences, for example, it has quite a lot of impact because we represent states ranging from Ireland to Britain and France. Something that commands consensus in the European Union at the very least attracts a lot of attention from parts of the non-aligned movement, for example, and can become the focal point for a consensus. In that multilateral context the EU is not a negligible actor at all. On the whole, what either of the US potential presidents is going to do takes them much more in the European direction and ought to assist the process of creating the large consensus that is very important. All of those developments seem to me to be very welcome indeed.

Q270 Chairman: “Responsibility to Protect”?

Mr Cooper: It seems to me it is a little bit like the phrase, “human security”, that somehow the phrase has taken on a life of its own. In a way, it is what we do. We do our best to try and catch states before they fall. It was what we were doing in the case of Kenya where there was a very major effort mounted by the European Union and the US together to try and prevent the last elections from bringing about a collapse of the state. I do not think there is a problem with the substance, it is somehow that the language has become—

Q271 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Yes, but surely you need to unpack the language a bit, do you not, and get away from a kind of acronym which simply gets people behind barricades shooting at each other and gets them to thinking seriously about how it should be done. After all, as an important player, as you rightly say, in somewhere like Kenya we should have our say also and try to move the debate away from this because it damages one of our objectives, which is effective multilateralism. If every time somebody talks about “Responsibility to Protect” nothing happens and everybody just says, “Oh well, it’s completely useless and we can’t do that”, then we are...
an area where there is an underlying di

take it seriously on a continuous basis. Thirdly, it is

secular trend that there is going to be more, the means

Secondly, it does seem to me that there is a sort of

of thing where if you do not have a major incident for

Personally, I thought this was a good moment to

so involved and Richard probably knows better than

Mr Cooper: I do not want to commit myself because

Q272 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Presumably even if

the word has to be redefined, because the concept is

now in greater currency, there would have to be some


Mr Cooper: I do not want to commit myself because

I would like to see what the debate is going to be like

on that. When the existing Security Strategy was

drafted the word that caused more attention than

anything else was—

Q273 Chairman: “Pre-emptive”.

Mr Cooper: The concept did not actually cause that

much difficulty and if you read the document
carefully you can see the concept is still there. The

word caused enormous trouble.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: It is just Article 51.

Q274 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I have trouble with

the words, I must say. I do not man the barricades

against Lord Hannay on this, but it has an awfully

open-ended sound to it to me and it then says to me

that if you find it necessary this “Responsibility to

Protect” takes you into Chad but it does not take you

into Zimbabwe. That is the worry I have about it.

Why do you think Chad is more worthy of being

saved? I know why it is, but under that umbrella I do

not see you can really differentiate between one or

the other.

Mr Cooper: The trouble with real life is that one is

faced everyday with particular problems and you do

your best.

Q275 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Yes, exactly, but

inevitably you pick and choose and that is the world

we live in. I would like to move on to terrorism. The

question is whether it should be added into the
document? I hate asking that question because I do

not think anything should be added into your
document at all. Do you think it that the reaction to

terrorism has been covered? Do you think people are

aware of the threat really to our cities in Europe?

Mr Cooper: This is a personal view, I have not been

so involved and Richard probably knows better than

I do the debates that have taken place so far.

Personally, I thought this was a good moment to

have another look at terrorism because it is the kind

of thing where if you do not have a major incident for

18 months then everybody tends to forget about it.

Secondly, it does seem to me that there is a sort of

secular trend that there is going to be more, the means

for terrorism is more and more available and, like it

or not, there is going to be more and we do need to

take it seriously on a continuous basis. Thirdly, it is

an area where there is an underlying difference of

approach between Europe and the USA which needs to

be resolved and therefore it would be a good thing

for us to clarify our ideas on this in advance of a new

American administration. You do not find people in

Europe use the phrase “war on terrorism”, it is clearly

seen in different terms from the USA. However, that

said, I am not familiar with how the debate has gone

so far.

Mr Crowder: The only point I would add to that is

there might need to be more of a focus on home-
grown terrorism compared to five years ago.

Chairman: If one looks at the French White Book

where in a sense they look at security in this sort of

way, this might be one of the inputs which the French

looking in your direction would favour.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: The Director of Chatham

House in his inaugural speech made that distinction.

For us terrorism is a domestic issue needing all the

sensitivity it requires; for the US it is a foreign policy

matter dealing with nasty individuals in far away

places.

Q276 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: It is quite interesting

even with home-grown terrorism, the degree to which

they are cued into the Internet, the information they

are getting and the encouragement to commit an

atrocious act does come from abroad.

Mr Cooper: It is both national and international.

Q277 Lord Anderson of Swansea: My question

follows Lord Hamilton’s. Clearly WMD is going to

arise in the document and the question, therefore, is

posed whether the 2003 document, together with the

document on non-proliferation, in your judgment is

adequate and whether there will be a need for

amending in any way and, if so, in what way?

Mr Cooper: I do not think we have done badly on

WMD. I find the extent to which the EU is conscious

of WMD as a challenge and a threat and is active on

the subject is very di

erent now from five years ago.

We have also done perhaps better at WMD than we

have on terrorism in identifying the things that can be

done well at a European level. We have quite a lot of

programmes designed to help support the IAEA in

different ways. We are the principal contributor to

something called the Nuclear Security Fund which

helps ensure that countries have got adequate

security systems, adequate safeguards, adequate

administrations to—

Q278 Lord Anderson of Swansea: So you are content
effectively?

Mr Cooper: One can always look at these things

again, but what we have done with WMD is we have

had five years of activity and rather than rewrite the

2003 paper on WMD we have had a continual six

month process of updating the priorities. During this

Presidency there is going to be another look at the EU
Q279 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could you speculate briefly about where we are likely to be by December with the Iranians given that that will undoubtedly affect the way in which people address all these issues? You have just been to Tehran, I think. Secondly, on this nuclear area, there is the all these issues? You have just been to Tehran, I think. Secondly, on this nuclear area, there is the all these issues? You have just been to Tehran, I think. Secondly, on this nuclear area, there is the all these issues? You have just been to Tehran, I think. Secondly, on this nuclear area, there is the

Mr Cooper: That is absolutely vital and in my mind it links in a little bit to the subject of Iran. We find that when Iran is discussed in the IAEA Board, for example, it is still somehow seen as being a north/south question, but that is ridiculous because the people who are going to suffer are going to be the south, the north can look after itself. Therefore, the right moves by the USA to promote real international consensus on this are vital in terms of everybody understanding that proliferation is a problem for them and it is not us trying to deny people technology or anything like that. Those all go together and they go with the Iranian case specifically to try and get away from the Third World reflex. We have not made progress with Iran in the last three years and it would be very surprising if we made progress between now and Christmas while they are waiting for the new US administration. We went to Tehran for all kinds of different reasons, to continue to demonstrate that we are serious about seeking a negotiated solution, and I think that we somehow got through quite well to some of the people in the government who seemed to listen to us. If you looked before Solana’s first meeting they put out a press statement saying that they totally rejected everything he brought with him. After the second meeting they put out a press statement saying that perhaps his visit had opened a path towards negotiation. I do not build too much on that but, nevertheless, he seemed to have made some impact there. Where we did make some impact was in the wider Iranian public because we held a press conference that was like nothing I have seen. You would have had to have a press conference for Madonna or somebody to see something similar.

Q280 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Wearing a hejab, of course!

Mr Cooper: Of course! This time we gave out copies of the proposal we put to the Iranians, several newspapers have published it and it has excited a certain amount of debate within Iran, which was one of the things we hoped would happen, but I do not think we are expecting this to come to fruition this year.

Q281 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Presumably the Iranians also have a tactical problem about how to get from now until the installation of the new American President without any nasty experiences.

Mr Cooper: Yes. I do not know, they are very difficult people to understand.

Q282 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Yes, but it must be on their minds.

Mr Cooper: I guess so, but they are very good at concealing what is on their minds. (The answer continued off the record)

Q283 Chairman: One of the things which has developed and one can see is more than hinted at, proposed within the Security Strategy, is the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Mr Cooper: Yes.

Q284 Chairman: One wonders how far the pursuit of stability and specific interests such as energy security sometimes seem to take precedence over the promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights in the neighbourhood. Our approaches to Belarus and Algeria are not identical.

Mr Cooper: Right.

Q285 Chairman: What do we do about it?

Mr Cooper: I am reluctant to fall back on the old Foreign Office standard saying we deal with these things on a case-by-case basis.

Q286 Chairman: With respect, the problem about that is we differentiate, but one of the difficulties is if you have something called a Neighbourhood Policy, if you then have things on the one hand called a Union for the Mediterranean, which looks as if you are treating people rather homogeneously, and if you have an Eastern Partnership for other countries, there seems to be a contradiction between the positive conditionality which you are talking about in one area and, on the other hand, trying to group people together into all being part of a common neighbourhood.
Mr Cooper: The reality is that the way in which the Neighbourhood Policy operates, and you have probably heard this from the Commission, is that those who really want to move forward can move forward and get support in moving forward. If you look at where the money goes, you will see that a whole lot more goes to Morocco than it does to Algeria just because the Moroccans are interested in the kind of development that we are trying to encourage.

Q287 Chairman: On the other hand, you talk about making special arrangements with Israel in spite of the fact that perhaps as far as settlements and opening up travel in the West Bank are not altogether fitting into things which in the Middle East Peace Process we would have expected.

Mr Cooper: The language in the Council Conclusions on Israel was very carefully worded. The Israelis have chosen to present it in one particular way, but I do not think that is the way everybody here sees it.

Q288 Chairman: I shall re-read it. In the Strategy you do call on the European Union to be more “active, capable and coherent” and, indeed, there have been some efforts made. I wonder how far you feel that the EU has delivered on that commitment in the original Strategy. To some extent that takes us forward to a Lisbon or Lisbon-minus agenda.

Mr Cooper: I do not think the European Union has had a problem with being active. Capable, I think we have still got some way to go. Here in Brussels we have improved our organisation in the five year period, we are more capable of handling the very large deployment in Kosovo now than we were five years ago, for example, but there are capability questions, which we discussed earlier. The big challenge is coherence and that is connected to the Treaty, on the one hand, and it is also connected to a bit more. I ask myself sometimes if all of our activity really fits into a kind of coherent political objective or not.

Q289 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: As the greatest supporter and believer in this room, other than you, of your document, you could argue that actually the EU has been able to do what on earth it likes, expanded its activities in many different directions ever since the day you printed it and, therefore, there is even less rationale for rewriting it.

Mr Cooper: Yes. I am not in favour of rewriting it.

Q290 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Or even adding to it. It covers everything really, so if we add bits on all we are doing is emphasising certain bits more than they were before.

Mr Cooper: I am certainly in favour of trying to take some clearer steps in the direction that we want to go, particularly on the capability front.

Q291 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I think we agreed that would be an addendum, did we not?

Mr Cooper: Yes, certainly. As far as coherence is concerned, partly that is a story about the Treaty. That is such a big thing that the rest is not so important. It is also a question of it being a day-to-day struggle to ensure that one has a viable political strategy surrounding all of the things that you do.

Q292 Lord Anderson of Swansea: The 2003 document referred to working with partners. We have had five years’ experience of that working and in your judgment in what way should a revised document envisage that form of working with partners? The same partners, new partners, different forms of mix, clusters of partners?

Mr Cooper: Things have changed a bit in five years. China is a much more prominent player now than it was five years ago and begins to look much more like a potential partner than it did five years ago. Although the Chinese have not rushed forward eagerly in these areas, you find in areas like Darfur and Burma a different Chinese response now from five years ago. That is a bit of the landscape which has changed most prominently.

Q293 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Accepting international obligations in a way that they would not have done before.

Mr Cooper: Yes. In a rather narrow area, in Chad we have the first Russian participation, in an ESDP operation with the contribution of helicopters, and that seems to me to be a good thing.

Q294 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Presumably the partners at that time included private sector partners, NGOs and so on, or did one have in mind simply the other organisations?

Mr Cooper: No, we were thinking internationally of partners. We do work very much with NGOs in some areas, for example in Kosovo. In preparation of the police rule of law operation in Kosovo there has been very extensive contact with the NGOs who know that sector very well.

Q295 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: This question of partners leads one always back to China, Russia and the United States, and probably beyond that India, although it is not the quite same order of priority because at the moment the Indians do not seem to be very big players on the international stage.
Mr Cooper: Except in the UN, of course.

Q296 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Yes, but they are negative, they are defensive players, so they are not really on the same side as us. I suppose we could try to make them slightly less tiresome. Given that is so, that it always leads you back to China, Russia and so on, is there going to be any way in which the review of the Security Strategy can actually lead to a qualitative improvement in the way that Europe handles these things? Is there any way in which the review is going to point towards a better performance in that?

Mr Cooper: I am afraid to say I come back to the Lisbon Treaty. I think the Lisbon Treaty would have been helpful on this point because it makes much clearer who is in charge of putting forward proposals. When you have 27 people around the table somebody needs to make a proposal. Now, no doubt, what you agree, because it is by consensus, is going to end up fuzzier than that, but at least you can start with some clear proposals and priorities and it would be much easier to do that if you had one structure, one person clearly in charge. For me, that is the best way of getting round that. It also potentially makes the dialogue with the third parties a bit more meaningful. I do not know if Lord Hannay perhaps has participated in troika meetings at some point or other.

Q297 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: No, thank God!

Mr Cooper: Well, there we are, I do not have to explain to you what they were like.

Q298 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: No.

Mr Cooper: They are not a very useful way of communicating with people. In the end communication takes place between two individuals, not between enlarged teams on both sides. For me, that would be the best way of producing a bit more sharpness into the way in which we conduct these things.

Q299 Chairman: This was illustrated to us when we were looking at the way in which the Quartet works within the Middle East Peace Process, that in fact it is—

Mr Cooper: Sextet.

Q300 Chairman: Three plus one plus one, which does not, in fact, increase the credibility of the European Union.

Mr Cooper: No, it is ridiculous.

Q301 Chairman: Could I just come back to the example that you gave earlier which we found very interesting about the role of the ESS as far as Sweden is concerned. Without expecting you to be too precise, do you think that the influence of the ESS as an educational influence in developing the policy of Member States in these sorts of areas is probably inversely correlated with the size of the Member State?

Mr Cooper: I think it is probably more random than that actually. From time to time the other place where it gets cited is here, of course. Now and then somebody underlines that the ESS laid down this doctrine and therefore we must do that, but normally somebody produces it in support of something they are already going to do. That the EU is committed to trying to make multilateral institutions work is normal and natural, and I guess we probably would have done it anyway.

Q302 Chairman: Would it be possible to have some discussion of the issues if there had not been a certain result in the Irish referendum, totally off the record?

It might be interesting to hear from you an assessment of where you think we are and what the implication of this is for the next six to nine months?

Mr Cooper: (The answer was given off the record)

Q303 Chairman: Thank you very much, as ever, for coming and spending time with us, we do appreciate this. We are also very pleased that you seem to be enjoying what must be a very tough job.

Mr Cooper: Exhausting!

Chairman: Thank you very much.
TUESDAY 1 JULY 2008

Present
Anderson of Swansea, L.
Hamilton of Epsom, L.

Hannay of Chiswick, L.
Roper, L. (Chairman)

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr Kees Klompenhouwer, Director of Civilian ESDP Operations, and Lieutenant-General David Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff, Council Secretariat, examined.

Q304 Chairman: Good morning. As I think you know, the Committee is carrying out an inquiry into the review of the European Security Strategy and looking at its effectiveness over the last five years, how useful it has been, what could be done and should not be done in terms of reviewing it, and what sort of instruments people who are doing the sort of things you are doing feel would be useful to come out of the process. The questions which we have raised with you that you have had a chance to see touch on those sorts of areas. I would like to begin by saying that in the Strategy there is this phrase calling on the European Union to be more “active, capable and coherent”. To what extent do you feel over the five years since the Strategy was prepared that the Union has been able to do this? You may have an opening statement you would like to make on the general themes.

Mr Klompenhouwer: As an opening statement I would say that we have been engaged in a lot of operations on the civilian side and are still engaged in a lot of operations. One of the things we try to manage is the gap between the political objectives and the situation on the ground and the means that are made at our disposal. It is a constant challenge and we are trying to do a better job every day, but it remains a challenge. That is what I would like to say as an opening statement.

Q305 Chairman: Thank you very much. In terms of being more “active, capable and coherent”, how far has one moved in this direction in the last five years?

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Maybe it is easier for me to handle that, having had an acquaintance with the ESDP and its instruments both out in the field and here in Brussels at least since mid-2004. The first thing is one has only got to look at the spectrum of operations, the geographical spread, the number of them, the specificity of those operations in technical terms, to recognise that we have certainly been active. I think one can tick that box. Whether we have been capable, I would say, and perhaps it is not for me to judge, from a technical point of view highly capable and highly effective in some very discrete areas. I have seen some of the civilian operations at firsthand, for example some of the activities in Darfur, the police and the EUPM in Bosnia, and I know Kees will probably talk about some of those. Very technical, very effective, very efficient, very targeted, very specific and, therefore, capable, tick the box there. When you come to the military operations I would say we have been capable and we have also been lucky. FYROM was not a demanding mission. It was a good experiment, as it were, to try the mechanisms out with some real people on the ground, but it was not demanding, and it was well done. The first Congo mission, Artemis, was more demanding, it was time limited, geographically limited, task limited; I think it was well done. It was more or less French led, so it was a national operation with an EU flag on it but, once again, as a starter it was well done, it demonstrated a capability. The next operation was really the EUFOR operation in Bosnia. I am going to tell you it was very well done. It was well done. The seamless transition for which there was a lot of scepticism, the transition from NATO to the EU, from SFOR to EUFOR, was indeed seamless by acknowledgement, including of the Americans, who were the most sceptical, and possibly the Brits, who were the second most sceptical. As one American described to me, in fact SACEUR, he was astonished. It was effective and was well done. In that EUFOR mission, and you have heard me say this before, it was different from the SFOR mission and Solana himself told me, and it was reflected in the OPLAN that I received, that it was a “new and distinct”, was how he described it, mission and that EUFOR was to make a difference. We did things differently from SFOR, we had some different tasks and tackled them differently. It was the start of the comprehensive approach. I address the “coherent” bit now, because the idea of EUFOR taking over from SFOR was to get the various EU instruments better collaborating in delivering an effect on the ground, and that happened with some coherence. (The answer continued off the record) Since the Bosnia operation, on the military side we have done another Congo operation and Chad. The Congo operation demonstrated the capability. We had the German Potsdam operational headquarters, which worked and was not very good, but nor was PJHQ in the UK when it tried to do its first operation either. However, it succeeded, so it developed a capability which if it did it again would do it twice as well. We put close to 3,000 people onto the ground for a limited period of time with infrastructure, they delivered an...
operational effect and we did not take any casualties. It was exposed to some risk, both of security and risk to the effectiveness of the mission, and I would say they were lucky because they were not seriously tested. Had they been tested, I think the story could have been otherwise. That is not so much to do with the European Union as with national caveats, which is a common international problem rather than an EU one. Then the Chad mission, another OHQ is being tested. I was out there with the Sec-Gen a few weeks ago. I think the Chad mission has had an effect on the ground. The doubters and sceptics have been surprised. Even the NGOs in Chad and the Central African Republic some of whom I saw last August when I went on the recce and spoke to them and saw them again a few weeks ago when I went out, said, “Okay, you’re forgiven”. People have been surprised. There have been troubles with force generation, we have got problems. (The answer continued off the record). What has been encouraging, and where I took the greatest encouragement, was the French Force Commander told me at the outset, and I know him reasonably well because he did the recce with me last year when we set up the missions, “I am very worried that we are going to get a collection of contingents from small and new Member States who can’t do the business out here and we’ll have to carry them”. Out on the ground he told me, “I have been surprised. These small contingents have come out and the soldiers have been willing to live in austere conditions, at risk, under-resourced when they first arrived, no proper security arrangements, just a bit of desert to live in with a tent, they just got on with it. More than that, they have initiative, they have been proactive, and even some of the ideas they have brought for living in an extremely austere place in the world, frankly we French have learned a couple of lessons”. That was some accolade, I have to say.

Q306 Lord Anderson of Swansea: High praise.
Lieutenant-General Leakey: That has been good, that ESDP has got some of these Member States—we are talking here of Ireland, Austria, the Swedes and so on—who are not habitual Africa Corps experts. They have gone out there and they have done the business. This has expanded capability. Not too bad. On the coherence, Chad has not been a big civil-mil operation. Co-ordination with the UN, the external agencies, has been okay, and with the Commission. We did the initial recce jointly. The UN and Commission came with me on the initial recce. We did all the meetings together. We had our daily conferences together to stitch the idea together, and I think the coherence was good. On coherence, over the last five years I would say capability has grown. On coherence we are getting the idea but there is a long, long way to go and some of your questions will address where it might go.

Q307 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: If we could just step back, because our inquiry is about the European Security Strategy and one of the things we are trying to identify is what the interface is between the day-to-day work that you are doing on ESDP missions and the broad and pretty brief but very well expressed, in the view of all the people we have talked to, concepts that were set out in the original Security Strategy which are now being reviewed. It would be very helpful to us if you two could say to what extent does the European Security Strategy, in a way, guide your overall approach to policy, not defining what you do in Chad or what you do in Bosnia, we know perfectly well it does not do that, but is it of any relevance at all, or is it irrelevant and unimportant? Are the people you work with, the Chadians or the Bosnians, even conscious of what the European Union’s overall approach is as set out in the European Security Strategy and does that matter? I know these things are terribly imprecise but it is quite important given that a lot of witnesses have told us that it is not really a strategy in the correct Staff College meaning of the word “strategy”, it is more a concept and so on. What is its usefulness to an operator like yourself, a practitioner, if any?

Lieutenant-General Leakey: It is well-written. It covers all the bases. It is short, it is digestible and, therefore, gives a hook for everything we do. There is nothing I do or Kees does that is not hooked in the ESS. From that point of view it is a good chapeau document for ESDP operations. In terms of its future development there is one thing I am wary of and one thing it should have. There are lots of small things, but in general terms. The one thing I am wary of is making it a prescription to cover absolutely everything. I know it has been described as a Christmas tree which you hang every present off, and there is a risk in that, but in a way you could say it is that already because there is a hook for almost everything. What I think is missing from it and which would help not just us in our work but the Member States, and I have talked to Robert Cooper about this and he acknowledges this and intends to try and tackle this with some succinct, in his Cooper-esque way, paragraphs, is making what is written in the Security Strategy more relevant to a citizen in a Member State. We had real problems force generating for Chad, and not just Chad but in NATO for Afghanistan, and for the UN for any of their missions. Why is it? It is because Member States do not see these operations as priorities. If the Security Strategy is a priority, something that the European Union thinks it ought to be doing and investing effort in, then we need to make the linkage between all those bullets of activity with the vital interests of Member States and their individuals. That linkage is made but it is not convincing and compelling enough which is why the Germans, for example, will not go to Chad.
As you know, they hold their hands up and say, “Why on earth is that in our national interest?” We need to make the connection with the interests of the citizens so that ministers find it easier to justify to their parliaments, to their media and their constituents why we should send soldiers to Chad, Afghanistan or the Caucasus or wherever it might, how it affects national interests. That connection between the threats and the menace in the Strategy needs to be more closely linked to the vital interests and that section of the Strategy needs strengthening.

Chairman: Mr Klompenhouwer, you might want to add on that.

Mr Klompenhouwer: In the civilian arena this is also an issue. There is a danger that we will see the great number of civilian missions that we have now embarked upon as nice things, nice to have, to show, but not as something very important for either ourselves or for the countries concerned, more a political gesture. There is a risk in that. If this were to be the case then support would eventually erode. That is why I think what General Leakey has said is also very important for our civilian missions. What I try to make visible is that what we are doing in the civilian sphere with our police missions, rule of law missions and customs is a form of defence but not in the military sense, in the sense of a minister of home affairs who realises that he gets a lot of criminals into his country and they come from somewhere. By employing our expertise in the justice sphere outside our borders we could also contribute to achieving objectives of domestic public order and domestic security. This is important because it can help us to focus our work on things that are of direct relevance to Member States. An example is Bosnia where the EUPM mission is very active in the field of organised crime and has actively helped the police in Bosnia to make a number of arrests and the justice system come to a number of convictions, which I think add up to about 200 years in jail. This is about people who pose a risk to their societies, but inherently may also pose a risk for us. This is important for focusing our objectives, but it is also important to get the support of the ministers of justice and of the interior because it is their personnel we are using. That is very scarce and they have to make it available competing with domestic priorities. When the Minister of the Interior in the Netherlands has to choose between dealing with football hooligans in the city of Rotterdam or—

Lieutenant-General Leakey: British football hooligans!

Mr Klompenhouwer: --- public order in Kosovo, you have to make clear why public order in Kosovo is of relevance to him. I think that can be done if we make the international effort and the effort of bringing evidence to this. Everything I have said could be on the record, but particularly the following: it is as if we are reaching a sort of capacity limit with the missions that we now have, particularly since I have a very big mission in Kosovo, EULEX, and we are doubling or significantly increasing in Afghanistan. We may have to significantly increase our presence in the Palestine Territories if the process goes well. There was the Berlin Conference last week at which it was very clear that building the capabilities of the Palestinian police is a key element of the whole two state solution. Condoleezza Rice referred to our EUPOL COPPS mission in the Palestine Territories being an important tool. The political profile of these activities is suddenly raised, which means that we will have to be stronger on delivery, which means not only an effort on our side in planning these missions but also an effort on the side of the Member States who have to supply the scarce personnel. We are talking about scarce personnel and areas of risk. Kosovo is a relatively benign environment but, of course, Afghanistan is not and the Palestine Territories can be tricky. All of these things play into the final judgments of these ministers as to whether or not to make personnel available. We have to deal with this. I hope that the next step or the next version of the European Security Strategy will help us in addressing these issues.

Chairman: I think the point of ensuring that people realise the relevance of ESDP missions and how far the Strategy can help in that, the point that General Leakey made, is one which we will come back to.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: The steer that we have been getting so far from almost everybody we have been talking to is that there is serious downturn potential in revising the European Security Strategy. You may end up with a weaker and much bigger document than you have already and as it is not really read by anybody it seems to me you have got to be quite careful fiddling about with this. It has not actually stopped anybody doing anything they want to do in Europe anyway. If you are a Conservative, like I am, you do not change things unless there are very compelling reasons to do so. What we have got to concentrate on is capabilities and I would really like a steer from you. Do we need to be spelling out action plans? Do we need timescales? Should we be saying something about defence budgets? In particular people have been talking about helicopters and police, which are the two key areas. I am interested, General Leakey, by what you say that the Germans did not go into Chad because it was not in their national interest. Is it not also conceivable the Germans did not go into Chad because they were seriously worried they did not really have the troops who were trained to do the job? One of the problems that Europe has is not numbers but actually there are not the people who are trained and equipped to do the jobs that need to be done. Is that not one of the
weaknesses of Europe as it stands? There are plenty of people standing about in uniform but whether you can send them anywhere is another question altogether, is it not? Lieutenant-General Leakey: Addressing that point directly, I would say if you can put Finns, Swedes, Irish and Austrians successfully into Chad there is absolutely no reason on God’s earth why the Bundeswehr could not go there.

Q310 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I have had it suggested to me that the real worry that the Bundeswehr has is that they will send troops, they will suddenly get caught in an ambush and they will have an unacceptable level of casualties. Lieutenant-General Leakey: That is a different issue. That does not apply to the deployment in the Chad region, they are not trained for the Chad region. (The answer continued off the record)

Q311 Chairman: For example, the Swedes have just completed their time as the Battle Group, how far has the Battle Group concept been useful in helping them to start thinking about this sort of thing and helping in the process of internal transformation?

Lieutenant-General Leakey: From the Swedes’ point of view it has been the vehicle for that transformation in their defence structure and defence spending, and others have looked at the Swedes as a benchmark. Particularly those who participated within the Nordic Battle Group have learned hugely out of this. It has raised capability, and we see it in the willingness to go to Chad.

Q312 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: What do you want us to say in terms of capability? Lieutenant-General Leakey: Did you mention defence expenditure across the piece?

Q313 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Yes. Lieutenant-General Leakey: I forget what the statistics are but it is all mostly bad news everywhere.

Q314 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: It is all dropping, is it not? Lieutenant-General Leakey: It is all dropping. If it drops it is dressed as efficiency and more effectiveness for your pound or your euro, but, to be honest, it means less available capability by and large. The evidence for that is to be seen now when we try and force generate.

Q315 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Do you think we should put in timescales and those sorts of things for things to improve? Lieutenant-General Leakey: I would just make four remarks. I categorise where we are at the moment with the Europeans. When it comes to force generating for an operation like Chad there are those Member States who “can and do”, and in this case France and Ireland and those who have gone. There are those who “can but will not”; that is, for example, Germany and there are one or two others. Germany has got plenty of capability and I do not accept that they could not have the capabilities or the training, they could, but they are in a mindset which prevents them, they just politically will not for their own internal reasons. Then there are those who “would but cannot”, and I put the UK into this category. If the UK was not in Iraq and Afghanistan I am sure they might have gone to Chad with at least a Battle Group. Then there is this group of countries that “would but cannot”, a bit like the UK, but for different reasons. Here I put, I do not know, Portugal, Spain, Italy, some of the other new Member States, who have got force capability, they have even got helicopters, medics, engineers, infantry and so on, who are available in barracks, not on their force deployment cycle, but there is not enough headroom in their budget to deploy them, in other words the capability exists in the Member State but the additional cost for deploying on operations is not there. I have talked to CHODs about this and they have been absolutely specific. I have gone down there and said, “What about these and these?” and they have said, “Look, David, of course we have these and they are sitting in the barracks. They would love to go and we would love to send them, but I have not got the headroom in my defence budget and the Treasury will not give me, as we have, the contingency fund, the headroom cover for that.”

Q316 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: When you go to Chad, who gives you your rules of engagement? Lieutenant-General Leakey: It is done in exactly the same way as it is done in NATO. NATO has the Council of Ministers and the ambassadors represented there who give the political guidance and directions to the operations, which includes approval of the rules of engagement. It is exactly the same procedure here in the EU, we have the PSC, the Political and Security Committee.

Q317 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: So if the Germans contribute troops to a force that you have sent they have to operate under the rules of engagement that have been agreed? Lieutenant-General Leakey: No, absolutely not.

Q318 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: So they go, but they do not operate to the rules of engagement? Lieutenant-General Leakey: Yes, that is called national caveats. Everybody agrees to the OPLAN agrees to the rules of engagement, that all gets signed up to and everybody ticks it off, and when they force
generate they bring their force but say, “No flying at night. No shooting at this”.

Q319 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The problem is identical basically to the problem NATO has in Afghanistan and the UN has worldwide?

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Exactly that.

Mr Klompenhouwer: In civilian missions you have that as well.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: You cannot draw a distinction between NATO and the EU here, it is exactly the same.

Q320 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Or the UN.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Or the UN or coalitions. It is a national discretion. The UK are offenders.

Q321 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Are they?

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Good Lord, yes.

Q322 Chairman: Use of helicopters in Bosnia you sometimes cite. Non-UK personnel were apparently not permitted to fly.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Yes. That was to do with insurance and risks and things like that. (The answer continued off the record)

Q323 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The interesting thing is that the UN suffered from this phenomenon before anyone else because nobody else was on the piste at the time. When NATO then started to act out of area they caught the disease and now you have got the disease, but it is the same disease.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Yes.

Mr Klompenhouwer: All the caveats for KFOR are now out of the way. They have worked for a long time but they are now out of the way, so you can achieve something if you keep on pushing.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: That is absolutely true. When I was COM EUFOR, Yves de Kermabon was COM KFOR and we used to get together and say, “Which Member State are we going to beat up over which caveat?” and we would do a concerted effort, particularly the Germans.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: I have one comment and one question. General, there is vital interest in Chad, I can understand why the French say so because if you read the French newspapers it is all about Francophone Africa. But ministers, planners, politicians, work within a certain context and clearly the French context is much easier in terms of Francophone Africa and there is an aid development context in Ireland, Sweden, Finland even, which there is not in Central Europe.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Yes.

Q324 Lord Anderson of Swansea: There is the Commonwealth interest. At least one would have the start of an argument, but I would not try to argue about Chad.

Mr Klompenhouwer: The Sudan maybe.

Q325 Chairman: Darfur.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: What is the national interest in Darfur?

Q326 Chairman: Because of the things they see on the television.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Is that a national interest?

Q327 Lord Anderson of Swansea: There is a group who would feel motivated by it, but Chad is relatively marginal.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Can I just come back to you a little bit. I agree that you can dress these things up, the ethical interests and the humanitarian responsibility we in the rich West have for Darfur and, therefore, Chad and so on. That is fine until you try and force generate and then you go to a minister and he says, “Yes, I have got it” and the foreign minister here in Brussels gets it and he goes back to the UK and speaks to the Chief of Defence and says, “Give us a battalion or two” and the Chief of Defence says, “We are fresh out of battalions”, or “Fine, the battalions are available, go to the Treasury and get more money out of the contingency fund”. I am sorry, but it is an entirely internal domestic political problem about where the resources go: is it to education, health, hospital, roads, or is it to extra operational commitments abroad. This is the priority where the ESS has to make this connection much stronger and get the ministers and heads of state to sign up to that strength or ESDP is going to be a paper tiger.

Q328 Lord Anderson of Swansea: But ministers, planners, politicians, work within a certain context and clearly the French context is much easier in terms of Francophone Africa and there is an aid development context in Ireland, Sweden, Finland even, which there is not in Central Europe.

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Yes.

Q329 Chairman: The Poles have deployed into Chad, have they not, relatively significantly?

Lieutenant-General Leakey: Yes, a big contingent.

Q330 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I have to say I think my constituents are different, what they wanted was anything we did to be short, sharp and successful with minimum casualties and bring the boys back. If you could achieve that you would go anywhere.
**Lieutenant-General Leakey:** You have put your finger on what Kees was hinting at before. We can go on doing that sort of thing. Artemis, Congo, Chad for a year, EUROPOL here and so on, little sticking plasters, politically important symbols and they do some good, they are sort of EU Médecins Sans Frontières in the police domain or whatever it is. If that is what we want to go on doing and that is the level of political ambition, let us write that into the Security Strategy and say that is what the level of ambition is, but do we have to think, and it is a rather different point, what is the appetite for fixing the problems. If we look back at the lessons now from what has been happening in the international arena over the last 10 years—Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, Chad, the Balkans—we have not fixed any of these problems. Even the Balkans, which is on our back doorstep, 1995 was the Dayton Peace Agreement and 13 years later we still have not fixed Bosnia. Nine years later we have not fixed Kosovo. Iraq is going to be a long time. Afghanistan we are in for the long haul. Why have we not fixed these? I am not sure that the European Security Strategy, unless it becomes an enormously long document, is the place for this. It comes back to the level of ambition and our understanding of the comprehensive approach.

**Q331 Lord Anderson of Swansea:** History.

**Lieutenant-General Leakey:** It is history. The only way we have brought order and stability to a country is through the comprehensive approach.

**Q332 Chairman:** This is really the question I want to come on to in terms of how far the Security Strategy ought not to be also considering how we do deal with fragile states, fragile or failed, because in a sense this is not just a question of ensuring security. If we think about Bosnia it is also a question of governance and development. On the one hand we say how wonderful it is that the EU has got this opportunity for the development. On the one hand we say how wonderful it is, but do we have to think, and it is a rather different point, what is the appetite for fixing the problems. If we look back at the lessons now from what has been happening in the international arena over the last 10 years—Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, Chad, the Balkans—we have not fixed any of these problems. Even the Balkans, which is on our back doorstep, 1995 was the Dayton Peace Agreement and 13 years later we still have not fixed Bosnia. Nine years later we have not fixed Kosovo. Iraq is going to be a long time. Afghanistan we are in for the long haul. Why have we not fixed these? I am not sure that the European Security Strategy, unless it becomes an enormously long document, is the place for this. It comes back to the level of ambition and our understanding of the comprehensive approach.

**Q333 Lord Anderson of Swansea:** Africa is one of those places.

**Lieutenant-General Leakey:** Africa and the Middle East and perhaps the Caucasus. The critical thing is what is the level of ambition: is it to fix fragile states or just to put a sticking plaster on them? (The answer continued off the record) When I came here I found exactly as you have described, compartments of people doing their own thing, turf wars and egos, exactly what you find in Whitehall, in fact, between the various ministries and departments, and within the ministries. Do not anybody criticise Brussels because it goes on in capitals just as bad and it is just as bad. I have to tell you that here in Brussels in the last 16 months it has changed out of all recognition. The civ-mil cell is actually doing some civ-mil, the CPCC has been set up and we have people working collaboratively. When I went to Chad the Commission came with me. We have got joint missions running now. These are small steps. (The answer continued off the record)

**Q334 Chairman:** I would like to get Mr Klompenhouwer to comment on some of this because what he has been developing we would like to hear about because in a sense your part of operations perhaps get rather less attention than ESDP military missions.

**Mr Klompenhouwer:** It is less visible, we do not have aircraft and tanks rolling through the landscape. They did not come to us as units but as individuals, we have had to form teams and do an operation which is mostly not very big, so it is less visible. There is an upward slope, an upward line. We are going from improvising as we go along to organising what we are doing by the establishment of the CPCC which is able to conduct operations and support operations in the field. We can still improve on planning and there is work to do. We are able to organise things better and organise operations which can have more impact. The key to this is civ-civ co-operation, co-operation between the civilian sides. Civ-mil is relatively unproblematic in spite of the anti-magnetism that the General referred to. The planning documents that we have use the same terminology, “OPLANs, Con-Ops” and all these things, so there is a lot of methodology which is similar. Civ-civ is quite an area and one challenge is working with the Commission, which is very jealous of its prerogatives. There was a court judgment lately, the ECOWAS judgment, which was heavy in its consequences. At the working level, as the General said, we find a lot of good, willing people who realise that when, due to internal differences, our missions do not work that reputation damage affects all of us, including
Member States but also the Commission and the Council. We have a common interest in anticipating this sort of misery by working together and developing work programmes, setting out the problems we need to tackle together and is there any system change that we need to introduce in terms of bureaucratic management, financial controls, procurement rules, framework contracts, et cetera, because they are important, while respecting the competences of one another. That is the line I try to take, to say we have a job to do and competence is not what our job is, our job is to put missions in the field and make them work and make Europe have an impact there.

Q335 Chairman: Force generation is as much of a problem, in fact more of a problem, for you because you have to recruit individuals as distinct from recruiting units.

Mr Klompenhouwer: That is right. There are steps that can be taken in order to improve that process. Police procedures have been set up, the call for contributions, which are somewhat comparable to the force generation processes on the military side, but the weak part is the organisation in the Member States because a request comes in at the ministry of foreign affairs and then they have to mobilise other ministries. There is a need for a co-ordinated mechanism at the national level and nowadays in most Member States this has been established. Some Member States have taken another step and said they are developing a national strategy, for instance Finland and Sweden have developed a national strategy. They have said, “Contributing to civil ESDP missions is in our national interests because we are medium-sized countries who can leverage our influence through the EU, so let us make a strategy so we can contribute quality people but have a good relative position within those missions and have some influence”. They are big contributors to our missions and very systematic and well-prepared. They are well able to respond to these calls for contributions. We are promoting the Security Strategy as a counterpart measure to what we are doing here in Brussels.

Q336 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Can I ask a question or two. Is what you are saying that countries like Finland and Sweden that are doing this are basically carrying an establishment in terms of judges, civil servants, whatever it is, above what they need to staff their own national posts so that they have people available to serve overseas in the same way that the military establishments of every country carry a surplus—not in Britain’s case at the moment, of course, but in most normal circumstances—which is available? That is normal in the military but it is not normal at all in the civilian area. These countries are doing that, but a lot of other countries are not doing it.

Mr Klompenhouwer: That is exactly right. It is a surplus, but also preparing the people in terms of training and all of that.

Q337 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Secondly, do you draw any lessons from or have any serious cooperation with the UN which, of course, has been active in this civilian field for quite a lot of years now and very active since the beginning of the 1990s, in some cases with great success, like El Salvador, Liberia now or Mozambique? Do you have a potential to train, say, the African Union on the civil side if it gets into more multifaceted peace operations, peace building and so on?

Mr Klompenhouwer: I must say these are potential areas of growth, I agree with you, and both of them are very important. In the field we have been working with the UN a lot. The EUPM mission in Bosnia was a follow-on from the UN police mission. In Kosovo we are also following on from what the UN is doing and we are getting there. In Congo there is a big UN operation that is ongoing. Our police mission that we have there has also co-ordinated with UN efforts, but it is ad hoc. I take your point that there is merit in exploring more structural forms of co-operation and learning lessons. This is definitely on my agenda. I arrived here just six weeks ago and I have a long agenda of things that need to be done, and this is one of them. I had not dared consider this option simply for capacity reasons. We have eight missions now, I have to focus on eight different theatres varying from Afghanistan to Kosovo, Bosnia, Guinea-Bissau, Congo. There is a hesitation to take on new commitments in the organisational field, but you have a point that the African Union could be something to look at but, there again, I would look at the military and see what experience they have—

Q338 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: It has a military dimension as well.

Mr Klompenhouwer: ---in working with the African Union.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: They have less problem of force generation for military personnel than they have in force generation for civilians, which is virtually zero I should think.

Q339 Lord Anderson of Swansea: What you said about Finland and Sweden in terms of the additional capacity, the possibility of training, is that feasible as a model for other countries? Presumably they have a register, a list of people who may be available. Is there a training course? Is that something one might look at?

Mr Klompenhouwer: I would hope so. It is a question of surplus and training, which is also very important.
Q340 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Institutionally what do they do? Is it within the MFA?
Mr Klompenhouwer: I am not sure exactly how they have structured it. I am going to visit Sweden and find out. One of the things they also do is integrate it into career paths, which is very important because if it means by being sent on an international mission that it is the end of your national police career, that does not help.

Q341 Lord Anderson of Swansea: It is a badge for promotion.
Mr Klompenhouwer: It is all on a voluntary basis. We want to get good people, not just people who are available.

Q342 Chairman: Redundant.
Mr Klompenhouwer: This is a very important issue and that is why we need the ministers of justice and the interior to buy into this.

Q343 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Most of the people you would want to recruit would be in domestic ministries rather than the MFA?
Mr Klompenhouwer: Yes, absolutely. MFAs are trying to make troops available—the Netherlands is trying to do that—and slowly the ministers of the justice and interior are responding. It depends on the type of police corps you have. For instance, we have Gendarmerie type forces and they are easily mobilised sometimes by the ministry of defence. You also have a regional police corps for the south-west Netherlands.

Q344 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Can I move on to the Security Strategy. There has been five years of experience with Macedonia, Bosnia, with respect relatively easy at that time, and now there are new terrains, new spectrums of military-civilian. Is there a document or something which you have to be incorporated into the new revised Strategy as to things you would like to see with a new emphasis over terrains, new spectrums of military-civilian. Is there a document or something which you have to be incorporated into the new revised Strategy as to things you would like to see with a new emphasis over the next five or 10 years as a result of that lessons learned experience?
Lieutenant-General Leakey: We have a lessons learned process on both the military and civilian sides which go out separately because there are things in the police in which we are not interested on the military side. After all of the operations there is a process we go through and the ones that we describe as common lessons or where there are overlap areas come together. The answer is there is a process. Some of these things are quite low level. To give you an example, we have just been through a major process on the military side having been through the Congo operation, which was a very demanding operation and tested our concepts for planning, operational headquarters, the force headquarters, the infrastructure, the logistics, strategic lift, rules of engagement, CIS architecture, everything was tested to stretching point. As a consequence of the Congo operation and an exhaustive lessons process, in which Member States were deeply involved, we have rewritten about seven of our overarching concepts of how we do the operations.

Q345 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Are there key principles which, in your judgment, following that experience can be carried forward into the Security Strategy rewrite?
Lieutenant-General Leakey: They are just a touch below that level.

Q346 Chairman: If there were subordinate documents going to be prepared, which people sometimes talk about, then one might think that among the list of things, together with adopting the document in December, there are various things which should be done and one might be something referring to how lessons learned could be more effectively integrated or something like this and discussed in Member States. Perhaps it is being done already.
Lieutenant-General Leakey: Funnily enough, on lessons learned there could be an overarching document.

Q347 Chairman: I am always a bit worried that as far as lessons learned in European and even slightly wider international organisations people are sometimes a little anxious to pull their punches because they do not want to say the sorts of things which you have said recently. Somehow one ought to find some way to ensure messages do get fed back from things which have not gone as well as they should have done.
Lieutenant-General Leakey: On the lessons learned, we have had major spats in trying to get the lessons honestly agreed—major spats—and some Member States have just said, “Look, I’m sorry but you cannot write that down on a piece of paper”.

Q348 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Can I return to your opening remarks about the Chief of Police in Amsterdam whose problem is British football hooligans and not Kosovo. That is the world he is living in, he has no incentive whatsoever to send any hooligans and not Kosovo. That is the world he is living in, he has no incentive whatsoever to send any.
Lieutenant-General Leakey: That is right.

Q349 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Unless you pay him. There has got to be a financial deal here. Where does the money come from to fund an overseas liability? You have bank clerks in England who are members of the Territorial Army and the next thing is they find themselves in Iraq. Why can we not fix that?
would the money come from? It has got to come from Europe rather than the Dutch budget, has it not?

Mr Klompenhouwer: Or both. We have various sorts of personnel. First of all we have those people who are contracted by the Commission, experts. Then we have the operational people on active duty who are seconded by Member States, so their salary is being paid by the Member States. Then the EU supplements that with a per diem.

Q350 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: When they are deployed?

Mr Klompenhouwer: When they are deployed. This money for the per diem comes from the Commission’s budget, so we have to provide all that. This budget is scrutinised in a group called RELEX which is very anxious to prevent any undue expenditure, as they should be. However, the net result of that is that a seconded European policeman in Afghanistan receives less pay than an expert contracted by the Commission. He receives less pay than if he was engaged in NATO. I am talking about the most difficult theatre, Afghanistan. The same applies everywhere else. In Kosovo one of the things we are supposed to do now is transition police personnel who are now in UNMIK to EULEX. They know the terrain, they would be perfect. They would not have to move them and it would be a very economical solution. However, because of the system, those who accept the move from UNMIK employment to EU employment under EULEX will also face a decrease in their revenue because of the tight budgetary rules that affect the EULEX group. I do not want to blame the group, I just point at a systemic problem. What we are seeing here is exactly the contrary of the image that the EU has of being a logical formula. It also involves reforming the ministry of defence and in the planning stage we have had a lot of support from General Leakey’s staff but also from the Directorate DG8 which deals with military matters. In a bureaucratic sense it may be difficult in the beginning to figure out who is in the lead but in the end, with a lot of goodwill and commonsense, it works out. We have a few examples of that.

Q352 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Can I ask about intelligence. The Commission is notoriously leaky, the culture is transparent, against the whole spirit of military operations. To what extent has the intelligence problem, intelligence sharing, readiness to give good intelligence to partners, been solved and how watertight are we now?

Mr Klompenhouwer: On the civilian intelligence I would like to say the arrangements that we have with the SitCen are not perfect but it is not a bad beginning. It is improved analysis which helps us make a judgment about the risk that we are taking when undertaking a mission. It is very important to do it, but also for pay rates and other things. This is an important first step. I do not think that these documents always leak because they are carefully handled. This is good news. Of course, this is not really intelligence, it is analysis which has been fed by occasional intelligence that some Member States have.

Q353 Lord Anderson of Swansea: The raw material.

Mr Klompenhouwer: Yes, that has been processed.

Q354 Chairman: It is product-proof.

Mr Klompenhouwer: I do not know. It depends on the complexity of the operation and political and other terms that determine how much you are going to need to undertake. Of course, there is the question of intelligence in the field. In Afghanistan, our civilian mission benefits from intelligence received in the field from NATO. Not everything, of course, on a need-to-know basis, but that intelligence is risk-oriented so if one receives intelligence that there is a threat against the EUPOL mission then the warning comes through. It has taken some effort to get this in place but it is there.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Is that American-led in Afghanistan?

Chairman: We are very grateful that you have been able to give so much time. The fact that we have moved beyond the particular subject of the ESS is
really because in our weekly work, and we meet every Thursday for a couple of hours, as well as doing longer term studies we are considering all of the things which are moving between the Council Secretariat and the GAERC and, therefore, tend to comment and write to ministers about proposals for redactions of various sorts. Quite a lot of the things that you have been talking about are things which have come before us. We have steered deliberately off of questions about Afghanistan police missions because we know that in the autumn Dublin is coming up but the sort of discussion we have had this morning has been extremely valuable in giving us a feel for how it is seen by you in your different ways having to cope with these things in practice. We are really grateful and it has been very useful for the Committee to have had the chance to meet you today. Thank you very much.
The review of the 2003 European Security Strategy: evidence

Thursday 3 July 2008

Present
Anderson of Swansea, L
Chidgey, L
Crickhowell, L
Hamilton of Epsom, L
Hannay of Chiswick, L

Roper, L (Chairman)
Selkirk of Douglas, L
Symons of Vernham Dean, B

Lord Hylton

Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Mr Jim Murphy, a Member of the House of Commons, the then Minister for Europe, and Ms Jennifer Cole, European Security and Defence Policy & EU External Spend Team Leader, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Memorandum by Mr Jim Murphy MP, the then Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

European Security Strategy

I am writing in response to Lord Roper’s letter of 23 April, asking me to set out the Government’s views of the European Security Strategy in the light of your Committee’s inquiry. Lord Roper asked in particular for our views on the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy, whether we will be seeking to include additional threats and risks into the revised strategy, and to what extent our position is shared by other EU Member States and the Commission.

The European Council’s tasking of the European Security Strategy to the High Representative/Secretary General in 2007 was two-fold, namely reviewing implementation since 2003 and setting out priorities for the future:

“The European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 has proved very useful. It provides the Union with the relevant framework for its external policy. In the light of all evolutions which have taken place since, in particular the experiences drawn from ESDP missions, the European Council invites the SG/HR, in full association with the Commission and in close co-operation with the Member States, to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it, for adoption by the European Council in December 2008”.

The Government’s view of the European Security Strategy, shared by other Member States and reflected in the European Council Conclusions above, is that its basic analysis remains valid, and that it serves as a valuable high-level policy framework, against which EU action can be measured and developed. But we agree that this is the right moment to review implementation and identify elements for further development, in the light of experience since the Strategy was agreed in 2003. The Government’s views on these elements are set out below.

Javier Solana is currently in the first phase of this work, reviewing implementation. He will make an oral report to the June European Council, when Member States will also discuss progress. The second phase of the work will be conducted in the second half of the year and completed for the December European Council. In line with the tasking, the Council will approve elements to improve implementation and complement the Strategy. These may be put into a declaration that would effectively form a preface to the Strategy.

The European Security Strategy identifies terrorism, proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as the major threats to Europe’s security. It sets three objectives for EU action—addressing those threats, building neighbourhood security and developing effective multilateralism. Its conclusion is that Europe needs to be more active, more coherent, more capable and work with others to make a contribution matching its potential.

The Government’s objective for the European Security Strategy review is to encourage greater EU impact on the key external security issues identified in the Global Europe agenda, set out by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister last October: tackling climate change and energy security, tackling global poverty and development, promoting security and stability in neighbouring countries and beyond, and tackling terrorism and organised crime.
Although the European Security Strategy makes reference to the impact of climate change, energy security, poverty and development on security, these issues are not given sufficient prominence. The Government’s view is that the review of the implementation of the European Security Strategy should develop the Strategy’s treatment of these, including through taking into account the security dimension of climate change. This should be informed by the work already in hand to take forward the joint report by the High Representative and the Commission on “Climate Change and International Security” to the Spring European Council, about which I wrote on 23 April. The High Representative has been tasked to submit recommendations on appropriate follow-up action by December 2008 in consultation with Member States. We are working to ensure that the report leads to concrete EU action, including regional studies and deeper analysis of climate and security issues. The Government believes that the European Security Strategy review should also take into account the Spring European Council’s agreement to develop a common approach to external energy policy, including energy security issues.

The Government believes that the review should also acknowledge more fully the link between development and security, and underline in this context the importance of the Millennium Development Goals. The Government fully supports the Commission’s proposal for agreement at the June European Council on an Agenda for Action for the Millennium Development Goals.

The EU now contributes over 55% of total global aid flows and has a real responsibility to take a lead role in reinvigorating efforts on the Millennium Development Goals and set out what it is doing to accelerate progress.

In addition to highlighting the development of the European Security Strategy’s analysis of threats and risks, the Government sees the review as an opportunity to improve the EU’s impact in conflict-affected countries by setting out clear priorities for EU work on stabilisation. This would capture developments since the Strategy was written in 2003, including progress in civil-military co-ordination and capability development, the implementation of the Stability Instrument, the European Consensus on Development and the November 2007 Conclusions on Security and Development and Situations of Fragility. Key stabilisation issues include the use of expeditionary military and civilian capability development, co-ordinated planning to achieve coherent effect, building African Union capabilities, and close co-operation with the United Nations, NATO and the African Union.

The European Security Strategy rightly prioritised countering terrorism and proliferation. Both of these areas have since been taken forward through work to implement the 2004 EU Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism and the 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Government wants to use the European Security Strategy review to highlight priorities for future action in combating terrorism and proliferation. On terrorism, this includes recognising that what happens outside the EU has a direct effect within communities in Member States and vice versa. This points to: tackling radicalisation and extremism, both within the EU and in third countries; helping third countries to build their own counter terrorism capabilities; and strengthening action against terrorist financing.

On proliferation, this is an opportunity to update the perception of threats, including regions of concern and terrorists’ use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, and to highlight emerging issues, such as the proliferation risks of the potential renaissance of civil nuclear technology. It should reflect EU priorities for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Finally, the Government will want to ensure that the European Security Strategy review emphasises the importance of close EU-NATO co-operation. The UK National Security Strategy underlines the importance of a strong EU and NATO to both European and regional security, complementing the contribution of global institutions, and is clear that the Government supports the development of both institutions and close co-operation between them. It will be important that the review reinforces the importance of closer EU-NATO co-operation, building on the European Security Strategy’s conclusion that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable.

The detailed views held by other Member States and the Commission of the review of the European Security Strategy are not yet clear. The Government will discuss the review with other Member States at the June Council following Javier Solana’s report. At this point we will write again to update the Committees. During the French Presidency we will then work closely with Partners to ensure that the priorities for future action identified above are highlighted in the review.

26 May 2008
Q355 **Chairman:** Mr Murphy, we are very pleased to see you. As you know, we have been carrying out an inquiry into the European Security Strategy and therefore most of the questions today will be dealing with that. We were in Brussels at the beginning of the week and we are very grateful to UKRep for having laid on a very good programme for us. In particular, on Tuesday morning Tim Barrow, our Ambassador to the PSC, organised a breakfast for a number of his colleagues from other countries of the EU and we had a very interesting discussion with them about different perspectives of different countries on the Security Strategy. I merely say this because I wanted you to know how grateful we were to your colleagues in Brussels for having done so much to make our visit so worthwhile. We would also like to thank you for the informative letter you sent us on 26 May setting out in a number of ways the Government’s views on the Security Strategy. I wonder whether you could perhaps as the first question let us know what progress has been made in reviewing the Strategy since you wrote. We do know that because there was other business at the last meeting of the European Council, the discussion which had been expected did not take place but we would be interested to know how you see that being caught up and how in particular you see the process moving forward under the French presidency.

**Mr Murphy:** Thank you, Lord Chairman. I am delighted to be here again to offer reflections and evidence. I do apologise in advance that we may be interrupted. Also, I appreciate you putting on record your Lordship’s appreciation of the team we have at UKRep, and I will of course draw their attention to the very kind comments you have quite rightly made. In terms of the progress we have made, you are right in saying that the report that had been envisaged was postponed in light of other pressures, but there is a very clear view and, importantly, a very clear determination of all those involved that this can still be concluded with a report in December. There is anticipation of a substantial discussion at the Gymnich meeting in September so, despite the lack of discussion last month, it remains on track. I think some of those discussions are now happening informally rather than in a formal, gathered conversation. The good news is it is on track, unaffected by other events.

Q356 **Chairman:** Perhaps I could just raise that point. Given that there will be this discussion at the Gymnich meeting, and I know it is an informal meeting, but if it were possible after that meeting, if there was anything further that you felt you could write to us about, giving us a feel of the way things were going, it would obviously be quite helpful for us in the preparation of our report.

**Mr Murphy:** I will happily do so, and if your Lordships consider it more appropriate for me to give evidence again, I am entirely in your Lordships’ hands.

Q357 **Lord Hamilton of Epsom:** During our visit to Brussels at the beginning of the week the point was emphasised, which we had really had from people giving evidence here, that there were great dangers with this strategy, that it was going to be rewritten as a much more massive document than we now have. I think people in Brussels confirmed that they rather admired the document as it exists, because it is short and simple and everybody understands it. It is quite interesting, because everybody says we do not want a Christmas tree, as it was rather elegantly described by one of the British people. He talked about a Christmas tree with hooks, because there is this concept that everybody comes with just their little bit that they want to put on it. We had this breakfast with a number of ambassadors. They all broadly agreed, but each one had something different—Russia, the Caucasus, West Balkans. Our Committee is equally guilty. We have people with things they want put on it. So although we agree in principle that we should not cover this thing in enlargement, everybody has their little contribution that they want to make. Do you think it is going to be very difficult to keep this document as slim and comprehensive as the original one?

**Mr Murphy:** I should introduce Ms Jennifer Cole. It was remiss of me not to do so. As your Lordships can see, Jennifer is the ESDP and EU External Spend Team Leader in the Foreign Office. I think it is inevitable and actually desirable for this refreshed Strategy to have greater substance than the previous one. There is no intention to say that the existing Strategy is no longer valid. In fact, there are important parts of it, of course, that are as valid today as they were when they were drafted but, as your Lordships will be aware, Her Majesty’s Government view is that the current Strategy is relatively silent on issues of climate change and security, the interaction of climate change with migration and a series of other issues. It is not strong enough perhaps on some aspects of weapons of mass destruction and others. It is about getting the balance right. You have to avoid, as you say, a Christmas tree or “kitchen sink” approach, but it does have to be updated with today’s and future challenges. I am very much aware of the concern that exists in your Lordships’ Committee, and it is a concern that we share in Government but it is about getting the balance right and updating this in exactly the right way.

Q358 **Lord Anderson of Swansea:** Basically, Javier Solana has been tasked with the business of producing this by December. The French will clearly have an input but we will be presented with a hard and fast document in December. Can you tell us the nature of the informal contacts between our own planners in the FCO and Solana’s team and the French team? How do you envisage the contacts, formal and informal, between the experts in the FCO,
the planners and others, the energy experts, the climate experts, and those who are actually remoulding this document?

Mr Murphy: There is a range of interventions that Her Majesty’s Government can utilise, ourselves at the Foreign Office, DFID, the Department of business and others, on different aspects of the Strategy through UKREP, through the informal contacts and discussions we have with the Commission, but, importantly—and I want to emphasise this point—our work with the French presidency, our work with the French in advance of their presidency. OK, it is only a day or two old but our preparations for the French presidency and in fact their preparation for their presidency on these matters is pretty strong. I was in Paris last Tuesday evening to meet my opposite number in the French government who is leading for them on the presidency, and I think there is a remarkable proximity between ourselves and the French government, which I think will be a formidable combination.

Q359 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Can I ask a further question on this? You have mentioned the way in which DFID will be involved because it is external yet, with respect, as a constituency MP, you know that in terms of security that which affects constituents is security on their streets, security from terrorism, security from drugs and a range of home programmes. Is it your view that the Strategy will be slanted, deformed, partial, because it only focuses on external matters, when on these key issues—drugs, energy, terrorism—there is an important domestic agenda, as important certainly as the external? To what extent will the concerns of the people at home, the citizens, on domestic matters be reflected in the final outcome or will it be narrowly external?

Mr Murphy: The Strategy itself will largely be external, but the European Union’s work cannot be exclusively external, of course. There is separate work on Justice and Home Affairs-related issues of security under the Hague Programme. There is a very strong political commitment to have a coherent approach, and it has been impossible to do anything but have a coherent approach. I think there will be separate architecture around the internal and external factors of EU security. If I can offer a criticism, and it is one that I think needs to be addressed by those who are working very diligently on the external work and those who are working equally hard on the internal challenges of security, my reflection is that at the moment it is not coherent enough. The two terrorism committees do not meet formally together. I think there is an informal exchange of information but the two separate groups of senior officials who are working on this are too silo-based. If the Strategy is going to be as coherent and cohesive and holistic, that has to be reflected in the architecture and the way in which they talk with one another, and that does not happen enough at the moment.

Q360 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Can we take it, given what you have already said, that you will be pressing for Justice and Home Affairs and the more narrowly external to be more integrated?

Mr Murphy: We certainly will. This of course will not be a conversation about the Lisbon Treaty but one of the difficulties in a post Lisbon or non-Lisbon environment is that the pillar on Justice and Home Affairs was envisaged to be an important part of the internal facing security work, moving pillar 3, JHA, into the Community method, but that is not currently expected.

The Committee suspended from 3.42 pm to 3.54 pm for a division in the House of Commons

Q361 Chairman: Just on the question which Lord Anderson was raising with you, which is the relations between the external and the internal dimensions of security, I wonder, given that the French White Book which has come out has very much pulled together the internal and the external dimensions of security, whether there is any chance that one of the things the French presidency will wish to see given a higher precedence within the European Security Strategy is this internal dimension of security and the inter-linkage between both of them.

Mr Murphy: I think there is a genuine desire in Paris to see a much better inter-linkage. I do not think it is conceivable or practical for the French presidency or even in the context of this refreshed Strategy to expect an absolutely common architecture in the governance of these issues but certainly a much better cohesion between internal and external, perhaps a more proportionate spend. It is certainly my understanding that there is a 10 to one balance internal versus external spend in the EU budget on migration. I am not certain whether the right balance is seven to one or eight to one, but is the 10 to one legacy or a reflection of today and tomorrow? That is another conversation I think we do need to have.

Q362 Lord Crickhowell: I would like to come to energy security, which is rather another aspect of the internal/external. It is a subject we have been pursuing with a number of witnesses. Clearly, Europe is faced with an energy supply problem, notably with gas from Russia on and so on, which is what people tend to think about energy in Europe. That is really an economic infrastructure subject. One of the things that has come out of the evidence is that what many people are thinking in terms of the energy strategy, or vision, as one rather wisely thought of it rather than a strategy, was the fact that states around the world,
including Russia, are over-dependent on energy and that when it runs out, they may be faced with severe internal crises and become weak and fragile states, and that again, if energy shortages around the world develop, there may be tensions between states and even outbreaks of conflict over energy. There are two quite different issues here, I think, and they are dealt with probably by different functionaries in the economic community, one dealing with the energy to Europe supplies and the other with the creation of the threats to security with which the Strategy deals. I would be very interested to hear what the Government’s approach is to this and whether you agree that what we are talking about here is the fragile state, the threats outside, rather than simply the supply of gas, primarily, to Europe from Russia or central Asia.

Mr Murphy: I do hope your Lordship does not mind when I say I think it is all of the above, in that a genuinely coherent strategy, partially in the Security Strategy but also in the review of the European Energy Strategy, I think, has to deal with the pressing problem we have about diversity of source and diversity of routes to market. In terms of our own economy, the case is pretty clear: the geopolitics of energy is well. There is also another additional issue. I think Gareth Thomas in his letter to your Lordships’ Committee talked about the relationship between climate change and energy as, I think he said, a multiplier of instability. I think that was the phrase he used. A coherent strategy should capture all of that. This point about energy source and route to market: I recently, a month or so ago, travelled to Baku to meet the President and other members of the government and those considering investing further in the diversification of routes to European markets. I think that is the importance of the Nabucco pipeline. There are at least two important criteria here: diversity of source and diversity of route to market. In terms of our own economy, the case is pretty clear: the geopolitics of energy is well. There is also an additional issue. I think that is very important developments in the last few months of the Security Strategy needs to take account of the very big increase in civil nuclear power that is likely to occur as a result of climate change negotiations and also demand for electricity? Then if I could step somewhat wider than that and ask you whether you believe that the Security Strategy needs to take account of the very important developments in the last few months on both sides of the Atlantic with regard to the need to revive the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda, efforts led by Schultz, Perry, Nunn and Kissinger on the far side of the Atlantic but taken up in the pages of The Times this week by three former Foreign Secretaries and a former Secretary General of NATO, contributed to also by the Foreign Secretary, whether you think that with that issue rising up the agenda and becoming very actual next year it needs to be reflected in this review of the security agenda.

Mr Murphy: That is right; it is important to avoid a confusion but the temptation in some of the conversations—I reflected on this either in evidence to a Commons Select Committee or in the chamber of the House itself—the conversation and debate about European energy I think is entirely out of kilter with the importance of it. The European debate over the past year has been energetic for all sorts of reasons but, as we perhaps move away in time from the debate on the Lisbon Treaty and accept perhaps that is to be parked for a little while and wait to see the outcome and what happens with Ireland, the energy of the European debate on these issues I think will gain a much sharper focus. The danger is we see it through the prism of our relationship with Russia or the world’s relationship with Iran, both of those things and an awful lot more besides, but, regardless of the failed state security threat in oil or gas-producing nations, it is an over-arching strategic priority for us to do what we can in terms of these pipelines, which is why I went to Baku.

Q364 Lord Hannay: Minister, I wonder if we could talk about weapons of mass destruction. First really an analytical question to you: to what extent has proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, become a greater security concern since the 2003 Strategy was agreed? Is it to an extent that needs to be reflected in the review of implementation that is under way? What is your assessment also of the risks posed by the very big increase in civil nuclear power that is likely to occur as a result of climate change negotiations and also demand for electricity? Then if I could step somewhat wider than that and ask you whether you believe that the Security Strategy needs to take account of the very important developments in the last few months on both sides of the Atlantic with regard to the need to revive the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda, efforts led by Schultz, Perry, Nunn and Kissinger on the far side of the Atlantic but taken up in the pages of The Times this week by three former Foreign Secretaries and a former Secretary General of NATO, contributed to also by the Foreign Secretary, whether you think that with that issue rising up the agenda and becoming very actual next year it needs to be reflected in this review of the security agenda.

Mr Murphy: In response to those three specific questions on the nuclear threat, has it become more acute since the 2003 Strategy, the direct answer is yes, with North Korea, Iran and potentially Syria, but
Q366 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: How?

Mr Murphy: It is about getting involved in the funding of technological advancement. It is about offering technological advice and on some occasions investment, certainly in the poorer nations, or where investment would help pinpoint the type of behaviour we would like to see. The European Union, the Commission and others being involved at that early stage. The fact is—and I know you are very acutely aware of this—we have said to these other countries that we strongly support the principle of doing so, whether it is for economic purposes, whether it is, as some try and couch it, for climate change purposes, and for others sometimes it is status, to be frank. Therefore, a greater role for the EU at that early point, sending the dual message of welcoming, in fact celebrating their ambitions, but within the proper context. There is a greater role for the EU. I am not in a position this afternoon to comment on the detail of the EU’s failings or deficiencies in this, but I am happy to reflect on it and return to it, if you wish.

Q367 Lord Hannay: If we could change now to a subject which has also come on to the international agenda since the 2003 European Security Strategy was agreed, which was the acceptance by all Member States in UN of the responsibility to protect. Up to now that has not been very easy to implement, to put it mildly, and there has been much talk about it but not much action, and it has proved in a number of specific cases, of which I imagine Zimbabwe is the most recent but Darfur of course is the most prominent over a longer period and there was a brief reference to it in the case of Burma, but it has been very difficult to articulate this new principle which the European Union’s 27 members were very prominent in promulgating in 2005. I just wondered whether you felt that the Security Strategy should point the way forward to a renewed effort to make this a practical working reality rather than just a few words on paper which, frankly, are losing credibility as, when circumstances arise where people are not protected, the international community finds itself unable to do much about it, and whether this should not be one of the directions in which a European Security Strategy which is committed to effective multilateralism should be looking in the future.

Mr Murphy: The UK’s National Security Strategy, of course, acknowledges the importance of the responsibility to protect, and so should the European Security Strategy. One of the things that surprised me in my reading over the past few weeks in advance of conversations about the European Security Strategy, and I perhaps should have known this, is that all 191 Member States, countries who have membership of the UN, signed up to this responsibility to protect. We can perhaps with a spirit of realism come to a

Q365 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Minister, can you just expand a bit on the civil nuclear renaissance? The fact is that it is actually many countries in the region who are finding that they have uranium. Some of them are relatively poor countries with few natural resources who want to exploit their uranium to the utmost. Others are pretty rich countries who already have supplies of oil and gas but who have also seen that they want to have that sort of capacity into the future. What sort of effort is the EU making in terms of the sorts of things that you were talking about, that is to say, the regular inspection, the nuclear cycle? These are exhortations that you have made, “This is OK provided that . . . ” but in what active way do you think that the EU through the Strategy ought to be really getting around these issues? Frankly, I have been involved in some of this bilaterally and I do not see a great deal of EU activity. I see quite a lot of UK activity and quite a lot of American activity and I see the International Atomic Energy Authority being very interested, but not actually the EU.

Mr Murphy: In response to Lord Hannay’s point I said that we would like to see a greater role for the EU and greater involvement of the EU.
sense of how firm and how specific and how strong a commitment it was when all the Member States of the UN signed up to it. I say that only as a way of reflecting. It has not been precise enough. The UK raised the responsibility to protect in the context of Burma. The UN Secretary-General said that Kenya was a most pressing recent example of responsibility to protect. The important development is that the Secretary-General is due to return to the UN with a report about institutionalising the responsibility to protect, and I think that is when we get to a sharper conversation about what all 191 countries actually believed that they signed up to and the consequences of them signing up to it. I think that is the pressure point on responsibility to protect. In the mean time, we will continue to cite it on the basis that all countries in the UN signed up to it. The short answer to your question about the European Security Strategy is yes, it should find an important place in the Security Strategy.

Q368 Lord Chidgey: Minister, I would like to move on to questions regarding climate change. I will start, if I may, with the formal question which you are aware of concerning the High Representative and his counterpart, who presented a joint report in the March 2008 European Council in which they drew attention to the impact of climate change on international security. Then, of course, there is your letter to us on 26 May, which joined together with this question. It would appear that the Government is concerned that these recommendations from the High Representative were not really ambitious enough given the size of the challenge, which therefore brings us to the main body of this discussion as to what the European Security Strategy should be undertaking. Perhaps you could now spend a little time giving us the Government’s view on that in relation to your letter to us in late May.

Mr Murphy: Of course I will happily do so. I was struck by a comment that Lord Crickhowell made in the context of energy, about how a wise sage had reflected that perhaps this was more of a vision than a strategy, and I think in response to this question the report by the Commission is more of a vision than a strategy.

Q369 Lord Chidgey: It was a pragmatic Anglo-Saxon that influenced it.

Mr Murphy: A pragmatic and principled Anglo-Saxon. I had the opportunity to be in Berlin earlier in the week and made a speech trying to persuade our colleagues in Berlin that actually our view of Europe was both pragmatic and principled. They accepted the former resolutely but needed some convincing of the latter. Nevertheless, it is a vision rather than a strategy as it currently exists. This point about regional instability—I was struck when reading in preparing for today by the regional aspect of this. Your Lordships, again, I have only brought one copy of this but I will happily provide it to your Lordships.

Earlier in the summer myself, the Foreign Secretary and the whole ministerial team in the Foreign Office Board looked at this issue of climate change and the regional impact in the context of the Security Strategy on water scarcity, demography, crop decline, hunger, coastal risks and finally recent conflicts, and it is a global matter of where the interaction between all six is. I think it may be helpful for your Lordships’ Committee to see where the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Board and Ministers consider the interplay between all six of these factors to be, at least five of which are directly relating to climate change, one of which indirectly but I think in time increasingly directly related to climate change, which is conflict. It may be helpful. This is the multiplier of instability template across the globe; it certainly is the guide to the Foreign Office in the work we are doing in this matter, as it is for the rest of the Government and, perhaps not surprisingly, north and central Africa and parts of the Middle East having perhaps four or five of these factors laid on top of one another, with the UK only having one, which is the coastal risk. I will happily provide a copy of this for your Lordships’ Committee. On what more the Security Strategy should do, in addition to providing resource, which is important, in addition to providing support by scientific development on climate-sensitive technologies and energy generation and transport and everything else that goes with it, it is also about a greater investment in things like mitigation of disasters, preparation for and mitigation of the tragically inevitable increase over the short to medium term of man-made natural disasters. Substantial work is going in there as well. Ourselves and the Dutch in particular are working on that matter.

Q370 Lord Chidgey: Thank you for that. In your earlier remark you touched on the issue that these matters have started to spill over into conflict issues, which have far greater significance perhaps in the medium term, if I can put it that way, to the security issues we are talking about. Can you tell us what sort of input the UK has been able to have in addressing that with our colleagues in terms of this European Security Strategy? It seems to spill over much wider issues—I do not want to get into them because they could get out of hand—talking with our EU counterparts in terms of providing physical security against conflict within states we are bounded by in terms of the energy resources that you mentioned, for example.
Mr Murphy: Our aim in the work we are doing is to ensure that, while this map is informative I think—I know it is certainly informative and illustrative—it is worth reflecting on, without EU and international action, what this map will look like in the future in terms of the very clear prediction on the link between hunger, crop decline and conflict. It is worrying—that is a glib way of putting it; it is much more than worrying about the trends behind crop decline and hunger and the relationship conflict which is why the UK, the Dutch but also the World Bank are working on climate change prevention technologies and the relationship between that and conflict. I will happily, in conjunction with colleagues in DFID, provide more detail to your Lordships on this work we are doing, particularly with the Dutch and the World Bank. A final point perhaps on this, and I hope your Lordships accept I am not one of those who says, “We have managed to persuade Europe to do more of what we would like” because, as I have said before, that is a recipe for fuelling Euro-scepticism, not overcoming it, but this is one of the issues where it is genuinely the case that the UK has been in the lead in the relationship between climate change, conflict and security.

Q371 Lord Crickhowell: I welcome what you have just said on climate change and really in many respects it was the same point I was making about energy. There are two aspects to this. In the case of climate change, Europe happens to have a very strong climate change policy which it is trying to implement and have an impact on other countries as well. What we are really talking about here—and we have talked about mitigation of disasters and hunger and crops and so on—is also adaptation in the widest sense. What I was trying to seek in the energy question is that, in developing this Security Strategy or vision, one has really got to concentrate on those aspects which really are security-related rather than the home economic aspects, because otherwise we will get into a confusion. It seemed to me that you rather clearly were stating it in the case of climate change, and what I am hoping is that if we are adapting the policy as a security policy, we are emphasising those aspects which are security-related clearly, because otherwise I think we get into a muddle. It seemed to me you were doing that rather clearly in the case of climate change and addressing what are really security aspects.

Mr Murphy: I apologise to your Lordships if I gave the impression that on both energy and on climate change there is a domestic EU economic imperative but also very clear international peace/conflict prevention dimension as well. I was hoping to emphasise that on both aspects. I apologise to your Lordships if I gave the impression but it certainly was not my intention. It is important on both climate change and energy.

Chairman: We have been very interested that you have put it like this today because we had an earlier witness talking a bit about the French White Book and suggesting that there again in looking at security were these inter-linkages across. Again, it is one of the points which it is rather important we should see made more clearly in the review of the Security Strategy.

Q372 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Minister, in an earlier reply you appeared to adopt the view that this 2003 document is a vision and is not a strategy, and suggested that the revision should be more action-orientated. In respect of climate change, in your letter of May 26 you write “We are working to ensure that the report leads to concrete EU action, including regional studies and deeper analysis of climate and security issues.” How are you going to do this? How will you seek to ensure that it will be more action-orientated, will concentrate more on implementation? Do you envisage, for example, a series of appendices which relate specifically to proposed action, including timetables?

Mr Murphy: Lord Anderson, what I was saying was that specifically the report on climate change is more of a vision than a strategy. This specific train of work. The work is to be concluded by December. We have plans to conclude this specific work that Solana and the Commission are doing on climate change by December. I think there is a general acceptance that there have to be many more specifics added to this general vision and that is the process that we are in just now.

Q373 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Within the body of the document?

Mr Murphy: Yes. It is within Member States proposing specific courses of action which are specific enough to be tracked and monitored but are realistic enough to be achieved.

Q374 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: If Member States are going to make those sorts of suggestions, should they not couple them with the increased capabilities they are prepared to contribute towards what they want to see happen? It does not really matter what you put in this document, either as it is now or as it might be revised; if the capabilities to do things are not there, nothing will happen.

Mr Murphy: That is fair. It is the capabilities to do these things but also—I will probably put this rather inelegantly—the capability within the receiving country, the capacity of the receiving country to absorb the support that is being offered. The Security Strategy is not an aspirational document; it is a very strong statement of the collective view of the
European Union countries about the threats that we face and what we should do to resolve them. So it cannot be aspirational; there have to be specifics but, as I say, also the specifics at the other end. I think it is a fair point but it is only part of the story about deliverability. It has to be deliverable but also receivable. That is rather an inelegant way of putting it.

Q375 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Would you not also agree that actually what has happened under the existing document is that Europe has massively extended its foreign interventions in a number of different areas since 2003 and the restraint, as much as anything, has been capabilities? You need a lead nation, say France, to say that they think a European mission should be sent to Chad, and then they try and gather anybody else they can to join in on the exercise, but if France does not have the political will and the capability to lead the mission to Chad, nothing happens.

Mr Murphy: Of course, the Security Strategy is a political declaration. In that context, it is agreed unanimously by Member States at the European Council and it is a political declaration of intent about what Member States are willing to collectively enter into to support and protect their own and other populations. As your Lordships know, it is not a legal document so it will always rely on political will, but the important point I was referring to in Lord Hannay’s question about responsibility to protect is that it was political will that got 191 countries to sign up to a document that we would wish to see play a greater role in conflict prevention and conflict intervention on occasion. On the political will, of course it requires ourselves, the French, the Germans, the Dutch and others to have the political will to put technology, equipment and people on the ground, both military and civilian. Some people bemoan this but I actually think it is a very important part of making a positive case for Europe that we can achieve much more by co-operation, for example, in Kosovo. We can achieve an awful lot more by co-operating with other European nations than we could ever do by ourselves. That is the important part of the Strategy that in the past I do not think we have made enough of and, hopefully, if we can agree a comprehensive Strategy, it is a very strong case for Europe in and of itself to be a world player.

Q376 Lord Hannay: Yes, but surely Lord Hamilton’s point is a perfectly valid one, that if you are going to have a review of this Strategy and you are going to both confirm existing priorities and perhaps refer to one or two new ones, like climate change, responsibility to protect and so on, you are going to need to accept that these broad lines of policy will only work if the capabilities are there to make them work, and that it is no good proclaiming them if you do not follow that through and then produce capabilities, which of course could be completely different. Climate change means Europe doing its bit primarily and giving a lead and being prepared credibly to reduce its carbon emissions and so on. In the responsibility to protect it is quite different. The point about the capabilities is surely a very valid one. There has been some shortfall in the period between 2003 and now in turning what was a pretty good document, as everybody feels it was, into a living political policy reality.

Mr Murphy: Certainly we have looked at the 2003 document and reflected on it, and one of the lessons is that we should all only enter into a set of political commitments that we can reasonably be expected to have the political will to fulfil. So despite the progress in Afghanistan, for example—and we may have time to talk about that—there are problems about commitments in Afghanistan. This is an important point about climate change. There is so much to this, but climate change is, of course, the major emergence since 2003, and we have to get our own house in order. Renewables: the UK was the first EU Member State last week to publish its consultation on renewables. What do we do in terms of Poland? I am not a specialist on the Polish economy or industry but I think 96 or 97 per cent of Polish energy is generated by coal-fired power stations. As we encourage other countries outside the EU to be doing the right thing on climate change, we also have to do the right thing within European Union boundaries and borders. My short answer to Lord Hamilton’s question is that we should enter into this political agreement at the end of the year with our eyes fully open, with a full understanding about what it means for the UK and for the other 26 countries of the European Union, and get a collective understanding and a willingness to do what we sign up to.

Q377 Chairman: I wonder if we could go on to another issue. I think it was during the Portuguese presidency that the EU began to see the links between security and development and governance in approaching the problems of fragile states. I wonder whether you feel, although there is obviously some reference to development in the 2003 document, this question of stabilising fragile states is not something that has become more important over this five-year period and the problems arising from what one might call the implosion of fragile states are one of the real sources of insecurity in the modern world. How far do you feel that ought to be taken into account in the revision?

Mr Murphy: There is certainly a greater international sensitivity to the impact of failed states, the regional impact and in some instances the global impact of failed states, which I am certain will be reflected in the
reflected on energy policy in relation to Russia. Although there has been difficulty in reaching a consensus you would presumably say there will at least be something, possibly aspirational, but rather alongside, paralleled, by the actual discussions which are under way with Russia.

Mr Murphy: This certainly has to be much more than aspirational. It has to be firm and specific and wide-ranging. That is the mandate the EU has agreed. I omitted to mention this earlier so thank you, Lord Anderson, for giving me a chance to mention it now, because, in the context of energy, an important part of our conversation with Russia is that, looking at these facts before coming here today, the difficulty—and I am not shy of acknowledging this difficulty—on energy policy in relation to Russia is that, looking at the table—and again, if your Lordships do not have this table, I am happy to provide it—about energy import/export dependence, my reading of is that seven Member States are 100 per cent reliant—

Q378 Lord Anderson of Swansea: There will presumably be a section on Russia but I assume that would have been overtaken to some extent by the agreed view of the Union, the new mandate in relation to Russia. Although there has been difficulty in reaching a consensus you would presumably say there will at least be something, possibly aspirational, but rather alongside, paralleled, by the actual discussions which are under way with Russia.

Mr Murphy: This certainly has to be much more than aspirational. It has to be firm and specific and wide-ranging. That is the mandate the EU has agreed. I omitted to mention this earlier so thank you, Lord Anderson, for giving me a chance to mention it now, because, in the context of energy, an important part of our conversation with Russia is that, looking at these facts before coming here today, the difficulty—and I am not shy of acknowledging this difficulty—on energy policy in relation to Russia is that, looking at the table—and again, if your Lordships do not have this table, I am happy to provide it—about energy import/export dependence, my reading of is that seven Member States are 100 per cent reliant—

Q379 Chairman: We published a table of this sort in our own report.

Mr Murphy: Seven states are 100 per cent reliant; of their imports, 100 per cent are Russian. If I am sitting in a European capital as a politician in one of those countries where, of our imports, 100 per cent is Russian, I think the tone of the debate about our relationship with Russia is slightly different. Notwithstanding that, there is an EU mandate which is broad-ranging, which even goes so far as to say it should be a legally binding agreement between ourselves and Russia. So it cannot be aspirational. I think it is a step backwards.

Q380 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Not one suit fits all, because I think Sweden has nought per cent dependency on Russia.

Mr Murphy: According to the table—and it may, of course, be from your Lordships' report; I should have acknowledged that. Actually, no. It may not be reliable because the source is Eurostat 2004; it does not say “House of Lords” so perhaps your Lordships' report is more accurate, but this paper says that we are at 5.2 per cent in the UK, with only Denmark being in a different position, being a net exporter of course. Based on this information, we are the lowest importer.

Q381 Lord Crickhowell: It is oil though, not gas. That is the difference.

Mr Murphy: Yes. So if it is simply aspirational, that is a step backwards from the PCA that we currently have at the moment. I think that is a failure if it is just aspirational.

Q382 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Can we turn to another partner pinpointed in the Strategy as one of the most important partners for the EU, that is, the United States. The United States, of course, have a Security Strategy, and we were wondering how far in the United States' analysis of the global threats and challenges, and indeed their prescriptions for how you deal with them, there are real similarities between their analysis and prescriptions and the EU's.

Mr Murphy: I have reflected already that the UK and French position on this shows remarkable synergy. Tomorrow evening I am going to the States to discuss European policy among other issues in Washington and New York, and some of the issues we have spoken about already, so I will get a greater sense of current thinking and future thinking on US policy. The 2006 Strategy I think starts with a presidential statement which says “America is at war” and then goes on to focus on the external challenges much more than the internal challenge. It is not my job to criticise America but it is certainly a very strong external-facing posture in the US position.

Q383 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: When you are with your colleagues in the United States this week—I hope this is a fair question—how far are you going to have in your mind the EU strategy when you are talking to them about these issues? You are going as the EU Minister but you are a UK Minister. How much will that really focus in your discussions with them?

Mr Murphy: I am certainly going as the Europe Minister but it is the Europe Minister in the UK Government rather than in any way representative of the EU. The conversations on the Security Strategy will be about our firm commitments on our own Security Strategy and the ways in which we wish we would seek to influence the European Security Strategy. So it is both actually.
Q384 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Chairman, can we perhaps ask the Minister if he would be kind enough on his return from the United States to drop us a note? He has talked about this reflecting historically, but perhaps, to bring it up to date, how far your discussions have reflected real similarities in the analysis of the threats and also the sort of prescriptions for dealing with them. I think that would help to bring us a bit more up to date and, as you are going, it is a jolly good opportunity.

Mr Murphy: I will happily do so.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Thank you.

Q385 Chairman: One of the important things is that the original Strategy was written in 2003, which was a period in which the European Union Member States had differing approaches to the policies of the United States, and there was an attempt to bring the European Union together. We have now moved into a very different period and particularly, given the changes which have perhaps occurred in France and to some extent in Germany, would it not be possible in the revised Strategy to take perhaps a more positive line in terms of the relationship with the United States?

Mr Murphy: I think there is a very strong opportunity for a better conversation about this post 2003. In fact, the EU-US summit declaration of last month talked of—and your Lordships will be aware of this—"the transatlantic unity of purpose"; that is the phrase that is used in the context of global threats and challenges. So it is transatlantic unity of purpose, which I am not sure would have been a declaration five years ago. I know it would not have been.

Q386 Chairman: So that is the sort of language which one might begin to feel now coming into the revised Security Strategy?

Mr Murphy: It certainly reflects our ambitions and I think reflects the renewed French ambitions and the German ambitions and the Central and Eastern European states. While it may not be that phraseology, certainly that should be the type of vocabulary we would expect to see.

Q387 Lord Hannay: If I could just follow that up, perhaps you may find it easier to answer this question after you have been to Washington, which you are about to do. Over past years there has always been a lot of criticism of the fact that the methods of dealings between the United States and the EU are not really terribly effective, and that these summit meetings that take place twice a year are extraordinarily wooden and pre-programmed and not really very satisfying for either side. I wonder whether, when we move into what will undoubtedly, for better or for worse, be a new era in the transatlantic relationship after the election in November, you think that the present mechanisms for co-operation between the two sides of the Atlantic are really up to the job or whether one should be thinking about making them a little bit more intimate, a little bit more intensive than they are now.

Mr Murphy: I think on specific issues there is a strong argument for making ... Whether it is more regular, I am not so certain but certainly more substantial. It is a reflection of Europe as it is today rather than Europe as it was five or six years ago. I mentioned three European capitals. Largely, the UK has stayed in a very similar posture, but there have been changes, is the way I would put it, in posture in Paris and Berlin, which from a UK perspective, the transatlantic relationship is a very good thing. Your Lordships' view will be similar to that of Her Majesty's Government that the renewed French commitment to NATO is a fundamental component of that improved relationship.

Q388 Lord Chidgey: Minister, can we now move on to somewhere further afield in terms of working with partners. Should the importance of working with Africa, including the African Union and individual African countries, be given greater prominence in the Strategy? That is the formal question. What progress has been made in EU efforts to build up African peace and security institutions and peacekeeping capabilities? Of course, it is an incredibly topical question to ask in the sense of our European Security Strategy given the current events in key countries in southern Africa, so I would be very grateful if you could give us your views on that.

Mr Murphy: I think the 2007 EU-Africa Strategy avoided most of the pitfalls of previous European African documents, which gave the impression of "We have decided and this is what is going to happen. The Europeans have decided this is what is going to happen" in previous bilateral documents of whatever nature, be it development or whatever else, but the new Security Strategy, the refreshed Security Strategy I think has to better capture our support for African peacekeeping capacity, and turn a very welcome set of political statements into supporting on the ground capacity to deliver, and that is what the Security Strategy should capture. The EU has been doing good work in Darfur and also Burundi. There is some more work being done in Somalia. I think that is the main part of it. There are other aspects but that is the main part.

Q389 Lord Chidgey: That is very helpful. Can I just ask a supplementary, chairman? In your note—obviously this letter has captured our imagination.
Mr Murphy: I need to write shorter letters!

Q390 Lord Chidgey: In relation to your answer, you make the point that the EU now contributes over 55 per cent of total global aid flows, and it is in the context of our relations with countries in Africa, particularly the African Union and other institutions, that my question relates. What I am interested in is how much we are able as part of the Strategy from the EU umbrella to help strengthen the democratic institutions, the securing of sound and robust democratic processes, strengthening parliaments perhaps rather than the executives to address the issue that you mentioned yourself earlier about conflicts being often at the root of instability in our own EU Security Strategy.

Mr Murphy: It is an important part of the work and it is part of the work that is contained within the strand . . . One of the reasons I am going to Washington is to launch a document on modern public diplomacy in a global world, launching in Washington and London, and part of that document is about developing democratic capacity, but not just democratic capacity through traditional government to government bilateralism; much more government to NGO bilateralism and multilateralism, UK NGO to overseas NGO bilateralism, people to people multilateralism, so all of that is certainly reflective of contemporary UK diplomatic thinking. It is important to see how far we can get a European context on that as well. I should have just said your Lordships may find it informative, if the Committee is not already aware of it: the EU has provided over €300 million for African peacekeeping, including support to the African Standby Force, with the intention of commitment up to another €300 million of practical support and capacity support for that important work as well. It is not directly related to Lord Chidgey’s question but that is an important additional piece of information.

Q391 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: This question is really about the usefulness of the Strategy to us. Is it a tool for strategic policy-making within government departments, especially the Foreign and Commonwealth office? Do you have any ambitions to bring the Strategy to the attention of the public and, if so, how would you do that?

Mr Murphy: There are two questions. The first one is about the influence on governments. I hope your Lordships do not find this to be an inappropriate way to answer this, but the first point is that we would not sign up to something as a Security Strategy that did not reflect our thinking. I would at least partially turn it round the other way and say this is a document that we will hope to influence to maximum effect rather than have it influence us, because we would only sign up to that with which we agree. What we are looking to do, and your Lordships will be able to judge whether it is successful or not, is to have the European Security Strategy as far as possible very strongly mirror the Foreign Office four strategic priorities. If we can do that, I think we will have achieved what we have sought to achieve. It would be arrogant to say that is all it should cover but it certainly should cover those four. The second question was how you popularise, if that is what you wish to, the Strategy of the EU. In the lengthy debates we have had on Europe’s structures we have on numerous occasions said it is not a well-crafted ministerial speech or a well-crafted, thoughtful document. It is about delivery. I think we could work harder, not in a spin sense; I do not mean a spin sense. When the European Union is doing remarkable work—and it is remarkable work; regardless of our views on Europe, it is remarkable work in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Palestine and wherever else—we should do more to highlight it. We rightly are fantastically proud of our own forces and our own civilian commitment in these missions, but I think we should be a little more open about the fact that we are only actually able to bring democracy and stability to these countries, or minimise conflict, because we are part of a greater organisation, this great democratic force. That is the way of doing it. It is about emphasising the delivery. If we can say it is actually through co-operation with the other 26 countries of the European Union that we are able to do this, I think that is the way to do it.

Q392 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: How would you do that? What medium would you use?

Mr Murphy: It would be crass to try and put it in leaflets and that sort of thing. It is largely about the tone that is set when we are talking about these issues in Parliament and in the media. As I say, the context would be that we rightly celebrate without qualification the phenomenal bravery of our forces and the remarkable professionalism of our civilians on the ground, but just saying that, despite our contribution, it is a joint contribution. That is the way of doing it, I believe. That is a steadier, more patient way of doing it, and not a big bang, but I think that repeated message would gradually improve people’s perceptions about European capacity in this area. It will not deal with Euro-scepticism more generally but in this area I think it would give legitimacy to Europe’s function.

Q393 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I think it would affect Euro-scepticism; if you can prove that something positive is happening and something is being improved in some country where a mission is being sent, I would have thought that would help.
Mr Murphy: I think it would on those who are willing to be persuaded. My difficulty is I have now become good friends with the Honourable Member for Stone, who I have spent more time with than almost any other human being recently, so when I talk about Euro-scepticism, I mean the Honourable Member for Stone rather than those who wish to be persuaded. I think middle of the road, open-minded people on Europe—this is not an implicit criticism of the Honourable Member for Stone but nevertheless, if the cap fits, perhaps you should wear it. The type of people you are reflecting on can be persuaded of Europe’s role in the world through this type of work. It is a great celebration of the democratisation power of Europe across the globe. Perhaps I should reflect more about how we can practically do that. We should be doing it with the existing Strategy, of course.

Q394 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Popularising does not mean that one can reasonably expect an editorial in the News of the World on the Strategy. However, it can mean heightened interest by non-governmental organisations. One beneficial reason for our own analysis has been that a number of groups have written in, for example, the Quaker Council for European Affairs has just submitted evidence. Could not the FCO organise a conference of those who may have such an interest, various people in civil society who can give their own views? That is something which perhaps might have been done this time and should certainly be considered in response to the document which will evolve. Is it too late to try that?

Mr Murphy: Lord Anderson, I apologise to your Lordships if the invitations were not wide enough but we have just come to the end of a process of perhaps eight seminars that Her Majesty’s Government have been organising in the context of global Europe, and one of those seminars, for example, was on the role of faith in modern Europe, to which we invited faith groups and those who are involved on a day-to-day basis, regardless of which faith. One of the Muslim representatives said . . . her basic message was “I am proud to be British because this is the best country in Europe to be a Muslim in and I’m ashamed to be European,” and it was because of Bosnia.

Q395 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Discuss!

Mr Murphy: This is work that we are doing. Five or six of the other seminars involved UK NGOs from a remarkable diversity of backgrounds: sporting NGOs, trade unions, a whole series of other NGOs. We have said that we should do this again because we found it a very good exercise.

Q396 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Of the eight seminars, none dealt specifically with the Security Strategy?

Mr Murphy: Yes. I should have added that. There was not one specifically on the Security Strategy. That is right.

Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. I think that, in a sense, on a number of documents, obviously, the Government does go in for consultation. To some extent, by taking evidence in various ways, we are having some sort consultation, but perhaps when one is reviewing a Security Strategy like this it is the sort of thing the Government perhaps ought to consider whether it should not perhaps have some wider consultation. In a sense, the process of review is quite a good opportunity to bring it to the attention of people. It certainly brought the document to the attention of this Committee in a way perhaps we were not necessarily so fully aware of it previously. Thank you very much indeed for your evidence.
Supplementary memorandum by Mr Jim Murphy MP, the then Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

During my evidence session with sub-Committee C on 3 July, I said that I would write with some additional information. This letter covers the questions raised on proliferation, climate change and food prices.

Proliferation

Baroness Symons asked about the EU efforts in the face of the “civil nuclear renaissance”. As you know, EU Member States have widely divergent views on nuclear energy. France gets most of its electricity from nuclear power stations; the Austrians and Irish, amongst others, are vehemently opposed. We therefore had to work hard to ensure a coherent and helpful EU position at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in April/May. That position made three clear points: that the EU supported the right of NPT Parties to the research, use and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; that the decision on whether to develop nuclear power was for sovereign governments; and that any increased generation of nuclear power should not be accompanied by heightened safety, security or proliferation risks. This was in line with our national position and was helpful.

There are around a dozen different proposals that have been put forward to address potential concerns over security of nuclear fuel supply and enrichment services. These are national proposals, three of them developed by EU members (Austria, Germany and the UK). We have been taking forward work on our Enrichment Bond concept, which aims to provide an insurance policy under the auspices of the IAEA in the event of an interruption of commercial supply of enrichment services. At the same time we have been working closely with Germany and the Netherlands to engage potential customers. To achieve our aim of making it unnecessary and unattractive for countries turning to nuclear power to invest in their own enrichment and/or re-processing facilities, it is essential that we take their needs and concerns into account and address them in our proposals. The conference we co-hosted in Berlin on 17–18 April made some good progress in this area. We will have the opportunity to follow up at the conference announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 19 March.

As debate begins to mature, I think it is right that we look for the EU to play a greater corporate role. We have discussed this a number of times with French colleagues in recent weeks and I am encouraged that the French authorities have indicated that this will be one of the non-proliferation priorities of their EU Presidency. One option will be to earmark EU funds to develop one of the proposals on offer. We are open-minded on this but will need to ensure developing countries don’t see this as the developed world telling them what’s best.

Climate Change

In response to Lord Chidgey’s question about the impact of climate change on security, I mention a research study which the Department for International Development is jointly funding with the Dutch and the World Bank focuses on the economics of adaptation. The objective is to improve understanding and quantification of the benefits and costs of effective adaptation. This is important in supporting decision-makers in developing countries as they prioritise between adaptation measures and to estimate the cost of implementing climate-resilient development plans. As the recent UN Human Development Report noted, “governments cannot build credible plans in the absence of information on national financing requirements”. This analysis is also useful to inform international development efforts.

Enabling countries to tackle the threats of climate change and follow low carbon climate-resilient development paths will require additional financial support. How much extra funding is still uncertain, in particular for adaptation. Hence the importance of this joint study. The estimates that we do have are in the range of tens of billions of dollars per year. For instance, the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change estimates $28–67 billion by 2030. But these are only ballpark figures and aggregated across all developing countries and thus of limited value in helping governments to cost and budget for adaptation in their country. This research study covers six country case studies (Mozambique, Ghana, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Bolivia). There is potential to undertake an additional case study in a small island developing state if other donors express an interest.
Food Prices

In the context of security, Lord Hamilton also asked about global food prices and the mechanism which might kick-in to “correct” currently high prices. Projections show that world commodity prices should fall back from the high levels experienced in 2007–08 over the next couple of years as supply increases in response to those high prices and as stocks begin to rebuild. Some prices have already started to fall back, with wheat prices now around 25% lower than their March peak. Historically, we have typically seen agricultural commodity price spikes take around 18 months to reach their peak before falling away and allowing food prices to continue a long-term downward trend in real terms.

However, whilst some of the factors driving the recent increases have been short-term shocks, others are longer-term trends, particularly increasing demand from emerging economies and for bio-energy. As the Government’s recent paper “Global commodities: a long term vision for stable, secure and sustainable global markets” set out, we therefore agree with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s and the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s view that in the medium term prices are likely to remain higher than the levels experienced earlier in the decade.

16 July 2008

Further supplementary memorandum by Mr Jim Murphy MP, the then Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

European Security Strategy

During the evidence session on 3 July, I said that I would write after my visit to the US.

I reflected during the evidence session that the EU-US Summit declaration talked about “transatlantic unity of purpose” and the centrality of this struck me again during my visit. As the European Security Strategy says, “acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world”.

The US remains committed to European security through its commitment to NATO. During the NATO Summit, President Bush said that building a strong NATO Alliance also requires a strong European defence capacity and encouraged European partners to increase their defence investments to support both NATO and EU operations—an important issue that Lord Hamilton also raised during the evidence session. The US currently has around 23,550 troops in Afghanistan and European nations contribute a similar number. Both the US and EU are developing their deployable civilian capabilities to assist conflict-affected countries.

There are some differences in the US and EU approaches to security. Geography plays a part, with greater US interests in the Pacific. I also expect the European Security Strategy to be clearer than the 2008 EU-US Summit declaration about the relationship between climate change, conflict and security.

The US and EU work closely together on a variety of regional conflicts, most notably the Middle East Peace Process. The independence of Kosovo and deployment of the EULEX rule of law mission mark another stage in the shared European and American effort to build security in the former Yugoslavia, with the US participating in an EU mission for the first time. We also work together closely on the proliferation threat from Iran and violations of human rights in countries such as Burma and Zimbabwe.

The US and EU share a wide-ranging agenda on security. The updated European Security Strategy will need to capture this, forming part of the strategic backdrop to the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit with the new US President.

29 July 2008
THURSDAY 16 OCTOBER 2008

Present: Anderson of Swansea, L, Boyce, L, Crickhowell, L, Hamilton of Epsom, L, Hannay of Chiswick, L, Roper, L (Chairman), Selkirk of Douglas, L, Swinfen, L, Symons of Vernham Dean, B

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon Caroline Flint, a Member of the House of Commons, Minister for Europe, Ms Katherine Fox, Deputy Head of the Russia Section (RuSCCAD) and Mr Adam Bye, Deputy Head of Department, Western Balkans Group (Europe Directorate), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined.

Q397 Chairman: Minister, thank you very much indeed for agreeing to come to see us, and particularly coming to see us rather soon after you have taken up your new responsibilities which we are very pleased about. We know that you have had experience on these matters before so it is not a totally new field, but we are very grateful. As you know, we are carrying out an inquiry into the future of the European Security Strategy and the review which is going on and, although we took quite a lot of evidence before the summer, in view of developments which have occurred during the summer, we thought it was necessary to take some further evidence. We also have the intention of doing some further work on the European Union’s work in the West Balkans and therefore we also have several questions on that as well. Can I also welcome Katherine Fox and Adam Bye who are with you from Russia and from the Western Balkans desks of the Office. We are very grateful that you have them with you.

Caroline Flint: So am I.

Q398 Chairman: Could I begin by asking you if you would like to give us a view on the current state of discussions on the review of the European Security Strategy and how you see the process being taken forward? What outcome do you expect at the December European Council on the Strategy?

Caroline Flint: Thank you very much, Lord Roper. My understanding is the work is on track for the December European Council. There have been several discussions at official level. Mr Solana, the High Representative, is going to take the same course of action when he produced the original document which is, I think, to be in charge of the writing of it and, having looked through the document, it is quite amazing in terms of the EU to get something as concise but direct as the original document. The process of informal discussions with Member States with a text is similar to the process in 2003. This might have been mentioned before by my predecessor, Jim Murphy, one of the particular areas that he felt was omitted was the issue of climate change which, in terms of security supply and so forth, has become a much more important and talked about issue than it was five years ago. In terms of the outcome, my impression is that the review will say that the Strategy—a mission statement I suppose—has stood the test of time. It clearly needs to be informed by climate change as I have already mentioned, but also ESDP missions that have taken place in the last five years. As an observer rather than a European minister it is clear to me that that part of the European Union’s work has developed and clearly has been perceived as having an important role to play in terms of the EU and its neighbouring communities. The review will, we believe, reflect the UK National Security Strategy so that is obviously important for us but it will need to think about how it will be more effective on key threats like terrorism, proliferation. I have mentioned climate change, but also better linkages between external and internal security. I think that really in terms of process outcomes is what we are looking forward to seeing.

Q399 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: You said it has stood the test of time but on the whole I get the feeling the British position is that the European response to the crisis we are trying to deal with at the moment has been pretty pathetic. Do you think that this Strategy should do actually do something to enforce the necessity for European countries to defend our interests? I am also thinking particularly here of Afghanistan; they seem to think that all the heavy lifting should be done by the Americans, British, Canadians and Australians.

Caroline Flint: I am not a Ministry of Defence minister but I think we learn from these engagements and certainly the calls on our services in terms of peace keeping activities and other engagements for us as a UK Government are something that has tested those at the MoD in terms of how we can play a role because we are seen as one of the countries that delivers what we provide. However, the question is—and I think it is a fair question—how much more through our partnership in the EU we can build the
capacity and see how we ensure that there is a more equal role in terms of responsibility but also to deliver the capacity in these different engagements. I think it is a learning process and I think that is why it is important that as part of the review we look at the last five years where there have been the ESDP engagements and involvement and we take stock of those.

Q400 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Minister, we took some very useful evidence from your predecessor on this and on some of the things that have happened since 2003 which need to be looked at, some of which you mentioned yourself, things like the responsibility to protect the push for a resumption of multilateral nuclear disarmament and negotiations. I do not want to visit that again, but I wonder if you could give us any idea what areas in the seven rounds of informal discussions you say have taken place have really come up between the Member States and have they been giving some thoughts to the interface of Europe's security policy with NATO and the way NATO is reviewing its own role in the future likely to come to a head at the time of the first NATO summit after the election in the United States?

Caroline Flint: I think there is a consensus that the Strategy remains valid and it just needs reviewing. In looking at the experience of the last five years in terms of ESDP missions I think there will be thought given to how that sits alongside our work with NATO as well. I do think it is important to recognise that this document cannot and does not intend to try to provide for a complete analysis of, for example, various partnerships with different countries outside the EU as well as within, but also in terms of a more detailed assessment of our relationships with other international organisations such as NATO as well. Its worth is that it provides, as I say, a mission statement from which more detailed projects of work and collaborations should follow. As a guiding tool that we can use to go forward I think it has been useful and the question is: how will the review and the addition to it update and take us into the next five or ten years ahead or whatever it may be.

Q401 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The first part of the question was whether there had been any differences of approach in the discussions that the 27 have had on this in the seven rounds of discussions. I just wonder whether you could give us any feel for that at all.

Caroline Flint: I think Member States agree that the review needs to reflect our common assessment of, for example, EU-Russian relations and that is probably the part of the review that has been most scrutinised by Member States. This Committee will know probably more than I about the different relationships between the EU and Member States towards Russia. Mr Solana, I understand, will only start drafting the Russian text after Member States have examined the audit of EU-Russian relations and see how much progress the Geneva talks on Georgia make and obviously we are getting some feedback from those talks that have begun. I think that will help him reflect on what Member States will say and how it will contribute to the review.

Q402 Lord Crickhowell: Following on from Lord Hannay's question can I pursue a little further this NATO issue which really has emerged as a pretty central one since we prepared our report on Europe and Russia. Here we are in what Russia regards as their near abroad but it is also Europe's near abroad. We know that some members of the European Union are keener on the NATO role than perhaps others. We know it is an issue about which Russia feels extremely strongly and which was emphasised particularly in the President's Evian speech on 8 October. We talked about it a bit at our debate on Friday when it came up and I referred to the very interesting and important article by Kissinger and Schultz in the Washington Post in which they say, with great respect, to press on enforcing the NATO boundaries right up to the Russian frontier in a way that may only provoke Russia but it is very hard to see how NATO would actually intervene in a situation like we have had in Georgia. It is a pretty central issue so far as the relationships of Europe and Russia are concerned and it would be very interesting to know how you see that argument developing among the European members.

Caroline Flint: The UK's position is that we basically recognise that sovereign states should be able to seek to join NATO and certainly in terms of Georgia and Ukraine that is something we have supported. I did read the debate that took place in the House of Lords last week and I think part of it is appreciating and understanding—my colleague Lord Malloch-Brown made this point in his response—the insecurities that might exist on the Russian side but at the same time how actually we can work in partnership together and reassure them that our role in NATO and applicant countries wishing to join NATO should not be seen as a threat. We have much in common with Russia both in terms of trade and on other issues as well and I would hope that with the talks that are taking place and due to take place over the months ahead we can get onto a better footing, but our position is that southern states should be allowed to put themselves forward as candidates to be members of NATO.

Q403 Lord Swinfen: I am just wondering what would have happened if Georgia had succeeded in joining NATO before the Russians rolled in. What do you think would have happened?
Caroline Flint: I do not really want to speculate on that if you do not mind. On a general level in terms of the importance of countries seeking to join NATO part of it is obviously that the hurdles they have to take to get there and alongside that is this wider discussion which I referred to earlier about how do we at the same time as recognising that we have within our own rights to support NATO and candidate countries coming into it, that we need to work to reassure the Russians that they should not see this as a threat to themselves. As we carry on this discussion and as long as I am part of this discussion that would be part of the UK Government’s role and my role as a minister to seek to allay some of the concerns that clearly are there and, again reading the debate, the historical context of where we have got to today and how Russia sees itself. Likewise in terms of the suggestions the President has made about proposals for security we have not seen much detailed sight of those as yet but again we can have an open discussion about those issues as well.

Q404 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Minister, welcome; I am sure we will have the same happy relationship with you as we had with your predecessor. You mentioned partnerships of the European Union, the most important partnership is obviously that with the United States. I am wondering to what extent the recent turbulence we have had in the financial markets which has led to a European Union initiative rather than an initiative from the US, together with factors such as the policy vacuum prior to the US presidential elections which will continue for some while afterwards, will lead to perhaps a new assertiveness or a new self-confidence or a re-balancing of the relationship between the European Union and United States which might be reflected in the document.

Caroline Flint: I think it will be interesting come 4 November what the outcome is; I think there are some opportunities there not only in terms of our partnerships and relationships but actually some of the issues around climate change as well. I think there will be an opportunity to think about that and that is one of the reasons why it is very important, I have to say, that we believe that the European Union should continue to work on the climate change package because we think puts us in a strong position for working with the United States and the new administration down the road. In terms of the detail of the document, I will have to write to the Committee about how much reference there will be to the United States, but I think by itself in expressing and reflecting on the missions that have been undertaken under the auspices of the EU self-evidently says there is a role for the EU to take more of a role for being a good neighbour but a one voice neighbour within Europe to deal with potential conflict, and by that token take more responsibility for those areas in a way that maybe in the past we have not had the capacity or the one voice to do it. I think one aspect of this is how it can be a European one voice in some of these difficulties even given, understandably, historical relationships with some individual Member States and countries outside the EU.

Q405 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Remembering that at the NATO Council, had the US view prevailed, Georgia would have been on its way to a membership action plan, whatever value that might have been to the alliance. The question really is, given these factors do you see perhaps written into the document or at least in practice a greater readiness of Europe to have a more independent relationship? We have questions later on the Medvedev speech against a unipolar position, but do you think there will be a more independent view by Europe in certain sectors? Caroline Flint: I believe that the review will underline the importance of an EU-US strategic partnership; I think that is clear, however, within that context the role of the European Union to take effective action which I think has been welcomed by the US in terms of the approach to the situation in Georgia earlier this summer. I do not think it is necessarily an either/or. My understanding is that the US would welcome and have maybe been pushing for some time that as part of the partnership with the EU that we could be able to take a more considered and productive role in some of these issues. As I say, I think the review will continue to underline the strategic importance of the partnership between the EU and the US whilst also recognising the developments that have happened in the last five years that enables the EU to play more of a role.

Q406 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: When we come to revise the European Strategy do you think that special reference should be made to Russia and the clear threat of Russian expansionism which has now emerged with Georgia and of course the threat would extend to large areas of the Ukraine and indeed rationally to the Russian minorities and the Baltic States as well. I think there is a tendency that we have a rather clear threat but when looking for European unity we end up with incredibly bland statements that are almost meaningless. Do you think that the fact that the Germans do not really agree with anybody else on this destroys any chance of saying anything of significance vis-à-vis Russia in this revised strategy? Caroline Flint: My perception is that actually on the issues that have arisen over the summer President Sarkozy’s efforts but also the agreement on the first of September, the resolution that was passed, despite individual Member States and their relationships with Russia, did actually unite under a one voice.
think to a measured but actually decisive response in
terms of moving forward, discussions about the EU-
Russia partnership were put on hold, President
Sarkozy created his six point plan and key to all that
as well was that it could not just be business as usual;
whatever the analysis of how things happened in the
summer our Russian colleagues overstepped the
mark and were not behaving. I think it was felt, in line
with their responsibilities and also agreements that
they had signed up to. Having said that I think the
response has been a good one in the sense that it has
indicated that we just could not ignore that but it also
set in play, I believe, a number of steps where we can
enable Russia to not isolate itself but come back in. I
do not underestimate that that is not an easy task but
I think actually it was a good response really and did
demonstrate the European Union on a very difficult
and sensitive issue acting appropriately but also
decisively as well.

Q407 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Do you think that
the revision of the Strategy should actually include
some specific reference to Russia and to possible
plans for expansion and how we react to them?
Caroline Flint: I think what the review will have to
take into account are issues around what has
happened and how this impacts on, for example, our
Eastern Neighbourhood Policy and support. I think
that will be looked at and taken into account in terms
of what has happened. Obviously we have this audit
happening of the relations with Russia and I think, as
I said earlier, Mr Solana has indicated that he wants
to look at some of those discussions of what is said
and see how we might incorporate that in the review.
It has raised a whole number of issues about the
neighbourhood policies of the EU, particularly in the
eastern part of Europe and I am sure that will be
reflected; clearly that has a relationship to Russia as
well.

Q408 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: To follow up on
that, presumably we are not just sitting back and
saying to Solana: “We’re frightfully glad that you’re
the man who’s re-writing this, get on and do it”;
presumably we are inputting our views as to what
should be in it.
Caroline Flint: I think we are having those discussions
but, as I said before, part of this document is not
necessarily to try to produce a blue print in all the
areas of detailed policy in terms of our relationship.
It is to provide a mission statement as such in terms
which guide the more detailed work that happens.
There is the run-up to the next EU-Russian summit
which takes place on 14 November and we will need
to think about how that will be reflected in the
Strategy. I am sure that, as a Member State,
collectively with others, our views on that will be
taken forward to Mr Solana to think about in terms

of his final document to be produced at the end of the
year.

Q409 Lord Anderson of Swansea: You have
mentioned, Minister, the EU-Russia summit which is
only four weeks away. Is it the Foreign Office
assumption that after the strong response to the
invasion of Georgia it will, in your phrase, be
“business as usual” in respect of the PCA and other
arrangements with Russia when we come to the
meeting on 14 November?
Caroline Flint: I might ask my colleague Katherine to
come in on this but all I would just say is that we had
the start of the Geneva talks happen just yesterday—
we are getting some read-out from that—and clearly,
as we get to 14 November, I think we will be
analysing and checking along the way about how
productive those talks are going to be. There are
some very important issues to resolve. Whilst the
Russians have withdrawn from the buffer areas, there
are a number of issues around displacement of
people, property and so forth that still need to be
resolved.

Q410 Lord Anderson of Swansea: And refugees.
Caroline Flint: Yes, refugees as well. Having made my
first trip as Europe Minister to Cyprus last week
(which I know Lord Hannay has had an interest in),
one can only think about how these situations can, if
not addressed early on, last for many, many, many
decades and test us all.
Ms Fox: In terms of the re-start of the negotiations
with the successor to the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement the European Council taking
place yesterday and today, the conclusions from that
will be key. We are anticipating and are looking for a
continued postponement of the PCA negotiations so
that we can see where the Geneva talks go, but we do
not think that that means that the summit should not
take place because, as the Foreign Secretary set out in
his speech in Kiev, we need a policy of hard-headed
engagement towards Russia. Isolating Russia is in
nobody’s interest; we need to be bringing them back
into the international community and living up to
their obligations and their responsibilities
internationally. Part of that will be the agenda for the
EU-Russia summit that is taking place in November.
We hope it will be a pared down summit looking far
more at substance and engaging closely with Russia,
but we still think that the summit should be going
ahead.

Q411 Lord Anderson of Swansea: On this speech of
President Medvedev which Lord Crickhowell has
already mentioned, the immediate response of
President Sarkozy who was there was very
enthusiastic. Was President Sarkozy speaking on
behalf of his partners in that enthusiastic response?
How seriously do we take the proposals for a European security treaty which has been raised in the past by the Russians? Is it more than just a recognition by Russia that their one aim of being top-dog in the OSCE is no longer possible? How seriously do we view it? Or do we say, effectively, show us the beef and let us work incrementally in our relations? Do we share President Sarkozy’s apparently enthusiastic response? What is our view on the way in which this proposal should be incorporated, if at all, into the deliberations on the new Security Strategy?

Caroline Flint: I think, as I said earlier, we have not been fully sighted on the proposals and we are looking forward to some discussions around them. I would just say a couple of things, first of all we need to have more details on what the Russians are proposing; we have limited information. Secondly, we do have tried and tested structures in the form of NATO, the EU and the OSCE that do need to evolve as times change but what we would not want to see happen is a sort of debate happening that should undermine them. I think that is important in all of this. What is the purpose, what are we trying to achieve here? Rather than necessarily getting involved in another structure we would have to have a very close look at what that meant but also that it did not jeopardise existing institutions and what they would currently offer. The test in terms of how we work with countries such as Afghanistan at the moment is actually what gets delivered on the ground and how various organisations contribute to that, so it is right for the focus of the review to be on making our security policy more effective and looking at our partner organisations and how we work with them.

Q412 Lord Anderson of Swansea: What weight should be given to the Medvedev proposal in the evolution of the Strategy?

Caroline Flint: I think we are open-minded about people’s contributions. Russia is an important partner for us on many different levels; we seek to work with them and do so. Nobody has the source of all truth and we are open to proposals but as yet we have not really seen the details of them. Until we do we will have to think about that and then I might be able to answer whether we would agree with Mr Sarkozy’s comment or not.

Q413 Lord Boyce: Minister, you may have touched on this answer already in an answer to an earlier question about enlargement. How will the review of the European Strategy take into account the EU’s desire to strengthen its relations with its eastern neighbours particularly Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova?

Caroline Flint: I think the events in Georgia do indicate that the EU should step up its support in the region. It needs to send a strong political message that we support European aspirations of the region and in doing so strengthen the EU support for the long term processes that many countries in this area want to engage with us on. Coming into the job I am learning more about our European Neighbourhood Policy, particularly in terms of the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy (I think the Committee prefers “Network” to be used) for reinvigorating support for the East as an important tool for those of us in the EU. It adds weight in many respects and maybe a sense of momentum about how we take stock of our engagement and what it produces and the fragility of some of the countries and the journey they are on. Again I think this just focuses people’s minds and attention on making the various different partnerships and engagements in that part of the Continent more effective.

Q414 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Just following on from that, the 2003 Strategy put a lot of emphasis—correctly in my view—on the importance of enlargement of the EU for its security, that enlargement was in itself a contribution to strengthening security. This was of course a Europe of 15 before it had become 27. Is it going to be reflected further in this review that further enlargement remains a crucial part of Europe’s security and that obviously has implications for countries of the West Balkans but it also has implications in the case of Turkey, and it could have implications—certainly I would hope—if one day the European Union does give Ukraine a membership perspective. It is surely very important that the review should continue to put enlargement up there as a major security issue—not just in its own right but as a security issue—given that it has become rather controversial within the EU.

Caroline Flint: I would agree that enlargement is one of our most powerful tools in terms of democratic reform, opportunities for prosperity and trade, but also security as well in which I think trade and democracy play an important part in delivering that too. Again I think enlargement is very important to be reflected about how it does increase across the EU our stability for the future and helps us respond as well effectively to some of the challenges that we face which will continue in different forms to be with us in the future. I think the review will reflect that.

Q415 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Does the Government therefore rule out at any stage, at any point in the future, the membership of Russia in the EU?

Caroline Flint: I think that is an issue where Russia might have to decide what it wanted to do, but importantly EU membership is open to countries to come forward with as far as I understand. In the last week I have spent some time in different countries in
that part of the world and talking to my colleagues who deal with Russia and the Western Balkans as well and clearly we have a number of countries who are on a journey and for some it is a long journey. I think it would be unwise to speculate about that because I think in the meantime we have to focus on our current relationships and engagements and make those work. Part of that is about engaging on common issues of security but trade and inter-partnership on some of the common challenges we face. Who knows what may lie down the road? It is an interesting discussion but I think there is probably enough to focus on with the present structures and relationships and where we are, to get that right first.

Q416 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: I would argue that it is slightly more than an interesting discussion because you could argue that we actually add to the paranoia of the Russians by excluding them either from the EU or from NATO for the indefinite future and saying that they are totally unsuitable. It just feeds the paranoia that they are being surrounded by people who are their enemies.

Caroline Flint: I think part of the discussions over the weeks and months ahead—I am not saying that will be the end of the discussion by any stretch—are about trying to give some reassurance. I think in some areas part of that is about, as I said, not just security issues but our trade engagement and involvement as well with Russia which in some respects getting that right can actually just assist how a country feels about itself and its close connection to us and other members of the European Union. I agree, these things are very important but I would just say that I think we have enough to deal with at the moment in terms of where we are in terms of our present relationship and how we get that right, but importantly the other side of this—the incident in Georgia has made this very clear—is that Russia is an important country, it is an important partner on a lot of different international platforms and as a country has responsibilities and has responsibilities to support the agreements that it signed up to. In that respect we want a good engagement but one that recognises that and as one voice in Europe are prepared to stand firm when we feel that that is not being applied to.

Q417 Lord Crickhowell: Minister, can we turn to energy security? Recent events have clearly strengthened the view that we put forward in our report about the importance of energy security for Europe. As you have told us, you read the debate on Friday and you will see that some of us actually welcome what we detect is the strengthening of the British Government’s position since some of the earlier statements about matters such as the Nabucco pipeline. However, clearly it is going to be a very difficult issue for Europe because whilst it is clear that Russia takes more notice of Europe when Europe acts together, there are different approaches. The Germans, particularly, with their pipeline connections and so on, may well take a rather different view; France has its nuclear. It is going to be quite difficult to get the kind of unity we need to produce an effective energy security strategy. Perhaps you could enlarge a little on the current British position and how you see the particular debate going in the coming weeks.

Caroline Flint: The Security Strategy is right to highlight energy dependence as a special concern for Europe and energy supplies for our consumers across Europe are important but also how do we make sure what type of fuel, what type of energy and also how secure it is. That is why the EU as one of the largest importers of energy has to look at this issue and the Committee will be aware that there has been some discussion at the European Council on climate change; there will be some discussions as we move towards the end of the year. The UK Government view is that this a really important debate, that regardless of the situation we are facing in terms of the financial challenges across Europe it is something we need to keep focussed on because it will always be a problem if we do not attend to it now. As far as our concerns in terms of the Strategy we would like to see the delivery of an improved security supply for the EU, the achievement of a fully liberalised and complete internal market for energy because we think that such a market would help to mitigate many of the energy security risks faced by the EU both in the short term and long term. The third energy package is a major step forward to achieving that sort of market and of course the 2020 market which is the subject of much debate at the moment we believe will further help to diversify the resources and reduce dependence. So we are working on this. The EU’s negotiating mandate for the post-Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia has now been agreed among Member States but the Committee will be aware that although talks started on 4 July they have been suspended due to the situation and action in Georgia. The EU has made clear that energy aspects should reflect the key principles of the Energy Charter and part of that will have to be our discussions with our colleagues in Russia about supply and what have you. I recognise that there are a number of EU members who rely pretty much totally on their supply from Russia and again we need to engage with them. On the other side of it, I think there is an opportunity, I would hope, for some constructive discussions with Russia as well about its own energy and how it is provided and what their plans are for the future and whether there is down the road some opportunity for cooperation and discussions. All countries in Europe in its widest
sense face difficulties in terms of planning their resources for the future in relation to both prices, supply security but also importantly the impact of climate change on our country.

**Q418 Lord Crickhowell:** Minister, I agree with you that it is not an entirely one sided debate. Russia needs its market; it may well need investment and skills but it does not seem to be going about it in a sensible way to encourage investment and skills at the moment. It also surely will need to take a pretty tough line with Gazprom and the Russian approach which basically says that they want to have it all their way. If we are going to have an effective partnership we are going to have to say to Gazprom, “You’re going to have to obey the rules that apply to trade in Europe just as European countries do”. We have taken a pretty tough line in another area with Microsoft; we are going to have to take a pretty tough line with Gazprom as well. Do you agree that in seeking security there has to be some give and some fairly firm lines taken on issues of that kind?

**Caroline Flint:** I would agree with you.

**Ms Fox:** Yes, we do agree with that. I think the first of September Extraordinary European Council was particular key in that and I know the Committee has been following energy closely with its report on EU-Russia. I think at the European Council the support for Nabucco, and the focus on the internal market showed that the European Union is alert to and has perhaps almost woken up to the importance of energy security. Its external relations with Russia will be a key part of that although some of that is reassurance to the Russians that pipelines such as Nabucco are not intended to displace our current supply security but also importantly the impact of climate change on our country.

**Q419 Lord Crickhowell:** We emphasise the difficulties of getting an agreement within Europe on the proposals put forward by the Commission. Do you detect a significant, helpful shift perhaps since recent events in European countries’ approach or is it still going to be a considerable struggle to get any kind of agreement on the energy policy? There are different views in Europe. As I said, Germany’s position is very much out on its own.

**Caroline Flint:** There are different views and I am sure the Committee will get some feedback from the discussions of the Council yesterday. I think part of the work that is going on in terms of the Energy Charter is to see how we can make a much more open and transparent market and in relation to Russia how that will be backed up by some legally binding dispute resolution mechanisms as well which I think goes to your point earlier about what we would expect in terms of engagement. I am sure when the second Strategic Energy Review comes forward later this year I hope it will reflect some of these difficult issues. As I said before, we are very much pressing that the package around climate change really needs to be supported to take forward because this is about recognising that we need to think about, despite the differences at the present time, how investing and making some changes now will actually have some economic dividends for countries down the road. If not, it is going to become increasingly more difficult and more expensive for countries if they do not start changing they way they both source fuel and energy but also supply it too.

**Q420 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** Minister, you have been very full in your descriptions of how we are trying to take forward policy on energy security, very full in what is going on with trying to get some unity with other European countries, but to come back basically to the point that Lord Crickhowell was making which is that this is a dialogue and we want Russia to play ball over this. Have you any indication at all that they want to play? That seems to me to be the missing part of this jigsaw. You have talked about the suspension of the discussions that began in July; we all understand why that happened. You have talked about the importance of Russia understanding that it needs the market and needs the investments that Europe brings to it, but has there been, at any point—if so, can you tell us what it was—any give in the way that the Russians have responded and any sign that they understand that this is a two way street too? Or are we, singly and together with our European colleagues, constantly in the position of demandeur?

**Caroline Flint:** As far as I understand I think there is recognition of the mutually beneficial results of engagement with this. They see the EU as a good customer for them in terms of their market and in that sense I think that drives some of the discussion in itself. The fact that the EU and Member States within it are a major customer of Russia in terms of its supply I think that helps in terms of these discussions, but I think clearly there is a long way to go on it. Obviously the present situation in terms of the way talks have suspended leaves us with somewhat of a vacuum in terms of how we are moving forward, but I think that is engagement that you have to continue on a very practical level how we rely in many respects in the EU on Russia’s supply but also Russia in turn relies on what they get back from that. I think that is part of the basis for discussion. I do not know whether Katherine from the Russian desk has anything more to add to that in terms of any discussions she has had in recent times.

**Ms Fox:** I think it would be interesting over the next few years, as your Committee’s report pointed out on energy, there is a forecast for a gas deficit. I think
Russia’s behaviour over the next few years, if it faces up to that, will realise the need for investment. The Secretary of State for Business and Regulatory Reform will be going out to Russia in a few weeks so I know he will be talking with Russian businesses about the importance of energy efficiency among other things. I think that is an important dialogue that we can have with Russia and the forecast gas deficit helps us to start talking about issues like energy efficiency, about gas flaring but also I think the EU’s approach has been quite realistic looking at the internal market, recognising what Russia’s behaviour is like and that if it is likely to continue that we need to respond accordingly and not just hope one day there is going to be some change in approach.

Q421 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Do you feel happy that there is a sort of Plan B, if they continue to hold us off in the way that I think many of this Committee are indicating that we are fearful will continue to be the case, that there is a Plan B about how we secure our energies, but it is largely one that is entirely EU focussed and based.

Caroline Flint: I think part of a Plan B is the climate change package, how we diversify the sources of energy that we have in terms of building a platform for alternative supplies in terms of renewables and things like the Nabucco pipeline as well. In terms of energy I think we all realise we cannot put all our eggs in one basket; we have to think about these alternative supplies. That is why the climate change package is important and clearly it does mean we are less reliant on one source. However, for the foreseeable future we still have a long way to go on that and therefore the gas supply from Russia is important to that end for some Member States more than others. We need to recognise that and find ways to engage with our colleagues in Russia on that issue.

Q422 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Minister, until now the main response of our European partners and indeed ourselves has been bilateral deals with Russia, the Germans on the North Stream, Bulgaria and others on the South Stream. To what extent in your view was the temporary closure of the Baku-Tbilisi to Turkey pipeline an alarm bell which has been heard by our European partners? What is our expectation on Nabucco? Are we totally in favour? Will it start up to that, will realise the need for investment. The Secretary of State for Business and Regulatory Reform will be going out to Russia in a few weeks so I know he will be talking with Russian businesses about the importance of energy efficiency among other things. I think that is an important dialogue that we can have with Russia and the forecast gas deficit helps us to start talking about issues like energy efficiency, about gas flaring but also I think the EU’s approach has been quite realistic looking at the internal market, recognising what Russia’s behaviour is like and that if it is likely to continue that we need to respond accordingly and not just hope one day there is going to be some change in approach.

Q423 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Minister, two other wild cards on this one. One is that there have been rumours that the Russians may be intending to build new pipelines to the East and supply China. The other one is the whole question of internal consumption, that this may rise inexorably and they may start using more and more of their own supplies of gas and oil. I would be interested to know what our official position is on that. One thing that was quite clear to us in our report was that actually the production of Russian oil and gas is pretty well static, it has not benefited from being nationalised and on the whole their exploration programme is pretty limited. If we are talking about a static supply of oil and gas with more and more of it being used internally, what is our thinking on those two elements?

Caroline Flint: I might ask Katherine to come in and I might say something about increased consumption because that is part of the issue we have to address about how we reduce people’s reliance and consumption because as countries develop then the knock on effect is that they want to use more energy and we need to find another alternative to that.

Ms Fox: In terms of the possibility of Russia moving eastwards in its energy supplies I do not think we have anything too concrete on that for the moment; there might be something we could follow up with. Certainly China receives a significant amount of LNG, I believe, so it is possible that it may free up more supplies into the global market. I am aware of a very complex picture that just because supplies are
going in different directions I think it would take someone with more specific expertise into the global gas market than me to give the Committee a fuller response on this.

Q424 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: In terms of internal supply.
Ms Fox: In terms of internal supply, as you are probably aware the Russian Government has been subsidising for its local population and is on track to increase the prices there. It is again something that we are very aware of and we are watching its plans closely. Work is being undertaken by what was BERR now moving over to the new Department for Energy and Climate Change in terms of the modelling of the effects of that. There is work going on there.

Q425 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Do you see a rising percentage of Russian production actually being consumed internally?
Ms Fox: That is one possibility.

Q426 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: You do not think it is a likelihood.
Ms Fox: Again it is an incredibly specialist field; I think we will write to you on that.

Chairman: It is not one of the issues which was suggested we were going to question witnesses on today.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: No, but it does have massive impacts on Europe.

Q427 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Is the reality not that we have not actually tried Plan A yet because we have not had a common energy policy and a common approach and we are now trying to construct that. The first priority surely is to give a real try at Plan A and get the underpinning in Europe for that. Secondly, surely Russian perceptions are going to be affected more than anything else probably by the oil price which is heading rapidly southwards and may possibly bring home to them that a policy which they built up on the basis of 147 dollars a barrel is not quite the right one for 75 and going south.

Caroline Flint: On the latter point, I saw some of the headlines in the papers this morning about the prices of a litre of petrol going down and again I think countries do need to look at this and how they model their plans in terms of their income has to be sound. On the wider energy issue obviously we have colleagues in other departments—although they have changed somewhat now—working on some of these issues, these common energy strategies. I think it would be fair to say probably in the last couple of years this has risen up the agenda for members of the EU but also in relation to supplies from outside the EU as well. The Russians, I understand, are invited to the Global Energy Initiative in London and the President is due to attend that, we hope.

Q428 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: The December one?
Caroline Flint: Yes. Hopefully that will be another opportunity to test out just where there are some common areas of discussion on these issues.

Q429 Lord Anderson of Swansea: The Western Balkans are our near abroad I suppose, and very manageable in size. Would you agree, Minister, of Serbia that there can be no long term stable relationship of the European Union with the Western Balkans without the incorporation of Serbia and that Serbia has made some very significant moves over the past year with Karadzic, with the very welcome parliamentary elections and so on. How do you see this progressing over the coming months? How significant, looking at the parliamentary side in Serbia, will be the EU instrument for pre-accession in terms of funding more relations with parliaments, for example, which is part of our interest. Where do we start in relation to Serbia and how can we help?

Caroline Flint: I think there has been some progress made. Following the elections in May we saw the formation of a pro-European government coalition in July and I think that has added to some real progress in terms of Serbia’s ambitions in relation to the EU. Like the Committee we welcome the Serbian Government’s ratification of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and of course the arrest and transfer of Karadzic to The Hague. I think that is an indication that Serbia is taking seriously its commitments to become a member of the EU. We do feel, however, further cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is needed and that the arrest and transfer of Karadzic was a significant step forward but we think there is more that can be done to demonstrate their full cooperation. There are, in particular, two remaining indictees, Hadzic and Mladic, and that is something where we hope for as much cooperation as possible. There are also some issues around witness protection and intimidation as well in Serbia that we feel needs to be addressed. Having said that, I think another part of this is the constructive role that Serbia can play in the region in line with the importance that the EU attaches to good neighbourly relationships. I think in practice that is about how Serbia demonstrates its constructive engagement with its neighbours. That is why we were slightly concerned with Serbia’s harsh reaction to Macedonia and Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo the other week because actually by demonstrating how Serbia can relate to its nearest neighbours I think is an important part of the EU being confident about their responsible role. We feel
that Serbia could demonstrate this by playing a helpful role in relation to the deployment of EULEX in Kosovo and that would I think signal very strongly their positive engagement.

Q430 Lord Anderson of Swansea: That seems to put us, with respect, in the camp of the hardliners, giving insufficient recognition of what Serbia has already done and to the neuralgic points which it has dealt with over the past months, certainly in a very constructive and diplomatic way. Where do we stand? The Dutch obviously have the ghosts of Srebrenica. Are we aligning ourselves with the hardliners within the European Union and are we giving a sort of veto to the International Tribunal before they give a total clean bill of health and we will say with our colleagues no further progress in relation to Serbia?

Caroline Flint: I would make a couple of points. First of all, the ICTY Prosecutor will be giving his assessment to the UN Security Council in December on Serbia’s level of cooperation with the ICTY. I think that in itself will be an important report for us to consider in terms of the way forward. In terms of where we see ourselves, we do recognise the progress that has been made but we still feel that it is important that further cooperation could be given both in terms of the ICTY but also in terms of relationships to near neighbours. We would be ready in the interests of sending a clear signal of EU commitment to Serbia’s European aspirations and recognising the arrest of Karadzic to consider implementing the Interim Agreement on the basis of significantly improved cooperation. That is something we have considered and feel we could go forward on. However, there is not a consensus, as I am sure you are aware, within the EU on this issue and therefore whatever we do there are other players in this who need to be persuaded.

Q431 Lord Anderson of Swansea: It may be very short-sighted and an unwillingness to recognise the extent of the burden upon Serbia and the great progress they have made thus far.

Caroline Flint: Yes, and I am hoping over the course of the months ahead to spend some time in the Western Balkans visiting. I do not know whether Adam, as Deputy Head of the Western Balkans desk, would like to add more in terms of his take on discussions over the summer.

Mr Bye: I think what you have said is absolutely right. We are willing to acknowledge the progress that Serbia has made and I think the EU has gone a long way to trying to convince Serbia that there is a genuine EU perspective for it. The signature of the SAA earlier in the year was an illustration of that. You pointed to the significant funding under IPA which is also an illustration of the EU’s commitment to Serbia. However, we have to balance that commitment against the need for Serbia to play a part as a modern, respectable democracy and part of that is cooperation with the International Tribunal in The Hague, and that is why we are trying to ensure a balanced policy on that which recognises their achievements but also ensures that they deliver full cooperation.

Q432 Chairman: Is there any progress on visa liberalisation with Serbia? I think it is very important that young Serbians should have an opportunity to come and discover what the rest of Europe is like.

Mr Bye: There is a new discussion on visa liberalisation; that is being taken forward at the moment. There is a roadmap to visa liberalisation; the countries have to meet certain conditions and then the EU will consider visa liberalisation. We also need to reflect domestically on what we can do in this regard as we are not covered by the Schengen arrangements.

Q433 Lord Swinfen: Now that Serbia is going to the International Court of Justice over the independence of Kosovo, is there anything that the EU as a whole can do to resolve the situation?

Caroline Flint: I think part of this is about continual recognition in terms of Kosovo. Since the judgment I think there are 51 countries that recognise Kosovo now. As I mentioned I think the Montenegrins and the Macedonians are included in that. Portugal, I think, came in at the final hour as well. Certainly in terms of the EU countries recognising Kosovo it is helpful in relation to that. We continue to work with Serbia and one of the points I raised earlier where we feel we are collectively working to encourage Serbia’s cooperation is with EULEX and that should be deployed throughout Kosovo. As I mentioned earlier I think an indication of an acknowledgement of the role of that deployment and support for it would be a very good sign. It is something that the EU collectively is pressing Serbia to acknowledge and work with. So there is unity on that part. I think with Serbia behaving in that responsible way and again one voice of the EU in terms of action to be taken is how we are working together on this. We know that Kosovo is a very difficult issue for Serbia but we believe that we are right to support the actions that are taken in relation to that particular country and we would press on Serbia, who we want to become a successful part of the EU, to recognise that there are huge benefits for its population and in some of these areas they can further their argument for progress by taking a more practical and positive role.

Q434 Lord Swinfen: What members of the EU have refused to accept the independence of Kosovo? Is there any sign of them changing their minds? Are
there any members that have not made up their minds on the issue yet?

Mr Bye: Twenty-two European Member States have recognised Kosovo, most recently including Portugal. The countries that have not recognised it yet are Slovakia, Greece, Romania, Cyprus and Spain.

Q435 Lord Swinfen: Of those that have not recognised, which have refused to accept the situation?

Mr Bye: I think all the EU Member States have been working together despite the differences over status so, for example, on the deployment of the EULEX mission that has had the support of the whole of EU.

Q436 Lord Swinfen: That is not quite the question I asked. What I am trying to find out is if any EU Member State rather than not having accepted the position—not having made a decision—is actively opposed to the independence of Kosovo. I had a feeling that Spain possibly was because of the Basque region.

Mr Bye: That is a difficult question to be honest with you. The situation as I would describe it at the moment is that you have these countries that have not recognised Kosovo but discussions have been relatively constructive. Occasionally there are signs of active obstruction or of difficulty but as a whole the EU has remained remarkably joined up despite the differences. I am sorry I cannot be more specific.

Lord Swinfen: The impression I get is the EU is not acting with one voice.

Chairman: As far as the EULEX mission is concerned it is acting with one voice.

Q437 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The European Union does not recognise states. The European Union’s Member States recognise states but the European Union does not. It cannot; it is not a state.

Mr Bye: That is absolutely right.

Lord Swinfen: That is fair enough but they are still not acting with one voice.

Q438 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Minister would you agree that the real significance of the referral to the International Court of Justice, given what you have mentioned as the very difficult internal problems of Serbia, is that they have responded in a peaceful, diplomatic way and in accordance with international law. We should seek to understand that.

Caroline Flint: The vote that took place clearly shows a large number of people abstaining in terms of referral and I think part of that was not necessarily acknowledgement that it was right but that we are dealing with a very difficult situation here. We believe that regardless of the judgment that we should continue to work to secure stability in the region and the fact that we now have 51 countries now recognising Kosovo, I think we have to look to the future and not the past, difficult though that is. That is why the other activities, EULEX deployment, is very important and we would urge our Serbians colleagues, whilst they sought this judgment, to recognise that in the meantime there is a lot they can do to be a responsible and good neighbour. Given their ambitions in terms of the EU I think that is very important.

Q439 Lord Crickhowell: May I just follow up what you have just been saying, that we should do our best and get on with it, can you tell me what the consequence is? Is it right that a judgment might not be there for a couple of years and, if so, what are the practical consequences for day to day events on the ground for a waiting for what is clearly a very important judgment? I am not clear what happens in the interval and what the consequences of delay may be.

Caroline Flint: My understanding is that it could take some years—I have seen some commentaries where it is three—for the court to decide. But, as I was saying before, given that we have a situation that we are having to deal with now and the fact is that we remain firmly convinced that Kosovo’s independence is consistent with international law and we do believe it is the most stable outcome for Kosovo and the region. That is why we want to continue working with Kosovo, Serbia and other neighbours to try to focus on the future which is for these countries in this part of world their ambition to be part of the European Union and how they can make progress in that. It is about promoting stability across the region and whether through our EU relationships or bilateral relationships that is what we try to do with the different countries that are most concerned. I just think we have to keep focussing on that. I am not an expert on how the court works when it does its business and what have you, but it does not mean an end to discussions and trying to improve relationships. I think we should be positive and forward looking about that.

Q440 Lord Crickhowell: I understand that presumably we all go on interpreting the international law and act on that basis. Unfortunately Serbia is clearly going to say, “Well, that may be all right by you” but they are not going to take the final crucial decision until we get the judgment. So although they may cooperate—we have asked them to cooperate in a number of areas—there is a terrible blockage now on actually bringing the situation to conclusion.
Caroline Flint: I think we are going to have to deal with that in our discussions. I believe that Serbia has made a mistake. As I said before, I think it keeps the focus on the past rather than the future and it talks about what divides Serbia from Europe rather than what connects Serbia and I think that is not helpful to the ambitions of the Serbian Government which we were really pleased to see after the elections in May when they formed this pro-European Coalition. We have different avenues of engagement and we will continue to pursue them in as constructive and forward looking way as possible. I think we will just have to see but again there are particular activities which will need to happen over the next few months which obviously inform how things will be moving forward, positively or not. Adam, do you want to say anything?

Mr Bye: I do not think there is much one can add to that. The independence of Kosovo is a fact; the recognition by 51 states is a fact and cannot be undone. What we have always disliked about this initiative is that it looks backwards rather than forwards as the Minister said. Our focus is on the ground and embedding stability and the success of Kosovo because that is what is key to the region.

Q441 Lord Selkirk of Douglas: Minister, to what extent is there a risk that Kosovo will be partitioned along ethnic lines and what action is the EU taking to address this risk? The background to the question is of course the strong principled stand we took against ethnic cleansing in the European Union in general, and also how important it was to protect minorities. To what extent do you see this as a grave risk?

Caroline Flint: Partition is an option that the international community has consistently rejected. Our goal is a multi-ethnic Kosovo not new divisions in the Balkans along the ethnic lines as you have outlined. My understanding is that the Serbian President rowed back from some recent media comments which appeared to entertain partition of Kosovo and our ambassador in Belgrade has made it clear to the Serbian Government that that is not a viable option. That is why we are committed to see EULEX deployed throughout the whole territory of Kosovo and it is important for our Serbian colleagues to recognise that and to support that. The deployment of EULEX to the Serb majority in the north is not conditioned on Belgrade’s acquiescence; it is very important that this takes place. As I am becoming more aware as Europe Minister, the issue of ethnic minorities in these countries of the Western Balkans is something which is not easy and extremely sensitive, but I think the international community after the terrible losses of life in earlier years really have made it the case that you cannot create states that divide along these lines, especially in terms of being part of the European Union. Within the existing Member States of the European Union we continue to work to ensure that minorities within those states as well are treated fairly. We are still working on that within the European Union with different groups; it is something we have to be firm about in terms any other country’s aspirations.

Q442 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: You will bear in mind though that the Dayton Accord thought about Bosnia that they should all be mixed up together and that in fact they all divided along ethnic lines. It may be that you have to live with people being divided before they are to come back together again. The wounds are still quite fresh from an extremely violent civil war.

Caroline Flint: I appreciate that.

Q443 Chairman: Minister, on behalf of the Committee I would like to thank you very much indeed for having come and given us quite so much time this morning over such a wide range of topics at such an early stage of your responsibilities in the Foreign Office. We are certainly looking forward to continuing the dialogue that we had with your predecessors and, as I say, we are very grateful to you and your officials for having come and helped us so much with the answers this morning.

Caroline Flint: Thank you very much. I would like to thank Katherine and Adam for their helpful support to me during this session.
Supplementary memorandum by the Rt Hon Caroline Flint MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

European Security Strategy

When I gave evidence to Sub-Committee C on 16 October I promised to write to the Committee on our policy towards the Nabucco pipeline and on trends in Russian domestic consumption of gas.

Nabucco Pipeline (Q422)

It has long been our view that diversity of energy mix, as well as a diversity of routes of supply and sources of supply, is necessary to provide long term energy security for the UK and EU as a whole. There are differences in approach to the issue across the EU, but successive European Council conclusions have noted that the EU needs to agree how to speak with one voice on external energy policy. The Georgia crisis, and the coincidental temporary closure of the Baku—Tbli—Ceyhan oil pipeline in August 2008, brought the need for European diversification of source and route of supply sharply into focus. In response, we have called for support for the development of the Southern Corridor and in particular the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline. This pipeline would bring gas from the Caspian region to EU markets via Turkey and would provide a market balancing mechanism to ensure that the EU was not dependent on a single supplier, who would hold a monopoly and be able to set the price. It is our belief that pipeline projects should be delivered by the market and, given the price balancing role of this pipeline, which would provide a new route and gas from new sources in terms of EU supply, we are fully supportive of it.

A commercial consortium made up of six companies is already established and is developing this project. We would expect this consortium to lead the funding of the pipeline. Given the lack of confidence in both the political stability of the producing and transit regions and the ability to raise sufficient funding on the market in the current economic conditions, we are encouraging the European Commission to step up its political engagement in the region on this subject. We are also exploring options for some public involvement through possible support from European institutions, for example the European Investment Bank, which already supports large scale infrastructure projects both inside the EU and beyond.

Russian Gas Consumption (Q426)

Lord Hamilton asked whether the Government thought that the proportion of Russian gas consumed domestically would rise. There is a great deal of uncertainty about the development of the Russian gas market over the coming years. Gazprom’s bullish forecasts regarding long-term increases in overall output and exports need to be set against widespread scepticism among independent analysts, some of whom in fact predict a potential “gas supply crunch” for Russia within the next few years, primarily due to Gazprom’s under-investment in new production projects. Under this scenario, Russian gas output would fail to keep pace with the twin requirements of meeting growing domestic demand whilst simultaneously fulfilling Gazprom’s supply obligations to its external customers in Europe. This would require the Russian authorities to make tough choices over which markets—domestic or external—to supply as its first priority. But at present, it remains unclear whether such a “crunch” will in fact materialise, and, if so, in what time-frame and on what scale. I attach a background paper on this issue, which you may find useful. (Not printed here).

30 October 2008
Written Evidence

Memorandum by Centre for European Reform (CER)

WHY EUROPE NEEDS A NEW SECURITY STRATEGY

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) surpassed expectations in many ways. Its drafters rose above the transatlantic tensions of the day and took a pragmatic view of security. They called attention to the same threats that the US National Security Strategy had identified two years previously: terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and, most worryingly, the combination of the two. The security strategy recommended a few specifically European approaches to security, emphasising prevention and the need to root all action in international law. But equally—and, at the time, controversially—the strategy reminded the Europeans that the EU, too, will sometimes need to use “robust responses” (code word for military force) to answer new threats.

Unusually for EU documents, the 2003 ESS was also succinct and highly readable. This helped to popularise it. New concepts which the strategy introduced, such as “effective multilateralism”, have entered the foreign policy lexicon. Arguably, the 2003 ESS shaped the European discourse on security and defence far more than many such national “grand strategies” do for their country’s policies.

Given its accomplishments, many think the European Union should retain the 2003 ESS. Senior German officials have argued that the ESS remains relevant, and that if the EU tried to replace it, it would produce a weak document because the member-states would never agree on Russia.

The CER disagrees. We acknowledge that the discussion on the new ESS could be divisive. But for any grand strategy to remain relevant, it must keep up with changes in the security environment. And the 2003 European security strategy has become dated. It says little about Russia, and virtually nothing about energy security or climate change. The EU needs a new document, or documents, that explain how the world has changed since 2003, and suggest new policies for addressing the changes.

We also believe that the circumstances for rethinking the security strategy are more propitious than the opponents of a new strategy suggest. Disagreements on Russia remain but the Iraq war is no longer shaping the EU member-states’ views on foreign policy and defence. America’s closest allies have ceased to defend the US as unquestioningly as before, while its critics no longer attack it gratuitously. France is even planning to rejoin NATO military structures. So we think that the new security strategy stands a good chance of steering clear of low politics and retaining the pragmatism of the 2003 document.

What are the new challenges faced by Europe in 2008?

The new ESS must above all take note of the shifts in global power and influence. This is not to say that climate change or energy security are unimportant, on the contrary. But they cannot be successfully addressed without a rigorous analysis of the global distribution of power.

The rise of new powers is making the world increasingly multipolar. By 2020, the US, China and the EU will each have a little under 20% of global GDP, while India will have almost 10% and Japan about 5% (according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, on a p.p.p. basis). Militarily, the US will remain the preponderant superpower, but its relative political influence is declining with its share of the global GDP. Russia has already returned as a significant geopolitical actor and is likely to remain one. China plans to use its growing economic strength and diplomatic clout to check American power.

The multipolar world could evolve in two ways—one undesirable from a European point of view, and the other desirable.

In the undesirable model, the various poles will coalesce into two hostile alliances, rather like in the Cold War. In one version (suggested by Robert Kagan), the “western” poles, proponents of democracy, would line up against the “axis of autocracies” (such as Russia and China) that oppose political liberalism. In another version (popular with some Russian analysts), a western attack on Iran would spark off a long-running world war between the West and Islam, with the other poles doing their best to keep out of it.
This kind of multipolarity, based on great power rivalry, would be unfavourable for Europe. In any global system ridden with ideological fault-lines, Europeans would find it much harder to tackle the problems they care about—climate change, the economic development of the poorest countries, the proliferation of dangerous weapons, and so on.

The desirable model of multipolarity, by contrast, would be multilateral. The more democratic powers would have a natural affinity to work together, but there would be shifting coalitions among the poles, depending on the issue. All the poles would be committed to the rule of law and play an active role in international institutions and treaties. As the 2003 EU Security Strategy (ESS) put it: “In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system”.

What should Europe’s responses be?

Neither energy security nor climate change can be tackled by individual countries—even when they are as powerful as the US or China—or a collection of countries such as the EU. They require effective multilateralism. The EU’s own attitudes, policies and actions will help determine whether the world that develops is based on multilateralism or rivalry.

An EU that is stronger will be better able to persuade the US, China, Russia and other powers to think multilaterally. One that is economically stagnant, divided over key policy questions and inward-looking will have little hope of shaping the international system. So the ESS must clearly outline what are the necessary building blocks of a stronger and more influential Europe. In our view, they include:

— A successful European economy. Some of the ingredients are: further EU enlargement, to boost competition in the single market; new schemes to attract skilled migrants to the EU; an economic reform agenda that prioritises innovation and a stronger competition policy; the liberalisation of energy and services markets; and the reform of higher education, leading to more autonomous and better-funded centres of excellence.

— An EU that leads the world on climate change. Europe’s fairly successful track-record on tackling carbon emissions contributes to its soft power. If the Europeans can make a success of their own carbon-trading scheme, persuade the Americans to sign up to a global system, and offer their best environmental technologies to developing countries, they may convince most of the world to join them in the post-Kyoto system.

— Continued EU enlargement. Taking in more countries would not only bring economic benefits. A truly continental Union that included Muslim states would have more influence, and be treated with more respect, in many parts of the world. The EU should make a clear statement of intent to keep its doors open to newcomers. But because enlargement is likely to move slowly, and because there are finite limits to the expansion of EU frontiers, the Union needs a much stronger neighbourhood policy than it has today. The more politically and economically advanced the neighbour, the more the EU should integrate it into EU programmes and policies.

— A greater capacity for delivering common foreign and security policies. This objective requires, more than anything, a unity of purpose among national governments. They need to understand that where they have common interests, they will often achieve more by acting together. But the EU’s institutions also have the potential to make a positive impact on foreign and security policy. Irrespective of the fate of the Lisbon treaty, the EU needs to reform its foreign policy institutions. The External Action Service (EAS) proposed by the Treaty is a good model. It would produce the kinds of analysis that helps governments to recognise their common interests, and it would enable them to pursue those interests in a more focused and strategic manner. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), too, will need more beef than it has today (see below).

— Strong EU support for international law, and for renewing the institutions of global governance. Europeans sometimes forget that an important source of their soft power is their respect for international law. One reason for the decline in America’s soft power in recent years has been its disregard for international law, especially in the first term of President George W Bush. But the cause of multilateralism has suffered setbacks since the ESS was approved four years ago. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been undermined by the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes. Russia has threatened to pull out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty and
it has suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. There has been no progress on negotiating the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty or the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space Treaty. The EU needs to highlight its attachment to the framework of international law and institutions, and to lead efforts to revitalise it. It should make a point of encouraging others, such as Russia and China (and of course the US), to support these efforts.

— The EU must engage constructively with other global powers. The Union’s most important relationship will remain the transatlantic link. If the EU can show itself to be a useful and effective partner, the US is more likely to choose a multilateral path. But the same applies to the other poles, which the EU will find much more difficult to deal with. If the EU can find the right policies for Russia and China, it will increase the chances of them supporting a multilateral system. And if it can find the right policies for the Middle East, it will reduce the risk of that region erupting into violence—and quite likely creating new great-power rivalries. Russia, China and the Middle East are existential for EU’s development in the coming decades. How, and how well, the EU deals with them will determine whether the Union becomes an effective international actor.

Defence in the European security strategy

The world will not take the EU seriously as a foreign policy actor unless it strengthens its capacity in defence. This is all the more important because for the next few years, the US will still be suffering the after-effects of the Iraq trauma. Europeans should not expect Americans to be enthusiastic about sorting out the world’s trouble spots, especially when they are close to Europe. Those tasks will increasingly fall to the EU alone. By mid-2008 the EU had launched 21 ESDP missions, generally with success (although the scope of most of them has been modest). However, the ESDP has not fulfilled expectations, notably on the capability side. On current trends the EU member-states are unlikely to have enough military personnel to fulfil the likely future demand. NATO’s response force, made up mainly of Europeans, is short of 25% of the soldiers it is supposed to have.

To strengthen Europe’s defence capacities, the new ESS should lay out the following principles:

— Adopt a target for its member-states’ defence budgets to reach the 2% threshold. Admittedly, NATO has done the same, without much effect. But the rationale behind the EU setting such goal is to re-emphasise the necessity of adequate spending. In recent years the EU has placed too much emphasis on the non-military side of security, as opposed to hard power, and too much emphasis on military reform, as opposed to larger defence budgets.

— Deepen military reforms. For any given level of spending, much more can be achieved by militaries and ministries that have been modernised. Those countries that have not abolished conscription should do so: what Europe needs are professional, mobile troops who are ready and able to go anywhere in the world. The liberalisation of defence procurement markets would allow governments to improve capabilities without spending more money. So would more role specialisation, and the pooling of military assets, particularly in non-sensitive areas (such as maintenance, transport, medical, catering and support operations).

— Improve NATO-EU co-operation. The ESDP will not become more effective unless the EU and NATO work much more closely together, in a complementary way. The EU and NATO need to collaborate on “comprehensive planning”, meaning that both would start working together at the beginning of an operation, on the assumption that they might both have to become involved. Arrangements could be made for NATO to have access to the EU’s expertise and tools in civilian crisis management, just like the EU can now draw on NATO assets for its ESDP missions. The European Defence Agency and NATO’s Allied Command Transformation are both concerned with boosting capabilities, harmonising procurement and promoting joint R&D. They should work together, not separately. NATO and the EU should do all they can to harmonise their procedures and soften the differences in the cultures.

Ultimately, the difficulties in building a strong ESDP lie with different strategic cultures among the member-states. The more EU countries work together on defence, the more the relatively robust strategic cultures of the British and the French should percolate among their partners. But cultures cannot change and defence budgets cannot rise unless politicians make an effort to explain to their publics that the world is dangerous, and that it would be less dangerous if Europeans gave themselves the means to tackle those dangers. So far virtually no European leader has made that effort.
How to rewrite the European Security Strategy?

Many EU governments feel that the 2003 security strategy is approaching the end of its shelf life; France and Sweden have led the calls for a fresh start. But EU governments disagree whether the ESS should be amended or replaced, and if replaced, how exactly. We believe the EU needs a new security strategy, that it should be completed in the second half of 2009, and that it should be written by the secretariat of the Council of ministers.

The process matters enormously. The 2003 ESS was successful because the drafting team maintained control of the writing. It consulted extensively with the member-states, but resisted their attempts to dictate the content, which would have turned the document into an incoherent list of various national priorities. The 2003 ESS is a brief, accessible document, which accurately captures the common ground of the security analyses of the EU governments.

Future updates of the ESS should follow the same path. The secretariat of the Council of ministers should retain ownership of the drafting process. (Should the EU adopt all or parts of the Lisbon treaty, the responsibility would shift to the High Representative for foreign and security policy, and his team.)

Partial updates and amendments to the security strategy, like the 2008 Solana/Ferrero-Waldner paper on climate change, can be a useful tool for addressing new and emerging challenges. But they need to be used with caution. The more the EU amends the strategy, the more the original document loses its influence.

This is all the more true if those “new” threats, addressed by amending documents, rise higher on the European citizens’ list of concerns than the “old” threats covered by the original strategy. And that is precisely the case with climate change. Authoritative polls like the Transatlantic trends or the Pew Global Attitudes poll now show that Europeans worry about climate change more than about any other threat.

Given the depth of change in threat perceptions since 2003, and given that five years have elapsed since the original ESS was written, we believe the time has come for the original document to be revised, rather than amended.

The European security strategy should be rewritten in co-ordination with NATO’s plans to draft a new strategic concept. The two documents will inevitably cover some of the same ground. Both will outline threats, and the respective institution’s responses to those threats. Because 21 of the EU’s 27 governments are also in NATO, many of the threats and responses will presumably be the same.

We believe that the need for transatlantic co-operation has increased, given the global nature of the new threats, and the declining relative power of both the US and Europe vis-à-vis China and India. That is not just a view from Europe: More Americans are aware that their unipolar moment has ended, and that a multipolar world requires more transatlantic co-operation. In this “new” transatlantic relationship, NATO will remain important but US-EU co-operation will be just as, if not more, significant. The threats that both the EU and the US confront—energy, climate, terrorism—tend to be handled by the EU, not NATO.

So the EU and the US should use the process of drafting a new ESS and a new strategic concept to re-launch closer relations. Both documents should be re-written at the same time, borne out of a transatlantic dialogue. The EU should have a role (through the High Representative, Javier Solana) in drafting the strategic concept. And the EU, too, should give the US a more visible role in the new ESS. It should devote one of the “workshops” (which the Council secretariat used in 2003 to sound out EU member-states’ views) specifically to transatlantic relations.

3 July 2008

Memorandum by Mr Gareth Thomas MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development

European Security Strategy

1. Thank you for your letter of 23 May, requesting that DFID comment on the European Security Strategy from an international development viewpoint. You asked for our views in particular on the extent to which the Security Strategy should place greater emphasis on the links between climate change and security. You also asked whether we agree with the analysis and recommendations set out in the report by the EU High Representative Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, his counterpart in the Commission, on the impact of climate change on international security.
2. You have already received a submission on the European Security Strategy from Jim Murphy, Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We agree with content of that letter, particularly with the need to acknowledge more fully the links between development and security (para 8). Our thoughts on these linkages are set out in the UK National Security Strategy and in the DFID policy papers on Security and Development and on Conflict (all attached).

3. We therefore intend to focus this submission on the two specific questions that you asked:
   — To what extent should the European Security Strategy place more emphasis on the links between climate change and security?
   — Does DFID agree with the analysis and recommendations set out in the [Solana] report?

**DFID’s view on climate change, conflict and security**

4. DFID is interested in the relationship between climate change and conflict primarily from the perspective of how it affects poor people in developing countries. The UK National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy outline how conflict and insecurity in developing countries can impact on UK and EU security respectively.

5. Climate change is already having, and will continue to have, significant physical impacts in developing countries, including changes in temperatures, changes in rainfall (resulting in increased risk of both droughts and flooding), the melting of glaciers and ice-caps, sea level rises, and an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.

6. All of these physical changes that are consequences of climate change will have significant and detrimental effects on the human security of many millions of poor people. Sudden-onset natural disasters will create humanitarian needs. Changes in climate and rainfall will alter the viability of certain livelihoods, and habitability of certain areas. The vulnerabilities of all, but of the poor in particular, will increase.

7. Developing countries also tend to have limited adaptive capacity in their societies and economies, which often rely heavily on natural resources. This exacerbates their vulnerability and the potential impact of climate change on human security.

8. The consequences of climate change may also increase the risk or severity of violent conflict, by influencing or exacerbating pre-existing social and political tensions. This is most likely to occur in fragile states or areas already at risk of conflict. In particular, the consequences of climate change may contribute to:
   — increased political and economic instability;
   — increased migration and urbanisation;
   — increased competition over access to resources such as water and land; and
   — changes in the viability of livelihoods eg pastoralists.

9. We therefore see climate change primarily as a factor that exacerbates conflict (a “threat multiplier” to use the language of the Solana report) eg by aggravating existing tensions and fragility, or by being an additional stress factor on top of existing political and social exclusion. The risk of climate change exacerbating conflict is greatest where governance structures and mechanisms for handling conflict constructively are weakest.

10. It is also important to note that some physical changes as a result of climate change may provide opportunities for cooperation that transcend conflict lines, for example trans-boundary water resource management.

**The Solana report “Climate change and international security”**

11. We agree with the broad thrust of the analysis in the Solana report. We would also underline the following:
   (a) The link between climate change and conflict/insecurity is indirect. Any conflict normally has multiple causes and drivers. It is the consequences of climate change that influence social, political and conflict dynamics, and we would emphasise the “threat multiplier” understanding of the relationship between climate change and conflict—we do not believe any conflicts are currently driven by climate change alone.
   (b) Governance and conflict management structures (at a local, national, regional and international level) are key intervening variables. Thus the consequences of climate change may lead to increased conflict depending on the ability of people and institutions to adapt, manage change peacefully, and mediate competing needs, interests and visions of the future.
(c) Whilst we agree that climate change is likely to have an impact on migration flows, the exact dynamics of this migration are unclear. Movement within national borders is by far the most significant form of migration for the poorest. It is therefore important to consider the impact of potential migration flows on developing countries as well as on the EU.

12. We believe that the recommendations in the Solana paper for the EU could be further strengthened. We would emphasise the need for:

(a) The EU to push for an ambitious deal in the UNFCCC negotiations on climate change, both on mitigating the negative effects and on adaptation to current and future climate change.

(b) The EU to support developing countries to adapt to the effects of climate change.

(c) The need for the international system to be modified to tackle the new challenge of climate change.

(d) Investment in new technologies for both clean energy and adaptation, in order to enable countries to pursue low carbon and climate resilient development paths.

(e) Climate change considerations to be integrated into the EU’s international development and humanitarian activities, including a greater emphasis on disaster risk reduction.

Should the ESS place greater emphasis on the links between climate change and security?

13. The ESS’s analysis of the dynamics around climate change and security could be a lot more sophisticated than it currently is, moving beyond a focus purely on competition over natural resources. Whilst the strategy mentions global warming in the context of global challenges, it does not follow through the implications of this challenge in other sections. It could examine many of the issues laid out above in DFID thinking on this issue, and in the Solana report. It could helpfully consider the wider human security aspects of climate change, and how climate change affects existing conflicts and tensions.

14. However, all of these issues require further detailed analysis. In particular, we need to understand better how specific [projected] climatic changes may influence particular conflict dynamics at a local or regional level. Therefore the Solana report and other such papers should be considered as only the start of our thinking on this subject.

15. From a development perspective a greater emphasis on climate change in the ESS would consider it as a cross-cutting issue that impacts on the causes and drivers of current conflicts. It is therefore important for the ESS to examine the potential of climate change to be an aggravating factor in regional conflicts and state failure (both already identified as key threats in the ESS).

16. Climate change is also likely to put considerable pressure on multilateral (and bilateral) international relations. Incentives for countries to take mitigation actions vary enormously (developed v developing countries, countries who will actually fare better under a warmer climate, etc). These tensions will be very difficult to manage and may further undermine the capacity of multilateral organisations to take collective action to improve international security (not only on climate change issues).

17. We would like to see climate change mentioned in several sections of the strategy where it does not currently figure. These include:

(a) Addressing the threats. Developing ambitious mitigation strategies, sound adaptation programmes, and building local conflict management capacity will be crucial to prevent and address instability that may arise from the consequences of climate change.

(b) Building security in our neighbourhood. Several countries in the near neighbourhood, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East, are especially vulnerable to the effects on climate change and potential linked instability.

(c) International order: There should be an increased focus here on the need to strengthen existing institutions to promote development and prosperity in the face of climate change in order to avoid future security threats. The international system also has an important role to play, through the UNFCCC negotiations and other institutions in tackling climate change through mitigation and in supporting adaptation.

(d) Policy implications for Europe. In order to properly integrate climate change considerations into the strategy this section should include reference to the UNFCCC negotiations and the need for an ambitious deal on both mitigation and adaptation. It should also emphasise the need to support low carbon and climate resilient development paths for developing countries through integration into EU development and humanitarian policy.
Policy responses

18. DFID is particularly interested in the recommendations once “cooperation with third countries” in the Solana paper. DFID and the UK government are already working in many of these areas.

19. The single most important thing that can be done to support developing countries face the challenge of climate change and linked security concerns, is to prevent dangerous climate change occurring. Successful mitigation efforts, resulting from an ambitious global deal are crucial to limiting the severest impacts of climate change and therefore to preventing conflict and instability. A fair deal for poor people and developing countries will also be crucial in managing tensions in the international governance systems.

20. DFID is developing programmes to support adaptation measures in developing countries. Both the UK and EU should continue to strengthen adaptation mechanisms and ensure that these are conflict sensitive (ie that they understand and anticipate their impact on conflict dynamics). Good adaptation programmes that are participatory, consultative and involve a broad range of people in planning for their own future make an important contribution to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

21. We agree that we should seek to better understand the security implications of climate change. The UK government is already undertaking various pieces of analytical work in this regard, including work with the Met Office’s Hadley Centre, drawing upon their climate science expertise. It is also important that the UK and EU support affected countries’ ability to develop their own analysis of the physical and social impact of climate change, and thus to develop appropriate and sustainable policy responses.

22. It is also important to note that continued support to governance and conflict management mechanisms at all levels (local, national, regional, and international) is the best way to prevent and resolve conflict exacerbated by climate change. Collectively, we already know a lot about what works best for managing conflict in many relevant areas such as water management, pastoralism, and natural resources governance. Future work needs to draw upon existing knowledge and good practice.

1 July 2008

Memorandum by Mr Michael Emerson, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

This is a short submission, in line with the limited importance of the European Security Strategy document, either in its first version of December 2003, or most likely its successor version to be presented by the EU institutions at the end of 2008.

These kinds of exercise have to be put into a realistic perspective. It is certainly desirable that such documents be drawn up from time to time, as an exercise to provide a coherent reference for the EU institutions themselves, for the foreign ministries and diplomatic services of the member states, as also for the EU’s partner states and organisations in international affairs.

However the document is neither legally binding nor an operational text. The 2003 document had the merit of brevity, although this also meant many banal and vague expressions of desirable intent. This is not a criticism of the method, since there is a place for overarching and comprehensive definitional documents. However this is not the format for thrashing out major moves of foreign and security policy in operational terms, since this cannot be done across the board simultaneously at a single point of time on all matters of foreign policy.

Some of your Committee’s questions seem to imply, to the contrary, that the document should be seen as an operational instrument of action. Was it successful? Could it be better implemented? Should its effectiveness be reviewed? Has it contributed to shaping EU policy in various places? Our reply would be “not really”, since the document is more in the nature of a still photo at a certain point of time. And to expect its successor document to be more than that would be illusory.

I have a substantive comment on the question whether the promotion of stability has taken precedence over the promotion of democracy and good governance in the EU’s neighbourhood. The answer is clearly yes. The EU is acting in practice more as a status quo power rather than a normative one, with the singular exception of its enlargement policy, which is itself now on slow or stop.1 In the Southern neighbourhood the EU and member states have backed off promoting democracy or criticising human rights abuses except in the mildest of terms; this in deference to maintaining positive relations with the region’s authoritarian leaderships in the interests of cooperation with security services over terrorism, as well concern for energy supplies. In the Eastern neighbourhood the EU has notably refused the membership perspective incentive for Ukraine’s reform processes, partly out of deference to Russia, partly out of concern for the EU’s absorptive capacity (ie its own internal stability).

The EU’s actual instruments of foreign, security and defence policy have in fact developed quite rapidly over the period since the 2003 document was published. And there are of course many vital issues of EU foreign and security policy to be further developed (relations with Russia, China, the next US administration, world trade negotiations, climate change, EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy etc). But the next European Security Strategy document will no doubt be no more than a well drafted update of the status quo at a rather high and imprecise level of generality. There is no basis today for proposing a drastic change of strategy, only incremental moves as time goes on.

20 June 2008

Memorandum by Mr Andris Piebalgs, Commissioner for Energy, European Commission

REVIEW OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY—ISSUE OF ENERGY SECURITY

In the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003, growing dependence on energy imports and reliance on interconnected infrastructures in energy and transport, inter alia, were recognised as security challenges for Europe.

Since then, the general approach outlined in the European Security Strategy and the policy implications for Europe (more active, coherent, capable, and work with partners) have been encompassed in the Energy Policy for Europe endorsed by the European Council in March 2007.

The Energy Policy for Europe is a strategy to achieve three objectives—security of supply, climate protection and competitiveness. The strategy is based on the combination of action at European and Member States’ levels, solidarity between Member States and an effective European international energy policy speaking with a common voice. A comprehensive Action Plan has been agreed by the European Council for 2007-2009 and will be updated in 2010.

The Action Plan fixes quantified targets for 2020 for energy efficiency and renewables energies, alongside those on greenhouse gas emissions. This highlights the important role of internal action, exploiting the potential for energy savings and developing domestic resources.

The Energy Policy for Europe addresses energy security in both its short-term (crisis prevention and management) and medium to long-term (investments, management of interdependence, transition to low-carbon energy systems) dimensions.

For crisis prevention and management, alongside EU frameworks (Oil Stocks Directive and Oil Supply Group, Gas Security of Supply Directive and Gas Coordination Group), a Network of Energy Security Correspondents has been established by the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Member States (Foreign Affairs and Energy Ministries), to act as an early warning and information exchange tool. A legislative proposal to improve the organisation and effectiveness of emergency oil stocks is in preparation, as is an evaluation report on the Gas Security of Supply Directive.

As regards actions to achieve energy security in the medium to long-term, a well-functioning, well-interconnected internal energy market is at the core of the strategy. Interconnections can diminish the vulnerability of individual Member States to supply shocks. Solidarity is impossible without interconnections. A well-functioning market can be the basis for the development of robust relations with energy suppliers. Such a market, attracting innovation and new market entrants, is essential in the transition to the high-efficiency, low-carbon, diverse energy systems which will be the basis of energy security in Europe and worldwide in the long term.

The development of security and solidarity within Europe will enable the development of a strong common voice in external energy relations. Internal and external policy should not be seen as separate tracks.

As a basis for the updating of the Action Plan for the period from 2010 on, the European Council has asked the Commission to prepare a second Strategic Energy Review. This will focus on energy security. It will be adopted by the Commission in late-October 2008.

7 July 2008
1. To what extent has the European Security Strategy provided a useful tool for addressing the security challenges faced by the EU? To what extent does it inform policy-making in the European Institutions and in the EU Member States? Have the EU Strategy for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other similar EU strategies served as tools for the implementation of the European Security Strategy?

Kuhne I–31) ... the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security and urges, (....) that the EU use the full panoply of instruments at its disposal in defeating the WMD threat, noting in this regard that the possible combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction requires prompt and appropriate action;

Von Wogau 2) ... is concerned about the prospect of renewed arms races at global and regional levels and the ongoing proliferation of conventional arms;

Kuhne I–30) acknowledges (....) the overall coherence of the European Strategy against the proliferation of WMDs, as formally adopted by the European Council in December 2003, with the strategic objectives of the European Security Strategy; notes with satisfaction the work undertaken by the Personal Representative of the High Representative in pursuing the implementation of Chapter III of this Strategy, particularly as expressed in the priority list endorsed by the European Council in December 2004;

Kuhne I–32) ... notes further the congruence of efforts to integrate aspects of non-proliferation within the EU Neighbourhood Policy with the overall strategic objective of building security within the Union’s neighbourhood;

Kuhne I–36) takes note of the current practical difficulties in implementing the strategy against the proliferation of WMDs, due in particular to the various sources and procedures through which budgetary means are to be mobilised;

Kuhne I–33) welcomes the intended inclusion of WMD non-proliferation clauses in all future partnership and cooperation agreements between the EU and third countries, as exemplified by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan of 11 October 2004 as well as the draft Association Agreement with Syria now awaiting approval;

Kuhne I–34) welcomes the fact that the EU’s negotiations with Iran as a regional power, aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, were carried out in connection with legitimate economic and regional security interests; notes that this policy is an expression of foreign and security policy based on the principles of international law and multilateralism in the best interests of the international community; welcomes the fact that the EU and US positions on Iran have come significantly closer;

Kuhne II–27) stresses the leading diplomatic role played by the EU with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme, which not only involves the High Representative speaking on behalf of the EU and the EU3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), but also the United States, Russia and China bringing together different interests and approaches in pursuit of a common goal; reaffirms that the proliferation risks attaching to the Iranian nuclear programme remain a source of serious concern to the EU and the international community; highlights in this regard its resolution of 31 January 2008 on Iran and supports the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1803 (2008) of 3 March 2008 as well as the offer made to Iran by the EU3 and by the United States, Russia and China concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy, political and economic cooperation, energy partnership, agriculture, environment and infrastructure, civil aviation, and development cooperation in the fields of economic, social and humanitarian aid;

Kuhne I–45) expresses its wish for a stronger cooperation with the United States in the fields of non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism; urges the EU and the US none the less to continue with their positive dialogue in these areas and to fully pursue an action plan for further cooperation as reflected in the EU-US Declarations on combating terrorism and on the non-proliferation of WMDs adopted at the EU-US Summit on 26 June 2004; considers that these points should be addressed in the context of all EU-US meetings relevant to security policy;

Kuhne I–38) calls on the countries defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear weapon states, in particular the USA, China and Russia, (....) to review their own nuclear policies in the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; regrets, therefore, the efforts made by the US administration over the last four years to promote research into, and the development of, new nuclear weapons and its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; expresses concern at Russia’s inadequate efforts to protect its nuclear stocks; is alarmed at China’s massive increase in military spending (12.6%), its comprehensive modernisation of its nuclear armed forces and the increase in its imports of modern weapons technologies;
Kuhne II–26) is of the opinion that the 40th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 1 July 2008 must be seen as an opportunity for the EU to promote the need for nuclear disarmament in its Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with a view to the Preparatory Committees for the forthcoming NPT review conference; reiterates its view that this includes the need for the “recognised” nuclear weapons powers to put forward disarmament initiatives, to make Europe a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and to conclude a global convention banning nuclear weapons.

2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy? Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the threats and risks facing the EU? Is there a need for the Strategy to pay greater attention to evaluating and analysing the EU’s sources of vulnerability and dependence, such as on energy supplies?

Kuhne I–1) emphasises that only a comprehensive understanding of the concept of “security” can properly take into account both the influence of issues of political democratic concern (eg violation of human rights, willful discrimination against particular groups of citizens, the existence of repressive regimes) and the wide range of social, economic and environmental factors (eg poverty, famine, disease, illiteracy, scarcity of natural resources, environmental degradation, inequitable trade relations, etc) in contributing to existing regional conflicts, the failure of states and the emergence of criminal and terrorist networks, though the actions of the latter may not be seen as being justified in any way, shape or form by the above-mentioned factors;

Kuhne I–2) welcomes, therefore, the comprehensive understanding of the concept of “security” as expressed in the European Security Strategy (ESS); shares the view expressed within the ESS that key threats to our global security presently include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), unresolved regional conflicts, failed and failing states and organised crime; emphasises that these threats can neither be primarily addressed nor exclusively resolved by military means;

Von Wogau 2) emphasises that the increasing worldwide competition for sources of water and energy, as well as natural disasters and the security of the Union’s external borders, must be included as a strategic objective in the further development of the ESS;

Kuhne II–4) invites the High Representative to assess in a White Paper the progress made, and any shortcomings, in the implementation of the ESS since 2003, including lessons learned from ESDP operations; the link between external and internal aspects of security (fight against terrorism); the protection of borders and critical infrastructure including protection against cyber-attacks; the security of energy supply as a challenge for civilian, economic, technical and diplomatic efforts; unresolved regional disputes in the EU’s neighbourhood, ie Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh; humanitarian and security challenges on the African continent; and the consequences of climate change and natural disasters for civil protection and human security, as well as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; invites him further to evaluate whether those threats, risks and challenges are directly relevant to a broad understanding of European security or whether they merely possess a security dimension;

Kuhne II–5) invites the High Representative to include in that White Paper proposals for improving and complementing the ESS, such as the definition of common European security interests and criteria for the launching of ESDP missions; invites him further to define new targets for civilian and military capabilities (including structures for command and control, and transportation for all European actors in crisis management for both ESDP and disaster relief purposes) and to reflect on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty with regard to ESDP and proposals for a new EU-NATO partnership;

Kuhne I–27) takes note of the following three categories of material deficiencies, which could seriously affect the Union’s ability to conduct both civilian crisis management operations and humanitarian intervention operations of high-intensity dimensions using mainly military means, such as halting humanitarian catastrophes of similar dimensions to that in Rwanda:

(a) lack of deployable forces required for maintaining the rotation needed (one third on deployment, one third on training, one third resting) in such long-term/high-intensity operations;

(b) lack of permanent large-scale airlift capabilities for transporting forces abroad;

(c) lack of sufficient deployable command, control and communications capabilities as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources within the collective framework of ESDP.
3. Should the Strategy place a greater emphasis on drivers of insecurity, such as challenges to the rules-based international system, climate change, competition for energy, poverty, inequality and poor governance? Does the Strategy sufficiently take into account the interrelationship between security and development?

Concerning the first part: see the White Paper tasks above.

Concerning the second part:

Kuhne I–3) draws, therefore, the same conclusion as that expressed within the ESS that a combination of the various assistance programmes and instruments, including those of development policy, at both EU and Member State level, in conjunction with diplomatic, civilian and military capabilities and expertise can best serve to contribute to a more secure world;

Kuhne II–25) welcomes the first ever EU joint meeting of Defence and Development Ministers on 19 November 2007, which was an important step in reviewing the problems faced by the developing world, thus enhancing coherence and consistency in the EU’s short-term actions on security and long-term actions on development vis-à-vis the countries concerned; also welcomes the Council Conclusions on Security and Development dated 19 November 2007, particularly the emphasis placed therein on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity, and strongly encourages the Council and the Commission to implement those conclusions.

4. How successful has the Strategy been in promoting security in the EU’s neighbourhood?

Kuhne I–11) notes the valuable experience gained in civilian and police missions over the course of the last two years, including: the assumption of control by the International Police Task Force (now EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2003; PROXIMA in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia;

Kuhne II–5) White Paper task: “unresolved regional disputes in the EU’s neighbourhood, ie Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh”;

Kuhne I–12) Recognises the significant progress made in expanding the military capabilities of the Union; at the same time notes the importance of the Berlin Plus Framework agreed with NATO, which made the first EU military mission CONCORDIA in FYROM and the ALTHEA mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina possible; acknowledges the advantageous flexibility of the Union’s ESDP framework (…)

Kuhne I–14) Emphasises that the defining characteristic and the additional value of the ESDP lie in the combination of civilian and military components and notes, in observance of the aforementioned accomplishments, that the EU will in future be increasingly faced with the challenge of striking a good and proper balance between military and civilian components in order to fulfil the objectives and the spirit of the ESS; takes the view that the ALTHEA mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina will provide valuable experience in this regard, in so far as the Union will be able to coordinate its military efforts with the civilian operations and programmes currently under way.

5. Does the Strategy make appropriate recommendations on the action the EU should take to address the security challenges it faces? Is there a good balance between short-term and long-term priorities for action?

See answers to questions 2 and 3.

6. In what ways could the Strategy be better implemented? Has the promotion of stability taken precedence over the promotion of democracy and good governance in the EU’s neighbourhood?

Kuhne I–4) Consequently stresses the urgent need for the practical transposition of this concept of the security environment within the existing structures of the Union, so as to enable the Union to detect crises sufficiently far in advance to act in a pro-active manner; in that connection, recommends greater efforts to establish an early-warning system for threats using innovative technologies from the civilian IT sector to carry out news analysis and assessment; expresses its view in this regard that the establishment of “tension detection centres” in regions particularly susceptible to crises, centres which may be set up under the auspices both of the future European External Action Service and of services outside the European Union, such as those of the African Union, would be one of many sensible ways of identifying, reporting on and helping to eradicate the roots of conflicts and thus preventing any violent escalations; stresses further in this regard the importance which it attaches to the integration of conflict prevention and the fight against terrorism as components within all EU policy areas;
the European security strategy: evidence

Kuhne I–13) Emphasises the positive contributions already made by the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN) in combining all available civil, military and diplomatic intelligence to produce cogent background analyses of any given situation; urges the Member States to further intensify their information-sharing with the SITCEN, so as not to unduly hinder the fulfilment of ambitions expressed in the ESS;

Kuhne II–general considerations) A. whereas in 2007 and early 2008 the Council has taken important operational decisions in the field of ESDP and on the implementation of the ESS, including:

(a) the launching of an EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan);
(b) the decision to launch an EU military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA);
(c) the reconfiguration and reduction of EUFOR Althea troops in Bosnia;
(d) the preparation for a civilian EU mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo);
(e) the preparation for an EU security sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau (EUSEC Guinea-Bissau);

B. whereas in 2007 and early 2008 further developments in the field of ESDP capabilities and the implementation of the ESS have been achieved, including:

(a) the adoption of a new Civilian Headline Goal 2010;
(b) the establishment of a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the Council secretariat;
(c) the reaching of operational capability by the EU Operations Centre;
(d) the reaching of full operational capability to undertake rapidly and simultaneously two ESDP military operations using the Battle Groups.

C. (. . .) 2007 and early 2008 have also witnessed continued shortfalls in the fields of ESDP and the implementation of the ESS, including:

(a) the lack of an EU Civil Peace Corps, requested by the European Parliament since 2000, and of civil protection and humanitarian relief capabilities, referred to in a number of Council and Commission documents since the 2004 tsunami catastrophe;
(b) delivery delays and rising costs concerning the much needed long-range airlift capacity in the form of the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft;
(c) an imbalance in the contributions from Member States as regards the staffing of ESDP missions, thus limiting EU crisis management capabilities;
(d) problems in recruiting sufficient police officers for the mission in Afghanistan due to security concerns and a lack of individual career prospects on their return;
(e) delays in the launching of EUFOR Tchad/RCA due to unsuccessful force generation conferences, in particular as regards the lack of helicopters;
(f) the failure as yet to sign the technical agreements drafted between the EU and NATO with a view to ensuring coordination in Kosovo between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the possible future ESDP mission, and in Afghanistan between EUPOL and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), due to opposition by Turkey.

Kuhne II–15) Urges the Member States to regularly review the availability of personnel for civilian ESDP missions and to bring their competent national authorities together in order to set up national action plans with regard to possible contributions, as is the case in Finland, including the creation of procedures to secure the career prospects of participants in such missions and appropriate consideration of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) concerning the representation of women in mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; further urges that specific training be devised with regard to the protection of children, in line with the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict;

Kuhne II–30) Welcomes the proposal from the United Kingdom that information about the availability of helicopters for EU missions be shared, with a view to better coordinating fleets;

Kuhne II–31) Welcomes the Franco-German heavy transport helicopter project, but is also aware of the complex reasons for the shortage of available and operational helicopters, mostly related to the high costs of flight hours and maintenance; invites the Council to explore possibilities designed to bridge the gap for the near future, either by a joint action or by supporting Member States in the refurbishing and upgrading of Russian-built helicopters as well as establishing a helicopter training centre; reiterates that, generally, one of the principal obstacles to modernising and transforming European forces so as to enable them to cope effectively with the security challenges of the 21st century is not the level of defence expenditure but rather
the lack of cooperation, the absence of a clear division of labour and specialisation, and the duplication and fragmentation in arms production and procurement, which increase the risk of non-interoperability between armies; however, urges the Member States to envisage an increase in defence expenditure for the concrete purpose of being able to make efficient use of acquired helicopters;

Kuhne II–32) Calls on the Council and the Commission to keep Parliament informed of current initiatives to address capability gaps in key areas such as helicopters and medical support units, and to put forward joint financial proposals for guaranteed access to such capabilities for both humanitarian and ESDP purposes;

Kuhne II–41) Regrets that the establishment of the EDA came too late to prevent the emergence of three different national programmes on the unmanned air vehicle instead of a single European one, thus enabling some companies to engage in more than one project and thereby to pocket taxpayers’ money several times over, leaving the EDA with no option but to work on the insertion of unmanned air vehicles into the regulated airspace; expresses its preference for a single European satellite project, whether in the field of intelligence or communication.

7. To what extent have the EU's Strategic Partnerships and political dialogue with third countries and organisations, including the UN and NATO, contributed to achieving the aims of the Strategy? Has the Strategy contributed to shaping EU policy and thinking in relation to the United States and other important partners such as Russia, China, India and Africa?

Kuhne II–55) regards the European Union and NATO as mutually reinforcing, and urges close cooperation between them;

Kuhne I—46) notes the continued recognition by many Member States of NATO as the cornerstone of their security in the event of an armed aggression; takes the view that cooperation and complementarity should be the key elements upon which EU/NATO relations are based; proposes in this vein discussions—taking into account the different character of each organisation—concerning improved coordination of national contributions to the NATO Response Force and those of the EU Headline Goals in order to avoid any duplication; urges Member States to continue to reform their armed forces with a view to making those forces more deployable, transportable and sustainable; notes in this regard that for the foreseeable future most Member States will continue to commit the same units to both NATO and the EU owing to the lack of units possessing the right skills and capabilities; urges Member States to continue to enlarge their pool of readily available forces so that in the future the operational needs of both the EU and NATO can be readily satisfied;

Von Wogau 11) emphasises that, in the event of an attack by the armed forces of a third country on the territory of the EU, NATO remains the guarantor of collective defence, but that the EU is expected to act in solidarity and to provide the Member State attacked with all necessary assistance in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter; welcomes NATO’s increasing capability of playing a role in out-of-theatre operations; also regards NATO as the appropriate forum for transatlantic dialogue on security issues;

Kuhne II–8) highlights that NATO is the transatlantic forum in which security concerns are to be addressed by most of the EU Member States, the United States and Canada; nevertheless encourages the Council and the High Representative to take initiatives for a direct security dialogue with the incoming US administration and the Canadian government in fields where the EU has competences; proposes that such a dialogue should concentrate on concrete issues such as increasing the credibility of Western values in the fight against terrorism and stabilisation and reconstruction;

Von Wogau 12) recognises that the capabilities of the Member States’ armed forces and their availability to the EU are influenced by the fact that most Member States are members of both the EU and NATO and maintain one set of armed forces at the disposal of both organisations; demands, therefore, that the EU should continue to work intensively with NATO, especially in the area of capabilities development;

Von Wogau 13) stresses the “strategic autonomy” inherent in the ESS, namely the ability to carry out operations within its scope independently of other actors, which requires interoperability and a more sustainable and reliable supply chain based on mutual support and assistance, avoiding duplication and suboptimal use of scarce resources at European level or between Member States; warns against unnecessary duplication of effort between NATO and the EU, and between the Member States of the EU;

Kuhne I–49) encourages the new European Defence Agency to examine the possibilities for cooperation with NATO in the area of armaments and to explicitly provide for the possibility of such co-operation within the framework of the Administrative Agreement to be signed in due course between the two as provided for in Article 25 of Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency;
Kuhne I–50) takes note of the complementary nature of certain policies and programmes of NATO (Partnership for Peace and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Mediterranean Dialogue) and the EU (Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process); encourages both parties to examine how these programmes and policies can more effectively serve to mutually reinforce each other;

Kuhne II–54) is of the view that the US plan to establish an anti-missile system in Europe at this time may hamper international disarmament efforts; expresses its concerns about Russia’s suspension of implementation of its obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which has caused worries about the strategic balance in Europe; stresses that both issues affect the security of all European countries and should not therefore be the subject of purely bilateral discussions between the US and individual European countries; calls on the Council and the Member States to establish, together with NATO, a framework designed to include as many European countries as possible in the debate; invites the Council and NATO to evaluate estimated future nuclear threats from certain countries and the danger of a new arms race in Europe and to propose an adequate multilateral response to them;

Kuhne I–48) calls on Turkey, in the context of NATO, to create the conditions to promote better cooperation—which is urgently needed—between the EU Military Committee and the relevant NATO bodies;

Kuhne II–53) regrets Turkey’s objections to the implementation of the EU-NATO strategic cooperation based on and going beyond the Berlin Plus Agreement; is concerned about their negative consequences for the protection of the EU personnel deployed, notably EUPOL Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo, and calls for the lifting of those objections by Turkey at the earliest possible date.

8. Is there a need to review the Strategy and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically?

Von Wogau 6) considers that the geopolitical challenges have evolved considerably since the adoption of the ESS in 2003, making its revision necessary in 2008 at the latest; is of the opinion that the ESS should be revised every five years and that it should be debated in the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States.

9 July 2008

Memorandum by Mr Luis Simón Navarro, University of London and Mr James Rogers, University of Cambridge

1. To what extent has the European Security Strategy provided a useful tool for addressing the security challenges faced by the EU? To what extent does it inform policy-making in the European Institutions and in the EU Member States?

It is often overlooked that the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 cannot be seen in isolation, but has rather built on previous European treaties and declarations. Chief among those is the Laeken Declaration of 2001. This represented a distinct paradigm shift, in the sense that the Member States declared for the first time that they wanted the European Union (the Union) to become itself a power in the wider world. As the declaration put it:

What is Europe’s role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others’ languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law.

Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.¹
And although the Laeken Declaration was also the product of a lineage of previous treaties, statements and documents, as well as events (not least 11 September), the declaration nonetheless dug out the foundations for the direction of the contemporary Union. Through branding the Union a “power”, European integration finally transcended its traditional role and purpose of cementing peace between the component Member States, and moved into the traditional realm of “High Politics”. That is to say, since 2001 it has become increasingly involved with providing a decisively European approach to the outside world, in order to protect Europeans from external challenges and threats.

It is in this setting that we should understand not only the creation of, but also the need for, a European Security Strategy, in 2003. Since its publication, the ESS has come to be a point of reference across most European institutions, national ministries, and importantly, academia, think tanks and security and defence institutions. The latter three, dimensions of civil society, are often overlooked in the way in which they shape the parameters of deliberation and debate, particularly when political leaders and civil servants responsible for the production of national or European security strategy attend their numerous events, and read their many publications. There is now a whole coalition of these institutions, and it grows annually. Further, some of the most successful and dynamic think tanks dealing in part or whole with European security strategy, are based in the United Kingdom. Here, the Centre of European Reform and the newly established European Council on Foreign Relations, both based in London, are the best known throughout the European Union. It is in this sense that the road towards European strategic thinking works like a water fountain. It involves a bottom up component: this occurs when struggles between various groups with particular strategic assumptions about the direction of European security strategy compete to crystallise their visions into a European strategic and security culture (much like the water being thrust up the fountain). And it includes a top down component: this occurs when one vision comes to dominate, and is diffused down through the layers of European civil society, the Union’s institutions, and the governments of the Member States (in which case the water, having been thrust up into the air, comes back down again). The ESS should be understood as an outcome of this dynamic interplay, a snapshot of how far it had come by 2003.

Determining the concrete impact of the “water fountain” component, particularly on the existing strategies of the Member States, is a more difficult task. It is seemingly impossible to confirm how national security strategies are becoming similar. The “water fountain” model is not alone, for the Member States’ security strategies could also be a result of spontaneous convergence. Yet we should be careful here: while the degree of spontaneous convergence is in itself quite an illustrative thermometer of the state of the Union’s success in its quest for strategic actorness, we should be reluctant to draw any conclusions. Just because a number of Union Member States start to see the world in a similar light, it does not necessarily transfer into a European approach. Moreover, spontaneous convergence does not automatically mean that the Member States would begin to favour the empowerment of the Union as a vehicle for the realisation of common strategic action. After all, West Europeans shared similar strategic worldviews throughout the Cold War, but that did not mean that their preferences would be transferred from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and towards the European Community. Having said that, spontaneous convergence between the Member States’ strategic worldviews can hardly damage the evolution of either a European security culture or European strategic culture. On the contrary, the growing similarities should only confirm the reasons as to why deeper European co-operation in the realm of foreign, security and defence policy makes sense.

A comparative snapshot of the ESS and the latest strategic reviews of the three biggest Member States can be quite revealing. The following list provides the trajectory:

- 1998  United Kingdom  Strategic Defence Review (MoD)
- 2003  United Kingdom  Delivering Security in a Changing World (MoD)
- 2003  United Kingdom  UK International Priorities (FCO)
- 2006  Germany    Defence White Paper (MoD)
- 2006  United Kingdom  UK International Priorities (FCO)
- 2008  United Kingdom  National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office)
- 2008  France    Defence White Paper (MoD)

Apart from the fact that the three Member States review and update their strategies at varying frequencies, both the ESS and the latest strategic reviews of the Member States make for a very similar reading of the strategic environment: the international system is characterised as evolving towards a multipolar system, while the massive influence that globalisation and interdependence exert upon security are highlighted. There is, consequently, also considerable consensus on the characterisation of security as a multidimensional concept and, therefore, on the identification of the main challenges emanating from the strategic environment: terrorism, failing states, the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), organised crime, energy
scarcity, migration flows, the effects of climate change, the spread of global pandemics and cyber security. From this similar analysis of the strategic environment comes a similar group of policy prescriptions—which may be merely coincidental—in both the European and national strategies. These policy preferences are structured around a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security, which integrates all forms of power. In this sense, all three countries highlight at the strategic level the importance of prevention and globalization, two concepts deeply interrelated. This reflects the ongoing movement away from “defensive defence”, understood as a reactive approach primarily concerned literally with the defence of borders, towards “offensive defence”, defined in the ESS as: “With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad”. These principles are eloquently condensed in one of the flagship recipes for international security in the ESS: “effective multilateralism”.

In this sense the ESS plays a pivotal role as the reference point to all aspects and actors that make up the European foreign, security and defence policy system. However, the European Security Strategy can only be effective if the right conditions for it to take root exist. This is why the implementation and further expansion of the ESS are crucial to its effectiveness, and why it must provide the framework for the development of greater coherence.

2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy? Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the threats and risks facing the EU? Is there a need for the Strategy to pay greater attention to evaluating and analysing the EU’s sources of vulnerability and dependence, such as on energy supplies?

The effectiveness of European security strategy and foreign, security and defence policy will be substantially determined by the Union’s ability to impose coherence. The issue of coherence is an inherently contending one not only in foreign policy, but also the business of politics at large. Nation-states themselves often show a substantial degree of incoherence in their foreign, security and defence policy: competing interests between executive and legislative branches of government (ie these are particularly salient in American foreign policy), within the executive branch of government (it is no secret to anybody that the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office, and the departments of the Treasury, Trade or International Development often pursue contradictory agendas) or even within the same department (ie divergent approaches among the different branches of the armed forces). Incoherence is a fact of life in pluralist societies and pluralistic systems of government: coherence is therefore more of an ideal type than an actual state of affairs. However, the very idiosyncrasy of European foreign, security and defence policy makes (the lack of) coherence a particularly salient problem in the Union’s road towards strategic actorness: a substantial improvement of coherence in foreign, security and defence policy is a must if any enterprise aimed at fostering (common) European strategic thinking is to be meaningful.

The Union’s two-tiered foreign, security and defence policy system makes the lack of coherence between Member States and the Union’s central institutions—but also among Member States themselves—the most substantial and visible obstacle to an effective and credible security strategy. Further, the normal intra-bureaucratic squabbles that are characteristic of any modern polity pose a particularly pronounced problem in the Union’s case: the lack of direct accountability and public scrutiny results in a looser sense of a public mandate that makes inter and intra bureaucratic disputes yet more salient in the Union’s case (ie among the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, intra Commission, etc). To be sure, the Union’s coherence problem can hardly be overestimated.

Beyond the institutional dimension, more coherence is needed among the Union’s general instruments (military, diplomacy, trade, development aid, immigration policy, etc.) and with the more specific initiatives (European Neighbourhood Policy, Barcelona Process, Mediterranean Union, bilateral Union-third state dealings, etc); there should also be more coherence in the Union’s relationship with other international actors, notably NATO—improving dialogue at the strategic level, better coordination of capability generation processes. In the realm of crisis management (the main framework of action of ESDP), recent developments in Afghanistan or Iraq have shown that today’s crises put a premium on coherence between prevention, intervention and post-conflict management. Further down at the operational level, coherence implies a smooth coordination between the Union’s operational tools in the realm of crisis management: coherence between the strategic and tactical dimensions of an operation but also between the military and non-military aspects of crisis management, both at the level of planning and command (the desired Civ/Mil symbiosis) and on the ground (ie coherence between the military, the police and other civilian elements deployed by the EU itself or other actors).

Beyond specific initiatives adopted over the past few years aimed at reinforcing the Union’s coherence (ie the creation of the European Defence Agency, the European Security and Defence College, or that of an Ops Centre in the Civ/Mil Cell of the European Union Military Staff), the process of Treaty reform that has
dominated the past five years provides the best source for assessing the implementation and further development of the ESS. In this sense, the Treaty of Lisbon represents a step in the right direction for it includes elements that are likely to bring a considerable boost not only to intra Union coherence (most notably the improvement of elements of coordination between the Commission and the Council in the realm of European foreign policy), but also among the Member States—through initiatives such as making national officials an integral part of the future European diplomatic service and, like this, making also the European dimension of diplomacy integral to national foreign policy. Further, the Treaty’s emphasis on flexibility provides the means for strengthening the coherence between the Union proper and other European cooperative initiatives in the realm of security (ie the Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euromarfor, Letter of Intent, Occar, etc). The Treaty of Lisbon also incorporates measures that will most likely bring further coherence between the internal and external aspects of security, such as the transfer of many aspects of policing, immigration and judicial cooperation to the first pillar.

Overall, the actions of the Council of the European Union in the past few years are a good complement of the ESS in that many of the initiatives adopted will make it easier to achieve the coherence that the ESS both needs and is meant to generate. More, however, needs to be done. In this sense, many of the proposals regarding ESDP proposed by the French government for its forthcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union are steps in the right direction, namely the need to increase Europe’s autonomous capabilities for effective crisis management (including the creation of a Permanent Headquarters in Brussels for the planning and command of European operations); the creation of a European strategic reserve force of some 60,000 personnel with the required naval and aerial components; a reinforcement of the mechanisms for common funding of ESDP operations; the establishment of common schemes for training European military and civilian personnel; the rationalisation of Europe’s defence industry; an expansion of the Union’s functions in the realm of security beyond crisis management proper (ie common defence, the need to better acknowledge the interdependence between the internal and external dimensions of European security); or the call for a comprehensive European Strategic Defence Review.

The recent French Defence White Book mentioned energy security, not only as a challenge to France, but also the rest of the European Union. The price of energy has risen dramatically over the past five years (since the ESS was issued), with particularly important consequences for an increasingly dependent Europe. This development has largely contributed to the reassertion of Russia’s power: the combination of Russia’s rise and energy dependence results in a myriad of economic and geopolitical challenges for the continent and, arguably, represent the most far-reaching change since the approval of the ESS in 2003. This challenge demands a bold and coherent response on the European Union’s part. First, coherence among Member States in their behaviour vis-à-vis Russia is mandatory; second, progress on a common European energy policy is needed; third, a European effort to stimulate the diversification in the sources of energy, including far greater investment into renewable sources, is also required. Diversification must be pursued through coordination of domestic and international measures: keep up taxes on oil and gas as an incentive to investment on alternative energies, but also further investigate proposals for internationally-supervised production of nuclear energy for civilian purposes (as was proposed by the High Representative). So far, energy exporters like Algeria, Libya, and particularly Russia, have done a better job in coordinating their strategies and efforts than Europeans have. The immediate aim for the Union must be to develop a concerted and coherent approach to energy security. This will provide the Union with far greater leverage over Russia, while simultaneously reducing the forces threatening to permanently derail Russia’s experiment with constitutional government.

If anything, the emphasis on the impact of globalisation and interdependence on the strategic environment (ie the blurring of the line between the internal and external dimensions of security or that between traditional and non-traditional threats) are emphasised yet more in national strategies than they are in the ESS, not least because the former are newer documents and the manifestation of the effects of globalisation and interdependence have grown exponentially over the past few years. One can only expect that the anticipated revision of the ESS in December takes further stock of these and other variations the strategic environment has experienced over the past five years (since the ESS was adopted). For one thing, since the ESS was implemented, the rise of new giant powers like China or India, and of regional powers, such as Russia, has accelerated. There has been a tendency to ignore geopolitical developments in East and South East Asia, which cannot continue given that the enormous flow of trade between countries on the Pacific Rim and the European Union passes through the region. And the growing assertion of Russia on the periphery of our continent adds a new dimension to geopolitics, which was not so pronounced in 2003. Indeed, the resurgence of Russia has become the most urgent challenge for the Union, particularly given the fact that the Union’s authority is reduced with each Russian success. This is further compounded by new European geopolitical imperatives, not least after the refocusing of European interests in Central Asia, the Middle East and the Caucasus after the recent two rounds of European enlargement.
The progressive consolidation of centrifugal forces both globally and regionally will surely complicate effective multilateral solutions to global and regional crises. The 2003 intervention in Iraq has perhaps been the most visible symbol of this failure, but it is certainly not the only case: the inability of the international community to agree upon a common course of action towards Iran’s nuclear program; the failure to prevent violence and chaos in Darfur; the ongoing disputes over the status of Kosovo or other potential crises in Europe (ie Georgia); and the ongoing Zimbabwe imbroglio are only a few examples of the pace at which the international system is evolving. The current evolution of the strategic environment is certainly widening the gap between the concepts of effectiveness and multilateralism. It is in this respect that the European Union’s ability to achieve the right balance between the two, and our ability to rise to the challenge should the international strategic environment turn ugly, depends on the cohesion and coherence of the Union, and ultimately on political willingness to uphold its duties and obligations to behave as a global power.

8. Is there a need to review the Strategy and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically?

The European Security Strategy must, by implication, be a dynamic document, ready to change with the evolving global strategic environment, as well as reflecting the geopolitical desires and strategic requirements of the European Union. Given the diverging preferences for strategic renewal mentioned previously between the United Kingdom, France and Germany, it might be appropriate for there to be a “European standard”, set by the Union itself, and adhered to also by the Member States. That is to say, the renewal or alteration of the Union’s security strategy should be met with a commitment on the part of the Member States to acknowledge the changes and implement them into their own foreign, security and defence policy white papers. So when, as anticipated, in December 2008, a renewed European Security Strategy emerges, the British government, for example, should make public the Strategy and its proposals to the British people. In this regard, it was a profound failure on the British government’s part to not mention the European Security Strategy anywhere in the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom in March 2008. This merely reflects the pre-existing inconsistencies in strategic thought between the Member States and the Union as a whole. Not only would greater publicity accelerate the movement towards coherence, but it would also help with the forging of a European approach when dealing with the wider world, while simultaneously keeping the public informed of European developments.

The timing for the renewal of the existing European Security Strategy could be dependent on a number of factors. In the United States, the preference seems to be to renew the National Security Strategy of the United States with each presidential cycle. Should the Treaty of Lisbon be implemented, it would be desirable for something similar, if only to keep the debate on European foreign, security and defence policy up to date. That is to say, the appointment of a new President of the European Council should correspond with a review of the European Security Strategy, in full partnership with the Union’s High Representative and his or her department. The combination of the two should provide for new political input from the incoming president, as well as longer-term “institutional memory” bestowed by the High Representative. However, should the Treaty of Lisbon not be implemented, in light of the Irish referendum, the need still exists for the Strategy’s ongoing review and development. Depending on the path taken by the Union—which is still uncertain—the precise nature of the changes will be dependent on that path.

Finally, it may be desirable to move away from the concept of “security strategy” per se, and move towards the notion of a European “grand strategy”. While this may be a rhetorical move, and fairly abstract, it also emphasises the point that the European Security Strategy is not only a security strategy, but also a broader strategy for staking out and placing the Union and its interests in the wider world. Its spatial and functional aspects should integrate foreign, security, defence and developmental policies, including space, energy and environment policy—three areas likely to grow in importance in the 21st century—into a comprehensive schema, providing a point of reference for all European institutions, the Member States and the institutions of civil society, like university departments, think tanks and other related institutions. Indeed, it is only by integrating civil society with government more coherently and comprehensively that the European Security Strategy will grow and provide fruit; in this regard, greater consultation should occur during future reviews. The name of the European Security Strategy—“A Secure Europe in a Better World”—might also be altered in the upcoming review in December 2008. Given that a secure Europe is only feasible if the Union is stronger, a better title might be: “A Stronger Europe in a Better World”.

1 July 2008
Notes

2 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s paper has been included because it also included areas concerned with security and geopolitical issues.
3 Ibid.
5 This is especially the case with the presidential administration of George W Bush.

Memorandum by Mr Timothy Othieno, Overseas Development Institute

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy? Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the threats and risks facing the EU?
   
   — The strategy does not mention ways in which it can deal with threats outside its borders—does it have, for example, arrest warrant agreements with fragile and volatile countries?
   
   — The strategy needs to emphasis that not only is the EU’s first line of defense abroad but there is need for the EU to work with governments in those countries where threats emanate and in cases where there is no government, work with actors who share the EU’s values and goals as well as moderates who may not share the EU's goals and values.
   
   — The strategy mentions that enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe, however, Kosovo might prove to be destabilizing; so is the case of the tension between Slovenia and Croatia over Slovenia’s right to fish in the Adriatic sea.
   
   — The strategy is weakened by the fact that it does not highlight contravention of EU decisions by member states over issues such as, say, Western Sahara. In this case, EU members are not in agreement as to how they should address the Saharawi crisis. For example, France, Spain have taken up positions that contradict the European parliament’s position.
   
   — In the policy implications section of the strategy, although the strategy stresses the need to work with partners, there is an even greater need for the EU to also engage with those who do not share similar views with the EU rather than only focus on those who share similar views—cooperation with like and unlike minded states is of utmost importance.
   
   — The strategy needs to be amended accordingly to determine how it will engage neighboring countries that may or may not pose a threat to the EU. The Barcelona Process is a good example of such engagement however, how would the EU engage Russia for example? The strategy also highlights the need for the EU to work towards closer relations with Russia yet recent events over gas and oil supplies, tense Anglo-Russo relations, and Russia’s mining of minerals in the North Pole paint a different picture and casts doubt whether the EU can really engage Russia effectively.
   
   — I think there is a general need for the strategy to focus on building strategic partnerships and engaging with those states that do not share the EU’s values and goals. This is the EU’s major challenge which can be translated into a new opportunity.

2. Is there a need to review the Strategy and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically?

Periodic review of the EU strategy and its implementation effectiveness should be undertaken to keep abreast with changing and emerging threats and challenges. Since threats and challenges transform over time it would be prudent on the EU to keep up with current developments and changes in order to develop effective responses as these “new” threats and challenges emerge.

3. Are there any other issues which should be brought to the Sub-Committee’s attention as part of this inquiry?

   — Within the EU there appear to be pockets of instability, for example, in Belgium and Spain. It would be useful if this inquiry could take into account these two cases and determine how the EU would address these challenges?
   
   — I may have missed it but there is no mention in the strategy how the EU’s “internal disputes” would be addressed. For example what is the EU policy towards Cyprus, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo.
I think that there is a need for the EU to support and develop collective security systems in volatile parts of the world. These systems would not be EU-led but would have more regional ownership and expertise.

The increase in horizontal inequalities (HIS) in underdeveloped and developing countries is a threat that extend to the EU and its neighbours.

There is a need to mention emerging threats such as human and arms trafficking that pose a danger not only to the EU but the world in general.

One important issue absent in the strategy document is that there is a need for the EU to establish an early warning system for both natural and man-made disasters. Such a system could form the basis of the EU’s preventive action strategy.

10 July 2008

Memorandum by the Oxford Research Group

Context

The European Security Strategy, published in 2003, sought to propose a broad strategy for responding to threats to European security. It was established in the context of a relatively peaceful Europe, declaring that:

“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history”.

The Call for Evidence points to the changing international security environment and also a recognition within the EU of issues such as climate change and energy security. It therefore “has decided to review the usefulness of the European Security Strategy and the extent to which it informs policy-making in the European Institutions and the EU member states”.

This note takes as its starting point the 2003 statement, but also recognises the significant developments in UK security policy, especially the new National Security Strategy published earlier this year.

Global Challenges and Global Responses

The European Security Strategy (1) pointed to the major issues of underdevelopment and made some reference to resource security, but it described the “key threats” to European security (as seen in 2003) as:

— Terrorism.
— Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
— Regional conflicts.
— State failure.
— Organised crime.

While all of these issues remain pertinent, Oxford Research Group would argue that they are not necessarily central to long-term European security concerns. Although most military and strategic thinking still relates to states and terrorist groups as being the major problems for the future, there are indications that some of the more thoughtful analysis goes beyond such issues to look at other more significant global trends. In the United States there is at last some concern over the security implications of climate change and some European security think tanks have undertaken studies on future security trends that put some emphasis on socio-economic divisions and environmental constraints. (2) The UK government, in particular, has sought a rather wider understanding of security in its recently published National Security Strategy. While these do represent a degree of new thinking, they are essentially focused on maintaining the security of particular states. As such, they concentrate primarily on the responses required to meet threats and maintain security for the states concerned rather than placing an emphasis on preventing the threats developing in the first place.

Taking a more holistic approach to new challenges tends to be mainly concentrated in some independent think tanks, with some evidence that an approach that is being termed “sustainable security” is attracting attention. (3) This new thinking focuses on three main trends that are together likely to influence international peace and security over the period through to around 2040—socio-economic divisions, environmental constraints and militarisation.
Socio-economic Divisions

The period since the collapse of the Soviet Union has seen the global economic system embrace a market economy mode of operation, with centrally planned economies in retreat. Even China has moved towards a mixed economy and the overall result has been reasonably sustained economic growth, sometimes reaching 8–10% per annum increases in GNP. This impressive overall trend is seriously marred in two ways. One is that major regions of the world have not experienced even more modest rates of growth, including most of sub-Saharan Africa, parts of the Middle East and South Asia and significant parts of the former Soviet Union.

The second trend, which is of even greater concern, is that the economic growth that is being achieved is singularly failing to deliver socio-economic justice. What is happening, instead, is that much of the increase in wealth is being excessively concentrated in about one fifth of the global population, while the gap between that group of rather more than a billion people and the remaining 5.5 billion is widening steadily. The extent of the socio-economic divide is startling and remains largely unrecognised, as does the fact that it has increased markedly in recent decades. The period from 1965 to 1990 was particularly acute—in 1960 the average GNP per capita for the richest 20% of the world’s population was 30 times that of the poorest 20%. By 1995 this had widened to 60 times. More recently, a detailed study from the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), a research and training centre of the United Nations University, has published an analysis of the global distribution of household wealth. By 2000, the richest 10% of the world owned 85% of household wealth whereas the poorest 50% owned barely 1% of the wealth.(4)

The “elite” community is very substantial and is not rigidly concentrated in a few geographical areas. While many of the North Atlantic and West Pacific states have most of their populations among this elite, there are substantial wealthy elites in India, China and Brazil, and most Southern countries have smaller elites. It is much more of a trans-national phenomenon than 40 years ago, but the entire process has been accompanied by substantial and greatly welcome improvements in education, literacy and communications among the majority of the world’s people. This has been one of the major success stories of international development in recent decades but it carries with it the implication that it is far easier for marginalised peoples to be more readily aware of their own marginalisation. The old idea of a “revolution of rising expectations” of the consumer society era of the 1970s now risks being replaced by a revolution of frustrated expectations.

While the most immediate effect of the brutal divisions of wealth and poverty is continual marginalisation, ill-health and suffering, it also leads to insecurity in the form of petty crime and, frequently, a desire to migrate in the hope of an improved standard of living. It can also lead to the development of radical and even extreme social movements, as has been the experience in countries such as Peru, Mexico and Nepal, as well as unexpected reactions in countries experiencing very rapid growth. China has witnessed many thousands of instances of riots and other forms of social unrest in towns, villages and cities away from those few metropolitan centres in which so much of the national growth is concentrated. In India, the quasi-Maoist Naxalite rebellions of the 1970s were thought to have disappeared but they have made a remarkable comeback and now affect a third of all of India’s states. While there are many reasons for the development of radical Islamist movements such as al-Qaida, a very strong element is the perception of marginalisation.

One of the clearest statements of a revolt from the margins came at the start of the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico. On 1 January 1994, a rebellion broke out in the southern Mexican province of Chiapas. It was timed to coincide with the coming into force of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), an agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico that was seen by the rebels as another example of the free market trends that would further marginalise the majority of the people of Chiapas into greater poverty. A rebel source gave the reasons for the revolt:

We have nothing, absolutely nothing—not decent shelter, nor land, nor work, nor health, nor food, for education. We do not have the right to choose freely and democratically our education. We have neither peace nor justice for ourselves and our children. But today we say enough!(5)

Overall, a developing response from the margins does not necessarily involve a revolt from the poorest of the poor—more commonly it is to be found among educated people who do not share in the fruits of economic growth. Nor is it true to describe this phenomenon as a single global movement, even though some movements, such as al-Qaida, do have trans-national aspects. At the same time, the perception of global inequalities feeds into many radical social movements, as does the belief that a small group of countries, led predominantly by the United States and the countries of the European Community, seek to maintain the socio-economic status quo. It is probable that the trend towards radical reaction has some similarities to the global anti-colonial movement of the 1940s and 1950s. There was no single tightly organised international movement, but there was a commonality that was pervasive and strengthened individual components.
Similarly, as anti-elite movements develop, whether rooted in political, religious, nationalist or racial aspects of human identity, one should expect a certain trans-national solidarity to develop, providing considerable empowerment to individual movements.

Environmental Constraints

Although the original Limits to Growth Study of 1971 was widely derided by traditional economists, its central thesis, that the global ecosystem would not be able to handle the increasing impact of human activities within 70 years, has a much greater resonance over 35 years later. In terms both of resource depletion and pollution, it is becoming more obvious that the entire biosphere is now subject to human impact. In relation to resources, there may be problems over competition for gems, some high-value minerals and water, but the major issue is oil, with its extraordinary concentration in the Persian Gulf and the increasing dependence of almost every industrialised and industrialising state, not least those of Europe, on imported oil.

Even more significant as an aspect of environmental constraints on development is the impact of climate change, with a subtle but crucial difference in likely effects now apparent. Until around a decade ago, climate change induced by carbon dioxide and methane releases was expected to have its main impact on relatively wealthy temperate and near-polar latitudes. While the impact might be considerable, these regions had a much greater capacity to adapt and cope than poorer countries of the South. What became clearer from the mid-1990s was that the economically weaker tropical and sub-tropical regions would also be greatly affected. Three impacts were likely. One would be an increase in the severity of tropical storms, likely to have severe impacts on heavily populated coastal cities and on some of the world's most fertile croplands in major river deltas. The second would be the impact of rising sea levels leading to the inundation of such cities and deltas. The third would be the most serious of all—a tendency towards a drying out of the tropical and subtropical regions with relatively more rainfall over the oceans and the polar regions.

The implications of all of these trends on countries badly equipped to adjust and cope, would be considerable, but a “drying out” could be wholly catastrophic. If those land masses that support the majority of the world's 6.5 billion people are likely to dry out over the next 30–40 years, when the population of these regions is already set to increase substantially, then there will be endemic suffering, frustration, a desperate urge to migrate to more tolerable localities—from North Africa to Southern Europe, for example—and intense anger if the response of the elite states is to “close the castle gates”. It is when the trends towards majority marginalisation and environmental constraints increasingly interact that we see a combination of factors that will cause a degree of insecurity that will be far greater in scale than any current issue. Moreover, these are issues of direct relevance to Europe, not just in terms of energy insecurity or much increased migratory pressures but, as was seen in the 9/11 attacks, the capacity for violent social movements to directly affect the security of advanced industrialised states no matter how strong their military capabilities.

What has to be stressed is that this combination involves two very clear trends that have already been sustained for some decades and, at least for now, show no sign of change. The widening wealth-poverty divide and consequent majority marginalisation has developed over at least 40 years, and climate change has accelerated over a similar period. None of the economic policies currently in existence appear to likely to make substantive differences to the wealth-poverty divide, and the responses to climate change, while welcome, remain minimal compared with what is required to curb the trend.

Militarisation

Although global military spending fell at the end of the Cold War, mainly because of the collapse of the Soviet military budgets, there was a transformation in the military outlook of the United States, and to a lesser extent of allies such as Britain and France, to a posture focused on maintaining security in a world of disparate threats—a matter of “taming the jungle”. This trend received an extraordinary boost in the wake of the 9/11 atrocities, leading to enforced regime termination in two countries, and a robust global campaign against the al-Qaeda movement. In essence, the response to 9/11 was the rigorous implementation of what might best be termed a control paradigm. It was led initially by the United States, but with support from a number of Western countries, although that support has weakened in recent years.

Even so, the vigorous military response has been maintained in the face of intense problems, especially in Iraq but also in Afghanistan where many European states are engaged, but the control paradigm will not easily be abandoned. In terms of future instability arising out of an environmentally constrained and economically divided world community, including mass migratory pressures and the rise of radical and extreme social movements, that paradigm will result, at least on present trends, in the securitisation of these issues and a determined effort to maintain the status quo. Much as the war on terror has emphasised the regaining of
control—rather than an exploration of the motives and mindsets of radical Islamist movements together with determined efforts to counter the factors that are ensuring they thrive—so the tendency will be to do likewise in the face of future problems rather than see them as capable of amelioration.

Effecting Change

More than 30 years ago, the economic geographer Edwin Brooks feared a scenario of “a crowded glowering planet of massive inequalities of wealth, buttressed by stark force yet endlessly threatened by desperate people in the global ghettos . . .” While that looks more likely now than then, there are numerous changes in policy that can greatly decrease the risk of such a societal dystopia. Reversing the widening socio-economic divisions will require policy changes in three broad areas:

— One will be comprehensive debt cancellation, given that Southern indebtedness remains a persistent obstacle to development in spite of many fine words and some limited action.

— A second will be a wide-ranging reform of North-South trading relations towards a genuine fair trade agenda, reversing those aspects of the world economy that still date largely from the colonial era and have persistently limited the development prospects of the majority of the world’s people.

— Finally there is an urgent requirement for direct assistance in developing gendered and sustainable development processes that aid the poorest while being environmentally sound.

Preventing the worst effects of climate change will require three forms of action:

— One is that the main polluters, primarily the industrialised states of the North, will need to lead in cutting back carbon emissions to a level far lower than is now envisaged and in a much tighter timescale. Something of the order of 60% cuts by 2020, and 80% by 2030 will be essential, with this to be achieved by a combination of huge improvements in the efficiency of energy use and a much higher reliance on renewable energy resources. The European Community has a pivotal role to play in this transformation. One major effect of such a change will be a markedly decreased reliance on fossil fuels, including oil. Decreasing the dependence of major industrialised states on Persian Gulf oil will substantially decrease the risk of further conflict in the region.

— The second form of action is that countries now engaged in industrialisation will need to be consistently aided to develop forms of industrialisation that have a low environmental impact.

— Finally, even the most rapid transformation of economies away from current impacts on climate change cannot happen in time to prevent a degree of such change. As a consequence, direct assistance will be required to aid communities in the South as they are forced to respond to some degree of environmental impact, including storm intensity, coastal inundation and persistent drought.

Sustainable Security

These approaches embody the principles of “sustainable security”, a concept developed by Oxford Research Group that focuses on a sustainable approach to global security using the long-term resolution of interconnected root causes of insecurity and conflict, with an emphasis on preventative rather than reactive strategies. It has the following features:

— Focus on ordinary people and their needs

A fundamental priority of security policy should be to protect people, their families and their livelihoods. State security is only a legitimate goal to the extent that it promotes human security.

— Address the most serious threats

Security priorities need to take account of the most serious and long-term threats to human security, such as climate change, resource competition, poverty and marginalisation, as well as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other high-tech weaponry.

— Prioritise preventative approaches

The major threats to security should be prevented by removing their causes rather than by controlling their consequences.

— Promote a comprehensive approach

The main security threats interact with one another and therefore solutions must address all the threats in an integrated fashion rather than in a piecemeal or fragmented manner.
CHANGING PARADIGMS

One of the main critiques of the traditionally state-centred approach to international security has been the idea of “common security”, which is predicated on a high level of state cooperation for addressing common problems. It has been paralleled by “critical security studies” which is more directly critical of the state-centred approach and also embraces an emancipatory agenda, not dissimilar to elements of peace research. Also in parallel, there has been the development of the “human security” approach which prioritises the value of individuals, groups and communities.

Sustainable security does no more than combine elements of the common and human security approaches while ensuring that policies adopted build in a capacity for long-term resilience. In the broadest terms, the combination of socio-economic divisions and environmental constraints is the core global security predicament and provides a unique circumstance. Unless current trends are reversed, there is a very high probability of exceptional levels of insecurity over the next three decades and beyond. The traditional state-centred approach will be to prioritise maintaining security by military and related means, with inadequate attention to altering the trends. Sustainable security involves adopting the policies outlined above to do just that. The timescale for the required changes is essentially the period through to around 2015.

While there were indications in the late 1990s of a recognition of failings both in free market globalisation and environmental impacts, one of the main effects of the 9/11 attacks was to reinforce the control paradigm, setting back by five years or more the possibility of embracing the sustainable security approach. At the same time, the first few years of the war on terror have been notable for the systematic failure of the control paradigm. This therefore provides for the possibility of a re-thinking of the paradigm not just as it applies specifically to the war on terror but also to overall global trends. In one sense it is a contest between a very deeply embedded outlook, supported by some of the world’s most powerful lobbies, and a recognition that global security has to be approached in entirely new ways—in effect a paradigm shift.

Three aspects of the current predicament give some cause for optimism. One is the growing awareness of the confluence of environmental constraints and socio-economic divisions as the core drivers of future insecurity. The second is the palpable failure of current security policies since one of the most powerful inducements for new thinking is that the very approach to the war on terror is increasingly recognised as a lost cause. Finally, there is immense scope for the European Community to play a pivotal role in responding to these drivers of insecurity. In a real sense the Community has its origins in some of the visionary political thinking of the early 1950s on the need to prevent a third European civil war. It now has the potential to respond to an even greater issue—a global rather than a continental predicament.

June 2008

NOTES


(2) An example is the work of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, a UK Government defence think tank which has published Global Strategic Trends 2007–2036, (DCDC, The Defence Academy, Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire, 2007).

(3) This section seeks to summarise a more detailed analysis developed by the Oxford Research Group: Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, “Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century”, ORG Briefing Paper, June 2006, Oxford Research Group, London. This was subsequently developed into a short book, Beyond Terror, by the same authors, published by the Rider Books division of Random House, April 2007 and since translated into German, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese.


(6) One of the early accounts of this issue was: David Rind, “Drying Out the Tropics”, New Scientist, 6 May 1995.

(7) Although the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have sounded frequent warnings, they tend to be consensus documents, primarily to ensure a degree of scientific authority. One effect is to err on the side of caution whereas there are indications that climate change is actually happening faster than
predicted by the IPCC. An example is the rate of melting of Arctic sea ice where there are indications that this is, on average, happening at three times the rate predicted by the 18 climate models used by the IPCC. See: Richard A Lovett, “Arctic Ice Melting Much Faster Than Predicted”, National Geographic News, 1 May 2007.

(8) In 1993, President Clinton’s newly appointed Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, characterised the ending of the Cold War by saying that the United States and its allies had tamed the dragon but now faced a jungle full of poisonous snakes. Taming the jungle would therefore be a security priority.


Memorandum by the Quaker Council for European Affairs

1. To what extent has the European Security Strategy provided a useful tool for addressing the security challenges faced by the EU? To what extent does it inform policy-making in the European Institutions and in the EU Member States? Have the EU Strategy for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other similar EU strategies served as tools for the implementation of the European Security Strategy?

One of the more fundamental issues addressed by this question is: what is meant by “security”; the European Security Strategy in its current form lacks any definition of the term and does not describe in any other way what is meant. It is not made explicit whether the focus is the security of the European Union, the Member States of the European Union, European citizens, or whether the security concept is more global in nature and recognizes that security is indivisible. In our view, the strategy needs to recognize that none of us will be secure until all of us (at a global) level are. This, to us, limits the usefulness of the document significantly.

The extent to which EU Member States’ decisions in foreign policy matters are informed by the European Security Strategy is a question that Member States need to address. The EU Institutions—and here we are referring essentially to the Council of the European Union (encompassing both the General Secretariat and the Presidency) and the European Commission—certainly refer to the European Security Strategy regularly; however, and because it lacks a clear vision of what security is meant, it is difficult to then use the document to inform specific action beyond the various capability commitment processes.

The European Security Strategy clearly states that Weapons of Mass Destruction (and no doubt, nuclear weapons are included in this term) are a major threat to the security of Europe. They are, in our view, also a major threat to global security. The European Security Strategy and thus the European Strategy on the Non-Proliferation of WMD however focuses on the threat coming from elsewhere and not the implications for this threat of the fact that EU Member States and their allies have significant arsenals of nuclear weapons—and no doubt some other weapons of mass destruction. A real step forward would be if the EU Member States who are in this position would lead the world by example and commit themselves to the following steps (both at a national and at a European level):

— To dismantle their own nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals and to make this action visible, verifiable and transparent and to refrain from replacing them.
— To ask that all foreign bases on their territory are cleared of any and all nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals and to ensure that the process of so doing is visible, verifiable and transparent.
— To commit themselves to prevent the manufacture and export of any such weapons within and from their territories.

We believe that the lead taken by the United Kingdom in the recent negotiations regarding the ban on cluster munitions shows the impact such leadership can have; a similar and unilateral European step on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would, in and of itself, contribute significantly to global security.

2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy? Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment of the threats and risks facing the EU? Is there a need for the Strategy to pay greater attention to evaluating and analysing the EU’s sources of vulnerability and dependence, such as on energy supplies?

The European Security Strategy outlines a number of key challenges the world faces (including competition for resources, poverty, disease and migration). But the threats which are put at the centre of the strategy are much narrower: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.
We believe that it is important to identify as security challenges (and thus as priorities for action) also those challenges which are at the route of conflict: poverty, inequality, injustice, lack of education, alienation in a globalized world which offers little by way of chances to those who are already vulnerable and deprived. Addressing these underlying issues may do much more for security for people all over the world than some of the approaches highlighted in the strategy.

The EU itself has identified climate change as an international security issue in a paper issued on 3 March 2008; whilst this goes some way to identifying the problems (and this is welcome), the responses are, in line with the European Security Strategy, about affecting the situation elsewhere and not about changing how we do things here.

Generally speaking, the approach taken by the EU and the Member States (and this is also implicit in the formulation of the question above about the “EU’s sources of vulnerability and dependence”) is one of looking at security too narrowly. As we said above, security is indivisible; so long as there are those people in the world who see us as the haves and themselves as the have-nots, there will be no true security for anyone.

3. Should the Strategy place a greater emphasis on drivers of insecurity, such as challenges to the rules-based international system, climate change, competition for energy, poverty, inequality and poor governance? Does the Strategy sufficiently take into account the interrelationship between security and development?

The role of development policies and programmes is barely mentioned; as the biggest provider of aid assistance worldwide, the EU has a responsibility to consider the impact of development programmes and policies on conflict issues; poverty and security are linked and studies demonstrate that reducing poverty can improve conditions of security. The impact of development programmes on conflict issues should be taken into account and evaluated. Conflict analysis should become an integrated part of development programming exercises and they should be regularly updated. A conflict-sensitive approach to development programmes should be chosen, as already required by a small number of EU policy documents. All this should be included expressly in the European Security Strategy.

In fact, Javier Solana recognised this himself when he gave evidence to the special committee set up in July 2007 by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, to draft a white paper on defence and national security for France. He said: “Western countries spend over $1,000 billion on defence and less than $100 billion on official development assistance. Might there be a margin to move towards a certain rebalancing that would be more acceptable to public opinion?” We agree with this statement and we believe that the European Security Strategy should reflect this insight.

4. Does the Strategy make appropriate recommendations on the action the EU should take to address the security challenges it faces? Is there a good balance between short-term and long-term priorities for action?

Whilst the strategy makes it clear that the range of threats faced by the EU (and by humanity globally, we might add) are not “purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means, each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled”, it then goes on to focus principally on military responses. It fails to take full account of the range of tools available to the EU (in both the first and second pillar) and it fails to view security and action to achieve security in a sufficiently broad framework to encompass both long- and short-term priorities for action; it also fails to put the emphasis on long-term action.

It is our view that any external action taken in response to conflicts, post-conflict situations, and crises, should:

- Give precedence to long-term engagement over short-term crisis response.
- Give precedence to civilian and non-military state actors and their approaches over civilian ones.
- Engage local affected populations at all stages of the intervention in order to make solutions sustainable through stakeholder involvement.

The priority objective should be long-term, sustainable peace.

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2 Translation of this quote delivered in French by QCEA.
5. In what ways could the Strategy be better implemented? Has the promotion of stability taken precedence over the promotion of democracy and good governance in the EU’s neighbourhood?

There are important questions relating to implementation of the strategy.

First, there is the question as to how choices are made about where to engage. If this is on the basis of what can be agreed by 27 Member States (ie the type of engagement that none of the Member States have a major problem with in terms of their national interests) then this is too low a common denominator.

Second, there is the question about the evaluation of engagement; is it achieving what it is intended to achieve? How is the impact of engagement measured?

And third, there is the question of the appropriate linkage and prioritisation of pillar 1 and pillar 2 tools. The recent decision in the European Court of Justice in case C91_05 clarifies at least that pillar 1 tools should have precedence over pillar 2 tools and this needs to be reflected in the European Security Strategy to ensure this is implemented in the future. What that judgement means is that “the Court recognises the link between security and development, and, more importantly, the fact that peacebuilding is an important objective of the development policy of the European Union”.

6. Is there a need to review the Strategy and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically?

Not only is there a need to review the European Security Strategy and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically; such review should be in the public domain, involve citizens and be conducted with openness and transparency. The fact that the UK Parliament’s European Union Committee is conducting this exercise of consultation with the possibility of a hearing included is a most welcome step in that direction and it can only be hoped that many UK citizens will make full use of this opportunity. This is an opportunity which, in some form or another, should be open to all EU citizens in all Member States.

In the context of the review of the European Security Strategy the role of both national parliaments and the European Parliament cannot be overestimated.

Beyond that, a systematic review of the effectiveness of the implementation of the European Security Strategy should also include the evaluation of individual missions and other actions taken; this, too, should be done in a systematic way with as much openness as is feasible in the circumstances without putting either EU citizens active in areas of conflict or local citizens in harm’s way.

As it stands, the strategy lacks any kind of methodology for evaluation. There are no benchmarks set. This may well be a result of the lack of clear objectives. To have clear objectives, the strategy needs to start, as we have said above, with a definition of security, an identification of clear indicators which show where insecurity exists, action plans with deliverables to address insecurity, and a regular review mechanism which is inclusive in its assessment (ie where those whose security is being addressed have a say in the evaluation).

More specifically, the review of the strategy needs to take on board the development of new tools within the EU itself to identify how they contribute to the achievement of the strategic objectives. Inter alia these include:

- The new financial instruments for external action.
- The Africa—EU Strategy.

Finally, the specific actions taken in the context of CFSP and Conflict Prevention priorities also need to be evaluated specifically against their intrinsic objectives and against their contribution to the achievement of this strategy. This needs to be transparent, needs to involve civil society and needs to include ESDP missions.

7. Are there any other issues which should be brought to the Sub-Committee’s attention as part of this inquiry?

We would like to conclude by setting out some of the strategic priorities which we would like to see highlighted in a revised European Security Strategy:

- Europe needs a security strategy that recognizes that security is indivisible;

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Europe and European peoples need to recognise their own contribution to global insecurity and address this through:

- An international treaty regulating the trade of arms to stop the spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
- The EU Code of Conduct being made legally binding with sanctions for those found in breach.
- Reductions in arms manufacturing and arms exports.
- Compliance by the two EU Member States who have nuclear weapons with the commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
- Significant increases in official development assistance.
- An EU asylum and migration policy which recognises the needs of refugees and economic migrants rather than starting from the labour needs of the EU.
- An EU compensation payment scheme to third countries to compensate for the brain drain.
- EU action on its own contribution to climate change, reducing our use of energy more radically than can be achieved through efficiency savings,
- A strategic response by the EU to the threat of organised crime which addresses the European dimension; ie for people to be trafficked (be it for work or for prostitution) there have to be markets for such forms of slavery. The EU needs to develop internal policies to make such demands a thing of the past.

26 June 2008