Memorandum by the Quaker Council for European
Affairs
1. To what extent has the European Security
Strategy provided a useful tool for addressing the security challenges
faced by the EU? To what extent does it inform policy-making in
the European Institutions and in the EU Member States? Have the
EU Strategy for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and other similar EU strategies served as tools for the implementation
of the European Security Strategy?
One of the more fundamental issues addressed
by this question is: what is meant by "security"; the
European Security Strategy in its current form lacks any definition
of the term and does not describe in any other way what is meant.
It is not made explicit whether the focus is the security of the
European Union, the Member States of the European Union, European
citizens, or whether the security concept is more global in nature
and recognizes that security is indivisible. In our view, the
strategy needs to recognize that none of us will be secure until
all of us (at a global) level are. This, to us, limits the usefulness
of the document significantly.
The extent to which EU Member States' decisions
in foreign policy matters are informed by the European Security
Strategy is a question that Member States need to address. The
EU Institutions—and here we are referring essentially to
the Council of the European Union (encompassing both the General
Secretariat and the Presidency) and the European Commission—certainly
refer to the European Security Strategy regularly; however, and
because it lacks a clear vision of what security is meant, it
is difficult to then use the document to inform specific action
beyond the various capability commitment processes.
The European Security Strategy clearly states
that Weapons of Mass Destruction (and no doubt, nuclear weapons
are included in this term) are a major threat to the security
of Europe. They are, in our view, also a major threat to global
security. The European Security Strategy and thus the European
Strategy on the Non-Proliferation of WMD however focuses on the
threat coming from elsewhere and not the implications for this
threat of the fact that EU Member States and their allies have
significant arsenals of nuclear weapons—and no doubt some
other weapons of mass destruction. A real step forward would be
if the EU Member States who are in this position would lead the
world by example and commit themselves to the following steps
(both at a national and at a European level):
— To dismantle their own nuclear, chemical
and biological arsenals and to make this action visible, verifiable
and transparent and to refrain from replacing them.
— To ask that all foreign bases on
their territory are cleared of any and all nuclear, chemical and
biological arsenals and to ensure that the process of so doing
is visible, verifiable and transparent.
— To commit themselves to prevent the
manufacture and export of any such weapons within and from their
territories.
We believe that the lead taken by the United
Kingdom in the recent negotiations regarding the ban on cluster
munitions shows the impact such leadership can have; a similar
and unilateral European step on nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons would, in and of itself, contribute significantly to global
security.
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of
the Strategy? Does it provide a coherent and well-balanced assessment
of the threats and risks facing the EU? Is there a need for the
Strategy to pay greater attention to evaluating and analysing
the EU's sources of vulnerability and dependence, such as on energy
supplies?
The European Security Strategy outlines a number
of key challenges the world faces (including competition for resources,
poverty, disease and migration). But the threats which are put
at the centre of the strategy are much narrower: terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure
and organised crime.
We believe that it is important to identify
as security challenges (and thus as priorities for action) also
those challenges which are at the route of conflict: poverty,
inequality, injustice, lack of education, alienation in a globalized
world which offers little by way of chances to those who are already
vulnerable and deprived. Addressing these underlying issues may
do much more for security for people all over the world than some
of the approaches highlighted in the strategy.
The EU itself has identified climate change
as an international security issue in a paper issued on 3 March
2008; whilst this goes some way to identifying the problems (and
this is welcome), the responses are, in line with the European
Security Strategy, about affecting the situation elsewhere and
not about changing how we do things here.
Generally speaking, the approach taken by the
EU and the Member States (and this is also implicit in the formulation
of the question above about the "EU's sources of vulnerability
and dependence") is one of looking at security too narrowly.
As we said above, security is indivisible; so long as there are
those people in the world who see us as the haves and themselves
as the have-nots, there will be no true security for anyone.
3. Should the Strategy place a greater emphasis
on drivers of insecurity, such as challenges to the rules-based
international system, climate change, competition for energy,
poverty, inequality and poor governance? Does the Strategy sufficiently
take into account the interrelationship between security and development?
The role of development policies and programmes
is barely mentioned; as the biggest provider of aid assistance
worldwide, the EU has a responsibility to consider the impact
of development programmes and policies on conflict issues; poverty
and security are linked and studies demonstrate that reducing
poverty can improve conditions of security. The impact of development
programmes on conflict issues should be taken into account and
evaluated. Conflict analysis should become an integrated part
of development programming exercises and they should be regularly
updated. A conflict-sensitive approach to development programmes
should be chosen, as already required by a small number of EU
policy documents. All this should be included expressly in the
European Security Strategy.
In fact, Javier Solana recognised this himself
when he gave evidence to the special committee set up in July
2007 by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, to draft a white
paper on defence and national security for France. He said: "Western
countries spend over $1,000 billion on defence and less than $100
billion on official development assistance. Might there be a margin
to move towards a certain rebalancing that would be more acceptable
to public opinion?"[2]
We agree with this statement and we believe that the European
Security Strategy should reflect this insight.
4. Does the Strategy make appropriate recommendations
on the action the EU should take to address the security challenges
it faces? Is there a good balance between short-term and long-term
priorities for action?
Whilst the strategy makes it clear that the
range of threats faced by the EU (and by humanity globally, we
might add) are not "purely military; nor can any be tackled
by purely military means, each requires a mixture of instruments.
Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked
through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying
political causes are also tackled",[3]
it then goes on to focus principally on military responses. It
fails to take full account of the range of tools available to
the EU (in both the first and second pillar) and it fails to view
security and action to achieve security in a sufficiently broad
framework to encompass both long- and short-term priorities for
action; it also fails to put the emphasis on long-term action.
It is our view that any external action taken
in response to conflicts, post-conflict situations, and crises,
should:
— Give precedence to long-term engagement
over short-term crisis response.
— Give precedence to civilian and non-military
state actors and their approaches over civilian ones.
— Engage local affected populations
at all stages of the intervention in order to make solutions sustainable
through stakeholder involvement.
The priority objective should be long-term,
sustainable peace.
5. In what ways could the Strategy be better
implemented? Has the promotion of stability taken precedence over
the promotion of democracy and good governance in the EU's neighbourhood?
There are important questions relating to implementation
of the strategy.
First, there is the question as to how choices
are made about where to engage. If this is on the basis of what
can be agreed by 27 Member States (ie the type of engagement that
none of the Member States have a major problem with in terms of
their national interests) then this is too low a common denominator.
Second, there is the question about the evaluation
of engagement; is it achieving what it is intended to achieve?
How is the impact of engagement measured?
And third, there is the question of the appropriate
linkage and prioritisation of pillar 1 and pillar 2 tools. The
recent decision in the European Court of Justice in case C91_05
clarifies at least that pillar 1 tools should have precedence
over pillar 2 tools and this needs to be reflected in the European
Security Strategy to ensure this is implemented in the future.
What that judgement means is that "the Court recognises the
link between security and development, and, more importantly,
the fact that peacebuilding is an important objective of the development
policy of the European Union".[4]
6. Is there a need to review the Strategy
and the effectiveness of its implementation periodically?
Not only is there a need to review the European
Security Strategy and the effectiveness of its implementation
periodically; such review should be in the public domain, involve
citizens and be conducted with openness and transparency. The
fact that the UK Parliament's European Union Committee is conducting
this exercise of consultation with the possibility of a hearing
included is a most welcome step in that direction and it can only
be hoped that many UK citizens will make full use of this opportunity.
This is an opportunity which, in some form or another, should
be open to all EU citizens in all Member States.
In the context of the review of the European
Security Strategy the role of both national parliaments and the
European Parliament cannot be overestimated.
Beyond that, a systematic review of the effectiveness
of the implementation of the European Security Strategy should
also include the evaluation of individual missions and other actions
taken; this, too, should be done in a systematic way with as much
openness as is feasible in the circumstances without putting either
EU citizens active in areas of conflict or local citizens in harm's
way.
As it stands, the strategy lacks any kind of
methodology for evaluation. There are no benchmarks set. This
may well be a result of the lack of clear objectives. To have
clear objectives, the strategy needs to start, as we have said
above, with a definition of security, an identification of clear
indicators which show where insecurity exists, action plans with
deliverables to address insecurity, and a regular review mechanism
which is inclusive in its assessment (ie where those whose security
is being addressed have a say in the evaluation).
More specifically, the review of the strategy
needs to take on board the development of new tools within the
EU itself to identify how they contribute to the achievement of
the strategic objectives. Inter alia these include:
— The new financial instruments for
external action.
— The Africa—EU Strategy.
Finally, the specific actions taken in the context
of CFSP and Conflict Prevention priorities also need to be evaluated
specifically against their intrinsic objectives and against their
contribution to the achievement of this strategy. This needs to
be transparent, needs to involve civil society and needs to include
ESDP missions.
7. Are there any other issues which should
be brought to the Sub-Committee's attention as part of this inquiry?
We would like to conclude by setting out some
of the strategic priorities which we would like to see highlighted
in a revised European Security Strategy:
— Europe needs a security strategy
that recognizes that security is indivisible;
— Europe and European peoples need
to recognise their own contribution to global insecurity and address
this through:
— An international treaty regulating
the trade of arms to stop the spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
— The EU Code of Conduct being made
legally binding with sanctions for those found in breach.
— Reductions in arms manufacturing
and arms exports.
— Compliance by the two EU Member States
who have nuclear weapons with the commitments under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
— Significant increases in official
development assistance.
— An EU asylum and migration policy
which recognises the needs of refugees and economic migrants rather
than starting from the labour needs of the EU.
— An EU compensation payment scheme
to third countries to compensate for the brain drain.
— EU action on its own contribution
to climate change, reducing our use of energy more radically than
can be achieved through efficiency savings,
— A strategic response by the EU to
the threat of organised crime which addresses the European dimension;
ie for people to be trafficked (be it for work or for prostitution)
there have to be markets for such forms of slavery. The EU needs
to develop internal policies to make such demands a thing of the
past.
26 June 2008
2 Translation of this quote delivered in French by
QCEA. Back
3
European Security Strategy, 2003. Back
4
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Conflict Prevention Newsletter,
Vol 3 Issue 5, May 2008, accessible at:
http://www.eplo.org/index.php?id=223
accessed on 12 June 2008.
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